Sustainable Development and Infrastructure: Effective Indigenous Resistance from a Power and Decolonizing Environmental Justice Lens

Abstract

Under the discourses of sustainable development and modernization of the Amazon, an iron triangle of governments, companies, and investors often impose large-scale infrastructure projects (LSIPs) on Indigenous peoples to facilitate commodity extraction and market transactions in a context of capitalist market expansion. Indigenous resistance to LSIPs can be understood as a power struggle against coloniality and towards decolonizing environmental justice (DEJ). This study merges DEJ and power frameworks, while involving Indigenous leaders as co-researchers to provide a critical, insider perspective on the (i) motivations, (ii) strategies, and (iii) agency of two effective Indigenous resistance processes: the luchas led by Yunguillo Indigenous Reserve against roads, and by the Mancomunidad de Comunidades de los ríos Beni, Tuichi y Quiquibey against hydroelectric dams. In both cases, motivations reflected DEJ goals: the defense of Indigenous autonomy and territorial sovereignty, as well as Indigenous ontologies and epistemologies, reflecting an alternative vision of sustainability and development. However, locals’ positions regarding the projects were convoluted, partly due to the patronizing and divisive strategies of the iron triangle. To challenge the coloniality of power, both groups applied a diverse, synergistic, and adaptative set of strategies. External and internal alliances (i.e., with other actors and within communities), as well as actions to empower themselves as groups (e.g., self-governance) and individuals (e.g., spirituality) constituted key organizational leveraging strategies to increase their power-with and power-within. The instrumental strategies of collective action, civil disobedience, and direct resistance, in a climate of highly unjust and poorly trusted official institutions, showed great effectiveness to exert pressure on the iron triangle (power-over) and halt the projects (power-to, or agency). Success, nevertheless, was partial and uncertain: one battle won in an unequal war and in a changing context. This study seeks to contribute to previous efforts to decolonize and repoliticize academia, environmentalism, and sustainability, advance debates on strategies that challenge official systems and entrenched power structures, and validate Indigenous perspectives and experiences, producing scientific evidence that contributes to their luchas.

1. Introduction

Large-scale infrastructure projects (LSIPs) of access and energy represent hegemonic ways of life, value systems, and political and historical projects that emanate from colonization [1,2,3]. In the Amazon, under the discourses of development, integration, modernization, competitiveness, and sustainable growth [4,5], and through the program Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA), an iron triangle of governments, companies, and investors [6,7,8] heavily promotes LSIPs to facilitate commodities extraction and trade in a context of capitalist market expansion [9,10,11,12,13,14,15]. With USD 27 billion, IIRSA emerged to reconfigure the Amazon through national and transnational LSIPs in the energy, transportation, and communication sectors [3,16,17,18]. This reflects a “colonial and postcolonial vision of the [Andean-Amazonian] foothills as a physical and symbolic frontier between a ‘civilized’ and a ‘savage’ world” (p. 69, [8]). Combining decolonizing environmental justice (DEJ) and power as analytical lenses facilitates a critical, non-apolitical analysis of Indigenous resistance to LSIPs. The numerous cases of Indigenous peoples (IPs) posing resistance to LSIPs [2,17] can be understood, then, as power struggles against coloniality—the power matrix created in the context of colonial Eurocentered capitalism and that continues dominating in post-colonial societies [19,20,21]—and towards DEJ—which calls for Indigenous autonomy, ontological justice, self-affirmation, and epistemological justice [19,22].

Indigenous resistance to LSIPs can arise from three interlinked motivations. The first is the defense of their Indigenous autonomy, sovereignty, and self-government rights, which are infringed when LSIPs are imposed in their territories. IPs reject the iron triangle’s attempts to coerce them into, exclude them from, or treat them as just one of many actors in decision-making processes. The second motivation is ontological [23]: the defense of their Indigenous worldview, culture, and ways of life. Amazonian and Andean IPs promote Buen Vivir (“Sumak Kawsay” in Quechua), which means living well or having a full life [24,25,26,27]. Thus, IPs oppose the hegemonic, capitalist paradigm of development as economic growth and of nature as service provider [1,3,17,28] that come along with LSIPs. The third motivation is about self-affirmation and epistemic justice: IPs reject LSIPs to defend their right to self-recognize their own existence, self-worth, knowledge systems, and customary (de facto) rights, independently of what is recognized (or not) by formal institutions (de jure rights) [19,29,30,31,32,33]. This raises the question as to whether these motivations fit in the sustainable development discourse, a globally hegemonic “lexicon based on [Western] sustainability science” (p. 9 [3]).

With the above-mentioned motivations, IPs apply diverse resistance strategies to challenge the coloniality of power. The iron triangle concentrates important sources of power (e.g., political, economic, ideological) [34,35], which they use to impose LSIPs, usually through power-over (i.e., power that emanates from coercion, domination, and control over others) [36]. Resistance strategies help IPs counteract such colonial power structures, often through power-with (collective power that emanates from networks and relationships), power-within (power that emanates from the sense of self-worth and self-confidence), and power-to (agency or power to shape reality) [35,36]. Disobeying official (de jure) institutions that are considered unjust—for instance, through social protests, non-negotiation, and occupations of construction sites and public buildings—has proven to be a “distinct possibility” for Amazonian conservation (p. 9 [3]) and highly effective to fight political coercion and control [7,37,38]. Paradoxically, appealing to official systems rather than challenging them is also often effective, as in demanding that social–environmental laws be effectively enforced, promoting the legal recognition of communities’ rights and territories, or dialoguing with the government to amend official institutions [7]. Other highly effective strategies include strengthening Indigenous organizations and creating coalitions with other actors (power-with) [7]. Alliances have been particularly key for diverse types of social–environmental resistance processes [39,40]. IPs often seek support from conservation actors by forming alliances with them, framing their historical struggles for social and economic power as environmental sustainability struggles [1,34].

Despite the various studies examining Indigenous resistance to LSIPs, there are relatively few analyses that focus on successful cases and use decolonizing approaches [21,22,41,42]. Using a power and DEJ lens, and including Indigenous leaders as co-researchers, this study comparatively analyzes two cases of Indigenous resistance in the Amazon with LSIPs that were part of IIRSA and were eventually suspended: the stories of the Yunguillo, an Indigenous Reserve in Colombia with communities who opposed roads, and the Mancomunidad de Comunidades de los Ríos Beni, Tuichi y Quiquibey, a group of communities in Bolivia who opposed hydroelectric dams. We ask, in a coloniality-shaped context (i) what were the Indigenous groups’ motivations, and how did they reflect DEJ goals?; (ii) what resistance strategies did they use, and how did they help challenge the coloniality of power?; and (iii) to what extent were they effective in stopping the LSIPs, and what does it mean for Indigenous agency? Our ultimate aim is to produce scientific evidence that validates the perspectives, experiences, and knowledge of both Indigenous groups and contribute to their luchas (in English, struggles). Although findings and conclusions are specific to the two cases, they are also relevant to other Indigenous resistance processes in the Amazon and other regions. This research aims, in that way, to contribute to previous efforts to decolonize and re-politicize academia, environmentalism, and sustainability, as well as to existing debates about political strategies that question official systems and challenge unequal power relations.

