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Article

Pathways to Carbon Neutrality: Integrating Energy Strategies, Policy, and Public Perception in the Face of Climate Change—A Global Perspective

by
Artur Pawłowski
1,* and
Paweł Rydzewski
2
1
Faculty of Environmental Engineering, Lublin University of Technology, Nadbystrzycka 40B, 20-618 Lublin, Poland
2
Institute of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Pl. M. Curie-Skłodowskiej 5, 20-031 Lublin, Poland
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Energies 2024, 17(23), 5867; https://doi.org/10.3390/en17235867
Submission received: 12 October 2024 / Revised: 27 October 2024 / Accepted: 20 November 2024 / Published: 22 November 2024
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Green, Low-Carbon and Sustainable Development)

Abstract

:
The significance of the research presented in this article lies in its comprehensive view of global efforts to achieve carbon neutrality, integrating technological, policy, and social aspects. The urgent need to address climate change requires the development of renewable energy sources, technological innovations, and public engagement in shaping climate policies. This article presents an interdisciplinary approach, combining scientific data on carbon dioxide emissions with public opinion research. It highlights the need for global cooperation, emphasizing that the responsibility for achieving carbon neutrality extends beyond governments to entire societies. The analysis includes empirical findings from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), providing insights into public perceptions of climate change and their influence on climate policies. The key findings of the research indicate that accelerating the development of renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind energy, and implementing carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies are crucial. Public opinion plays a vital role in the success of these initiatives. The article demonstrates that international cooperation, particularly in supporting developing countries, is essential to overcoming barriers to the adoption of renewable energy. Ultimately, achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 is possible, but it requires not only technological innovations but also public support and coherent climate policies at both global and regional levels.

Graphical Abstract

1. Introduction

Climate change is widely regarded as the most significant threat to the global environment in the 21st century [1,2]. These disturbances translate into tangible and often devastating consequences for both the natural environment and human societies. For instance, the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, such as heatwaves, storms, floods, and droughts, have markedly increased, leading to substantial economic losses, environmental degradation, and human suffering [1,3]. One of the primary drivers of climate change is the anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs), particularly carbon dioxide (CO2). The burning of fossil fuels for energy, deforestation, and various industrial processes release significant amounts of CO2 into the atmosphere, enhancing the greenhouse effect and leading to global warming [4].
The global community has recognized the urgent need to address climate change, culminating in the Paris Agreement of 2015. Most nations committed to limiting global warming to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, with efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C. Achieving carbon neutrality by around 2050 is a critical target for this endeavor, necessitating widespread adoption of renewable energy sources, significant improvements in energy efficiency, and innovative solutions such as carbon capture and storage technologies [5].
Recent research on carbon neutrality highlights the critical need for integrating energy policies, developing low-emission technology, and collaboration between the public and private sectors. In this context, Hashemizadeh, Ju, and Zareian [6] emphasize the key role that government support can play in accelerating the development of renewable energy. Their dynamic model shows that well-designed policy interventions can significantly speed up the energy transition, which is essential for achieving global climate goals. Similarly, Liu and colleagues [7] underline the importance of collaboration between the public and private sectors, arguing that this synergy is crucial for the effective deployment of low-emission technologies. Public and private investments in these technologies are essential to the success of carbon neutrality efforts.
This collaboration and policy support are also essential in China, as Zhang and Chen [8] demonstrate. Their research on China’s energy transition shows how important it is to combine climate goals with long-term economic development. The authors argue that the success of achieving carbon neutrality in China depends on integrating climate policy with economic priorities. Further insight into these global processes is provided by Wu and Tian [9], who discuss how international climate policy changes are playing a critical role in shaping decarbonization pathways. Their analysis illustrates how policy revisions can support long-term carbon neutrality goals, particularly through international cooperation.
The European context is explored by Capros et al. [10], who analyze energy system models in the European Union, focusing on the integration of the industrial, transport, and energy sectors. Their research suggests that the EU’s success in achieving climate neutrality will depend on effective decarbonization across all sectors of the economy, not just the energy sector. Similarly, Evro, Oni, and Tomomewo [11] investigate how hydrogen technologies could contribute to decarbonizing industries and transport. Hydrogen, they argue, has the potential to become a key element in emission reduction strategies across multiple sectors.
From a social perspective, Mahoney [12] addresses the challenges of combining climate policy with energy poverty alleviation. His research shows that it is necessary to harmonize social goals with climate efforts to avoid conflicts of interest and ensure a fair energy transition. This complex issue is also addressed by Wei and Chen [13], who review different emission management strategies in the context of carbon peaking. They stress that carbon neutrality must be a central element of emission management strategies, not only in developed countries but also in developing nations.
These studies illustrate the complex process of achieving carbon neutrality. It involves not only technological advancements but also social, political, and economic factors. Collaboration between sectors and government support for innovation are critical for a successful worldwide energy transition.
This article fills an important research gap by integrating public opinion and societal engagement into the broader discussion of technological and policy-driven solutions for achieving carbon neutrality. While many existing studies focus either on the technological aspects of renewable energy development or on the role of policy in shaping energy transitions, this paper emphasizes the often-overlooked dimension of public perception and its crucial role in the success of climate policies.
Specifically, this article bridges the gap between scientific advancements and the need for public engagement by using data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) to show how societal attitudes toward climate change can influence both policy formation and the adoption of renewable technologies. By focusing on how public opinion impacts national and global climate strategies, the authors address the need for a comprehensive approach that includes not only technological innovation and policy support but also societal acceptance and behavioral changes.
This article contributes to filling a gap in the literature by emphasizing that the path to carbon neutrality requires not only scientific and technological solutions but also active public participation and support, making it an interdisciplinary approach that incorporates social science perspectives alongside technical and policy analyses.
Addressing the multifaceted issue of climate change requires not only scientific and technological interventions but also an understanding of public opinion, which plays a crucial role in shaping policy and driving the societal change needed for achieving full carbon neutrality. Therefore, this article is structured into two indispensable parts. The first part delves into the scientific literature on climate change, examining the current state of global carbon emissions, efforts towards achieving carbon neutrality, and the role of renewable energy in mitigating climate impacts. This section provides a comprehensive overview of the challenges and opportunities in combating climate change. The second part of the article presents empirical findings from public opinion research, emphasizing the importance of societal perceptions and attitudes towards climate change. Public opinion influences policy agendas, educational efforts, and consumer behaviors, making it an essential component of effective climate action.
This paper aims to address several research questions:
  • What are the key technological advancements and policy changes necessary to achieve global carbon neutrality around 2050, considering regional differences and the roles of emerging economies?
  • What are the primary barriers to the adoption of renewable energy technologies globally, and how can international cooperation and partnerships effectively address these challenges?
  • How do social inequalities affect the impacts of climate change on vulnerable populations, and what policy interventions can promote equity in climate resilience?
  • How do public perceptions of climate change vary across countries, and how do these perceptions influence national and global climate policies?

