“You Will Do Well”: But How, Exactly? A Curious Ending to the Apostolic Letter of Acts 15

Abstract

In this paper, I focus on the puzzling ending of the apostolic letter in Acts 15 in which the addressees are told that if they hold to four “essential” prohibitions, they will “do well” (εὖ πράξετε, v. 29). The question as to how, exactly, can destabilise some understandings of the decree, with alternative translations creating different problems, and particularly so where theological commitments are at play. Following Danker’s call for greater attention to this phrase, I undertake a fresh, stratified survey of Greek usage across corpora ranging from the arguably less to the more proximate and bring this into dialogue with the senses given in various literary and social approaches to the decree involving epistolary rhetoric, reciprocity theory, and intertextuality. This reveals how purely linguistic data can stand in tension with compositional arguments in different ways and require a more complex arbitration between possibility, likelihood and coherence when both lexical- and discourse-level constraints are applied. Whilst not solving the problem of the decree outright, observing the impacts of different readings of εὖ πράξετε on the delicate balances involved presses some oblique but productive questions into the interpretive task.

1. Introduction1

1.1. The Problem, Background and Approach

According to Luke2, when the decision is taken to allow gentile believers into the church in Acts 15:19–213, the apostles and elders4 reject the call for full Jewish conversion5 but insist on the need for the new members to observe6 four prohibitions (ἀλισγημάτων τῶν εἰδώλων καὶ τῆς πορνείας καὶ τοῦ πνικτοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἵματος7), typically rendered as “pollution of [food offered to] idols, sexual immorality, [meat from] strangled [animals] and blood”.

The so-called Apostolic decree in Acts 15 has attracted enormous scholarly attention over the years, constituting what Roloff calls one of the great “unverwüstlichen Dauerbrennern der Exegese”8. Its enduring challenge stems from the unresolved questions that surround its compositional development and ultimate historicity9, the meaning of its four elements, and its overall rationale10.

Questions surrounding the four prohibitions include whether ἀλισγημάτων τῶν εἰδώλων bans idolatry more broadly, or idol “food” more specifically11; whether πορνείας concerns behaviour or merely marriage within “forbidden degrees”12; how literally πνικτοῦ (strangulation) should be understood13; and whether αἵματος refers to eating blood or bloodshed in the sense of violence and murder14. Textual variations15 and differing patristic adaptations16 suggest they were difficult to understand from the outset. A greater challenge concerns the overall rationale of the decree, which seems to combine a rather general ban on two key aspects of pagan behaviour with two further requirements of a more specifically Jewish complexion17.

Although further problems of interpretation will be outlined below, there will be no attempt to resolve these enduring controversies directly. Our starting point is rather to “turn aside” to a lesser noticed curiosity which concerns the ending of the apostolic letter: ἐξ ὧν διατηροῦντες ἑαυτοὺς εὖ πράξετε.

The common English translation, “If you abstain from these things, you will do well”, could appear to promise well-being, a curious but not impossible assurance after the earlier statement of obligation in v. 28, where the council resolves “to impose on you no further burden than these essentials” (ἐπιτίθεσθαι ὑμῖν βάρος πλὴν τούτων τῶν ἐπάναγκες). The “well-being” reading of the closing assurance is in fact permitted by the Greek18, however, εὖ πράξετε can simply mean that the Antiochenes19 will be “acting in a good or praiseworthy manner”, or more narrowly, “doing the right thing”, a reading adopted in other European translations. The question as to the intended meaning of this phrase remains unresolved.

A call for further attention to this problem is made in an important paper by Danker, who notes:

“The phrase εὖ πράξετε … has not received adequate treatment. There is no substantial progress from Jackson-Lake to Haenchen … no real clue is given to the meaning”.

(Danker 1983, pp. 52–53)20

It is not difficult to understand the lack of urgency. Because εὖ πράξετε is genuinely ambiguous, commentators are usually able to offer a reading that aligns with their position on the decree as a whole, and therefore do not feel the need for any more detailed investigation.

The aim of this paper is to challenge this state of affairs, particularly the tacit assumption of equal support for the possible meanings of εὖ πράξετε, and allow this curious and neglected phrase to pose its own, albeit more oblique questions of our reading of v. 2921. It is not imagined that this will provide an instant solution to the problem of the decree as a whole but may open up more subtle tests of coherence.

The basic problem framing this inquiry is that εὖ πράσσω, a common-enough phrase in classical and Hellenistic literature, albeit with a range of meanings, occurs only here in the NT, and very infrequently in biblical literature more broadly. Any approach will not only have to suggest a meaning, but also account for why this particular wording has been used rather than a more familiar alternative. Beyond the cruder explanations of an uncritically incorporated source, a miscued translation from a Semitic language, or even textual corruption, an expression used this rarely in the NT might suggest an intertextual or cultural allusion22. Attempting to do this will inevitably involve a trade-off between the potential value of a more exotic word, and the risk of its connotations not being recognised. Any such choice would have to be informed by an estimate of likely audience competence. Asking how a phrase like εὖ πράξετε has been used in general, and thus what it is possible for it to mean, may need to be tempered by a consideration of less erudite options from Luke’s more proximate literary environment.