2. Analytical Framework

Our analytical framework (Figure 1) represents the motivations (i.e., the defense of autonomy rights, ontological justice, epistemic justice, and self-affirmation), different types of strategies (and the synergies among them), and effectiveness of Indigenous resistance processes (and the agency of the Indigenous groups involved). [This framework can be adapted to analyze socioenvironmental conflicts and movements in general]. Reflecting an adaptive governance perspective [43], motivations and strategies interact iteratively with the results obtained and the project proponents (iron triangle), with the feedback represented by the black and gray arrows in Figure 1. All of this occurs within the context of coloniality-shaped systems that govern power relations (coloniality of power): cultural paradigms, economy, policies, politics, legality, illegality, rights, territories, public opinion, etc. [1,16,44,45].

Adapting the typology developed by Perz et al. [7], we distinguish two main types of resistance strategies: organizational and instrumental (see

Table 1. Types of resistance strategies.

Types of Strategies	Strategies		Code	Description
Organizational	Internal empowerment		ORG-IntUni	Actions to strengthen internal governance, group unity, culture and collective identity, and social capital; for example, through awareness-raising processes and internal dialogue.
			ORG-IntCap	Actions to strengthen the capacities and knowledge (traditional and/or Western) of its members; for example through educational programs and training, as well as their self-confidence (i.e., psychological empowerment or ‘power within’) and personal security.
	Research and information		ORG-Inf	Research, assessments, information gathering and monitoring of social or environmental indicators.
	Coalitions with other actors		ORG-Coa	Networking and alliance building with other external actors who have similar or compatible objectives or positions.
Instrumental strategies	Collective action and communication		MOV-Act	Collective impact actions, such as protests, civil disobedience, and awareness campaigns, aimed at influencing or exerting social pressure on external actors.
	Political incidence	Enforcement of laws and norms	POL-Enf	Enforcement of international, national, local, or community (e.g., customary) laws and norms that aim to protect IPs, their rights, territories and/or environment.
		Promotion of new or innovative legal and institutional frameworks	POL-Innov	Creation of new policies or legal regulations with innovative designs or approaches aimed at improving the protection of IPs, their rights, territories and/or environment.
	Territorial protection and management	Protected areas and Indigenous reserves	TERR-Protc	Creation, expansion, protection, and legal planning of conservation areas and legal recognition of IP territories.
		Territorial management	TERR-Mng	Management of ecosystems, resources and/or species of flora or fauna, for example, through land use planning, zoning, or management plans.
		Livelihoods management	TERR-Econ	Community forest management, community enterprises based on the sustainable use of resources, payment systems for ecosystem services (PES), among others.

). Organizational strategies are applied by groups to empower themselves and their members by boosting their internal governance, knowledge, capacities, and alliances. We consider them leveraging or enabling strategies because they facilitate the implementation of instrumental strategies. Instrumental or action strategies are meant to influence decision-making directly, and include collective action, political negotiation, and management of territories and livelihoods. Synergies can exist between different strategies.

3. Methodologies and Methods

3.1. Case Selection

The two cases selected both exhibited resistance processes led by Amazonian Indigenous groups that managed to suspend LSIPs promoted by national governments as part of IIRSA. The two cases varied in terms of the type of infrastructure project and various aspects of the local and national contexts. IPs from Colombia and Bolivia that are part of a Community of Practice and Learning facilitated by the University of Florida (Governance and Infrastructure in the Amazon, GIA, https://giamazon.org) identified these cases as valuable opportunities for documentation and analysis. Thus, cases were not selected with the purpose of generalizing findings but to allow analysis of lessons learned from experiences with infrastructure governance in the Amazon [46].

The Yunguillo Reserve is located in the north of Mocoa, in Putumayo, Colombia (Figure 2). Officially established by Presidential Decree in 1953, it is organized into four “cabildos” (governance systems of Indigenous Reserves, recognized by Colombian legislation) and it is home to around 1700 members of the Inga-Kamentzá ethnic group [47]. Possessing a strong identity and warrior nature as an Inga people, in this paper Yunguillo also refers to the mobilized IPs of the Reserve. Yunguillo is known for its extensive area and for its communities who actively fight to defend their traditions and rights. In addition to surviving numerous threats, such as guerrillas, illicit crops, and invasion of their territories by outsiders, Yunguillo also managed to create one of the first national parks in Colombia (Cueva de los Guácharos) and, in 2015, they secured the expansion of their legal territory from 4320 to 26,716 hectares [46,47,48]. Yunguillo opposed two mega road projects that would impact Yunguillo: the San Francisco–Mocoa road (45 km) and the Bajo-Bota Caucana-Santa Rosa-Descanse–Yunguillo-Condagua road (hereinafter, called Bajo-Condagua), announced in 2010 and 2014, respectively [46]. The San Francisco–Mocoa road, promoted by Alvaro Uribe’s administration and financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) [49], passes approximately 2 km from Yunguillo’s boundaries. The Bajo–Condagua road, promoted by the government of Juan Manuel Santos, would cross Yunguillo, as building it around the Reserve would mean crossing several rivers and higher costs.

The Mancomunidad de Comunidades in Bolivia is a representative body of 18 communities from the Beni River basin and its tributary rivers, the Tuichi and Quiquibey, from the Tsimane, Moseten, Tacana, Uchiamonas, Esse Eja and Leco ethnic groups. The communities adjoin two legally protected areas created in part for them to sustainably use natural resources: the Madidi National Park and Integrated Management Natural Area (PN-ANMI), where there are four Community Territories of Origin, and the Pilón Lajas Biosphere Reserve and Community Land of Origin (Figure 3 and Figure 4). The Mancomunidad was established in 2001 to protect their territory from the NGO ECO Bolivia, which was trying to develop tourist activities. The Mancomunidad was reactivated in 2007 when Evo Morales’ government announced the Chepete–Bala hydroelectric project, declaring it to be of national interest and priority [50]. The project consists of two dams in the Beni basin, El Bala and Chepete [51]. The national electricity company ENDE was designated to build the dams, following an energy agreement with Brazil in 2016; the private company GEODATA was hired by ENDE to carry out the technical studies. According to the environmental records of the project, the Chepete and El Bala dams would cost around USD 6.912 and 1.151 billion, respectively, costs that would be covered 70% by external financing (unspecified) and 30% by state funds. It is estimated that there are around 900 and 2314 inhabitants located within the areas of influence of the project, respectively, in addition to 1950 inhabitants in neighboring areas [52].

3.2. Approach and Methods

Applying collaborative methodologies, and in the context of the GIA Community of Practice and Learning, five Indigenous leaders, three from Yunguillo and two from the Mancomunidad, participated as co-researchers. They contributed to defining the research goals and questions, designing methodologies and methods, conducting interviews, and analyzing results. They presented the project to community authorities and leaders, elders (i.e., wise men), and inhabitants of Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad, to gather their opinions and request their consent. In Colombia, this process involved ceremonies and spiritual rituals with community members and traditional authorities, called Sinchis Iachas in the local Indigenous language (Inga).

Qualitative data were collected in 2020, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, in three ways. First, via Zoom meetings and events, unstructured interviews and observations were used to capture the perspectives of governmental actors, NGOs, and other key actors about general aspects of the local and national context (e.g., infrastructure, governance, Indigenous peoples) and the two study cases. Second, storytelling and open-ended conversations via telephone and Zoom were conducted with the Indigenous co-researchers, to capture their views about the general context and more specific details of the local context and the studied cases, in which they were directly involved.

Third, the Indigenous co-researchers conducted semi-structured in-person interviews with 43 leaders and members of their own communities, both women and men (

Table 2. Type and number of interviews conducted in the four cabildos that are part of the Yunguillo Reservation, Colombia.

