Relationship between Related Party Transactions and the Social Contribution Activities of South Korean Chaebol Companies
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
2.1. CSR Activities
2.2. RPT
2.3. Hypothesis Formulation
3. Methodology
3.1. RPTs
3.2. CSR
3.3. Research Design and Sample Selection
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation
4.2. Main Results
Impact of RPT on CSR
4.3. Further Analysis
5. Implication, Conclusions, and Future Research
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Variable | Mean | SD | Min | 25% | Median | 75% | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CSR | 62.343 | 2.959 | 52.863 | 60.328 | 62.484 | 64.269 | 72.264 |
RPT | 0.845 | 0.362 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
CHA | 0.184 | 0.388 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
SIZE | 26.819 | 1.113 | 24.461 | 26.078 | 26.682 | 27.437 | 30.864 |
LEV | 0.764 | 0.758 | 0.001 | 0.249 | 0.580 | 0.983 | 6.867 |
MB | 1.302 | 1.108 | 0.279 | 0.648 | 0.965 | 1.510 | 7.131 |
ROE | 0.055 | 0.092 | −1.068 | 0.021 | 0.048 | 0.087 | 0.632 |
LAR | 0.455 | 0.168 | 0.075 | 0.346 | 0.461 | 0.549 | 2.493 |
FOR | 0.110 | 0.129 | 0.000 | 0.025 | 0.064 | 0.149 | 0.771 |
CSR | RPT | CHA | SIZE | LEV | MB | ROE | LAR | FOR | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CSR | 1.000 | 0.043 | −0.045 | 0.065 | −0.063 | 0.143 | 0.062 | −0.173 | 0.107 |
(0.2647) | (0.2358) | (0.089) | (0.1011) | (0.0002) | (0.1045) | (<0.0001) | (0.0051) | ||
RPT | 1.000 | 0.028 | 0.112 | 0.021 | −0.098 | −0.050 | 0.075 | 0.024 | |
(0.4609) | (0.0034) | (0.5772) | (0.01) | (0.1868) | (0.0484) | (0.5213) | |||
CHA | 1.000 | 0.452 | 0.074 | −0.107 | 0.024 | −0.006 | 0.137 | ||
(<0.0001) | (0.0516) | (0.0048) | (0.534) | (0.8681) | (0.0003) | ||||
SIZE | 1.000 | 0.158 | −0.077 | 0.099 | 0.067 | 0.426 | |||
(<0.0001) | (0.044) | (0.0091) | (0.0804) | (<0.0001) | |||||
LEV | 1.000 | 0.074 | −0.185 | −0.050 | −0.117 | ||||
(0.0509) | (<0.0001) | (0.1928) | (0.0021) | ||||||
MB | 1.000 | 0.118 | −0.143 | 0.032 | |||||
(0.002) | (0.0002) | (0.3959) | |||||||
ROE | 1.000 | −0.018 | 0.123 | ||||||
(0.6397) | (0.0012) | ||||||||
LAR | 1.000 | −0.075 | |||||||
(0.0498) | |||||||||
FOR | 1.000 | ||||||||
Variables | (1) Y = CSR | (2) Y = CSR | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
Coef. | t-Value | Coef. | t-Value | |
Intercept | 52.747 | (16.15) *** | 52.365 | (16.09) *** |
RPT | 0.610 | (2.00) ** | 0.947 | (2.86) *** |
CHA | −0.605 | (−1.9) * | 1.168 | (1.53) |
RPT × CHA | −2.055 | (−2.55) ** | ||
SIZE | 0.359 | (2.86) *** | 0.362 | (2.89) *** |
LEV | −0.493 | (−3.05) *** | −0.465 | (−2.88) *** |
MB | 0.315 | (3.09) *** | 0.314 | (3.1) *** |
ROE | 0.314 | (0.25) | 0.353 | (0.29) |
LAR | −2.160 | (−3.2) *** | −2.232 | (−3.31) *** |
FOR | 0.102 | (0.11) | 0.137 | (0.14) |
Σ IND, ΣYR | Included | Included | ||
Adjusted R2 | 0.1116 | 0.1189 | ||
F Statistics | 5.32 *** | 5.42 *** | ||
Sample Size | 689 | 689 |
Variables | (1) Chaebol Sample | (2) Non-Chaebol Sample | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
Coef. | t-Value | Coef. | t-Value | |
Intercept | 68.604 | (8.75) *** | 48.236 | (12.29) *** |
RPT | −0.813 | (−1) | 0.915 | (2.75) *** |
SIZE | −0.282 | (−0.94) | 0.526 | (3.51) *** |
LEV | −0.109 | (−0.26) | −0.547 | (−3.1) *** |
MB | 1.152 | (2.36) ** | 0.264 | (2.55) ** |
ROE | −1.056 | (−0.25) | −0.171 | (−0.13) |
LAR | −1.829 | (−0.92) | −1.885 | (−2.59) *** |
FOR | 2.510 | (0.96) | −0.673 | (−0.64) |
Σ IND, ΣYR | Included | Included | ||
Adjusted R2 | 0.1288 | 0.1246 | ||
F Statistics | 2.03 ** | 5.20 *** | ||
Sample Size | 127 | 562 |
Variables | (1) Y = CSR1 | (2) Y = CSR2 | (3) Y = CSR3 | (4) Y = CSR4 | (5) Y = CSR5 | (6) Y = CSR6 | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coef. | t−Value | Coef. | t-Value | Coef. | t-Value | Coef. | t-Value | Coef. | t-Value | Coef. | t-Value | |