A second observation, also contributing to the lack of urgency, is that the phrase εὖ πράξετε occurs only at the end of the letter in v. 29b, after the substance of the judgment has been fleshed out by the council earlier on in v. 20. The phrase has thus often been viewed as part of a cordial sign-off rather than offering a new technical point. But again, this does not mean that closing comments of this kind do not in fact conceal some significant if subtle politicking in their “coded politeness”. Our later considerations of epistolary implicature and power relations will indeed show that an apparently incidental remark of this kind might reveal more about what is going on than we imagine. And it is not impossible that to include something suitably telling here, Luke precisely needs to reach beyond the idiomatic commonplaces of the NT.

Of course, scholars differ as to how much authorial erudition and audience competence it might be reasonable to imagine. That Luke is capable of using his Graeco-Roman literacy to good effect is widely agreed23, but whether a particular possibility is credible is another matter. Notwithstanding this caveat, the large number of NT hapaxes in Luke-Acts in general, including several in the apostolic letter alone24, shows that an overly pessimistic assessment of competence must surely be misleading. The same dilemma arises in reverse for those whose convictions about what Luke’s account is telling us more broadly lead them to close off permissible meanings that do not “fit”.

All this reflects a broader tension over how much weight to accord purely lexical arguments, based on wider patterns of Greek usage, and how much to constrain possible translations by a consideration of the compositional aims and theological context25. This tension is encapsulated in Barr’s warnings about separating “external” and “internal” lexicography26 and continues to bedevil scholarly debate on our phrase27.

These two evidential domains will be used to structure what follows. Thus, after some further scene-setting (below), we first adopt a lexical focus, starting with the choices made in the modern versions, setting these against classical, Hellenistic, Jewish and early Christian usage of εὖ πράσσω and related terms on a roughly corpus-by-corpus basis (Section 2). This will be followed by a consideration of a range of issues arising at the compositional level that are frequently used to narrow such choices, including epistolary rhetoric, reciprocity theory and theological intertexture (Section 3).

In view of the distinct semantic problems involved, I do not grant lexical data or contextual considerations the right simply to trump the other on principle but assess likelihood and coherence as their interplay dictates on a case-by-case basis, suspending judgment for as long as possible. In this sense, observing the impacts of different readings of our phrase within different interpretive scenarios constitutes a procedure not unlike semantic “variation” thought experiments28. I also allow for a wide a range of linguistic evidence in order to map this interplay “to the edges”.

Working on such a broad front has arguably led to an overly long discussion, particularly where no definitive conclusion is offered. However, a “non-committal” heuristic approach of this kind may be of particular help when an unusual wording points tantalisingly beyond a text’s more typical idiomatic stock. That more focussed, solution-hungry approaches have in some measure led to the current impasse, provides further impetus for the less obvious “exploration of avenues” offered here.

1.2. The Character and Rationale of the Decree

As noted above, the key perceived problem with the decree in its (traditional) Alexandrian textual form is its mixed character. Although Bockmuehl has done much to expose the misconception of an ethical/ritual divide29, it is still difficult not to feel that if the prohibitions on idolatry and sexual immorality can be understood more broadly, the two elements with a specifically Jewish character (eating blood, and meat from strangled animals) become particularly difficult if only because of the council’s ruling that gentile members were not required to become Jewish30. In any case, it begs the question of why these two issues and not others were selected. For many, pressing any rules of this sort has been difficult to reconcile with the “law-free” rhetoric of Galatians31.

It is easy to see why one classic line of interpretation views the prohibitions as a cultural accommodation designed to allow fellowship between Jewish and gentile church members32. Paul at least appears to commend a similar principle of sensitivity within his own congregations33. It is not impossible to believe that the stipulations of the decree were related to the kinds of conditions required of gentile adherents to synagogues34. That three of the four prohibitions could be argued to be related to food (with one eye also to Gal 2:12) has directed many towards the issue of table fellowship35, although support for this as a determinative principle is not unanimous and other issues may be at stake36.

The accommodation theory is nevertheless called into question by some. This is mainly because it does not match the overall logic of the dispute, at least as presented in Acts 1537, and is made more difficult still by the fact that the apostles and elders make their points formal requirements rather than simply recommendations, e.g., v. 28, ἐπιτίθεσθαι ὑμῖν … τούτων τῶν ἐπάναγκες, “to impose upon you … these essentials”38; cf. v. 29, ἐξ ὧν διατηροῦντες ἑαυτούς, “keeping yourselves from”; and 21:25, φυλάσσεσθαι αὐτούς, “guarding yourselves”, where the intensive διατηρέω and cognate φυλάσσω are often used in solemn, adjuratory and religious contexts39. This certainly seems to point beyond courtesies40.

It is, of course, possible that apostolic judgements on cultural and other disputed matters could assume the status of “rulings”41, particularly where an important matter of unity was felt to be at stake42. Aristotle devoted some attention to the question of how, in different settings, principles could inform the drawing up of “rules”43, so long as there was appropriate clarity and consent44.