Cabildos of the Yunguillo Reservation	Type of Interview	Number of Interviews
Cabildo Mayor de Yunguillo	Individual	11
Cabildo Menor de San Carlos	Individual	2
Cabildo Menor de Tandarido	Individual	4
Cabildo Menor de Osococha	Individual	2
Total interviews		19

and

Table 3. Type and number of interviews conducted in the communities of the Beni, Tuichi y Quiquibey rivers that are represented by the Mancomunidad de Comunidades, Bolivia.

River Basin	Communities Represented by the Mancomunidad de Comunidades	Type of Interview	Number of Interviews
Quiquibey	Asunción de Quinquibey	Individual	2
	Corte	Individual	2
	San Luis Grande	Individual	2
	San Luis Chico	Group	2
	San Bernardo	Individual	1
	Bisal	Individual	1
	Gredal	Group	2
Beni	Torewa	Individual	2
	San Antonio de Sani	Group	2
	Carmen Florida	Group	3
	San Miguel del Bala	Individual	2
	Villa Alcira	Individual	2
Tuichi	San Jose de Uchupiamonas	Individual	1
Total interviews			24

). To gather diverse perspectives, interviewees included both inhabitants who were directly involved in the resistance process and inhabitants who were not. Using a question guide jointly designed with the Indigenous co-researchers, carefully adapted to the context of Yunguillo (Colombia) and the communities of the Beni area (Bolivia), and previously approved by communal authorities, interviewees were asked about their perceptions on the LSPIs at issue and their involvement in resistance processes. In situ, the Mancomunidad co-researchers adapted the question guide and methods to respond to the preferences of the interviewees. Thus, in Bolivia some interviews with community members were in groups, some interviewees preferred to speak in the presence of other community members, and some interviews followed a less structured format.

All interviews with community members were recorded, voluntary, and confidential. Interviewees were willing to participate in the study with the idea of helping disseminate their history of rights violations and lucha. In Yunguillo, 19 individual interviews were conducted in the four cabildos. In Bolivia, interviews were conducted with 24 people in 13 of the 18 communities that form part of the Mancomunidad. Two communities in Bolivia decided not to participate and another three agreed to participate but information could not be collected or recorded. The information collected was analyzed and interpreted manually, jointly through oral sessions with the Indigenous co-researchers. To avoid the identification of interviewees, no information is provided about the speakers of the quotes and pieces of information used in this article. In the following section on findings, statements from interviewees are indicated in italics with quotation marks.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1. The Why of Resistance Processes: A Call to Decolonizing Environmental Justice

In this section we show why resistance processes in both cases constituted a struggle against the coloniality of power. “The community has rebelled.” Both groups challenged hegemonic political, economic, and cultural systems, marked by colonial power relations between Indigenous groups and organizations in the iron triangle: the highest authorities of the national government and the contracted companies, supported by various local authorities (e.g., the municipal government of Rurrenabaque, an urban area near the Chepete-Bala project), and financed by large international entities (e.g., the IDB in Colombia). In both cases, Indigenous groups fought to defend their autonomy, ontological justice, and epistemic justice (Figure 5).

4.1.1. Indigenous Autonomy: Rejection of the Imposition of LISPs

In a context of systematic violations of IPs’ rights—“the government has never respected [us]”—Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad opposed the LSIPs largely because they were being imposed, i.e., undertaken in their territories without their consent. The Bolivian government tried to justify the lack of a consultational process by claiming that the area was uninhabited. “The government declared that there were no inhabitants in this place, they have taken us as animals.” Both groups, then, were defending their Indigenous autonomy, sovereignty, and self-government rights: the right to decide for themselves about their lives and their territories. They supported this claim not only on official norms of IPs’ rights such as the right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) (Section 4.2.7), but also based on their community laws. A leader from Colombia explained that Yunguillo is governed by Derecho Propio (communal regulations, specific to Yunguillo), Derecho Mayor (Indigenous autonomy and sovereignty), Ley de Origen (principles that guide the existence of the IPs, their ways of life, belief systems, and relationships among humans and between humans and nature), and Ley Natural (the intrinsic relationship between humans and nature, implying that it is necessary to obey Mother Earth above all things and to act accordingly when Mother Earth expresses herself.). “This resistance is not a whim, but is based on respect for this Ley de Origen and Ley Natural.”

Interviewees highlighted their “territorial sovereignty” as an historical struggle. For centuries, IPs’ territories in the Amazon region have been violated by outsiders, investment projects, companies, and governments [For instance, the expansion of the Yunguillo territory was the result of several decades of struggles, not only because of the state bureaucracy but also lack of political will. “They did not want to give us the territory”]. “If our parents had not defended these territories we would not be here”; “The settlers always invaded our territory, this is the same experience, we have to defend ourselves.” The Mancomunidad was specifically born as an alliance between local communities “to support, to fight for the territory”. As for Yunguillo, communities had won their fight for territorial autonomy years ago by working on their Territorial Environmental Management Plan [That plan was developed in addition to the Safeguard Plan of the Inga Peoples, which led to the creation of the Indigenous Territorial Entity Atun Wasi Iuiai, of the Inga peoples of Colombia] with support from the NGO Amazon Conservation Team (ACT) [https://www.amazonteam.org/colombia/]. In this context, both groups rejected governments and companies proposing to execute the LSIPs in their territories. Yunguillo complained that the roads would cut through the ancestral territories of the Inga and Kamëntzá ethnic groups and facilitate the entry of outsiders. “Many people were worried (…) [that the San Francisco—Mocoa road] was going to pass through the territories.” Instead, Yunguillo requested a small road that would allow them to transport their products while maintaining control and authority over their territory. “What we wanted were small roads, for small cars that could reach this area.” In contrast, the government wanted to strengthen its control over the territories, strongly affected by the armed conflict, promoting the San Francisco–Mocoa road as synonymous with “peace building” [18].

4.1.2. Ontological Justice: Opposition to the Vision of Development Associated with LSIPs and Defense of Their Own Ways of Life

Interviewees from Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad, in interviews as well as their public statements [54,55], revealed that their resistance was largely an ontological struggle. They opposed the capitalist, extractivist, and colonialist development promoted in the LSIPs, presented by IIRSA masked as sustainable development or sustainable growth [4,5]. Interviewees claimed that LSIPs directly clashed with their traditional ways of life and endangered their culture, identity, and overall existence as IPs.

Conceiving “national and regional integration” and “economic competitiveness” as the objective of infrastructure (p. 887, [18]), IIRSA’s vision is to achieve rapid absorption of capital surpluses [56], resource extraction and markets in South America [10], and economic development and growth understood in terms of gross domestic product [57,58]. Thus, roads in Colombia and dams in Bolivia were promoted in the media with the idea that they would bring development. The Bolivian government claimed that the Chepete-Bala would “guarantee the country’s energy sovereignty,” shortly after having signed an energy agreement with Brazil [6,50]. The Colombian government promoted the roads with the idea of facilitating physical and economic exchange, both national and international, in a context in which the peace agreement of 2016 had opened the door to the Colombian Amazon to private actors interested in oil, wood, mining, and livestock [6,7,18,46].

This developmentalist paradigm represented by the LSIPs was rejected by Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad. For both groups, the LSIPs constituted a danger to their worldview, culture, spirituality, identity, and ways of life, which are rather based on a “harmonious relationship” with the environment and challenge the dualism between humans and nature. The Yunguillo Life Plan [47] emphasizes Indigenous culture and establishes a vision aligned with Buen Vivir [25]. The ontological shock of IIRSA was particularly strong in the case of Yunguillo given that, due to the insurgency, for several decades the Colombian Amazon had not been easily accessible to private actors and infrastructure megaprojects for capitalist development.