2. Materials and Methods

This article aims to offer a holistic understanding of the climate change challenge and the necessary pathways to address it, highlighting the intersection of energy, policy, and public engagement.
The research presented in this article employs a mixed-methods approach, combining both quantitative and qualitative methods to provide a comprehensive understanding of the climate change challenge and the necessary pathways to address it, highlighting the intersection of energy, policy, and public engagement.
First, we analyze the available statistical data on carbon dioxide emissions and the level of development of renewable sources of energy on the global level in the last few years. The primary research method used in this section is the quantitative analysis of statistical data on CO2 emissions and the development of renewable energy sources at both global and regional levels. These data were sourced from reliable organizations, such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) and other international institutions that monitor greenhouse gas emissions and analyze energy trends.
The quantitative research covered the following aspects:
  • CO2 Emissions Trend Analysis: This part examines historical data on CO2 emissions in selected countries, such as China, the USA, India, Russia, and Japan. The focus is on the dynamics of emission changes over recent years (2022–2023) and forecasts for the future.
  • Renewable Energy Development: Data on the growth of production capacity from renewable energy sources (e.g., solar, wind, and hydro) were analyzed. This includes technological advancements in energy storage and the development of hydrogen technologies.
The data were collected from international reports and scientific articles, providing detailed insights into emission levels and renewable energy developments. The analysis aimed to identify the major regions contributing the most to emissions and those achieving the greatest success in reducing emissions through innovative energy solutions.
The next part of the research focuses on a qualitative analysis of climate policies and strategies implemented by various countries and regions to achieve carbon neutrality. A literature review was conducted using the Web of Science database.
The qualitative research covered the following aspects:
  • Literature Review: A systematic review of the literature was conducted in the Web of Science database to examine how different countries approach the realization of carbon neutrality goals. The review covered scientific articles published between 2019 and 2023. Key search terms included “carbon neutrality” and “carbon neutral”. The review comprised 12,589 articles, with a focus on major economies that are also the largest polluters: China, India, the European Union, the United States, Africa, Japan, and Russia.
  • Analysis of Climate Policies: This study compared the approaches of different countries regarding carbon neutrality. This analysis included a comparison between countries that pledged to achieve carbon neutrality before 2050 and those that set later targets (e.g., China—2060 and India—2070). Focus was also placed on regional strategies, such as the European REPower EU plan.
  • Regional Case Studies: Example case studies examined the challenges and progress of China, India, the United States, and the European Union. This study analyzed their technological and political approaches in the context of limitations related to infrastructure, resources, and demographics.
By combining both quantitative and qualitative analyses, this study provides a better understanding of the path to carbon neutrality, considering both hard data on emissions and technology development as well as more nuanced political and social aspects. The triangulation of data helped to validate information gathered from various sources, enhancing the reliability of the results.
The sociological part of this article is based on data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), one of the largest and longest-running research projects in the social sciences, covering more than 50 countries.
The analysis uses a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative and qualitative research to provide a comprehensive understanding of public opinion on climate change and environmental issues, as well as social inequalities related to these challenges. Additionally, this section includes a literature review on the topic of social inequalities in the context of climate change, which adds context and depth to the data analysis.
Quantitative methods used in this study involve analyzing survey results from the ISSP, where respondents from various countries answered questions about climate change and key environmental issues. These data allow for a comparison of public opinion across different regions of the world.
The quantitative research covered the following aspects:
  • Statistical Data Analysis: The data obtained from the ISSP surveys provide quantitative information on the perception of environmental problems, such as climate change, air and water pollution, and other significant issues. Statistical analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS 28 software, allowing for the comparison of responses between countries and the identification of global trends in the perception of these issues. Key questions focused on the most important environmental problems, opinions on the causes of climate change, and the assessment of its impacts both nationally and globally. This analysis allows for the identification of regional differences in the perception of environmental challenges.
  • Data Representativeness: The results are representative of the populations of the countries where the surveys were conducted, thanks to the use of random sampling methods and multi-stage sampling. Sample sizes ranged from 1000 to 3000 respondents per country, allowing for conclusions about public attitudes toward environmental issues in different regions.
The qualitative research in this part is based on the interpretation of the quantitative data collected, as well as the socio-cultural context that influences the perception of climate issues in various regions. Additionally, this section includes a literature review on the connections between social inequalities and climate change, enriching the analysis of survey data.
The qualitative research covered the following aspects:
  • Literature Review on Social Inequalities: This section includes a literature review focusing on the relationship between climate change and social inequalities. Key studies highlight that marginalized populations, particularly in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change due to limited resources and a lack of adaptive capacity.
  • Qualitative Analysis of Regional Differences: As part of the qualitative research, an analysis of regional differences in the perception of climate issues and social inequalities was conducted. For example, in developed countries such as Germany and the USA, residents may be more inclined to view climate change as a critical issue, while in developing countries such as India or Russia, awareness of climate issues may be lower. These differences are influenced by variations in education levels, media access, and experiences with the direct effects of climate change.
The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods provided a more comprehensive understanding of the perception of climate issues and social inequalities across different parts of the world. Data triangulation allowed for the verification of results from different sources, increasing the reliability of the conclusions. The mixed-methods approach offers a better understanding of how public opinions can influence the effectiveness of climate policies and how policymakers can tailor their strategies to be more socially acceptable.
The use of a mixed methods approach is justified by the complexity of the climate change issue, which encompasses both technical and social dimensions. The analysis of CO2 emissions and the development of renewable energy sources required quantitative data to assess technological progress and changes in emissions across various countries. On the other hand, qualitative research provided deeper insights into the political and social challenges related to the implementation of these technologies and public responses to climate change and social inequalities. This approach allows for the integration of objective data with a contextual understanding of policies and social attitudes, offering a comprehensive assessment of the issue.
Below is a closer description of the ISSP Environment project.
The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is one of the most significant research projects in the field of social sciences. It was initiated in 1984 by four countries: Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the USA. The ISSP aims to develop and implement annual survey research on critical social issues such as equality, the role of government, national identity, health, family, religion, and the natural environment [14]. The ISSP is unique because its primary objective is to enable cross-cultural comparisons through the standardization of methodologies and research instruments. This standardization allows the results of surveys conducted in various countries to be directly comparable. Currently, the ISSP comprises over 50 countries, making it one of the most extensive and diverse research projects in terms of participation worldwide. ISSP surveys are based on standardized questionnaires developed by international teams of experts. Each thematic module is prepared every few years, allowing for the tracking of social changes over extended periods. The questionnaires are translated into the national languages of participating countries, with significant emphasis placed on maintaining the equivalence of translations.
The latest edition of the ISSP’s ‘Environment’ module, conducted in 2020, offers valuable insights into public attitudes towards climate change. The module covers topics such as the perceived seriousness of climate change, its potential causes, and the actions taken by individuals and governments to address environmental problems. The sample sizes varied by country, which is a standard practice in such comparative studies. The average sample size typically ranged from approximately 1000 to 3000 respondents per country (details regarding the sample sizes of individual countries are shown in Table 1). It should be emphasized that the selection of countries studied and the results presented here were dependent on the ISSP and are not the choice of the authors of this article.
ISSP studies employ sampling methods designed to ensure data representativeness. ISSP typically relies on national population registers where available. In cases where these registers are inaccessible, alternative reliable databases often include government records, electoral rolls, census data, or comprehensive national databases from public or private institutions that maintain accurate demographic information. In some countries, multi-stage sampling methods are used, where regions or administrative units are randomly chosen in the first stage, followed by the selection of individual respondents.
The ‘Environment’ module is a key component of ISSP research, focusing on attitudes and beliefs related to environmental protection. This module aims to understand how people in different countries perceive environmental problems, the actions they take to address them, and their expectations of government policies in this area. The module includes, among other topics, research on climate, concentrating on the extent to which respondents consider climate change a serious threat and their views on the causes of these changes [15].
In the analyses, respondents’ answers to four questions from the ‘ISSP 2020—Environment IV Final Source Questionnaire’ [15] were used. The topics addressed the following issues: (1) Most important environmental problem for the country as a whole, (2) Opinion on climate change and potential causes, (3) Assessment of impacts of climate change on the country, and (4) Assessment of impacts of climate change on the world (and a comparison with the impacts on the respondent’s country) [16].
The ISSP allows access to raw databases available, among others, in the IBM SPSS format. The data analysis presented in this article was conducted using IBM SPSS. The ISSP survey results offer a comprehensive examination of global public opinion regarding environmental issues. These data reveal crucial insights into how different societies perceive the urgency and importance of various environmental challenges. In particular, it highlights how public opinion on these issues varies across countries and cultures, reflecting diverse priorities and levels of awareness.
Understanding these perspectives is essential for shaping effective environmental policies and actions that resonate with the public. By exploring the survey’s findings, we can identify which environmental issues are seen as most pressing by different populations, thereby guiding policymakers in tailoring strategies that address both local and global environmental concerns. The subsequent section delves into the most important environmental issues identified in the survey, providing a detailed look at the global public’s environmental priorities and opinions regarding climate change.

