Research on Investment and Coordination Strategies for Supply Chain Resilience under Supply Disruption Risk

In the context of supply disruption, having a resilient supply chain is crucial for the survival and growth of enterprises. It is also essential for gaining a competitive advantage in a turbulent environment. Enterprises need to invest in supply chain resilience to better deal with future uncertainties. This paper constructs a Stackelberg game model with the manufacturer as the leader and the retailer as the follower. We explored how supply chain-related factors under supply interruption risk affect supply chain resilience investment, and studied how to choose supply chain coordination strategies to improve the effectiveness of manufacturer capacity recovery and mutual profits in the context of supply interruption. The study also analyzes the asymmetrical impact of changes in product order quantity, supply disruption probability, and the capacity recovery coefficient on retailer decision-making and the profits of supply chain members. The results indicate that manufacturer profits are negatively correlated with supply disruption probability, while retailer profits are positively correlated with supply disruption probability when product order quantities are low and negatively correlated when product order quantities are high. The supply chain resilience investment is positively correlated with the supply disruption probability. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the cost-sharing contract is closely related to product order quantity and supply disruption probability. When the product order quantity $d<{\alpha }_L{\displaystyle \frac{-c[\left(1-\xi \right)a_L+\xi a_H]+s{\alpha }_H\xi +w{\alpha }_L(1-\xi )}{k}}$ or ${\alpha }_H{\displaystyle \frac{-c[\left(1-\xi \right)a_L+\xi a_H]+s{\alpha }_H\xi +w{\alpha }_L(1-\xi )}{k}}<d<{\displaystyle \frac{{\alpha }_H[\left(1-\xi \right)a_L+\xi a_H](w-c)}{k}}$, manufacturers can withstand the risk of supply interruption by investing in supply chain resilience alone. But when the product order quantity is ${\alpha }_L{\displaystyle \frac{-c[\left(1-\xi \right)a_L+\xi a_H]+s{\alpha }_H\xi +w{\alpha }_L(1-\xi )}{k}}<d<{\alpha }_H{\displaystyle \frac{-c[\left(1-\xi \right)a_L+\xi a_H]+s{\alpha }_H\xi +w{\alpha }_L(1-\xi )}{k}}$ and ${\displaystyle \frac{{\alpha }_H[\left(1-\xi \right)a_L+\xi a_H](w-c)}{k}}<d$, the use of cost-sharing contracts is more effective. Additionally, when the sensitivity analysis is conducted, the capacity recovery coefficient positively correlates with supply chain profits in a decentralized mode. However, under the cost-sharing contract mode, it exhibits a U-shaped fluctuation pattern, indicating that the impact of improving capacity recovery efficiency on the profits of both parties is not symmetrical and linear. As $\xi$ approaches 0.5, the profits of manufacturers and retailers decrease. Instead, it undergoes an initial decline followed by a subsequent increase, highlighting the nonlinear benefits of capacity recovery strategies under the cooperative approach.