“The issue of the road is not a development for IPs, that is the loss of cultural identity as a people, it is allowing a people to be totally exterminated (…) Now men no longer want to identify themselves as Inga people (…) And for what reason? Because of the road. Because we are not prepared to receive the technology of [the Western] man, the intervention of [the Western] man.”

The ontological struggle is explicitly evident in interviewee concerns about the non-material damage that the LSIPs would cause, referring to the loss of their Indigenous culture. In Bolivia, the interviewees stated “Apart from the material losses, because of the dam, our identity, culture, language, traditions, and others would be lost”; “in the community there are customs and habits. If they move us to other places, we would lose all our culture”; “we lose our essence, our identity as an Indigenous people”. In Colombia, regarding the San Francisco—Mocoa road, a large part of which would be built on an ancestral route (Camino de Sachamate), the leaders of Yunguillo expressed to the media that their territory, sacred to them, would be destroyed by the road [59].

The ontological struggle is also evident in Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad’s rejection of the material damage that the LSIPs would cause, referring to damage to their territory and common goods, since their traditional ways of life depend on them. “Speaking of material things, there are the resources, the water, the impact on an ecosystem that we are inhabiting.” Interviewees claimed that the LSIPs would harm their territories, environment, crops, hunting, fishing and forest product gathering areas, thus endangering their ways of life and their survival as IPs. Some expressed a non-anthropocentric worldview: “[Roads] would affect us in everything, both animals and people.” They highlighted the impacts on aquatic ecosystems and water sources. In Yunguillo, roads would harm the headwaters, which are a source of water not only for the local population but also for the population downstream. “We live in headwaters (…) this is where the rivers are born.”. In Bolivia, interviewees expressed concern about the potential impacts of the dams on the aquatic ecosystem, mercury contamination, and eutrophication of the waters. “Everything will be flooded, there are poisonous trees that will die, the well they are going to dig will be poisoned, the fish will die from it, that water will not even be useful for bathing.” There is concern in Bolivia about the flooding and displacement of communities that the dams would cause and that would especially affect the eight communities settled on the banks of the Beni River. “We do not accept the project, because we will sink with all our houses”; “We were going to lose everything (…) It is better to have territory than to receive money.”

4.1.3. Epistemic Justice and Self-Affirmation: Defense of Traditional Ways of Knowing and Self-Assertion as IPs

The ontological struggle is closely linked to the epistemic struggle. When mentioning possible immaterial damages, the interviewees referred not only to the loss of their Indigenous culture, but also to the loss of their traditional knowledge, which is largely based on spirituality.

“As Indigenous peoples we cannot say that the effects are only material but also intangible… the issue of spirituality, of the knowledge of the people that we have, that we have been practicing for millennia, of sacred plants, especially yagé [A plant-based psychoactive brew, considered sacred and traditionally used by Indigenous peoples in South America], which science or the Western world does not see as we see it… that is the most important thing for us because it will generate great effects, irreparable damage in the communities.”

Although the interviewees did not explicitly mention self-affirmation as one of the motivations for resistance, it is however the case that self-recognition of their worth as IPs and of their rights, culture, and knowledge is indirectly evident in their strategies of resistance, which are analyzed in the following section.

4.2. The How of Resistance Processes: Strategies to Challenge the Coloniality of Power

Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad applied different strategies to challenge colonial power relations and stop the LSIPs. They did so in an adaptive manner, responding to the strategies of the iron triangle, “adapting, adjusting to circumstances” (Figure 6 and Figure 7) and creating synergies between strategies (Figure 8 and Figure 9). We begin by examining organizational strategies.

4.2.1. Internal Alliances: Building a Unified Position

In both cases, the position of community members regarding the LSIPs was not homogeneous or static, but rather complex and dynamic. Through processes of internal dialogue (ORG-IntUni) about the potential impacts of the LSIPs, the leaders of Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad progressively strengthened themselves as legitimate local representatives and consolidated a unified position among community members. This enhanced the collective power (power-with) of Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad as internal alliances and, thus, their internal power (power-within) as organizations. “The more numerous we are, the more strength there is. That is the strength of the Mancomunidad”; “With these [internal] alliances we expelled GEODATA.”

For Yunguillo, achieving a unified position was relatively easy, thanks to its solid internal governance, based on a strong Indigenous identity, respect for its traditional authorities, constant dialogue, and great unity between inhabitants and cabildos. This is explained by the history, culture, and specific traits of the Inga people, as well as by a previous process through which Yunguillo reinforced its governance and Indigenous identity by collectively formulating its Life Plan, rules of coexistence, Territorial Environmental Management Plan (TERR-Mng), and community ethno-educational project (ORG-IntUni and ORG-IntCap) with support from ACT (ORG-Coa). In addition, the then governor of Yunguillo, who led the resistance, is a highly respected leader among Yunguillo inhabitants, endowed with impressive knowledge, skills, and internal strength (power-within).

“A strength… governance in our territory. Until now we have always had our traditional authorities, and from there we have been strengthening the issue of politics and those dialogues with companies… we have also been working on different issues, the Life Plan, the Internal Regulations, the Environmental Management Plan… which empowers us as Indigenous peoples.”

In this context, Yunguillo undertook what they called a “political negotiation” that achieved a consensual position towards the roads. Following their community laws (POL-Apli and POL-Innov), they held traditional assemblies, ceremonies, and spiritual practices. These events were led by wise elders, ethno-educators, and traditional authorities of Yunguillo, who constitute “spokespeople for community members and for nature”. Community members talked among themselves and “with nature” to understand the potential impacts of the roads and make decisions with a view to the common good. “We must let nature itself speak, let nature itself listen.”

In contrast, the Mancomunidad, which had been inactive for many years, faced strong internal division regarding the Chepete-Bala. The government and company applied the divide and conquer strategy to try to weaken the Mancomunidad by refusing to meet with its leaders [They also met separately with the Regional Council of the Tsimane and Moseten peoples, whose territories occupy most of the project area of influence, to obtain their consent.]. Instead, with great political and economic power to “move quickly”, ENDE visited each community separately to “buy” their support with “promising gifts”, handing them out food, caps, and sewing machines and promising them schools, health centers, and low-cost electricity. It also used tricks to obtain signatures from the population as alleged proof of consent. “It is easy to try to convince people who cannot read much. They [ENDE] paid for the cooking and then, only after people finished eating, they made them sign. And they make that list look like… if they [inhabitants] had already given their consent… They did not know it was for the project.” Also, the company hired some community members, paying them more than local people usually earn. This must be contextualized in the historical marginalization of the IPs. “We continue living in oblivion, in darkness, we have no electricity, they have never remembered about us.” Inhabitants accepted the benefits offered by the company “out of necessity,” because they meant “a relief”.

The Mancomunidad responded by undertaking awareness-raising activities (MOV-Act) to inform community members about the environmental and social impacts that the Chepete-Bala would bring. They organized meetings, assemblies, and workshops in the El Bala region and Rurrenabaque city, using simple language, audiovisual materials, and group dynamics. It was not an easy process. The government attempted to discredit the Mancomunidad, claiming that it was acting “out of interest, for its own sake, and for large sums of money [from NGOs]” and threatened to not execute the promised development projects in those communities who met with the Mancomunidad. In addition, the inhabitants’ distrust of verbal agreements, a result of repeated deceptions by external actors, reduced their attendance to the awareness-raising events. “Word of mouth is not a valid call.” Still, the Mancomunidad managed to unify the population against the Chepete-Bala. Its horizontal governance system helped protect its legitimacy among community members. “Other Indigenous organizations are vertical, which is precisely why many important [Indigenous] leaders ally themselves with any [governmental] administration.” Furthermore, when the government did not deliver the promised development projects, some communities that were initially in favor of the project turned against it.