3. Technological and Policy Conditions for Carbon Neutrality—Global and Regional Perspectives

3.1. Technological and Policy Analysis

The current concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is the highest it has been for at least the last 800,000 years [1]. Before people began to use coal on an industrial scale (i.e., before the industrial revolution), almost all CO2 emissions were from natural sources, and natural carbon sinks (such as oceans and vegetation on land) were sufficient to absorb these [17]. Today, such natural sinks can accumulate only one-third of total carbon dioxide emissions, with most of the rest contributing to global warming and climate change [17]. As the International Energy Agency [18] highlights, global CO2 emissions are still growing. In 2023, they were 1.1% higher than in 2022 (an increase of 410 Mt) and reached a new record of 37.4 billion tons. The previous year was also record-breaking, with emissions 1.3% higher than in 2021 (an increase of 490 Mt). Of course, 2022 and 2023 are still quite far away from 2050, but how can we judge the current situation? The estimation from the IEA [18] shows that, without the development of renewable sources of energy, carbon dioxide emissions could increase three-fold from present levels. Table 2 presents the levels of CO2 emissions from the world’s major economies.
In the cases of advanced economies, carbon dioxide emissions fell in 2023 by 4.5%. At the same time, total emissions from China are higher than the total emissions from advanced economies and are growing. In 2013, it was 15% higher than in 2020. It is worth adding that this trend applies to the whole of developing Asia, which is now responsible for half of global emissions (two-fifths in 2015 and one-quarter in the year 2000) [18]. Emissions are also growing in India, Russia, and Brazil [18]. In both the USA and the European Union, emissions are decreasing. In the case of the USA, it was a decrease of 0.6 Gt, and in the European Union, it was a decrease of 0.5 Gt (compared with 2022) [18]. A unique period was during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. During the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, full lockdowns were introduced in most countries around the world. Air quality became much better and CO2 emissions radically decreased, but the effect was only temporary [19,20,21].
To lower CO2 emissions, most countries in the world agreed to become carbon neutral by approximately 2050 [22]. This is in compliance not only with the already mentioned Paris Agreement but also with the basic program for the future, as accepted by the United Nations in 2015 as one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. Action for the climate is goal number 13 and it is strongly connected with goal number 14: Life below water and goal 15: Life on land [22]. Renewable sources of energy are underlined in goal number 7: Affordable and clean energy, which is connected with goal number 9: industry, innovation, and infrastructure, as well as number 8: Decent work and economic growth [17] (UN 2015). Since achieving carbon neutrality is not only the duty of governments but every citizen in every country, we should also mention goal number 12: Responsible consumption and production [23].
However, on the road to carbon neutrality, there are important differences. Some countries have pledged to become carbon neutral earlier than 2050, but other countries have decided that this path will take longer. The following table presents the target years of various countries for carbon neutrality:
  • 2029: Finland
  • 2030: The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Slovak Republic, Romania
  • 2033: Slovenia, Czechia
  • 2035: Poland
  • 2038: Germany, Bulgaria
  • 2050: USA, Great Britain, West Africa, Japan, Republic of Korea
  • 2060: China, Saudi Arabia
  • 2070: India
It is important to highlight that the two countries with the biggest population on Earth, China and India, have decided to achieve carbon neutrality, respectively, 10 and 20 years after the 2050 limit. It is also important to note that the countries that pledged to achieve carbon neutrality earlier are members of the European Union. This is because of the radical policy introduced in this region. Currently, the most important European strategy is called REPower EU, which was introduced by the European Commission in 2022. It is worth underlining that this strategy was prepared not only because Europe wants to be green but mainly as the answer to the war in the Ukraine, as it will end the EU’s dependence on the import of fossil fuels, especially gas and oil, from the Russian Federation. In this context, diversification of sources is a must [24]. The strategy also sets the ambitious target of achieving 45% energy production from renewable sources of energy in the Community in 2030 (the previous goal achieved in 2020 was only 20%). However, introducing more renewable energy may not be enough to achieve carbon neutrality. That is why, among the pillars of the REPower EU plan, we may also find energy savings, better energy efficiency, and smart investments for promoting innovations and new technologies, such as energy storage and developing hydrogen technologies [24].
Of course, it is difficult to predict what the world will look like in 2050, but it is easier to observe current trends. As we discussed in the previous section, most of the countries in the world pledged to be carbon neutral. Nevertheless, as it was shown, CO2 emissions are still growing. We found that most of the papers on carbon neutrality are on very narrow issues: a single technology or one branch of industry. However, there are also papers that are trying to forecast the possibility of achieving carbon neutrality on the level of single countries, groups of countries, or even on the global level.
Holechek et al. [25] explored global decarbonization, focusing primarily on the expansion of renewable energy sources. The authors developed nine scenarios and seven pathways to carbon neutrality. They confirmed that, although all renewable sources of energy are important, two have the biggest potential: wind and solar. According to this research, carbon neutrality is achievable by 2050 if energy demand increases by no more than 50%, which requires an annual growth of energy production from renewables of 8-fold. However, it may only be 6-fold if we double the use of nuclear energy and still use limited amounts of fossil fuels, with the help of carbon and capture technologies.
Schreyer et al. [26] explored industrialized major economies. The findings are that all of them have the technological ability to become carbon neutral by around 2050. However, much more could be achieved if they were not acting independently but instead cooperating with each other to share regional experience, technology, and carbon-free fuels.
Dai et al. [27] present another proposal of cooperation for achieving carbon neutrality, on a smaller scale, between the two biggest economies in the world: the USA and China. Despite the visible tensions between these two countries in the last few years, the two powers can do more together than alone and may become world climate leaders. This cooperation should not only include renewable energy technologies but also technological exchange and common research and development projects, leading to a reduction in energy demand, common policies, a reduction in CO2 emissions outside of the energy sector, the development of carbon sequestration technologies, better energy efficiency, and the electrification of transport.
Therefore, achieving global carbon neutrality is possible, but it will not be easy. In this case, developing renewable sources of energy is a must as it will be much faster.
The IEA [17] showed that 2023 was the 22nd year in a row where new additional capacities from renewables were record-breaking: an additional 510 GW were installed, which is a 50% increase between 2022 and 2023. However, not all sources of renewable energy are developing rapidly. The most popular is water energy; however, most of the new capacities were achieved mainly in the field of solar and wind energy. In the case of solar energy, new capacities installed reached 374.9 GW in 2023. The most successful country was China. In 2023, the new solar capacities installed in this country were as high as all the solar installations from other countries in 2022 [17]. In the case of wind power, we noticed a new record in 2023, with an increase of 117 GW, which is 50% more than the year before. Again, China is the leader, with a 66% increase from the year before [28]. The current level of development of renewable sources of energy is presented in Table 3.
The development of solar and wind energy is impressive, but is it enough? Unfortunately, the IEA is proving that the goal of carbon neutrality by around 2050 cannot be achieved at the current rate of development of renewable sources of energy [17]. However, taking into account the current rapid development and possible changes in technological efficiency (especially in the context of solar energy), we are not without a chance. However, it also requires a large amount of support for developing countries [29].
Numerous challenges and opportunities await us in the pursuit of these goals. First of all, there are important limitations in the development of renewables.
Among them, we mention the following environmental and technological problems:
  • Land availability. For example, if the current electricity demand of the USA is to be fulfilled by solar and wind farms, these power plants should cover one-third of its continental territory [30].
  • Renewable technologies need materials such as metal ores. For example, wind turbines are built from iron and copper, which are limited resources [25,31].
  • Production of renewable energy, especially from the sun and wind, is unstable and depends on the weather conditions. It needs the development of better energy storage technologies [32].
  • To obtain a stable energy supply, many countries also want to develop nuclear power [33].
  • Secondly, renewable sources of energy are the main, but not the only, way to achieving carbon neutrality:
  • We should put pressure on better efficiency. Technological improvements can reduce energy use per capita by 50% in the next 30 years. However, for now, it relates only to developed countries [24].
  • For this transition time, we should also develop carbon capture and storage technologies [34].
  • There are high hopes for the development of other technologies, particularly hydrogen [34,35,36], biofuels, and synthetic fuels [37].
  • We must also not forget that the energy sector is the main but not the only source of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions. Agriculture is also very important. Here, entire food systems require change, more efficient fertilizer control is needed, and methane reduction emissions from animals are also important, as well as new biotechnologies [36].
Finally, social issues:
  • First of all, demography. Currently, birth rates are highest in poor countries. There are now 8 billion people, and in 2057, there will be 10 billion. By the end of the century, there will be 12 billion [38]. They will need resources and energy.
  • Poverty. In 2022, 712 million people were living in extreme poverty, most of them in Africa. They cannot afford not only renewable sources of energy, but even their survival is at stake [39].
  • Wars. In 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic, we witnessed outbreaks of war in more than 20 countries, mostly in the Third World. These conflicts affected approximately 850 million people. Some are perennial. The civil war in Yemen, ignited by insurgents from the Shiite Hutu movement, broke out in 2014 and continues to this day. In 2021 alone, 22,000 people died as a result of it. At the same time, 16 million people lived on the brink of starvation [40]. The consequences of ongoing wars in the Ukraine and in the Middle East are now totally unpredictable.
Therefore, there are quite a lot of challenges that must be solved, but it is possible. A blueprint for achieving this is presented by different strategies implemented in different parts of the world, especially among the biggest polluters. We will analyze this in the next section.