Whilst particular rulings may thus have assumed a normative status for some time45, they often stopped short of true universality or permanent relevance, a limitation exploited in Augustine’s approach to the decree46. Before we leap to read Acts 15 in this way, however, the term τὰ ἐπάναγκες (often translated “essentials”) requires some attention. Although sometimes used for passing operational “requirements”47, in broader classical usage, it more typically points to the “givens” that frame a regulatory area, not individual rules or judgments per se48. This reflects the way that in philosophical discourse, “sacred law” must ultimately come to us by tradition or revelation, not legal deliberation or committee work49. This resonates strongly with a new impetus in NT scholarship to wonder if scripture and tradition might be playing a more formal role in shaping the prohibitions than the accommodation theory allows for.

Thus, in spite of the council’s clear rejection of qualifying Jewish conversion, it may nonetheless understand Christianity as formally inheriting Judaism’s rejection of paganism50. The prohibitions of idolatry and sexual immorality, with which this stance was always closely associated in Torah, are widely attested in the NT as sine qua nons for all converts51, often appearing together52. These almost certainly express a fundamental continuity with Yahwistic monotheism rather than a new, distinctly Christian requirement53 and make sense of the overtones of covenant obedience in the decree’s language54. Nevertheless, as noted above, the bans on blood and [the meat of] strangled [animals] remain problematic in respect of gentile converts55.

However, over the last half century, scholars have shown a greater openness to the possibility that not only was paganism to be rejected in general terms, but that this should be signalled in specific ways, meaning the decree manifested both ethical and religious-performative aspects at source56. The latter were not borrowed from Judaism so much as based on points of Torah believed to be actually applicable to gentiles57. These can be understood to arise via ancient, pre-Mosaic commands such as those in Gen 9:3–658, or the rules in Lev 17–18 for “resident aliens”59. Indeed, a case can be made that all four of the provisions concern specifically religious commitments and practices as much as they do general ethics60. These seeds of what later rabbis would call “Noachide law” appear in Second Temple literature61, where Jubilees strikingly includes the blood taboo in a list of this kind62. The specific combination in Acts, whilst technically unique, can easily be located within this curiously fluid tradition of making lists of “essential things”. These lists appeared to act more as composite ciphers for the rejection of paganism63 than they did definitive codes, appearing with differing details at different times and in different contexts64. Nevertheless, the behavioural “distancing” they articulated carried the weight of obligation, and did so quite separately from the wider expectations associated with proselyte conversion, albeit overlapping with them65. An important consequence of this view is that the elements of the decree should not be viewed as a half-way gesture towards the more complete demands of Torah properly speaking, but something quite separate66.

Returning to the main focus of this paper, it can thus be seen more clearly how readings of the conclusion of the apostolic letter, ἐξ ὧν διατηροῦντες ἑαυτοὺς εὖ πράξετε, become entangled with judgments about the decree as a whole, producing coherences or incongruities of greater or lesser degree, depending on the choices made.

In relation to the accommodation picture, both senses of εὖ πράξετε are possible. The gentiles’ generous concession, if that is what it was, could be taken as “acting commendably”. One could even say that, in the context, such a gesture might amount to “doing the right thing”67. But the well-being reading can also fit. Here, the council might wish to assure them they would “prosper” from this decision, perhaps via some spiritual reward or simply from the ensuing harmony. If on the other hand, divine commands require both a general and ritually specific rejection of idolatry, then calling compliance “commendable” starts to sound a little lame, and adding a promise of well-being might “border on banality” (Savelle 2004, p. 464)68.

Although this calls for a serious consideration of the broader usage of εὖ πράσσω, I wish first to draw attention to the way that sheer familiarity with the English and other modern versions can compound our problems by what they seem to suggest, but which, in fact, warrants some caution. The connotations of different vernacular renderings correspond in some measure to ambiguities in the Greek, but do not always give a proper impression of relative likelihood, nor of the distinct literary and social contexts where one or other sense may be more natural.

2. Problems of Translation and Patterns of Use

2.1. εὖπράξετε in the Versions and Commentaries

The translational problems surrounding εὖ πράξετε are in fact more subtle than often supposed. Besides the choice between acting well or correctly, or “doing” well, on which we have already offered some comments, the reader’s instincts are already formed in part by a translator’s approach to the sentence spanned by vv. 28 and 29 as a whole.

The biggest choice that might start to constrain our understanding of εὖ πράξετε is our reading of the prior adverbial phrase ἐξ ὧν διατηροῦντες ἑαυτούς. Literally “from which, keeping yourselves, [you will…]”, this is often rendered by a new conditional sentence “If you keep yourselves…”, a reading followed by many modern versions69. This entertains the possibility of not obeying but encourages the choice to do so. However, the equally valid alternative, “which, by continuing to keep…”70, would foreground existing behaviour71, and by qualifying it by εὖ πράξετε would lend full approval to doing nothing (i.e., nothing new)72.