The Mancomunidad’s efforts to keep the population united against the Chepete-Bala can be described as partially successful. Several interviewees stated that “all” or “most” of the inhabitants opposed the hydroelectric project. However, others expressed that there was some disagreement partly due to the jobs offered by the company. “The Charque community has been won over and convinced by the government.” Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic complicated the Mancomunidad’s awareness-raising activities. “Before [the pandemic] there were workshops, meetings, we were strong and united, now… we are weakening even more, because there are no more workshops or meetings.”

4.2.2. External Alliances

Both Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad formed alliances with external actors (ORG-Coa), thereby increasing their collective power (power-with). Besides cementing pre-existing connections, external alliances also boosted the political influence of both Indigenous groups at the national and international level (POL-Apli) and helped them access economic, logistical, administrative, and legal support for their resistance activities, including collective action (MOV-Act), territorial protection (TERR-Protc), and personal safety measures (ORG-IntUni). Interviewed community members considered these alliances to be legitimate, since they had been established with prior authorization from the communities (POL-Apli), and were not concerned about not knowing in depth some details and technical aspects of these alliances, as they trusted the leaders of Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad.

For Yunguillo, the connection and relationship of trust that it had built with ACT over the past decade was crucial. Previously, ACT had provided Yunguillo with financial, technical, and administrative support to strengthen its internal governance and expand its legal territory (TERR-Protc), which was later key for Yunguillo’s struggle against the roads. ACT also helped safeguard the personal security of Yunguillo’s leaders (ORG-IntCap), while the NGO Land is Life helped implement security checkpoints in Yunguillo (TERR-Protc). In addition, Yunguillo reached an agreement with authorities from neighboring towns to request a small-scale road instead of a large-scale one (MOV-Act, POL-Innov). Yunguillo dialogued with governmental officials of some nearby farm towns and municipalities, who thus realized that the San Francisco–Mocoa road [18] could increase state control over the area and end up restricting their informal economic activities, such as coca cultivation, logging, and mining. Having aligned positions based on different interests, Yunguillo had a “love-hate relationship” with those local authorities.

The Mancomunidad connected with the Universidad San Andrés and the NGO Fundación Solón to develop technical studies that demonstrated the infeasibility of the Chepete-Bala (ORG-Inf). In addition, various civil society groups (in Spanish, colectivos), NGOs, merchants from nearby urban centers, producer associations, and private actors from the tourism sector offered support and resources to the Mancomunidad for its social mobilization and political negotiation activities (MOV-Act and POL-Apli), which they called vigilia (in English, vigil) (Section 4.2.6). In 2001, the Mancomunidad formalized a coalition with the Subcentral del Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Securé (TIPNIS) for a “joint struggle” to defend their rights and territories from LSIPs [54]. It also connected with the national Indigenous organization CIDOB, the so-called “organic faction”, which operates independently of the government and opposes Chepete-Bala—unlike other Indigenous organizations, linked to the Morales government (known in Bolivia as organizaciones matrices, in Spanish). Another partner was the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights of Bolivia, which helped strengthen their capacities (Section 4.2.3). The Mancomunidad also contacted and received political support from some governmental entities in the environmental sector, such as the national authority on protected areas. That way, the Mancomunidad framed its fight against the Chepete-Bala, which was fundamentally in defense of communities’ rights, ways of life, territories, and culture, as an environmental struggle. Its leaders also said that they were seeking more help from international actors.

4.2.3. Knowledge and Skills

The leaders of both groups acquired information, knowledge, and capabilities (ORG-Inf, ORG-IntUni, and ORG-IntCap). This boosted the power-within not only of individuals but also of Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad as groups. Given the strong legitimacy that leaders had among community members and the active ways they shared the information with them, capacity building reinforced collective knowledge and social networks. This constituted a leveraging strategy for their instrumental strategies of communication, awareness, and political influence (MOV-Act and POL-Apli), which in turn strengthened the knowledge and awareness of all the community members.

The leaders of Yunguillo sought information about the road projects that gave them solid arguments to claim to the government that these projects had not respected their right to FPIC nor properly considered the environmental impacts. The capacity of the then-governor of Yunguillo was key to the review and management of documents. Being a leader from a very young age, she had cultivated her ancestral knowledge and had access to educational programs in Colombia. “Wherever I went, I mastered the subject, because that is what being an authority is. But I did not acquire that in school, I acquired it in the community and in nature. If I know how the jaguar moves, learning the rest is very easy.”

The leaders of the Mancomunidad improved their knowledge and skills with help from external actors. Through the studies developed by the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés–UMSA and Fundación Solón (ORG-Coa), they grasped the technical aspects of the financial, social, and environmental unfeasibility of the Chepete-Bala [These studies contributed evidence that the Chepete-Bala Project did not have sufficient budget, that the price offered by Brazil did not cover the investment costs, and that what the government was looking for was access to credit. They also showed that the influence zone of the Project would include part of the two nearby protected areas]. Also, by participating in multi-actor events and meetings, they increased their technical and legal knowledge related to the potential impacts of the project. They also strengthened their management and legal skills through an agreement with the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights of Bolivia (ORG-Coa). “The Mancomunidad learned from lawyers, they sought information to strengthen themselves.”

“For example, with Universidad San Andrés, or with Marco Octavio Rivera, who held a workshop in 2015, telling us about the dangers caused by a dam. Before, we didn’t understand what a dam was or how it would affect us, or the magnitude, size, distance, flooding. It was like waking up to something that was coming at us.”

Such knowledge and skills were crucial for the Mancomunidad’s advocacy activities with the media, government, and international actors (MOV-Act and POL-Apli). “We have to be concrete in what we say. Be clear. Because sometimes the press asks tricky questions. We want the general public to understand what our position is.” Knowledge and skills were also keys for the awareness-raising process across communities:

“[The Mancomunidad] always brought in-depth information from other organizations and institutions knowledgeable about these issues, such as UMSA. It was Fundación Solón who told us: ‘Indigenous brothers, this is the risk we have if we accept this’ or ‘this is going to happen’ (…) to raise awareness among people in the communities.”

4.2.4. Safety and Inner Power of Community Leaders

In the case of Yunguillo, its leaders needed to safeguard their personal security and then strengthen themselves spiritually and psychologically (power-in) to confront the iron triangle. The then-governor of Yunguillo had begun to receive threats, in a context where people in different cities, towns, and authorities in the region seemed exasperated about Yunguillo’s position against large-scale roads and other development projects. Moreover, Colombia is the most dangerous country in the world for activists [60,61,62], marked by decades of armed conflict, violence, and reprisals by private companies, gangs, and criminal organizations against local leaders and activists [The presence of armed groups in the region continued even after the Peace Agreement]. Although the origin of such threats was uncertain, interviewees showed certainty that many of them originated from construction companies executing infrastructure projects.

Yunguillo first tried, unsuccessfully, to use official systems to safeguard its governor’s security. After initial complaints to governmental institutions were not properly addressed, they got help from ACT to request protection from state entities, such as the Ministry of the Interior and the National Protection Unit, which included armed bodyguards and vehicles for Yunguillo’s governor. However, Yunguillo did not have much confidence in this system, suspecting that spies had infiltrated the bodyguard team. Their distrust increased when, in the context of Colombia’s Peace Agreement, the government assigned former members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the same armed group that had threatened Yunguillo in the past, as bodyguards. Therefore, the governor opted for an unofficial security strategy: hiding in the remote areas of Yunguillo territory.