3.2. Carbon Neutrality—Regional Perspectives

We will begin with China and India for two important reasons. First of all, these two countries have the biggest populations in the world, accounting for almost half of the people living on the Earth. In the case of China, another important factor is also its impressive economy and industrial production.
China is supposed to become carbon neutral by 2060. This is a very difficult task, since currently, China is developing all sources of energy, including coal-burning power plants, nuclear power, and hydrogen and renewable sources of energy [41]. Zhang et al. [42] show that carbon dioxide emissions in China will rise until 2030 but will decrease later and this country will achieve—as declared—carbon neutrality in 2060. The most important reason why this process will take longer than in most other countries is that, currently, as much as 85% of energy in China is from fossil fuels and the industrial production level is very high [43].
In the work by Tan and Uprasen [44], the authors are putting pressure on the development of renewables, but also show that reducing income inequality should be taken into account when promoting the consumption of renewable energy sources. Indeed, wealthier people could be more interested in energy sources that they can afford. Zeng et al. [32] underline solar energy but also show that carbon neutrality in China cannot be reached without developing nuclear power.
Xu et al. [41] suggest that China may achieve carbon neutrality in 2050, or even in 2040, instead of 2060. Apart from technological issues, the authors also highlight improving the management of economic development. Therefore, even if China is the biggest global carbon dioxide polluter, the country has already set ambitious targets for decarbonization, with the possibility of achieving this earlier than pledged.
In the case of India, the road to carbon neutrality is supposed to take longer. As Uche states, although the country pledged to cut CO2 emissions by 50% until the year 2030, the total withdrawal from coal is planned to take until 2070 [45]. The challenge here is that it has the biggest population out of all the countries of the world, as well as a huge dependency on fossil fuels: 75% of energy in India is from fossil fuels [45].
Behera et al. [46] concentrated on renewable sources of energy as the main pathway to carbon neutrality. As Mukherjee et al. [47] state, apart from renewable sources of energy, the road towards a cleaner environment is also possible through coal gasification and carbon capture and storage technologies. Vats and Mathur [37] also highlight energy efficiency and the use of decarbonized fuels, mainly green hydrogen but also bioenergy. The authors also underline the problem of heavy freight, where India has no satisfactory renewable solutions.
Another major economy is the European Union. Perissi and Jones [48] assessed the possibility of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 in European Union countries. According to this research, only three member states, Spain, Sweden, and Denmark, implemented plans that make this goal fully feasible. For most of the countries, improvements in policy must be made, and technology itself is not enough. There are also countries, such as Bulgaria, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, and Romania, that have introduced policies that are insufficient to achieve this goal (although Luxembourg has adequate targets, its realization was assessed as unsatisfactory). The authors also mentioned unexpected crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic (further pandemics cannot be ruled out) and wars (such as the war in the Ukraine), which may complicate the situation. Maïzi and Assoumou [49], as well as Bohdanowicz et al. [50], suggest that all European countries agree that, to achieve carbon neutrality faster, the development of renewable sources of energy is a must. However, for some of these countries, solar and wind energy are not stable enough. Some countries, such as France and Poland, seek this stabilization through nuclear power.
However, there are other solutions. Wu et al. [51] report that a missing factor for Europe is biomass, not only planted especially for energy purposes but also produced as residues in agriculture. Gondia et al. [52] suggest that renewable sources of energy should be boosted not by nuclear power but by hydrogen (solar energy should be added to its production).
In the case of Europe, special attention should be paid to Germany. This is the biggest single polluter in Europe (644.31 Gt CO2 emissions in 2023), but also the country with the largest economy in the Community with a GDP equal to EUR 4 trillion [53]. Nuclear power is also not welcomed. Bartholdsen et al. [54] studied three scenarios and concluded that Germany has a high level of energy consumption that will increase in the future; however, it can still meet its carbon neutrality target due to the development of renewable sources of energy and hydrogen. Importantly, the authors do not see the necessity of developing nuclear power at all.
Rodrigues et al. [55] also underline other factors important for decarbonization in Europe, including carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies, hydrogen and synthetic fuels, the electrification of transport, better energy efficiency, and high carbon taxation (as an incentive to move to renewable sources of energy). The biggest world economy is the USA. As Yang et al. state, the United States of America has abundant renewable energy, and this is also the market where shale gas technologies were the most successful [56]. Williams et al. [57] prove that the USA has the technology to achieve carbon neutrality, which should be based on renewable sources of energy, energy efficiency, and carbon capture. The best result should be obtained when 80% of electricity is produced from wind and solar sources, with the remaining 20% generated by thermal generation, which will stabilize the market. This is in compliance with the White House proposal from 2021 [58]. However, the future realization of this project is heavily dependent on the results of the presidential elections in the autumn of 2024, since the program of possible president Donald Trump is totally different from that of the current administration [59]. Carlos et al. [60] show that achieving carbon neutrality in the USA is not possible without a higher level of afforestation, especially in balancing emissions from agriculture. This is an important perspective that is underestimated in many other regions.
Another important economy is Africa, a region responsible for only 3% of global carbon dioxide emissions. However, it is heavily endangered by climate change [17]. Bekun [61] characterized the situation in Africa and distinguished three main regions: North Africa, which relies on oil and gas, South Africa, which relies on coal, and sub-Saharan Africa, which relies on biomass. Eighteen out of twenty countries with the lowest access to electricity are from sub-Saharan Africa. Here, the problem is not only access to technology, but also poverty. Popular solar installations are just too expensive for the majority of people in this region [61]. Oteng and Gamette [62] suggest that financial inclusion can support broader access to renewable energy, reducing the high costs of solar and biomass technologies for most households in sub-Saharan Africa. Consequently, Elom et al. [63] showed that on the way to carbon neutrality in Africa, human capital must be strengthened by better education, which can help in achieving higher levels of employment, especially in the field of so-called ’green jobs’. Education is also mentioned in the works of Wiredu et al. [64] and Zhao and Dong [65]. African policymakers are increasingly recognizing that human capital development not only raises awareness about the benefits of renewable energy but also builds a skilled workforce in green technologies. Addressing poverty through education and sustainable energy initiatives can strengthen resilience to climate change impacts [65]. In another paper, Bekun [66] explores the significance of environmental technological innovation and renewable energy in achieving South Africa’s carbon neutrality. His findings indicate that advancing technology in renewable sectors, such as solar and wind, could greatly reduce emissions, underscoring the importance of eco-innovation and support from financial and policy frameworks [66]. Similar suggestions, in the context of South Africa, are presented in the work by Matenda et al. [67], who propose that carbon neutrality could be attainable by balancing fossil fuel use with renewable energy expansion. They stress that while South Africa relies on coal, scaling renewable energy is feasible if aligned with financial and institutional improvements [67].
Thus, while Africa’s carbon footprint remains low globally, the region faces significant challenges on the path to carbon neutrality. Financial inclusion, strengthened education, and improved access to renewable energy are essential steps for Africa to mitigate climate change impacts while promoting sustainable economic development. Nawaz and Rahman [68] suggest that achieving carbon neutrality in sub-Saharan Africa is challenging due to limited access to energy, high poverty rates, and insufficient human capital. For instance, foreign direct investment and financial systems play a vital role in developing renewable energy sources, but institutional quality and governance are equally crucial to sustaining these efforts. However, Karakezi and Kithyoma [69] prove that carbon neutrality in 2050 in Africa is possible; however, apart from developing renewable sources of energy, developing carbon capture and storage technologies is also a must.
Another important power is Russia. Klimenko et al. [70] suggest that this country may become carbon neutral by 2060. Factors taken into account go beyond renewable sources of energy, also including ecological premises of afforestation and developing carbon capture and storage technologies. Bashmakov [71] explores Russia’s roadmaps to carbon neutrality, emphasizing the importance of developing low-carbon technologies and setting 2060 as a target for achieving carbon neutrality. This goal aligns with Russia’s international commitments but remains dependent on sustained technological advancements and investment in green energy sources. Shirov and Kolpakov [72] present a socio-economic model that examines scenarios for Russia’s transition to low greenhouse gas emissions by 2060. Their research provides strategic pathways, including economic incentives for renewable energy, which Russia needs to adopt to align with its carbon neutrality objectives. Maslova [73] even contends that Russia has claimed to be ‘de facto climate neutral’ due to its extensive forests and natural resources. However, the study emphasizes that formalizing this status would require substantial verification and support from international climate bodies. However, this is doubtful. From 2022, Russia has begun a full-scale war with Ukraine. As Rawtani et al. [74] suggest, destruction not only affects infrastructure but also the environment and is responsible for additional pollution of the environment, including higher emissions of greenhouse gases, not only on the battlefield but also elsewhere. Biresselioglu et al. [75] highlight the tension between Russia’s energy security and its carbon neutrality commitments, noting the challenges that arise from the EU’s climate-neutral goals, especially with reduced Russian gas supplies to Europe. The study underlines that the geopolitical landscape significantly influences Russia’s environmental policies. Gurieva and Baburina [76] analyze how economic sanctions have badly impacted Russia’s energy companies and their green strategies. The study reveals that while companies aim for carbon neutrality, the sanctions pose barriers, making it harder for these firms to access green technology and funding. Cherepovitsyna et al. [77] highlight Russian companies’ decarbonization measures, noting that many of these initiatives are still in the early stages or symbolic. The study calls for more transparent reporting to track genuine progress towards carbon neutrality.
There is one more economy that should be mentioned, Japan, which is the world’s fifth-highest CO2 polluter [78]. This may be a surprise, since for many years, Japan was known for its highly developed nuclear energy. However, the tsunami in 2011 and the disaster that touched the Fukushima nuclear plant led to a worsening of attitudes [79]. Furthermore, the fate of the biggest nuclear power station in the world, which is the Japanese Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, is unknown. This plant has a capacity of 7695 MW. It was not touched by the tsunami, but there were doubts about its safety. The plant was closed on 26 March 2012 and remains closed [80]. Ozawa et al. [81] discuss the possibility of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 in Japan. They conclude that it is possible; however, it requires decarbonization of the energy sector by 2040 and the development of CO2 removal technologies, as well as the wider use of hydrogen. In the case of renewable sources of energy, the situation is complicated because of land use limitations for onshore wind and solar energy. Lee et al. [82] are also optimistic. They assess that by 2050, as much as 90% of energy in Japan will be produced from renewable sources. D’Ambrogio [83] assessed actions taken and planned by the Japanese authorities, assuming that by 2050, the energy mix in Japan will consist of 50–60% renewable sources of energy, 30–40% nuclear and thermal power plants, and 10% hydrogen and ammonia. There are some contradictions between the above two estimations. However, they present different visions and assumptions, which will be verified in the future.
All the papers analyzed in this section show a global commitment to achieving carbon neutrality as a way of fighting negative climate change. In most cases, this will be in or even before the year 2050. In all regions, renewable sources of energy play a key role, supplemented by carbon capture and storage technologies and hydrogen. In some regions, nuclear power will also play a role. However, it may not be enough, since carbon neutrality is not only the duty of governments or companies but also of ordinary people. This is the social factor of this paper.