But other variations in English can have further subtle impacts on perceived meaning. Thus, in translations that do introduce a conditional, and thus appear to encourage a “choice”, the ordering of a pseudo-protasis “If you do X…” followed by the apodosis “you will do well” or “be doing the right thing”73, seems to hint at the positive potential of following the advice. But when the conditional is left implicit and the word order is reversed to create the exhortation “You will do well to avoid these things”74, the tone becomes more like a warning, with hints that things may turn out badly if the advice is not followed. It will become important not to let connotations produced by translational choices like this impact a sober reckoning of what the Greek might most naturally imply by its own conventions and devices. As we shall see, translational choices can be affected more by overall beliefs as to what is going on in the passage than they are by strictly linguistic concerns.

At the level of εὖ πράξετε itself, the basic division between commending right or praiseworthy action or promising well-being, can be seen across the modern versions in nearly all European languages. The common English translation “do well” is particularly convenient in this regard, as it offers a word-for-word solution whilst retaining some of the ambiguity of the underlying Greek75.

Other languages, however, can force the translator’s hand76, and require a different verb to generate each of these main senses, sometimes involving reflexives. Thus, the French versions offer both “agir bien” or “se comporter” for acting/behaving well, but “se trouver bien” for “being” well77. The Spanish versions face a similar choice, but in practice all go with “hacer bien” (acting well) and avoid the well-being reading “irse bien” altogether78. The German versions also prefer “acting well” but predominantly opt for the more restrictive sense of acting correctly or doing right (“richtig” or “recht”)79.

In scholarly work, where both the underlying problems and the difficulties of translation are known, commentors usually note all the standard choices, and may express a relative preference, but also often suggest something of their own. Marguerat (2007, p. 2:83 and note k) opts for the literal but unidiomatic “faire bien” as a starting point, and notes “s’en porter bien” as an alternative, but also offers “être heureux” for the well-being reading. Whilst the German versions, as noted above, have preferred acting rightly, it is striking that earlier commentators were, in their own translations, often able to endorse well-being as their primary reading80, only for this to give way to “richtig/recht” again in later generations, although certainly still allowing for a well-being alternative such as “wird es euch wohl ergehen” (“you will fare well”)81. English-medium scholars, whose standard translations more often suggest well-being, can, in their commentary, follow their German counterparts by preferring “doing right” or “doing the right thing”82.

However, even if “doing right” is adopted, scholars still differ as to exactly what is meant. Thus, taking the prohibitions to be biblical obligations, Jervell (1998, pp. 401–2) reads the “rightness” in terms of obedience to applicable divine commands (“die Heiden richtig handeln… wenn sie die Gebote des Dekrets beobachten”83). Somewhat anxious about involving Torah in any overly direct manner and tending towards the so-called “ethical” interpretation84, Conzelmann speaks in terms of “Wohlverhalten” (good behaviour)85, and Johnson of “moral rectitude and fittingness”86.

Within this same orbit, it is interesting to see two other readings that suggest a more social conception of “rightness”. Thus, perhaps with a subtext of community approval, the Acts Seminar opts for “you will be in good standing” (Smith and Tyson 2013, loc. 3154), a reading adopted from Pervo (2009, p. 366), who unfortunately does not offer any detailed evidence for this87. Whilst this carries an overtone of compliance, it is possible, as we have noted, to refer to “doing the right thing” within an accommodation picture. Thus Gebauer (2014, pp. 2:50, 59) goes with “tut ihr recht”, but adds that the “rightness” stems primarily from making living in mixed communities possible88. Whilst we have argued that this may indeed be praiseworthy, Gebauer does not offer any further argument as to why such a gesture should be classed as “right”, as opposed to “helpful” or “kind”89. This again may only be resolved via concrete examples in Greek with some grasp of contexts and relative frequencies.

Finally, it is intriguing again that early German commentators often insisted that no reading should be finally determined by convictions about the overall sense of a story, but by comparative philology on the specific phrase in hand, here εὖ πράξετε. On this basis, Zahn retains the well-being translation and rejects both the ethical and the accommodation interpretations, no matter how intuitive or attractive they may feel to others:

“Dies wird weiter bestätigt durch εὖ πράξετε, was ja nach feststehendem Sprachgebrauch nicht wie καλῶς (oder τὸ καλὸν) ποιεῖν ein anerkennendes Urteil über den sittlichen Wert solcher Enthaltungen, geschweige denn wie εὖ ποιεῖν eine Beurteilung derselben als einer Ausübung von Wohltätigkeit gegen irgend jemand bedeutet, sondern den Empfängern des Briefes Wohlergehen und guten Erfolg in allen Berufsgeschäften wünscht und verheißt, unter der Voraussetzung, daß sie dauernd fortfahren, sich von heidnischer Unsitte fernzuhalten”.