After hiding for approximately 4 months, the strategy changed again: the governor decided to stop hiding and instead, spiritually empowering herself through traditional ceremonies, face their potential aggressors. “I was very angry, because [while hiding] I ended up sleeping in different places and even in the jungle (…) I said to myself ‘I don’t have to hide, I don’t owe anything to anyone’… After many ceremonies, I went out there.” By facing the towns, rural villages, and authorities with whom Yunguillo did not have good relations, she managed to convince them to position themselves against the Bajo–Condagua road (Section 4.2.3).

Next, we analyze how both Indigenous groups increased and exercised their power with diverse instrumental strategies. Finally, we analyze cultural practices and adaptation as crosscutting strategies.

4.2.5. Territorial Control and Collective Action

Territorial defense and control strategies (TERR-Protc) were very much linked to collective action strategies (MOV-Act) and reflected the culture of both Indigenous groups (Section 4.2.8). By applying direct action strategies and exerting public pressure, Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad disobeyed the government’s decision allowing the contracting companies to enter their territories. These actions managed to temporarily halt the projects (power-to), thus increasing the self-confidence of both groups (power-within).

In their defiance of the official approval given to the company to enter their territory to carry out the Bajo–Condagua highway project, Yunguillo showed its warrior tradition (Section 4.2.8). They enforced their traditional norms (POL-Innov), which prohibit the entry of outsiders without their permission, and applied their traditional system of control and sanction, finally expelling the offenders. Additionally, with support from allied NGOs, Yunguillo further strengthened its control over its territory through other means: by installing a security checkpoint at the entrance of the Reserve to control the entry and exit of third parties and, importantly, by achieving the legal expansion of the Reserve. Although initiated years ago as a separate struggle, the legal recognition and expansion of Yunguillo territory politically empowered Yunguillo in its resistance to large roads by giving legal legitimacy to their claim for territorial autonomy. “The territorial issue will always be key to respect.”

To respond to the unauthorized entry of the company into their territory in 2016, the Mancomunidad organized a vigil. It was the same strategy it had used in the past to expel the NGO ECO Bolivia. They blocked the passage of vessels meant to bring personnel, fuel, food, and materials to the project area, placing a barbed wire in a “strategic place” on the river, the Estrecho del Bala. Hundreds of residents and allied organizations participated; approximately 300 to 500 people in total. After 12 days of blockage, the company requested a pass to be able to withdraw from the area (power-to): “a battle won in an unequal war”. Creating a feeling of victory, this success strengthened the Mancomunidad’s cohesion and fighting spirit. As a celebration and demonstration of collective power (power-with), they gathered in the city of Rurrenabaque and mobilized “the bases”, that is, local leaders and community members. All interviewees, even those who did not participate directly (e.g., Gredal community), supported the vigil and remember it as a crucial moment. “The main activity that the Mancomunidad did was to block the Beni River, the vigil was the most appropriate measure to make ourselves heard.” The vigil was possible thanks in large part to support from external allies (Org-Coa) who helped cover the costs of fuel and food for the vigil participants (Section 4.2.3). Also crucial was the unity between communities (ORG-IntUni): “…with the alliances [between communities] the vigil was organized”. Some interviewees suggested that impasses between the government company ENDE and the contracting company GEODATA favored the success of the vigil.

The Mancomunidad also organized the protest and sit-in in front of the facilities of the contracting companies in the city of Rurrenabaque. It also participated in protests that different Indigenous and civil society groups in Bolivia organized against Evo Morales and various investment projects, such as the TIPNIS highway [54]. This social momentum helped lead to the resignation of Morales in 2019.

4.2.6. Appeal and Challenge to Official Norms, Based on Community Laws

The fact that the projects were violating Indigenous rights to FPIC was not only a reason why Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad opposed them (Section 4.1). FPIC also constituted an argument, a language, that they used to support their resistance processes. Both groups used national and international norms on FPIC in different ways at different times: first by appealing to them (POL-Apli) and then by challenging them.

National regulations on FPIC can be tainted by political and economic interests, given that ILO Convention 169 leaves it to each country to create and implement its own regulatory framework [63]. In the Amazon, in practice, FPIC is often not implemented, not implemented properly, or is inconsequential, functioning more as a bureaucratic procedure designed to give the green light to projects already politically approved [12,16]. To illustrate, the Colombian government used the fact that the legal expansion of the Yunguillo Reserve was still in process as justification to claim that no consultation process was needed for the San Francisco–Mocoa road. In Bolivia, numerous interviewees stated with frustration that what is written on paper is not applied in practice, and that the lawmakers are the same ones who violate the law. Even though Evo Morales’ administration maintained a leftist discourse and created the Bolivian Constitution of 2009 that established protections for the rights of IPs and of nature, it was also imposing the Chepete-Bala. Morales declared the Chepete-Bala a national priority the same year that he supported the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

In this context, while Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad did demand compliance with official regulations on IPs and FPIC. At the same time, they also appealed to their traditional norms, which prohibit entry into their territory and the execution of projects without their prior authorization, and which establish a harmonious relationship with the environment. This strategy is based on the customary (de facto) rights and community norms of Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad, while also appealing to national and international laws. Although not all those interviewed knew the de jure laws in detail, they knew of their existence and trusted their leaders to fight for their compliance. “It was demanded that the laws be respected. I don’t remember which laws (…) It is within the Constitution that culture be respected.”

In its fight against the two roads, as in many other previous struggles, Yunguillo appealed to its right to FPIC and to the ILO Convention 169. “We have always been talking about this free, prior and informed consent (…) we have always demanded that the different entities comply with it.” “If something happens without the consent of the communities, if they try to enter with projects we will go out and mobilize (…) The road to Santa Rosa, there we have been demanding that peoples’ rights be respected.” When the government tried to justify the lack of a consultation process for the Bajo–Condagua road by arguing that Yunguillo had already given its consent years ago, the then-governor of Yunguillo skillfully refuted this. She explained that the past consultation process was not valid because (i) it had been carried out several decades ago and most of the participants had already passed away; (ii) it had not complied with the minimum protocols, given that at that time the FPIC had not yet been legislated; and (iii) it had referred to it as a small road. In Bolivia, community members were wisely cautious due to their historical distrust of the government, and therefore refused to sign documents brought by soldiers and engineers. “Soldiers came by and told us to sign some documents, but we didn’t sign because we didn’t know what these documents were for.” Furthermore, the Mancomunidad issued public statements denouncing the lack of compliance with international standards on FPIC (ILO Convention 169) and national norms on IP rights, the right to health, and the rights of nature (articles 30, 39, and 71 of the Constitution, respectively), besides speaking at hearings of the Constitutional Court on the Rights of Nature in Cochabamba (Mov-Acc).

In a second instance, seeing the lack of political power to undertake proper FPIC processes, both Indigenous groups changed their strategy: they began to refuse to participate in any consultation process and directly demanded the cancellation of the projects. Leaders from Yunguillo argued that Colombia’s FPIC law was the result of a top-down process and, therefore, served only the interests of the government and private sector. “These decrees have a lot of traps.” In Bolivia, interviewees stated that they were not surprised that they had not been properly consulted, alluding to a long history of rights violations and abuses of power. “There were difficulties in demanding compliance with laws. The government is the government and they are the ones in power. We as Indigenous peoples have always been trampled on by them.” The consultation, they argued, would no longer be prior, since the Chepete-Bala was already being executed. “Although at the beginning we demanded prior consultation, that cannot happen now, because they have already entered the territory… they violated the rights of Indigenous peoples. Now we don’t want any consultation. Rather, we want them not to do it, to repeal [the project].” That way, both groups disobeyed laws that they did not consider to be designed and/or implemented in a fair manner. That move proved very effective in delaying and halting the execution of the projects (power-to). “The fact that there was no prior consultation helped the process not go so fast.” Yunguillo changed its strategy again later: it began to develop its own FPIC protocol (POL-Innov) to strengthen its autonomy with respect to this legal instrument. “One of our desires as a Reserve is to make our own prior consultation protocol.”