4. Social Challenges and Public Perception on the Path to Carbon Neutrality

4.1. Climate Change and Social Inequalities: A Global Perspective

Understanding public opinion helps policymakers design effective and socially acceptable interventions, ensuring that climate policies reflect the values and priorities of the population [84,85]. Moreover, public support is essential for the democratic legitimacy of climate policies, fostering trust in institutions and facilitating compliance with environmental regulations [86]. If people are afraid of climate change, they will also call for carbon neutrality as a way to solve the problem.
Climate change is a global phenomenon with widespread impacts, yet its effects are not felt equally across all regions and communities. Social inequalities exacerbate the vulnerability of certain populations, making them disproportionately susceptible to the adverse impacts of climate change and where achieving carbon neutrality seems more important than in other areas with more moderate climates.
This section explores the complex relationship between climate change and social inequality, highlighting how environmental challenges are intricately linked with socio-economic vulnerabilities. It underscores the necessity for equitable climate policies that incorporate considerations of social justice and aim to protect the most vulnerable.
The adverse impacts of climate change are disproportionately borne by the world’s most vulnerable populations, who often have the least capacity to adapt due to limited resources, inadequate infrastructure, and political marginalization [4]. In Africa, the reliance on rain-fed agriculture makes the continent particularly susceptible to climate variability. Sub-Saharan Africa, already grappling with poverty and underdevelopment, faces increased risks of food insecurity and water scarcity due to shifting precipitation patterns and prolonged droughts [87]. This scenario exacerbates socio-economic disparities, as wealthier individuals and countries can import food and invest in adaptive technologies while poorer populations suffer from resource shortages.
In Asia, the impacts of climate change are evident in both rural and urban settings. Coastal cities in countries such as Bangladesh, India, and the Philippines are particularly vulnerable to sea level rises and tropical cyclones [88]. The urban poor, often residing in informal settlements, lack the infrastructure to withstand such events, leading to increased displacement and loss of livelihoods. Meanwhile, rural communities, especially in South and Southeast Asia, face declining agricultural yields due to erratic weather patterns, which widens the urban–rural divide and exacerbates poverty [89].
Latin America experiences climate change through altered rainfall patterns, melting glaciers in the Andes, and an increased frequency of extreme weather events. These changes disproportionately affect indigenous communities and small-scale farmers who depend on natural resources for survival. Conflicts over diminishing resources such as water and arable land are likely to intensify, further marginalizing vulnerable groups and leading to socio-political instability [90].
Even in wealthier regions such as North America and Europe, climate change exacerbates social inequalities. In the United States, low-income and minority communities often live in areas more susceptible to flooding, heatwaves, and pollution, lacking the resources to adequately prepare for or recover from climate-related disasters [91]. In Europe, southern countries such as Greece, Spain, and Italy face increased risks of droughts and heatwaves, impacting agriculture and tourism, which are vital economic sectors. This widens economic disparities within the European Union, where wealthier northern countries are better equipped to adapt [92].
Addressing the intersection of climate change and social inequality requires comprehensive and equitable policy interventions. Effective climate policies must focus on building resilience among vulnerable populations by improving access to resources, investing in sustainable infrastructure, and enhancing adaptive capacities [93]. The Paris Agreement and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals emphasize climate justice and the need to integrate social equity into climate action plans. Policies should prioritize the needs of the most vulnerable, ensuring they are not disproportionately burdened by climate impacts or excluded from benefits [94].
Global cooperation and financial support for developing countries are crucial to addressing the inequalities exacerbated by climate change. Wealthier nations have a moral and historical responsibility to lead mitigation efforts and support adaptation initiatives in less developed regions, providing the necessary technology and expertise. Engaging local communities in climate decision-making processes ensures that policies are culturally appropriate and meet the needs of those most affected [95]. Capacity-building programs that empower communities with knowledge and resources to adapt can foster resilience and promote sustainable development.
Climate change deepens social inequalities by disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable populations globally. The disparity in impacts and adaptive capacities between different regions underscores the need for equitable climate policies that prioritize social justice. By addressing these inequalities, the global community can foster resilience and promote sustainable development in the face of a changing climate. As the world seeks pathways to carbon neutrality, integrating social dimensions into climate action plans will be crucial for achieving long-term sustainability and equity.