Intercept | 7.583 | (3.27) *** | 16.979 | (10.64) *** | 1.193 | (0.66) | 10.250 | (17.26) *** | 3.515 | (6.71) *** | 12.559 | (8.52) *** |
RPT | −0.063 | (−0.29) | 0.019 | (0.13) | 0.535 | (3.19) *** | −0.019 | (−0.35) | −0.001 | (−0.04) | 0.112 | (0.82) |
CHA | 0.301 | (1.33) | −1.116 | (−7.16) *** | 0.000 | (0) ** | 0.008 | (0.15) | 0.197 | (3.88) *** | −0.015 | (−0.11) |
SIZE | 0.352 | (3.94) *** | −0.038 | (−0.62) | 0.170 | (2.46) *** | −0.008 | (−0.39) | 0.050 | (2.5) ** | −0.137 | (−2.41) ** |
LEV | −0.285 | (−2.48) ** | −0.124 | (−1.58) | −0.134 | (−1.51) ** | 0.000 | (0.01) | 0.017 | (0.69) | −0.006 | (−0.09) |
MB | 0.172 | (2.38) ** | 0.069 | (1.4) | 0.138 | (2.48) | −0.038 | (−2.08) ** | −0.028 | (−1.78) * | −0.001 | (−0.04) |
ROE | −1.158 | (−1.32) | 0.032 | (0.05) | 0.353 | (0.52) ** | 0.166 | (0.74) | 0.578 | (2.86) *** | 0.063 | (0.11) |
LAR | −2.213 | (−4.61) *** | −0.052 | (−0.16) | 0.347 | (0.94) | −0.241 | (−1.97) ** | −0.153 | (−1.42) | 0.101 | (0.33) |
FOR | 0.605 | (0.88) | 0.197 | (0.42) | 0.310 | (0.58) | −0.262 | (−1.5) | 0.163 | (1.05) | −0.767 | (−1.76) * |
Σ IND, ΣYR | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included | ||||||
Adjusted R2 | 0.0924 | 0.0881 | 0.0461 | 0.0792 | 0.1362 | 0.0254 | ||||||
F Statistics | 4.50 *** | 4.33 *** | 2.66 *** | 3.96 *** | 6.34 *** | 1.90 ** | ||||||
Sample Size | 689 | 689 | 689 | 689 | 689 | 689 |
Variables | (1) Y = CSR1 | (2) Y = CSR2 | (3) Y = CSR3 | (4) Y = CSR4 | (5) Y = CSR5 | (6) Y = CSR6 | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coef. | t-Value | Coef. | t-Value | Coef. | t-Value | Coef. | t-Value | Coef. | t-Value | Coef. | t-Value | |
Intercept | 7.600 | (3.27) *** | 16.919 | (10.59) *** | 0.974 | (0.54) | 10.214 | (17.19) *** | 3.495 | (6.67) *** | 12.521 | (8.48) *** |
RPT | −0.078 | (−0.33) | 0.072 | (0.44) | 0.729 | (4.01) *** | 0.011 | (0.19) | 0.018 | (0.34) | 0.146 | (0.97) |
RPT × CHA | 0.092 | (0.16) | −0.322 | (−0.81) | −1.183 | (−2.67) *** | −0.190 | (−1.3) | −0.120 | (−0.94) | −0.203 | (−0.56) |
CHA | 0.221 | (0.4) | −0.838 | (−2.23) ** | 1.021 | (2.43) ** | 0.173 | (1.24) | 0.301 | (2.47) ** | 0.160 | (0.46) |
SIZE | 0.352 | (3.93) *** | −0.037 | (−0.61) | 0.172 | (2.5) ** | −0.008 | (−0.38) | 0.050 | (2.5) ** | −0.136 | (−2.41) ** |
LEV | −0.286 | (−2.49) ** | −0.120 | (−1.51) | −0.117 | (−1.33) | 0.003 | (0.1) | 0.019 | (0.75) | −0.004 | (−0.05) |
MB | 0.172 | (2.38) ** | 0.069 | (1.4) | 0.138 | (2.48) ** | −0.038 | (−2.09) ** | −0.029 | (−1.78) * | −0.002 | (−0.04) |
ROE | −1.160 | (−1.32) | 0.038 | (0.06) | 0.375 | (0.55) | 0.169 | (0.75) | 0.580 | (2.87) *** | 0.067 | (0.12) |
LAR | −2.210 | (−4.59) *** | −0.063 | (−0.19) | 0.306 | (0.83) | −0.248 | (−2.02) ** | −0.157 | (−1.46) | 0.094 | (0.31) |
FOR | 0.603 | (0.88) | 0.202 | (0.43) | 0.330 | (0.63) | −0.259 | (−1.48) | 0.166 | (1.07) | −0.763 | (−1.75) * |
Σ IND, ΣYR | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included | ||||||
Adjusted R2 | 0.0911 | 0.0877 | 0.0836 | 0.0801 | 0.1361 | 0.0244 | ||||||
F-Statistics | 4.28 *** | 4.15 *** | 2.90 *** | 3.85 *** | 6.08 *** | 1.82 ** | ||||||
Sample Size | 689 | 689 | 689 | 689 | 689 | 689 |
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Ryu, H.; Chae, S.-J. Relationship between Related Party Transactions and the Social Contribution Activities of South Korean Chaebol Companies. Sustainability 2022, 14, 2834. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14052834
Ryu H, Chae S-J. Relationship between Related Party Transactions and the Social Contribution Activities of South Korean Chaebol Companies. Sustainability. 2022; 14(5):2834. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14052834
Chicago/Turabian StyleRyu, Haeyoung, and Soo-Joon Chae. 2022. "Relationship between Related Party Transactions and the Social Contribution Activities of South Korean Chaebol Companies" Sustainability 14, no. 5: 2834. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14052834