Model and Simulation of Benefit Distribution of Collaborative Cooperation in the Supply Chain of General Contracting Projects
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Research Overview
2.1. Research on the Distribution of Engineering Benefits
2.2. Research on the Benefit Distribution of Supply Chain Cooperation
2.3. Research in Benefit Distribution Models
3. Basic Assumptions and Modeling
- The general contractor engineering supply chain is a consortium consisting of two parts: the general contractor and the subcontractors.
- The quality of products provided by the upstream supply chain of subcontractors is qualified, i.e., there will not be any problems with the quality of work due to material aspects.
- The Cobb–Douglas function [42,43] is used to express the bonus function given by the owner to the general contractor, i.e., . The expected bonus for the general contractor and the subcontractor is , where e1 represents the level of effort of the general contractor and e2 represents the level of effort of the subcontractor; α represents the general contractor’s level of contribution, and (1 − α) represents the level of contribution of the subcontractor. In the past two years, with the normalization of the new COVID-19 epidemic, the general contractor and subcontractors are subject to uncertainties such as epidemics and natural disasters in engineering construction, and the field of engineering construction has encountered challenges. Let the risk factor obey the standard normal distribution, i.e., .
- 4.
- The owner and the main contractor enter into a contract in the form of a fixed lump sum price plus bonus, i.e., ; the contract between the main contractor and the subcontractor, which is also a fixed lump sum price plus bonus incentive, is , where W is the total price of the benefits received by the main contractor at the end of the project, P is the total price of the benefits received by the subcontractor at the end of the project, ( is the fixed total price of the project contracted by the general contractor and subcontractors, β (0 < β < 1) is the bonus allocation coefficient of the general contractor, and 1 − β is the bonus allocation coefficient of the subcontractors.
- 5.
- The effort cost function paid by the general contractor in the construction of the project is , and the effort cost function paid by the subcontractor in the construction process is , where k1 represents the effort–cost coefficient of the general contractor and k2 represents the effort cost coefficient of the subcontractor.
- 6.
- Assume that the general contractor is risk-neutral in the cooperation process, while the subcontractor is risk-averse, i.e., the general contractor—as the general manager—is neither risky nor conservative in its decision, but the subcontractor—as a member of the project—will choose the riskier option when the expected benefits are the same, as it may bring them greater benefits. For a subcontractor, the cost of risk is , where represents the degree of risk preference of the subcontractor, and 0 ≤ f2 ≤ 1; f2 = 0 represents that the subcontractor is in a risk-neutral state, and f2 → 1 represents the increasing risk preference possessed by the subcontractor.
- 7.
- The final benefit to the general contractor is:
- 8.
- In the one-time cooperation, the Cobb–Douglas function is applied to obtain the optimal allocation share, optimal effort level, and optimal return of the general contractor and subcontractor and supply chain system as a whole under the egoistic decision-making mode and the collectivist decision-making mode, respectively. For the distribution of benefits during multiple cooperations, the effort level of one-time cooperation is used to calculate the conditions under which the two parties will still choose cooperation in the n + 1 stage so as to realize the continuation of the two parties from one-time cooperation to multiple cooperation.
4. Model Solving and Analysis
4.1. Egoistic Decision-Making Model (Model I)
4.2. Collectivist Decision-Making Model (Model II)
4.3. Numerical Analysis
5. Distribution of Benefits from Multiple Collaborations
6. Discussion
7. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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Decision Variables | Egoistic Decision Making | Collectivist Decision-Making |
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Wang, D.; Gao, W. Model and Simulation of Benefit Distribution of Collaborative Cooperation in the Supply Chain of General Contracting Projects. Buildings 2023, 13, 1788. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings13071788
Wang D, Gao W. Model and Simulation of Benefit Distribution of Collaborative Cooperation in the Supply Chain of General Contracting Projects. Buildings. 2023; 13(7):1788. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings13071788
Chicago/Turabian StyleWang, Dan, and Wenwen Gao. 2023. "Model and Simulation of Benefit Distribution of Collaborative Cooperation in the Supply Chain of General Contracting Projects" Buildings 13, no. 7: 1788. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings13071788