This is an early access version, the complete PDF, HTML, and XML versions will be available soon.
Open AccessArticle
A Study of Electronic Product Supply Chain Decisions Considering Extended Warranty Services and Manufacturer Misreporting Behavior
by
Rui Chen
Rui Chen 1
,
Zhen Luo
Zhen Luo 1,
Haiping Ren
Haiping Ren
Dr. Haiping Ren is an associate professor at Jiangxi University of Science and Technology. He a in a [...]
Dr. Haiping Ren is an associate professor at Jiangxi University of Science and Technology. He received a bachelor’s degree in applied mathematics from Changsha University of Science and Technology, China in 2003, a master’s degree in probability and statistics from Central South University, China in 2005, and a Ph.D. in Management Science from Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, China in 2015. He has published over 50 international journal papers and 3 academic monographs. His research interests include supply chain management, Bay, etc.
2,*
,
Xiaoqing Huang
Xiaoqing Huang 1 and
Shixiao Xiao
Shixiao Xiao 3
1
Business School, Jiangxi University of Science and Technology, Nanchang 330013, China
2
Teaching Department of Basic Subjects, Jiangxi University of Science and Technology, Nanchang 330013, China
3
Chengyi College, Jimei University, Xiamen 361021, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2024, 16(14), 6195; https://doi.org/10.3390/su16146195 (registering DOI)
Submission received: 30 May 2024
/
Revised: 14 July 2024
/
Accepted: 18 July 2024
/
Published: 19 July 2024
Abstract
In the supply chain management of electronic products, asymmetric cost information is a prevalent issue that can lead manufacturer to misreport costs, thereby exacerbating supply chain imbalances. This study focuses on the electronic product supply chain with an extended warranty service, where the manufacturer bears the after-sales responsibility during the extended warranty period. It explores the decision-making (DM) issues within the supply chain under different information environments and power structures. The Stackelberg game theory is employed to solve and analyze these models, and the main findings are as follows: (1) When supply chain information is symmetrical, centralized DM is the best choice. However, in cases where the supply chain adopts decentralized DM, it is more beneficial for the retailer and the supply chain if the retailer assumes the role of DM leader. Additionally, when the retail price sensitivity coefficient is low, the manufacturer will compete with the retailer for DM priority. Conversely, when the retail price sensitivity coefficient is higher, the manufacturer is better off as a follower in DM; (2) When the supply chain information is asymmetric, the manufacturer may engage in misreporting, which benefits the manufacturer but is detrimental to both the supply chain and the retailer. Moreover, if the price sensitivity coefficient is low, the manufacturer should lead the supply chain DM. Otherwise, the retailer should take the lead in supply chain DM. Adopting such a flexible strategy will prove advantageous for all parties involved in the supply chain. (3) The strategy of “reducing the retail price and increasing the extended warranty price” is a favorable strategy for the supply chain.
Share and Cite
MDPI and ACS Style
Chen, R.; Luo, Z.; Ren, H.; Huang, X.; Xiao, S.
A Study of Electronic Product Supply Chain Decisions Considering Extended Warranty Services and Manufacturer Misreporting Behavior. Sustainability 2024, 16, 6195.
https://doi.org/10.3390/su16146195
AMA Style
Chen R, Luo Z, Ren H, Huang X, Xiao S.
A Study of Electronic Product Supply Chain Decisions Considering Extended Warranty Services and Manufacturer Misreporting Behavior. Sustainability. 2024; 16(14):6195.
https://doi.org/10.3390/su16146195
Chicago/Turabian Style
Chen, Rui, Zhen Luo, Haiping Ren, Xiaoqing Huang, and Shixiao Xiao.
2024. "A Study of Electronic Product Supply Chain Decisions Considering Extended Warranty Services and Manufacturer Misreporting Behavior" Sustainability 16, no. 14: 6195.
https://doi.org/10.3390/su16146195
Note that from the first issue of 2016, this journal uses article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details
here.
Article Metrics
Article Access Statistics
For more information on the journal statistics, click
here.
Multiple requests from the same IP address are counted as one view.