(Zahn 1922, pp. 2:541–42)90

Although Zahn ends by having εὖ πράξετε promise “prosperity and good success” (Wohlergehen und guten Erfolg), and claims this on the basis of “established usage” (feststehendem Sprachgebrauch), in fact, he cites only a handful of examples from just Xenophon and Plutarch. Although both of these authors do have one or two exceptions implying commendable action, Zahn is in fact correct about the predominant usage91, a balance I confirm for almost all comparable authors via TLG searches discussed below. We can thus agree with Zahn’s basic judgment, whilst allowing that there may be just enough counterexamples in toto for Luke to be aware of them, assuming of course, that these classical and Hellenistic texts are the right place to be looking.

Notwithstanding Zahn’s claims to linguistic interests alone, Haenchen (1977, p. 437 n. 2) in fact believes that Zahn adopts this reading for essentially theological reasons, namely, to avoid a conflict with Galatians. His inference was that Zahn imagined that an assurance of happiness and prosperity would soften the note of obligation and make the decree sound less like a legal demand. How the well-being itself is supposed to arise is not spelled out92. Whatever Zahn’s motivations, Haenchen’s criticism also contains a fallacy of its own, which we shall explore further below, namely, a failure to appreciate that in some patterns of biblical rhetoric, obedience to true commands can indeed bring blessing and prosperity, which if in view, need not “soften” anything93.

The examples above hopefully show how overall understandings of the decree and translations of v. 29b are frustratingly interdependent, both for proponents of particular readings, but also their opponents, with linguistic points and questions of wider usage stranded awkwardly in the middle.

In the sections that follow, I shall respond to Zahn’s call to privilege philology by first, reviewing how the various readings might be supported in classical and Hellenistic usage, and then Septuagintal and other Jewish and early Christian literature94, before considering a number of broader issues of governance and decrees, epistolary rhetoric, social and other reciprocity principles95.

2.2. Classical and Hellenistic Usage

εὖ πράσσω [koinē] (πράττω [Attic], πρήσσω [Epic, Ionic], πράδδω [Cretan]96) is one of a number of related phrases that include the variants εὖ ποιέω97, καλῶς πράσσω and καλῶς ποιέω98; as well as a number of compound verbs, εὐπραγέω, εὐπρακτέω, εὐποιέω, etc.; and nouns, εὐπραξία and εὐπραγία, etc., the latter all formed with εὖ. In the following analysis, I shall first consider the general use, overlapping and distinct senses of the verbs πράσσω and ποιέω99, then turn to the adverbs εὖ and καλῶς, and finally to the distinct pairing, εὖ πράσσω, which, unlike any similar combination using ποιέω, can indicate well-being.

The semantic domains of πράσσω and ποιέω overlap strongly and thus at the simple level of performing actions, the two can function synonymously, e.g., in Xen. An. 7.2.24.5… ὑπισχνούμενός μοι, εἰ ταῦτα πράξαιμι, εὖ ποιήσειν (“promising me that if I should do this, you would treat [me] well”). When serving in this way, both πράττω/πράσσω and ποιέω can function transitively (“X performs Y well100”) or intransitively (“X acts well”), and can be qualified by the addition of an adverbial phrase (“by doing Y”)101, and/or an indirect object (“for the benefit of Z”)102.

There are, however, some differences of emphasis, e.g., between “outcome” for ποιέω and “activity” for πράσσω, and distinct senses such as “create”, “make”, “appoint” and “lay on” (a feast) for ποιέω, and “practice”, “concern oneself with”, “commit” (legally) or “exact” (financially) for πράσσω103. But for general cases involving action, the differences remain subtle104 and both can appear in a similar way in moral discourse, where, for instance, Paul pleads in Rom 7:15 οὐ γὰρ ὃ θέλω τοῦτο πράσσω, ἀλλʼ ὃ μισῶ τοῦτο ποιῶ105. One should add, however, that ποιέω is the commoner of the two terms for general purposes, with πράσσω more often used in one of its more specialised senses, or where a certain literary effect is required.

The adverbs εὖ and καλῶς (“well”) refer positively, although somewhat broadly, to the way an action is performed, and thus might, in context, imply that an action is correct, right, just, advisable, skilful, brave, wise, generous, advantageous, etc.106 In certain types of moral discourse, acting correctly can be understood as necessarily acting “well”107, a commonplace used by Philo to give Torah obedience some universal “value”108. In general, however, actions that are εὖ or καλῶς are not usually correct only at some technical or formal level but are self-evidently good in a broader sense109.

Some nuances in the use of εὖ and καλῶς necessarily arise through the timeframe. Thus, noting that someone has acted well in doing “X”, essentially praises their action110, and where the speaker has personally benefitted from this, may offer a word of thanks111. When referring to future actions, telling someone that they will do well if they do “X” can commend a course of action, but can also function as a request that might be translated “it would be most kind if you could…”112, a sense that has been considered by some commentators in relation to Acts 15:29b113.

In all of these contexts, εὖ and καλῶς are essentially interchangeable114, although in Hellenistic literature, εὖ is increasingly replaced, although never entirely eclipsed by καλῶς115. Thus, εὖ is still more frequent than καλῶς in the Septuagint (LXX)116, and in Philo117, but becomes the less common term in Josephus, and again in the NT, where we find just three instances118. The occurrence of εὖ in Acts 15:29b is the only use of this word by Luke, making his choice somewhat striking.