4.2. Public Opinion on Climate Change and Environmental Problems

The first part of this article establishes a foundational understanding of the scientific and policy frameworks necessary for addressing climate change, highlighting technological advancements, especially in the field of renewable sources of energy, and policy commitments towards carbon neutrality. However, achieving these goals requires more than technical solutions; it demands widespread public support and behavioral change, underscoring the importance of examining public opinion. This subsequent part, with results of social research, shows transitions from theoretical and empirical studies to an exploration of how societal attitudes and perceptions impact climate action. This research illuminates the critical role that public opinion plays in shaping policy implementation and educational initiatives, thus bridging the gap between scientific knowledge and public engagement. Understanding public sentiment provides insights into potential barriers and facilitators of climate action, allowing policymakers and educators to tailor their strategies effectively. By connecting the scientific literature with empirical social research, this article underscores the necessity of integrating public opinion into climate policy and advocacy efforts, ensuring that strategies are not only scientifically sound but also socially acceptable and democratically legitimate.
Public opinion research on climate change has grown increasingly important as the issue itself has become more prominent in scientific, political, and social arenas. This review examines key studies over the past few decades, highlighting how public awareness, attitudes, and behaviors related to climate change have evolved and the factors influencing these changes.
In the early stages (1960–1980), foundational studies laid the groundwork for later climate change research. One of the seminal works from this period is by Dunlap and Van Liere [96], who developed the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) scale, a fundamental tool for measuring environmental concern. These early efforts primarily focused on general environmental issues rather than climate change specifically. As public awareness of climate change grew in the 1990s, researchers began to explore the role of political and social dynamics in shaping public opinion. McCright and Dunlap [97] analyzed the influence of conservative movements on public skepticism about climate change, highlighting the emerging polarization in the U.S. during this period.
In the early 2000s, significant research focused on the public’s understanding of climate change and their policy preferences. Leiserowitz [98] emphasized the role of affect, imagery, and values in shaping public risk perceptions and policy preferences regarding climate change. Additionally, Krosnick et al. [99] explored the determinants of public concern about global warming and its effects on policy support, furthering our understanding of how public opinion can influence policymaking.
During the 2010s, research increasingly focused on how to effectively communicate climate change to the public and mobilize action. Corner, Markowitz, and Pidgeon [100] examined how human values shape public engagement with climate change issues, stressing the importance of value-based communication. Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins [101] assessed the factors that influenced shifts in public concern about climate change in the U.S. over an eight-year period, providing insights into the dynamics of public opinion.
Recent studies continue to explore nuanced aspects of public opinion on climate change. Ballew, Leiserowitz, and Maibach [102] provided a comprehensive overview of public concern and support for climate action across different U.S. states over a decade, highlighting significant regional variations. Mildenberger and Leiserowitz [103] examined the perceived tradeoff between economic growth and environmental protection, exploring how this affects public opinion on climate change. Additionally, Capstick et al. [104] summarized international trends in public perceptions of climate change over the past 25 years, showing how awareness and concern have changed globally. Furthermore, Steentjes, Maier, and Corner [105] offered insights into effective climate change communication strategies based on public perception data from various European countries, highlighting the importance of tailored communication approaches to engage different audiences.
As mentioned earlier, one of the goals of this article is to present public opinions on environmental issues and climate change based on data from the ISSP Environment.
In an ISSP study analyzing various countries, climate change emerged as the most frequently identified environmental issue (26.1%). Air pollution was identified as the second most significant concern (16%), followed by other issues such as chemicals and pesticides, water shortages, water pollution, domestic waste disposal, and depletion of natural resources, with each cited by approximately 9–10% of respondents (Table 4).
The findings of public opinion research highlighting climate change as the most significant environmental issue across various countries are not surprising, given the increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as floods, droughts, hurricanes, and wildfires. These events have caused significant damage to people and economies [106,107]. In media reports, these events are often directly linked to climate change, shaping public opinion and causing concern [108]. For instance, the devastating wildfires in Australia during 2019–2020 received widespread media coverage globally, with reports emphasizing their direct connection to climate change [109]. Educational initiatives and information campaigns conducted by environmental organizations worldwide have also contributed to raising awareness about climate change. These efforts often highlight the impacts of climate change, such as rising sea levels, loss of biodiversity, and severe disruptions in food and water supplies [110,111]. Climate change is often portrayed as an environmental challenge encompassing both short- and long-term effects, as well as exacerbating many other non-climate-related issues [112].
Air pollution, the second most frequently cited environmental issue, is often perceived as more localized and immediate compared to the global and long-term nature of climate change [113]. Research has shown that air pollution is a significant public health issue linked to respiratory and cardiovascular diseases and premature mortality [114]. The impacts of air pollution are often immediate and visible in specific areas, frequently making it a problem perceived as more manageable through policies and technologies such as emissions control and regulatory measures [115].
Climate change is often presented as a highly complex problem requiring extensive changes in energy production, transportation, and consumption [116]. The scale of the challenge and the urgency of action are emphasized, contributing to its prioritization in public opinion [117]. Conversely, air pollution is frequently portrayed as a more technical issue that can be addressed, at least to some extent, through legal regulations and technological innovations [118].
Climate change was most frequently identified as the most significant environmental issue in Japan (49.4%), Finland (45.7%), Norway (45.3%), Iceland (43.1%), and Germany (43%). It was also prominently mentioned in Australia, Austria, Denmark, and the USA (approximately 38–39%). Countries where climate change was not the most frequently cited issue include Thailand, China, Russia, South Africa, Slovakia, Slovenia, India, South Korea, Croatia, and Spain. The least frequent mentions of climate change as the most significant environmental issue were in Russia (6.6%) and Slovakia (7.5%).
The high frequency of identifying climate change as the most significant environmental issue in Japan, Finland, Norway, Iceland, and Germany seems to result from a high level of environmental awareness and effective educational programs in these countries. For example, Finland’s education system is considered one of the best globally regarding environmental issues, shaping public opinion and making the population aware of the threats posed by global climate change [119,120]. The governments of these countries promote pro-environmental policies and invest in renewable energy sources. Norway, for instance, is a leader in hydropower utilization [121,122]. These policies not only have pro-environmental impacts but also increase public awareness of the need to combat climate change. The Nordic countries experience the direct impacts of climate change, such as glaciers melting, changes in Arctic ecosystems, and extreme weather events [4]. As an island nation, Japan also feels the effects of rising sea levels, increased typhoons, and other extreme weather events [123,124]. Direct experience of these changes makes citizens more concerned about climate issues [125,126] The high standard of living in these countries also allows for greater engagement with environmental issues. Wealthier societies tend to have higher environmental awareness and access to resources, enabling the implementation of more eco-friendly solutions.
The next analyzed topic was the potential causes of climate change. The belief that the world’s climate has not been changing is shared by 31% of all respondents (most frequently in South Africa—16% and in India—76%). The opinion that the world’s climate has been changing mostly due to natural processes is held by 101%, while the belief that the world’s climate has been changing equally due to natural processes and human activity is shared by 378%. Nearly half of the respondents (49%) believe that the world’s climate has been changing mostly due to human activity (Table 5).
We are particularly interested in this last category. Over 50% of those convinced that the world’s climate has been changing mostly due to human activity reside in Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. The belief is most common (over two-thirds) among the residents of Finland, France, Spain, and Sweden.
The level of knowledge about climate change significantly influences whether people acknowledge human activity as the primary factor contributing to these changes. A high level of ecological education increases awareness of the anthropogenic causes of climate change [127]. Educational institutions (schools at various levels and higher education institutions) play a crucial role in shaping beliefs about climate change [128].
Media plays a key role in shaping public opinion in this regard. Regular reporting on climate-related events, television programs, and newspaper articles helps raise awareness about the anthropogenic causes of climate change. Unfortunately, the media can also contribute to the spread of misinformation, which impacts the polarization of public opinion [129]. It is worth noting the Dunning–Kruger effect, where individuals with low levels of knowledge tend to overestimate their understanding—these individuals may be more susceptible to misinformation and less likely to accept the scientific viewpoint [130]. Conspiracy theories further exacerbate this issue. The observable rise in climate change conspiracy theories also contributes to the spread of misinformation in this area. Moreover, conspiracy theories can undermine trust in scientific research and institutions studying climate change [131].
As mentioned earlier, the belief in the anthropogenic origin of climate change is most commonly shared by residents of Finland, France, Spain, and Sweden. Why is this the case? The issue is complex, but several probable causes can be identified.
Firstly, a high level of ecological education. Educational programs in Finland, France, Spain, and Sweden often include topics related to environmental protection and sustainable development [132]. Studies show that education on climate change leads to greater awareness and acceptance of the anthropogenic causes of global warming [128]. Secondly, the governments of Finland, France, Spain, and Sweden place great importance on climate policy and international commitments under the Paris Agreement. Political engagement in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and promoting renewable energy and carbon neutrality influences the perception of climate change in society [133]. Government actions are often widely reported in the media, increasing public awareness [117]. Thirdly, cultural values related to environmental protection and sustainable development are deeply rooted in the societies of these countries. These values are promoted by both the education system and public policy, influencing residents’ beliefs about the causes of climate change [98].
However, it should be noted that 37.8% of respondents believe that climate change is equally caused by natural and anthropogenic factors. Where do these opinions come from? One reason may be insufficient education and misinformation. Many people lack access to reliable scientific information or cannot interpret it correctly [134]. Misinformation often comes from the media, which sometimes presents climate science as a controversial topic, despite the scientific consensus on the main role of humans in climate change [108]. It is also important to remember that people tend to use defense mechanisms such as denial or minimization to cope with difficult and threatening information [135]. Belief in the importance of natural processes may be a way of coping with anxiety related to human responsibility for climate change and its potential consequences. Distrust in scientists and institutions also plays a role in shaping public opinion on climate change [136]. People who do not trust scientists or institutions may be more inclined to believe alternative explanations that emphasize the significance of natural processes. In recent years, the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as hurricanes, floods, and droughts have increased. For many people, these events are tangible evidence of climate change, which may lead to the mistaken attribution of these events to natural climatic cycles instead of human activity [137].
The assessment of the impacts of climate change for each country was another analyzed issue. On average, 46.3% of respondents believe that these impacts would be very bad, 48.3% think they would be moderate, while 55% of respondents believe that the impacts would be very good. The most frequent recognition of very negative impacts from climate change comes from Japan (68.1%) and France (63.5%). Over 50% of respondents see very negative impacts in Germany, India, Italy, South Korea, New Zealand, Spain, Switzerland, and Thailand. Very good impacts of climate change are most often seen in Russia (12.3%) and the Philippines (Table 6. Assessment of impacts on climate change for the country).
The divergence in opinions on the impacts of climate change may stem from various factors affecting how societies perceive these changes. Different levels of risk perception related to climate change can depend on individuals’ life experiences, education level, and access to information [138]. Risk perception is also shaped by the media and public discourse on climate change [135]. Geographical, climatic, and economic differences between countries influence how climate change is experienced locally. For example, coastal countries may be more exposed to rising sea levels, leading to higher risk perception in these regions [95]. Higher education and ecological awareness are associated with recognizing the severe impacts of climate change. Better-educated individuals generally have more access to scientific information and a better understanding of the complexity of climate issues [139]. Cultural values and norms in a society also influence climate risk perception. Societies that emphasize environmental protection are more likely to acknowledge the serious impacts of climate change [140].
Comparisons were also made regarding opinions on the impacts of climate change on the global situation and the situation in the country (Table 7). These opinions were measured on a 10-point scale (the higher the number, the more positive the assessment of the impact). Overall, the assessments are relatively low, clustering around a value of 3. It is noteworthy that the assessments of the impact of climate change in individual countries are more positive (mean 3.31) than the assessments of the impact of climate change on a global scale (mean 2.90). Interestingly, this trend is not only evident in the overall averages but also for each analyzed country. Differences in local and global assessments are sometimes smaller, sometimes larger, but always more optimistic in the local perspective. How can this phenomenon be explained?
The proximity effect might be at play here, where people are more inclined to perceive and assess threats as less severe if these threats concern their local environment rather than on a global scale. People perceive threats as less real and severe if they are distant from their everyday experience [139]. Another mechanism, comparative optimism, may also be at work. In this situation, people tend to believe that negative events are more likely to happen to others than to themselves. In the context of climate change, this may mean that although they are aware of the global threat, they believe that their own country is in a better situation and will cope better than other countries [141]. Availability heuristic likely influences these perceptions. People often assess risk based on how easily they can recall examples of a given threat. Local and direct experiences with climate change may be less visible or dramatic than images of global disasters, leading to more positive local assessments [142]. Media influence is also probable. Media in different countries portray climate threats differently, affecting public perception. Local media may focus on positive aspects of climate adaptation and mitigation in their country, leading to more optimistic assessments [108]. National and international policies influence climate perception. National policies promoting green energy and climate adaptation can lead to more positive assessments of the impact of climate change at the national level, while global negotiations and debates may highlight the negative aspects of climate change [143].
To recapitulate, the research highlights the significant concern for climate change as the most pressing environmental issue across various countries. If people take climate change seriously and are afraid of it, it means that they will also demand climate change actions, which should be based on carbon neutrality.
Concern about climate change is noticed primarily due to the increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events and their extensive media coverage, which emphasizes their link to climate change. Additionally, educational initiatives and campaigns by environmental organizations have raised public awareness about the impacts of climate change. Air pollution, though frequently cited, is perceived as a more localized and immediate issue compared to the global and long-term nature of climate change. The health impacts of air pollution are immediate and visible, making it a problem perceived as more manageable through regulatory measures and technological advancements.
Belief in the anthropogenic causes of climate change is particularly strong in countries with high levels of ecological education and active climate policies. These countries also experience the direct impacts of climate change, further raising public concern. In practice, this also means readiness to fight climate change by supporting carbon neutrality policies. One of the most important ways, as shown in the first part of this paper, is by introducing renewable sources of energy.
However, a significant portion of respondents still attribute climate change equally to natural and human factors, influenced by varying levels of education, access to information, and media portrayal. The assessments of the impacts of climate change reveal a tendency for more positive evaluations at the national level compared to on a global scale. This can be explained by psychological mechanisms such as the proximity effect, comparative optimism, and availability heuristic, as well as the influence of national media and policies. Understanding these perceptions is crucial for shaping effective communication strategies and policies to address climate change.