4.2.7. Communication to External Actors

Both groups applied communication strategies to spread the word among external actors (MOV-Act) about their struggle against the LSIPs and related abuses. The aim was to empower themselves politically before other social actors (ORG-Coa).

Yunguillo disseminated information to the general public at a national level using the media, but also to other Indigenous groups in Colombia through the mingas colectivas, a traditional system of collective work for the common good. Different Indigenous Reserves and organizations meet through mingas colectivas when the government does not comply with an agreement. These meetings helped Yunguillo (i) identify other Indigenous groups that were also battling development projects (power-with) and (ii) register, through meeting minutes, its complaint against the roads and associated rights violations. In Bolivia, during the time when the Morales administration was promoting the two roads (~2007–2019), two or three mingas colectivas were held per year.

The Mancomunidad also disseminated its resistance process against the Chepete-Bala at local, national, and international levels, facilitated by the communication skills of its younger leaders and with support from allies (ORG-Coa). “The Chepete-Bala alliance has been successful because we have put young spokespersons who have taken our voices to many corners of Bolivia, even the world, so that we can be heard.” At the local and national levels, the leaders of the Mancomunidad issued public complaints through events, platforms, and media outlets, several of them covering important cities of Bolivia. The event organized with allies to disseminate the study of the University of San Andrés stands out (ORG-Inf, Section 4.2.4). “The event with the university was a success, the auditorium was packed.” On its website, Fundación Solón published several articles and infographics communicating the results of the technical studies [64,65,66]. On the international level, representatives of the Mancomunidad refuted and condemned the Morales government at a United Nations meeting in 2018, where Morales had previously asserted Bolivia’s respect for IPs and the environment. As a result, the United Nations issued an official recommendation to the Bolivian government, calling for respect for IPs’ rights. The Mancomunidad also participated in other events in the United States, Switzerland, Germany, Brazil, and Peru.

4.2.8. Cultural Practice as Resistance System

Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad resisted the projects and defended their rights through cultural practices (ORG-IntUni). Several collective actions, communication tactics and personal security strategies, described above, directly reflected Indigenous practices, warrior cultures, forms of empowerment, and respect for traditional norms and territorial control (POL-Innov).

Interviewees from Yunguillo conceived the defense of their territories against infrastructure projects as a fruit born from the Indigenous sabios or sabedores (in English, wisemen): they are those who guide such resistance processes, respecting the intrinsic relationships between human beings and nature, following Yunguillo’s Derecho Propio (Section 4.1.1).

“Culture is the entire life of Indigenous peoples, it is a life that is woven and fought for, for example, through dances, face and body painting, and other rituals that are of a defensive and protective nature; that is a way of protecting themselves as a group and the territory where they live and that they have to protect (…) it is from there that the exercise of Derecho Propio takes place.”

This is reflected in how Yunguillo applied its traditional norms of control and sanction when company personnel entered their territory without their prior authorization (Section 4.2.5). They first reprimanded them and confiscated high-value equipment. Then, when the offenders followed them to the cabildos headquarters in search of their equipment, Yunguillo detained them and warned them: if they kept entering without permission, they would apply more severe traditional sanctions, such as physical punishment (POL-Innov). One leader stressed that cultural resistance is essentially peaceful and, as such, reflects the willingness of IPs to seek dialogue as a first instance.

In Bolivia, at the vigil and other protests against the Chepete-Bala, community members spontaneously decided to carry their traditional arrows as a symbol of their identity as a warrior culture and as a reflection of their history of resistance. “We showed up at Bala, all armed with arrows.” One leader explained their arrows are not only for fishing but also “for any contingency.”

We now move on to discuss the agency of the Indigenous groups as related to their power, evident in the suspension of the LSIPs.

4.3. Indigenous Agency: Power-To Stop LSIPs

4.3.1. Projects Went to “Sleep” but Were Not Definitely Cancelled

Overall, the effectiveness of the resistance processes rests on two findings. First, as both Indigenous groups succeeded in suspending the LSIPs, their agency, or power-to, is undeniable. Second, their effectiveness was partial and not permanent, because the projects went “asleep” but were not definitively cancelled. The potential reopening of the projects depends on the legislative and political context. In Bolivia, the legislative decree that established the Chepete-Bala project as a national priority has not been repealed: “our people and the Mancomunidad must be alert (…) this can happen again at any time.”. There is also concern about a possible return of the Morales administration: “hopefully Evo Morales does not come back so that the project does not continue.”. In Colombia, after the completion of the data collection for this study, the government of Iván Duque reactivated the construction of the San Francisco–Mocoa road just before the end of his term [67,68], and the subsequent government declared it a priority [69], supported by local representatives [70]. Regarding the Bajo–Condagua connection, mayors of the region continue to request that the project be resumed.

As for the effectiveness of the different resistance strategies, it is impossible to evaluate the individual effect of each strategy separately; various strategies fed back into each other synergistically, generating overall outcomes. Even so, direct resistance strategies, such as the arrest of the engineers in Colombia and the vigil in Bolivia, stand out as especially important for stopping LSIPs. “The communities have stood strong, that is why the project was not carried out.” Regarding the San Francisco–Mocoa road, other analyses claim that the reason why less than 30% of the road was built and was finally suspended in 2017 was largely due to the legal disputes that resulted from the environmental and territorial claims of the communities, which led to a depletion of government funds [18]. During the struggles, the influence of resistance strategies was intermittent, varying across time along with contextual changes. It is therefore difficult to dissociate the effectiveness of the strategies from the broader context. In Bolivia, the suspension of the Chepete-Bala project is largely attributed to the national social uprising and resignation of Evo Morales in 2019. Therefore, while Yunguillo’s and the Mancomunidad’s actions undeniably contributed to stoppages of the LSIPs, it is difficult to know with certainty the extent of such contribution.

4.3.2. Effects Beyond the Contested Projects

The interviews suggest that resistance processes in both cases had effects beyond the LSIPs in question. Resistance processes empowered Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad in a broader sense. Yunguillo communities collectively reflected and discussed and thereby implemented measures to protect their vast territory, not only from LSIPs but also from illegal mining, drug trafficking, and armed groups. The checkpoint they installed also served the purpose of training community members to more effectively protect their territory—“so they know who comes in and who goes out”. Collective mobilization also supported sending members to training programs in Colombia’s official education system. Yunguillo mobilization also responded to the need to train young apprentices in ancestral medicine who can replace their elders later on, in preparation for future struggles.

Its fight against the Chepete-Bala strengthened the Mancomunidad in four ways. First, the Mancomunidad “adjusted” its resistance strategies and “improved a lot”. Interviews emphasized two lessons learned from such adjustments: the importance of sticking together to defend their territories, and the need to train new leaders among young people. Second, the self-satisfaction that arose from the success of the vigil improved the personal confidence (power-within) of local communities. “With the vigil and other activities, we managed to get the company out, and there were improvements in the communities’ self-esteem. The communities have always been trampled on, we have always been submissive, but now we are improving our self-esteem.” Third, the process of resistance against the Chepete-Bala served as the basis for the creation of a national entity: the National Coordination for the Defense of Indigenous, Original, Peasant Territories, and Protected Areas (CONTIOCAP). Initially constituted by 12 grassroots resistance movements, today CONTIOCAP has 35.