We turn now to the specific combination of εὖ or καλῶς with πράσσω and ποιέω. Whilst all the resulting phrases can notionally mean the same thing, in practice, context and idiomatic specialisation require consideration. Where good or well-performed actions are in view, then εὖ or καλῶς πράσσω and εὖ or καλῶς ποιέω can act as synonyms119, sometimes in parallel where poetic or ornamented style requires. Plutarch does this when he notes that αὗται δʼ εἰσίν, ἃς τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ καλόν τι πράττειν ἀναδίδωσιν (“these are [the pleasures] that spring from good deeds and noble actions”, An seni 5.783b–797f)120. For day-to-day references to “doing good”, however, εὖ or καλῶς ποιέω remains the far commoner of the two121.

εὖ or καλῶς πράσσω, however, can carry a second, but widely attested sense that has important ramifications for our reading of εὖ πράξετε in Acts 15:29b. That is an intransitive of personal interest, often translated “N is doing well”, implying success, prosperity or general well-being122. Although the καλῶς form is known123, in practice, εὖ πράσσω occurs far more often and becomes a very recognisable formulation in classical works (e.g., Pind. Pyth. 2.74 Ῥαδάμανθυς εὖ πέπραγεν, “Rhadamanthys has fared well…” etc.)124. It continues throughout the elite koinē of the Hellenistic period125 in both literary texts and personal letters (e.g., Dion. Hal. Ant. rom. 8.48.4.5 εὖ πράττειν δοκῶσι, “they seemed to be doing well”)126. This sense is practically never carried by εὖ or καλῶς ποιέω, which almost always refers only to acting well, doing good, etc.127.

In view of the above, Luke’s use of εὖ πράσσω in Acts 15:29b creates an ambiguity128. If we assume the first possibility, εὖ πράξετε could imply that by observing the prohibitions, the recipients will be acting “rightly”, “well” or in some other “praiseworthy manner”129. This range of meanings can lend support to both Torah-based and social harmony readings, the two commonest interpretations since Zahn130. However, if we go with the second sense, it would imply that by following the prohibitions, the Antiochenes will fare well, suggesting quite a different, and not entirely obvious line of thought131. As noted above, resolving the ambiguity has often involved an appeal to the compositional and theological context132, and can usually be aligned with understandings of the decree narrative as a whole.

Convenient as this is for commentators, I set out earlier how it may be important to query an overly rapid appeal to contextual issues as if backed by essentially equal support for all the linguistic options. It was noted that the use of εὖ or καλῶς πράσσω for prospering or succeeding is common in classical and Hellenistic literature, but it is striking how much less frequently the expression is used for right or good action. Of some 549 test cases across a selection of classical and Hellenistic texts through to Luke’s period, nearly 90% refer to success or prosperity133.

Before immediately concluding that if Luke is looking to this body of material, then well-being must surely be his intention, we should, however, consider whether genre-based or thematic concerns might not lead to higher concentrations of references to quality of action in certain types of writing. Of the 10% or so of instances carrying this sense, a few appear in Greek drama134, a fair number in historiography135, and the rest in philosophy136, but all three of these represent known spheres of interest and influence for Luke137. Although the cadences of dramatic verse might have added literary flourish to the apostolic letter138, the key areas to consider for the moment should probably be philosophy and historiography.

A striking feature of the philosophical references is their distinctive use in, and in relation to Plato’s dicta on noble action and prosperity139. Whilst the consequences of right action were always of interest140, it is striking, from the point of view of the controversy over εὖ πράξετε in Acts 15:29b, how Plato “plays” with the ambiguity of εὖ πράσσω by using the same term for both senses, e.g., at Alc. 1.116b, ὅστις καλῶς πράττει, οὐχὶ καὶ εὖ πράττει; (“do not those who act well, also ‘do well’?”)141. Socrates, of course, knows that this is not always true142, but it becomes something of an erudite jest when “Platonic” authors start using εὖ πράττειν as an epistolary greeting instead of χαίρειν143. Apparently wishing their readers well144, they are quick to point out that they are not, in fact, promising them a “life of ease”145. Outside of such word games, however, others took care to avoid the confusion this might create146. Whilst it is entirely possible that the apostles and elders believed that the Antiochenes would indeed be acting well and thus prospering147, it would be curious to rely on a Platonic wordplay to suggest this, and odd not to be aware that Plato himself subverted any overly confident connection148.