5. Conclusions

Based on the analysis results, the following answers to the first two research questions can be formulated:
  • Achieving carbon neutrality is possible, but not granted.
  • Key technological advancements: Achieving carbon neutrality by around 2050 necessitates significant progress in renewable energy technologies, particularly in solar and wind power, which need substantial scaling up. Additionally, doubling the use of nuclear energy (even if some countries, such as Germany, will not fulfill this point) and deploying carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies are crucial. The specific needs and focus can differ across regions, depending on local resources and existing infrastructure capabilities.
  • Support and challenges in policy: Global frameworks such as the Paris Agreement provide essential support for transitioning to renewable energy, setting targets, and encouraging international cooperation. However, the effectiveness of these policies is often hindered by disparities in national climate policies and the varied timelines and commitments among countries, with some nations setting more ambitious goals than others.
  • Barriers to the adoption of renewable technologies: Key barriers include high upfront costs, limited infrastructure for energy distribution, and resistance from political and social groups tied to traditional energy industries. Overcoming these barriers requires financial innovations, such as increased funding and incentives for renewable projects, as well as public education campaigns to raise awareness and support for renewable energy solutions.
  • International cooperation: Leveraging international cooperation through collaborative research and technology exchange is vital for achieving carbon neutrality. Effective models include partnerships such as joint investments in renewable infrastructure, cross-border projects that share technology and expertise, and global initiatives that foster innovation and development in clean energy technologies.
  • Role of emerging economies: Emerging economies, such as China and India, are pivotal in global efforts to achieve carbon neutrality due to their significant contributions to global emissions and potential for rapid growth in energy demand. Strategies to support their transition include providing financial aid, facilitating access to advanced technologies, and implementing capacity-building programs that help integrate renewable energy sources into their national energy frameworks.
Based on the analysis results, the following answers to the last two research questions can be formulated:
  • Climate change is frequently identified as the most pressing environmental issue across various countries. Air pollution is another significant concern, followed by issues such as chemicals and pesticides, water shortages, and water pollution. The prominence of climate change is often due to its global impact and extensive media coverage.
  • A significant portion of the public believes that climate change is mostly due to human activity, with higher acknowledgment of anthropogenic causes in countries with strong environmental education and active climate policies. There is also a notable segment that attributes climate change equally to natural and human factors, influenced by levels of education, access to information, and media portrayal.
  • The impacts of climate change on individual countries are perceived predominantly as very bad, especially in countries such as Japan and France. There are, however, some differences, with a few countries such as Russia and the Philippines seeing more positive impacts. These perceptions are shaped by factors such as risk perception, education, media influence, and geographical vulnerabilities. A serious approach to climate change is in compliance with carbon neutrality strategies.
  • Public opinion tends to be more positive about the impacts of climate change on their own country compared to the world. This phenomenon is explained by psychological factors such as the proximity effect, comparative optimism, and the availability heuristic. People perceive local threats as less severe and believe their country can better manage climate impacts compared to the global situation.
Addressing climate change and the need for carbon neutrality requires a comprehensive approach that integrates scientific, technological, and social dimensions. By leveraging technological innovations, strengthening policy frameworks, and incorporating public opinion, we can drive the transformative changes needed to achieve carbon neutrality. While the challenges are immense, the potential for meaningful progress exists. Achieving carbon neutrality is within reach if governments, industries, and individuals work collaboratively to implement solutions that are both technologically viable and socially inclusive. By aligning scientific advancements with public engagement and policy support, we can create a resilient and sustainable world for future generations and save the global environment.
This article offers an interdisciplinary approach to achieving carbon neutrality but has several notable limitations.
Firstly, the analysis relies heavily on statistical data and literature reviews, which limits the depth of exploration into specific regional cases. While the article acknowledges regional differences, it often lacks a detailed examination of the unique challenges and opportunities that individual countries or regions face.
Secondly, the work focuses on public opinion and how societal perceptions influence climate policies, but it does not provide a detailed analysis of how these perceptions can be effectively shaped. Although educational campaigns are mentioned, there is little discussion of their effectiveness or the communication strategies that could better engage the public in supporting carbon neutrality efforts.
Thirdly, while the article discusses the development of technologies such as renewable energy and energy storage, it lacks detailed forecasts of the technological and financial constraints that could delay the large-scale implementation of these technologies, particularly in developing countries.
While the article offers valuable insights into the pathways to carbon neutrality, it requires a deeper exploration of specific technological, social, and regional barriers and solutions that could help achieve these goals.
Here are the recommendations for further research:
  • In-depth regional analyses: future research should focus on exploring specific challenges and opportunities related to energy transitions in different regions and countries. A deeper investigation is needed into the technological, financial, and social barriers that may hinder the implementation of carbon neutrality policies. Additionally, cultural contexts influencing public acceptance of climate policies should be examined.
  • Effectiveness of educational campaigns: further studies are needed to evaluate the effectiveness of educational campaigns and communication strategies aimed at raising public awareness and engagement in climate action. Research should identify the most effective methods of communication and education for shaping pro-environmental attitudes across different social groups and regions.
  • Technological and financial projections: future research should focus on forecasting the development of technologies related to carbon neutrality, including renewable energy and energy storage systems. Detailed analyses are needed to address the costs, availability, and technological constraints in various regions, especially in developing countries. Financial forecasts that consider potential investment barriers and economic limitations are also crucial for effective policy planning.
  • Managing social and economic transitions: further research should explore how to manage the social and economic impacts of the energy transition, particularly in mitigating potential negative consequences such as energy poverty or job loss in high-emission sectors. Research on strategies for achieving a “just transition” that considers social and economic equity would be valuable.
  • International cooperation for carbon neutrality: investigating ways to strengthen international cooperation on technology exchange, financing climate projects, and co-developing energy policies is essential. Future studies should explore the differences between developed and developing countries and examine how to support less-resourced nations in their pursuit of carbon neutrality.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, formal analysis, investigation, and writing: Section 1, Section 2 and Section 5: A.P. and P.R.; Section 3: A.P.; Section 4: P.R. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Data Availability Statement

