Evolution Game and Simulation Analysis of Disturbance Emergency Disposal of In-Flight Cabin: China Civil Aviation Security Strategy Study
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
3. Event Tree Analysis of Cabin Disruptions
3.1. Cabin Disruption ETA Model Construction
3.2. Analysis of Event Tree Results for Use of Open Flame or Smoking in the Cabin
4. Model Assumptions and Construction
4.1. Question Description
4.2. Basic Assumptions
4.3. Model Building
4.4. Replicator Dynamic Equation and Evolutionary Stable Strategy
4.5. Evolutionary Stability Analysis of the Strategy of Four Subjects
5. System Dynamics Analysis and Simulation
5.1. System Equilibrium Point Simulation Analysis
5.2. Evolutionary Game Simulation under Dynamic Strategy
5.2.1. Evolutionary Game Simulation under Dynamic Support Strategy
5.2.2. Evolutionary Game Simulation under Dynamic Penalty Strategy
5.3. Evolutionary Game Simulation Trend Analysis
5.4. Empirical Analysis and Simulation
5.4.1. Data and Parameters
5.4.2. Simulation Results
6. Conclusions
6.1. Results
6.2. Recommendations
6.3. Limitations and Future Research
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Serial Number | Use of Open Flame or Smoking Path Event in the Cabin | Formula | Data | Failure Probability |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Use of open flame or smoking in the cabin | Formula (1) | ||
2 | Airline security in-flight study of incidents | Formula (2) | ||
3 | Airline security in-flight dispose incidents | Formula (3) | ||
4 | Use of open flame or smoking passengers to stop the behavior | Formula (4) | ||
5 | Transferred under the plane to the airport police | Formula (5) | ||
6 | Airport police impose penalty | Formula (6) |
Subjects | Variable | Explanations | Notes |
---|---|---|---|
Regulatory authority | The probability of regulatory authority choosing support. | ||
The costs of regulatory authority support. | — | ||
The benefits of regulatory authority support. | |||
The benefits of regulatory authority nonsupport. | |||
The enhancement of regulatory authority credibility when it chooses support. | — | ||
The loss of regulatory authority credibility when it chooses nonsupport. | — | ||
Airline security | The probability of airline security choosing action. | ||
The benefits of airline security action. | |||
The benefits of airline security inaction. | |||
The acquisition of airline security duties and rights when it chooses action. | — | ||
The increase in enforcement difficulties when regulatory authority chooses nonsupport and airline security chooses action. | — | ||
The reduction in disposal costs when airport police choose strong penalty. | — | ||
Airport police | The probability of airport police choosing strong penalty. | ||
The costs of airport police choosing strong penalty. | |||
The costs of airport police choosing weak penalty. | — | ||
The enhancement of deterrence capability when disruptive passengers choose to break the law and airport police choose strong penalty. | — | ||
The loss of deterrence capability when disruptive passengers choose to break the law and airport police choose weak penalty. | — | ||
Disruptive passengers | The probability of disruptive passengers choosing to keep the law. | ||
The costs of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law. | — | ||
The additional benefits of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law. | — | ||
The penalty of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law when airline security chooses action. | — | ||
The penalty of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law when airport police choose strong penalty. | |||
The penalty of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law when airport police choose weak penalty. | — | ||
The probability of social loss when disruptive passengers choose to break the law. | |||
The social loss of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law. | — |
Strategy | Strong Penalty | Weak Penalty | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Keep the Law | Break the Law | Keep the Law | Break the Law | ||
Support | Action | ||||
Inaction | |||||
Nonsupport | Action | ||||
Inaction |
Equilibrium Points | Eigenvalue λ1 | Eigenvalue λ2 | Eigenvalue λ3 | Eigenvalue λ4 |
---|---|---|---|---|
Equilibrium Point | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Variable | Explanation | Default |
---|---|---|
The costs of regulatory authority support. | 1 | |
The benefits of regulatory authority support. | 2 | |
The benefits of regulatory authority nonsupport. | 1 | |
The enhancement of regulatory authority credibility when it chooses support. | 0.2 | |
The loss of regulatory authority credibility when it chooses nonsupport. | 0.2 | |
The benefits of airline security action. | 1 | |
The benefits of airline security inaction. | 0.5 | |
The acquisition of airline security duties and rights when it chooses action. | 0.1 | |
The increase in enforcement difficulties when regulatory authority chooses nonsupport and airline security chooses action. | 0.1 | |
The reduction in disposal costs when airport police choose strong penalty. | 0.2 | |
The costs of airport police choosing strong penalty. | 1 | |
The costs of airport police choosing weak penalty. | 0.5 | |
The enhancement of deterrence capability when disruptive passengers choose to break the law and airport police choose strong penalty. | 0.1 | |
The loss of deterrence capability when disruptive passengers choose to break the law and airport police choose weak penalty. | 0.1 | |
The costs of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law. | 0.1 | |
The additional benefits of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law. | 0.5 | |
The penalty of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law when airline security chooses action. | 1 | |
The penalty of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law when airport police choose strong penalty. | 2 | |
The penalty of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law when airport police choose weak penalty. | 1 | |
The probability of social loss when disruptive passengers choose to break the law. | 0.5 | |
The social loss of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law. | 5 |
Variable | Explanation | Default |
---|---|---|
The costs of regulatory authority support. | 1 | |
The benefits of regulatory authority support. | 1.5 | |
The benefits of regulatory authority nonsupport. | 0.6 | |
The enhancement of regulatory authority credibility when it chooses support. | 0.1 | |
The loss of regulatory authority credibility when it chooses nonsupport. | 0.1 | |
The benefits of airline security action. | 2 | |
The benefits of airline security inaction. | 1 | |
The acquisition of airline security duties and rights when it chooses action. | 0.2 | |
The increase in enforcement difficulties when regulatory authority chooses nonsupport and airline security chooses action. | 0.2 | |
The reduction in disposal costs when airport police choose strong penalty. | 0.2 | |
The costs of airport police choosing strong penalty. | 1 | |
The costs of airport police choosing weak penalty. | 0.5 | |
The enhancement of deterrence capability when disruptive passengers choose to break the law and airport police choose strong penalty. | 0.1 | |
The loss of deterrence capability when disruptive passengers choose to break the law and airport police choose weak penalty. | 0.1 | |
The costs of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law. | 0.01 | |
The additional benefits of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law. | 0.1 | |
The penalty of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law when airline security chooses action. | 1 | |
The penalty of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law when airport police choose strong penalty. | 2 | |
The penalty of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law when airport police choose weak penalty. | 1 | |
The probability of social loss when disruptive passengers choose to break the law. | 0.7 | |
The social loss of disruptive passengers choosing to break the law. | 1 |
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Wu, Y.; He, S.; Zhang, Q.; Shi, J.; Xie, J. Evolution Game and Simulation Analysis of Disturbance Emergency Disposal of In-Flight Cabin: China Civil Aviation Security Strategy Study. Sustainability 2023, 15, 9029. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15119029
Wu Y, He S, Zhang Q, Shi J, Xie J. Evolution Game and Simulation Analysis of Disturbance Emergency Disposal of In-Flight Cabin: China Civil Aviation Security Strategy Study. Sustainability. 2023; 15(11):9029. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15119029
Chicago/Turabian StyleWu, Yu, Shiting He, Qingsong Zhang, Jinxin Shi, and Jiang Xie. 2023. "Evolution Game and Simulation Analysis of Disturbance Emergency Disposal of In-Flight Cabin: China Civil Aviation Security Strategy Study" Sustainability 15, no. 11: 9029. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15119029