As for historiography, for some 54 cases that use εὖ πράσσω in a representative selection of texts, approximately 91% refer to prosperity or success, a similar proportion to the overall TLG result across all genres149. In view of the usage above, it is telling that the few uses of εὖ πράσσω for good or noble in historiography150 often have a literary or gnomic feel similar to those seen in philosophical texts, e.g., Arr. Epict. diss. 4.6.20 βασιλικόν, ὦ Κῦρε, πράττειν μὲν εὖ, κακῶς δʼ ἀκούειν (“It is the lot of a king, O Cyrus, to act well, but to be ill spoken of”); Plu. Cat. mai. 8.9 βούλεσθαι δʼ ἔλεγε μᾶλλον εὖ πράξας ἀποστερηθῆναι χάριν ἢ κακῶς μὴ τυχεῖν κολάσεως (“he said he preferred to do right and get no thanks, rather than to do ill and get no punishment”)151. However, things are somewhat different for the notional synonym, καλῶς πράσσω. Although less frequent in historiography overall, with only 28 cases in the same selection of texts, the balance of meanings is almost reversed, with c.75% indicating good or admirable action152. Nevertheless, a bare 21 examples over such a huge range of material scarcely constitutes a landslide, and in any case, Luke has specifically chosen to use εὖ πράσσω, not the καλῶς variant153.

In conclusion, anyone with a moderate exposure to classical and Hellenistic literature, professional or oratorical language, or a member of an educated social circle would be very accustomed to the prosperity or well-being sense of εὖ or καλῶς πράσσω but would certainly recognise its less frequent use for good or commendable action, particularly if they were familiar with drama, historiography or moral philosophy.

As we shall see shortly, the use of εὖ or καλῶς πράσσω practically collapses in the Septuagint and other Jewish and NT texts, although both of the two main senses are just about visible. Before dismissing any connection between Luke’s word choice and his most proximate literary orbit, upon which, after all, he is otherwise so dependent, it would seem safer to offer a survey of this material.

2.3. Septuagintal, Other Jewish and NT Usage

For the Septuagint, the most important point of comparison with classical and other Hellenistic literature is that εὖ or καλῶς πράσσω, as an expression—with either of its two main senses—becomes much rarer, with only three cases in total. Since εὖ, καλῶς and πράσσω all appear separately with their usual meanings, this should perhaps be viewed as a change in idiomatic currency rather than a semantic shift at the lexical level154.

The use of πράσσω, for instance, remains entirely typical, e.g., in relation not only to deeds155 or behaviour156, but also the other specialised meanings noted in LSJ 1460–61, including “transact”, “give over”, “sell” or “deliver”157, “exact payment”158, “accomplish” or “perform”159. Where actions are in view, we often find notes of approval or disapproval, using a range of qualifiers familiar from classical and other Hellenistic literature, e.g., acting well, honourably, knowledgably, justly (καλῶς, ἀστείως, etc.160); foolishly (ἀφρόνως, μετὰ ἀβουλίας, etc.161); insolently or arrogantly (ὕβρει, ἀγερωχίᾳ, etc.162); in an untoward, bad, unjust or despicable manner (ἄτοπον, κακά, ἄδικα, etc.163). This pattern of usage continues into the Greek Pseudepigrapha, where if anything we see an increased emphasis on bad deeds or offenses “committed”164.

Of the very few appearances of εὖ or καλῶς πράσσω, the phrase is used only once to refer to the quality of people’s actions, in 2 Macc 12:42 καλῶς καὶ ἀστείως πράττων, “acting well and honourably”165, which reflects the minority usage in classical and Hellenistic texts more widely, but seen a little more often in historiography166. As for prospering or faring well, εὖ or καλῶς πράσσω carries this sense just twice, in 2 and 4 Maccabees, respectively, one using εὖ, the other, καλῶς.

The use in 2 Macc 9:19 appears as part of a pastiche greeting in a purported letter from King Antiochus to the Jewish people, where εὖ πράττειν (the “philosophical” greeting noted above) is combined with the more traditional χαίρειν and a wish for good health, πολλὰ χαίρειν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ πράττειν, in a display of sham cordiality. It is interesting, however, that the writer knew how to use phrasing like to this to create the desired effect167. The formula does not appear in any of the other letters in 2 Maccabees.

In 4 Macc 3:20, on the other hand, we see a less contrived instance (using καλῶς) where the author speaks of a time when “our ancestors were enjoying profound peace… and were prospering” (Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ βαθεῖαν εἰρήνην… καὶ ἔπραττον καλῶς). It should be noted, however, that just because εὖ or καλῶς πράσσω is used only rarely with this sense, it does not mean that the LXX is uninterested in prosperity or well-being as such, of which it speaks often using a host of more common terms, such as εὐοδόω, ἀγαθύνω, ἀνθέω, etc.168, as well as the distinctly Semitic phrasing, εὖ γίγνεται or εὖ ἐστίν plus indirect object, seen in the Pentateuch (Exod 20:12; Deut 4:40, Deut 5:29 etc.)169.

If Luke is imagined to be looking primarily to Septuagintal language—on either account—for noble action, or well-being, then his choice of “external” wording (i.e., from wider Greek usage), as with the few other cases noted above, becomes all the more striking170.