Fourth, with its resistance process against Chepete-Bala and the help from external allies, the Mancomunidad became better known and politically stronger at the local, national, and international levels. “With these alliances, the Mancomunidad is able to gain visibility (…) the Mancomunidad comes out stronger from this.”. At the local level, it improved its legitimacy among the local population. “The Mancomunidad has gathered more strength by first bringing together the communities, the base, making them understand how much environmental impact we could suffer.” This may have contributed to the decision of the Eyoyoquibo Essejas community and of the Rio Hondo settlement of Mosetén origin to join the Mancomunidad. In fact, the leaders of the Mancomunidad affirm that other Indigenous organizations are currently “jealous”.

“There are organizations that are jealous of us… they say that we are taking away their people, but that is not the case. For example, the organizaciones matrices. But we are not here to represent people, but instead to support them, to defend their rights. And the organizaciones matrices do not do that, they do not stand up for them. Rather, these organizations have approached the government, so that the project is carried out, to the detriment of Ips.”

There is also an unintended, rather negative, effect in Bolivia. Two communities are currently estranged from the Mancomunidad because they do not share the same position regarding the Chepete-Bala. Today both the Mancomunidad and the national Indigenous organization CIDOB face that internal division (Section 4.2.2). However, the interviews suggest that more recently the Charque community began to show more openness to the Mancomunidad. This suggests that the iron triangle’s strategy of dividing the population through offers of benefits can be effective, given the socioeconomic marginalization of the IPs in Bolivia, but not always or definitively.

5. Conclusions

This study offers two major contributions. First, it provides a detailed and multifaceted account of the motivations, strategies, and agency of IPs in resistance processes that succeeded in suspending LSIPs. Second, it does so while following a decolonizing approach, both theoretically and methodologically. Integrating Indigenous perspectives, knowledge, and science was essential for a critical understanding of Indigenous resistance processes that challenge rather than reproduce paternalistic systems and colonial notions of sustainable development. Without that decolonizing approach and commitment to centering Indigenous contributions, reflected in the way the research was conceived, designed, and implemented, the insights achieved would not have been possible, which would undermine the search for justice.

The resistance processes of Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad against LSIPs constituted a challenge to the coloniality of power. By defying the attempt of the iron triangle to facilitate the control of territories and extraction of natural resources through the imposition of LSIPs, both Indigenous groups confronted unequal power relations that were originally forged through European colonialism and that today are perpetuated through the globalized, capitalist political economy.

Both resistance processes can be understood as calls for decolonizing environmental justice (DEJ). Rejecting the iron triangle’s imposition of the LSIPs (power-over) and of the capitalist, extractivist, and colonialist model of development these projects represent, Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad were defending (i) their Indigenous autonomy and territorial sovereignty, (ii) their culture, worldview, and traditional ways of life, and (iii) their ways of knowledge and self-worth as IPs. These struggles for autonomy, ontological justice, epistemological justice, and self-affirmation were intertwined with the defense of their physical territories and the shared resources on which their communities depend. Both resistance processes were thus part of the historical struggle for the survival of IPs, both culturally and materially. DEJ thus constitutes “the repatriation of Indigenous land and life” (p. 1 [71]). Yunguillo’s desire for small-scale infrastructure invites us to think creatively about alternatives that are compatible with DEJ and represent decolonizing approaches in line with the proposals for Buen Vivir, degrowth and/or post-development instead of “sustainable development” [24,25,26,27,44]. Because sustainable development constitutes a fuzzy term that can be interpreted differently across actors and time [72,73], Indigenous resistance processes can help imagine decolonizing interpretations.

The diverse and culturally grounded but also adaptive and synergistic set of resistance strategies displayed by Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad offered a robust, multifaceted basis for collective action to defy neocolonial hegemonic systems that sought to impose LSIPs. Cultural practices and Indigenous identity empowered people and united communities. Those in turn permitted synergies among different collective actions that were deployed in stages in an adaptive strategy [43]. Such adjustments afforded more effective responses to the changing context and to the iron triangle’s shifting tactics, which included skipping the consultation process, invading the IP territories without their prior authorization, blackmail, co-optation and division of the local population, and harassment and direct threats to local leaders.

Indigenous resistance strategies helped IPs in both cases to enhance and exercise multiple and interrelated forms of power. Organizational strategies contributed to their collective power (power-with) and self-confidence (power-within). At the group level, fostering internal alliances through local dialogue and governance processes (ORG-IntUni) was key to building unity among community members (power-with), as well as to empowering Yunguillo and the Mancomunidad (power-within) as socially legitimate organizations. Following Freire [74] “… a true revolution must initiate a courageous dialogue with the people. Its very legitimacy lies in that dialogue”. The local position regarding the LSIPs was, however, neither static nor homogeneous, but dynamic and complex, largely due to the divisive strategies of the iron triangle. We therefore agree with political ecologists [1,75,76,77] who call attention to the importance of avoiding homogenizing Indigenous groups and carefully considering contextual factors and power relations. Power-with was also exerted through external alliances (ORG-Coa), a crucial leveraging strategy that helped secure resources and support for diverse resistance activities. Regarding power-within at the individual level, this study highlights the importance not only of strengthening the capacities and knowledge of local leaders, but also their spiritual, cultural, and psychological empowerment (ORG-IntCap).

Power-to was largely exerted through the instrumental strategies of collective action, which were designed to exert pressure on external actors. Challenging official systems and decisions considered unjust aimed to resist coercion and political control by the State and is rooted in two intertwined historical ruptures. The first concerns the rupture between the social sphere and the political sphere, marked by strong distrust and discontent of IPs towards the state apparatus. The second is the rupture between the law on paper and the law in practice, as political and economic elites manipulate or ignore socio-environmental regulations. The defiance of official institutions thus arose in response to the low effectiveness of strategies of appeal to national and international de jure frameworks (POL-Apli). In that context, civil disobedience and direct resistance (MOV-Act) stand out for their effectiveness in stopping the LSIPs (power-to). Having said that, the two cases also showed that the language of rights was also used to appeal to official institutions in ways that gave legal and political legitimacy to resistance processes. Yunguillo’s intention to develop its own FPIC protocol (POL-Innov) recognized the importance of FPIC but called for the development of alternative institutional frameworks focused on Indigenous autonomy. Further research that critically explores the use of different IP strategies for resistance across different cases and contexts, using both decolonizing and intercultural approaches, is needed.

Without denying the privileged and dominant position of the iron triangle in this power struggle, this study documents the strength and agency of IPs (power-to) to achieve the goals fundamental in their resistance processes. As Foucault stated, power is in, and comes from, everywhere [78,79]. Both Indigenous groups managed to suspend the LSIPs. However, the success of both resistance processes was partial and uncertain. The suspension of the LSIPs responded in part to specific circumstances and did not constitute a definitive cancellation. However, the IPs in both cases recognized the need to remain vigilant to changes in the political, social and economic situation that could pose future challenges for infrastructure governance [12]. In particular, the continued adaptation of Indigenous resistance strategies and the ongoing strengthening of leaders with skills and knowledge grounded in their culture, identity, and shared experiences in mobilization will be crucial. Such strategies can continue to build capacity for future struggles of IPs to confront future attempts by the iron triangle to impose LSIPs and other forms of neocolonial development.