The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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Table 1. Sample sizes of ISSP Environment 2019–2023 for each country.
Table 1. Sample sizes of ISSP Environment 2019–2023 for each country.
CountryFrequencyPercent
Australia11472.6
Austria12612.9
China456310.3
Croatia10002.3
Denmark11982.7
Finland11372.6
France15203.4
Germany17023.9
Hungary10012.3
Iceland11502.6
India14213.2
Italy11382.6
Japan14913.4
Korea (South)12052.7
Lithuania12002.7
New Zealand9932.3
Norway11312.6
Philippines15003.4
Russia15833.6
Slovakia10132.3
Slovenia11022.5
South Africa28446.4
Spain22545.1
Sweden19214.4
Switzerland42809.7
Thailand14983.4
United States18474.2
Total44,100100.0
Table 2. Top 5 CO2 emissions from major economies in 2023 [18].
Table 2. Top 5 CO2 emissions from major economies in 2023 [18].
NoCountryEmission
1China10,677.89
2USA4712.77
-European Union E-27 *2598.46
3India2441.79
4Russian Federation1.5
5Japan1030.78
* The European Union is not counted as it is a group of countries.
Table 3. Renewable sources of energy—global perspective [17].
Table 3. Renewable sources of energy—global perspective [17].
NoSourceProduction of Electricity in TWh%
1Hydropower4240.0147
2Wind power2325.3126
3Solar power1641.5818
4Other renewables781.509
Total production:8988.39100
Table 4. Most important environmental problem for the country as a whole.
Table 4. Most important environmental problem for the country as a whole.
CountryAir PollutionChemicals and PesticidesWater ShortageWater PollutionNuclear WasteDomestic Waste DisposalClimate ChangeGenetically Modified FoodsUsing Up Natural ResourcesNone of These
AustraliaN29532544018110402299810
%2.8%5.1%24.4%3.8%1.7%10.5%38.5%2.8%9.4%1.0%
AustriaN11712457807685473931238
%9.5%10.0%4.6%6.5%6.1%6.9%38.3%7.5%10.0%0.6%
ChinaN167741317449211253331116019276
%42.2%11.1%4.3%13.0%3.8%14.2%8.5%4.1%4.8%2.4%
CroatiaN118992711835205160891249
%12.0%10.1%2.7%12.0%3.6%20.8%16.3%9.0%12.6%0.9%
DenmarkN971643915713594174612213
%8.6%14.6%3.5%13.9%1.2%5.2%37.0%4.1%10.8%1.2%
FinlandN7880514737465003214226
%7.1%7.3%0.5%13.4%3.4%4.2%45.7%2.9%13.0%2.4%
FranceN13831097588275365501856
%10.1%22.7%7.1%4.2%6.0%5.5%26.7%3.7%13.5%0.4%
GermanyN11116213472107456978219616
%6.8%10.0%8.3%4.4%6.6%2.8%43.0%5.1%12.1%1.0%
HungaryN1811266189578226255669
%18.3%12.8%6.2%9.0%5.8%8.3%26.5%5.6%6.7%0.9%
IcelandN16069219101454682415138
%14.7%6.4%0.2%1.7%0.9%13.4%43.1%2.2%13.9%3.5%
IndiaN175142248206451821287612040
%12.8%10.4%18.2%15.1%3.3%13.4%9.4%5.6%8.8%2.9%
ItalyN2431547769469329042996
%21.7%13.8%6.9%6.2%4.1%8.3%25.9%3.8%8.8%0.5%
JapanN8135112936997717257018
%5.6%2.4%0.8%2.0%25.4%6.7%49.4%1.7%4.8%1.2%
Korea (South)N2804338913435830317321
%23.4%3.6%3.2%7.6%2.8%29.9%25.3%1.4%2.7%0.1%
LithuaniaN1901461661491622411449430
%16.8%12.9%1.4%5.4%4.3%14.3%21.3%12.7%8.3%2.6%
New ZealandN486613119310123261246613
%5.1%7.1%14.0%20.6%1.1%13.2%27.9%2.6%7.1%1.4%
NorwayN103732811131394854413522
%9.6%6.8%2.6%10.4%2.9%3.6%45.3%4.1%12.6%2.1%
PhilippinesN339527266592894111515113
%23.1%3.5%4.9%4.5%4.0%19.7%28.0%1.0%10.3%0.9%
RussiaN3601233018011528710315516927
%23.2%7.9%1.9%11.6%7.4%18.5%6.6%10.0%10.9%1.7%
SlovakiaN1491493310653967010515918
%15.9%15.9%3.5%11.3%5.7%10.2%7.5%11.2%17.0%1.9%
SloveniaN1921431416031174168977615
%17.9%13.4%1.3%15.0%2.9%16.3%15.7%9.1%7.1%1.4%
South AfricaN546858934228221826055101127
%19.6%3.0%32.0%15.1%2.9%7.8%9.3%2.0%3.6%4.6%
SpainN121858117324556496423840
%5.6%3.9%37.5%3.4%1.1%2.5%30.0%3.0%11.0%1.9%
SwedenN14016610228944576605725041
%7.8%9.2%5.6%16.0%2.4%3.2%36.5%3.2%13.8%2.3%
SwitzerlandN341779116234288109136220465966
%8.2%18.7%2.8%5.6%6.9%2.6%32.8%4.9%15.8%1.6%
ThailandN54119014017523115059780
%37.2%13.0%9.6%1.2%0.3%15.9%10.3%0.3%6.7%5.5%
United StatesN14013975130388763811217493
%8.6%8.5%4.6%8.0%2.3%5.4%39.2%6.9%10.7%5.7%
TotalN66954170368537091870404210,95119014089861
%16.0%9.9%8.8%8.8%4.5%9.6%26.1%4.5%9.7%2.1%
Table 5. Opinion on climate change and potential causes by country.
Table 5. Opinion on climate change and potential causes by country.
CountryThe World’s Climate Has Not Been ChangingThe World’s Climate Has Been Changing Mostly Due to Natural ProcessesThe World’s Climate Has Been Changing About Equally Due to Natural Processes and Human ActivityThe World’s Climate Has Been Changing Mostly Due to Human ActivityTotal
AustraliaN411203995201080
%3.8%11.1%36.9%48.1%100.0%
AustriaN13844686811246
%1.0%6.7%37.6%54.7%100.0%
ChinaN137443192115884089
%5.4%12.0%47.1%39.2%100.0%
CroatiaN1864487414983
%1.8%6.5%49.5%42.1%100.0%
DenmarkN4635595441170
%0.3%5.4%47.8%46.5%100.0%
FinlandN12513417241128
%1.1%4.5%30.2%64.2%100.0%
FranceN22504689391479
%1.5%3.4%31.6%63.5%100.0%
GermanyN28556089611652
%1.7%3.3%36.8%58.2%100.0%
HungaryN33100404437974
%3.4%10.3%41.5%44.9%100.0%
IcelandN3543936631113
%0.3%4.9%35.3%59.6%100.0%
IndiaN983033725181291
%7.6%23.5%28.8%40.1%100.0%
ItalyN10695225191120
%0.9%6.2%46.6%46.3%100.0%
JapanN11475907591407
%0.8%3.3%41.9%53.9%100.0%
Korea (South)N82025114741195
%0.7%16.9%42.8%39.7%100.0%
LithuaniaN17985055161136
%1.5%8.6%44.5%45.4%100.0%
New ZealandN1074355526965
%1.0%7.7%36.8%54.5%100.0%
NorwayN81063126741100
%0.7%9.6%28.4%61.3%100.0%
PhilippinesN1102066145381468
%7.5%14.0%41.8%36.6%100.0%
RussiaN713096445281552
%4.6%19.9%41.5%34.0%100.0%
SlovakiaN20132504302958
%2.1%13.8%52.6%31.5%100.0%
SloveniaN4424176211084
%0.4%3.9%38.5%57.3%100.0%
South AfricaN4168277446172604
%16.0%31.8%28.6%23.7%100.0%
SpainN3910658614152146
%1.8%4.9%27.3%65.9%100.0%
SwedenN2410455911581845
%1.3%5.6%30.3%62.8%100.0%
SwitzerlandN14208149524814198
%0.3%5.0%35.6%59.1%100.0%
ThailandN921035086971400
%6.6%7.4%36.3%49.8%100.0%
United StatesN352376318491752
%2.0%13.5%36.0%48.5%100.0%
TotalN1298425715,91720,66342,135
%3.1%10.1%37.8%49.0%100.0%
Table 6. Assessment of impacts on climate change for the country.
Table 6. Assessment of impacts on climate change for the country.
CountryVery BadMediumVery GoodTotal
AustraliaN37435953786
%47.6%45.7%6.7%100.0%
AustriaN456608401104
%41.3%55.1%3.6%100.0%
ChinaN155714621553174
%49.6%46.3%5.4%100.0%
CroatiaN39040326819
%47.6%49.2%3.2%100.0%
DenmarkN386566531005
%38.4%56.3%5.3%100.0%
FinlandN41850333954
%43.8%52.7%3.5%100.0%
FranceN721403121136
%63.5%35.5%1.1%100.0%
GermanyN771636261433
%53.8%44.4%1.8%100.0%
HungaryN34242226790
%43.3%53.4%3.3%100.0%
IcelandN40847754939
%43.5%50.8%5.8%100.0%
IndiaN556478681102
%50.5%43.4%6.2%100.0%
ItalyN47839157926
%51.6%42.2%6.2%100.0%
JapanN795314581167
%68.1%26.9%5.0%100.0%
Korea (South)N570461791110
%51.4%41.5%7.1%100.0%
LithuaniaN342642781062
%32.2%60.5%7.3%100.0%
New ZealandN44629855799
%55.8%37.3%6.9%100.0%
NorwayN35456466984
%36.0%57.3%6.7%100.0%
PhilippinesN4085751591142
%35.7%50.4%13.9%100.0%
RussiaN2987361451179
%25.3%62.4%12.3%100.0%
SlovakiaN27450531810
%33.8%62.3%3.8%100.0%
SloveniaN43744152930
%47.0%47.4%5.6%100.0%
South AfricaN52412911821997
%26.2%64.6%9.1%100.0%
SpainN785477621324
%59.3%36.0%4.7%100.0%
SwedenN736832601628
%45.2%51.1%3.7%100.0%
SwitzerlandN176216521093523
%50.0%46.9%3.1%100.0%
ThailandN651410741135
%57.4%36.1%6.5%100.0%
United StatesN625654611340
%46.6%48.8%4.6%100.0%
TotalN15,86416,560187434,298
%46.3%48.3%5.5%100.0%
Table 7. Assessment of impacts on climate change for the country and for the world—a comparison.
Table 7. Assessment of impacts on climate change for the country and for the world—a comparison.
CountryAssessment of Impacts on Climate Change for WorldAssessment of Impacts on Climate Change for the Country
AustraliaMean2.732.92
N10471045
AustriaMean2.663.55
N12281225
ChinaMean2.563.00
N40314058
CroatiaMean2.943.21
N973976
DenmarkMean3.083.88
N10971089
FinlandMean2.303.45
N10851082
FranceMean2.232.44
N14751450
GermanyMean2.343.14
N16181609
HungaryMean2.903.24
N955951
IcelandMean2.523.47
N11181101
IndiaMean3.313.37
N12421236
ItalyMean3.163.22
N10971100
JapanMean2.562.65
N14141419
Korea (South)Mean3.703.76
N11851186
LithuaniaMean3.544.24
N11301119
New ZealandMean2.463.05
N957956
NorwayMean3.174.02
N10501058
PhilippinesMean3.953.89
N13591362
RussiaMean3.724.08
N14421432
SlovakiaMean3.553.82
N892909
SloveniaMean2.963.47
N10621043
South AfricaMean3.964.03
N23212335
SpainMean2.042.12
N21262093
SwedenMean2.603.57
N17801781
SwitzerlandMean2.473.16
N41394128
ThailandMean3.053.15
N12971289
United StatesMean2.873.03
N17221709
TotalMean2.903.31
N40,84240,741
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Pawłowski, A.; Rydzewski, P. Pathways to Carbon Neutrality: Integrating Energy Strategies, Policy, and Public Perception in the Face of Climate Change—A Global Perspective. Energies 2024, 17, 5867. https://doi.org/10.3390/en17235867

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Pawłowski A, Rydzewski P. Pathways to Carbon Neutrality: Integrating Energy Strategies, Policy, and Public Perception in the Face of Climate Change—A Global Perspective. Energies. 2024; 17(23):5867. https://doi.org/10.3390/en17235867

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Pawłowski, Artur, and Paweł Rydzewski. 2024. "Pathways to Carbon Neutrality: Integrating Energy Strategies, Policy, and Public Perception in the Face of Climate Change—A Global Perspective" Energies 17, no. 23: 5867. https://doi.org/10.3390/en17235867

APA Style

Pawłowski, A., & Rydzewski, P. (2024). Pathways to Carbon Neutrality: Integrating Energy Strategies, Policy, and Public Perception in the Face of Climate Change—A Global Perspective. Energies, 17(23), 5867. https://doi.org/10.3390/en17235867

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