This picture is not significantly altered in Philo and Josephus. Both use πράσσω for actions, deeds and behaviours171 and signal approval or disapproval in many different ways172. The broadly ethical sense of εὖ or καλῶς πράσσω is seen more a little more often than the sole example in the LXX—although still not very frequently, with ten cases in total. Eight of these use the Hellenistic variants καλῶς or κακῶς πράσσω173, often in quasi-forensic settings where concrete actions are being judged174, suggesting εὖ πράσσω here would have felt a little archaic. Indeed, the two cases with εὖ (rather than καλῶς) occur in discussions of moral philosophy reminiscent of Plato, e.g., in A.J. 4.286, where Josephus states that a man’s conscience “should oblige him to do well” (τὸ συνειδὸς ἐπιστάμενον τὸ αὐτοῦ προσῆκεν ἕκαστον εὖ πράττειν), and in Mut. 197, where Philo notes that it is “man’s [true] nature to design, act, and speak virtuously” (τὸ εὖ καὶ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν).

Both, however, certainly use εὖ πράσσω for well-being, Philo four times for material prosperity (Decal. 43; Virt. 170; Praem. 118; Flacc. 143)175, and Josephus five times, once for military success (A.J. 7.144), twice for prosperity (A.J. 9.291; 12.156) and twice with οὐκ, for adversity (A.J. 15.304; 16.355)176. Although these uses exceed those of the LXX, they still represent only a fraction of their wider references to prosperity and well-being, which, like the LXX, they do in many other ways177.

Where there might be some danger of confusion between the two senses of εὖ πράσσω, neither plays on the “Platonic ambiguity”, which Josephus carefully avoids in A.J. 4.199 when using πράσσω for a person’s actions, but alternative wording for the resulting well-being, τῷ θεῷ φίλα πράξετε… καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν βεβαίαν ἕξετε, (“doing things that are pleasing to God… you will have secure happiness”).

When we come to the NT, corroborating evidence rapidly vanishes, as Acts 15:29b represents the only instance of εὖ and πράσσω appearing together178. Indeed, πράσσω itself appears only forty times, and nearly all these instances are in Luke and Paul179. As usual, actions and deeds dominate180, with one eye firmly on divine rewards and punishments181, although of these, particularly the latter182, moral disapproval more generally183, and in Luke’s case, judgments by courts and officials184. That these include a warning about acting contrary to imperial decrees (ἀπέναντι τῶν δογμάτων Καίσαρος πράσσουσιν) is somewhat suggestive in relation to Acts 15185. This sort of language may lie behind Pervo taking εὖ πράξετε as a declaration that the Antiochenes will, by observing the prohibitions, be in a state of full compliance, and thus in “good standing”186. Unfortunately, whilst attractive, such a “positive” quasi-legal use of εὖ finds no support elsewhere in Luke-Acts187, none in classical forensic rhetoric or association law188, and practically none in historiography189.

As for generally praiseworthy behaviour, we find NT writers with others of this period routinely opting for καλῶς ποιέω190. Indeed, εὖ πράσσω is absent even from discussions of moral philosophy, where we saw it make a fleeting appearance in Philo and Josephus191.

Finally, bar our contested possibility in Acts 15:29b, there are no clear cases of the well-being sense of εὖ πράσσω, even though prosperity and success are of interest throughout. Thus εὐοδόω, the common Septuagintal term noted above, is used three times in the NT, once for material prosperity in 1 Cor 16:2, once for success in Rom 1:10, and once for well-being in 3 John 2, where the author prays that their readers may be well in body and soul192.

In conclusion to the above surveys of the “less” and “more” proximate literary orbits, respectively, we therefore find that in classical and Hellenistic sources, εὖ πράσσω is clearly a common expression for faring well. Surprisingly, its use for quality of action is less well supported, at only a tenth of the frequency, although shows modest visibility in drama, history and philosophy. εὖ or καλῶς πράσσω appears only rarely in biblical and Jewish texts, with the clearest, although still minimal evidence in Philo and Josephus, but nowhere else in the NT, in spite of familiarity with other uses of πράσσω throughout193. If the Jewish authors are aware of the preponderance of the well-being over the quality of action sense in classical and Hellenistic texts, their uses of the expression certainly show awareness of both, although none makes any use of the ambiguity194.

I conclude that the simplest explanation of the appearance of εὖ πράσσω in Luke is as a glance towards wider classical and Hellenistic usage rather than any special dependence on Jewish texts, although the same “glance” is probably being made independently by the latter’s authors. Such a reconstruction would support the lexical approach of Zahn, although, if the balance of Jewish use were to count for anything, it would not definitively favour one reading over the other. In terms of idiomatic stock, the occasional use of εὖ πράσσω in this way amounts to a niche although not incomprehensible turn of phrase, whichever sense is involved. In addition, this judgment would stand whether or not the apostolic letter was a purely a Lukan composition, or depended on a source, since Luke as editor would still need to “own” the wording and believe that his audience would recognise it.

This judgment might seem surprising for an account otherwise replete with Luke’s own language and interspersed with Septuagintalisms195, but scholars have in general been very open to Lukan borrowing from further afield. One common suggestion is that Acts 15 is intended to echo a Hellenistic council resolving a dispute, where phrases like εὖ πράσσω, and other more “Greek” terms in the letter, help to signal cultural “location”196.

In view of this, I now leave the question of linguistic usage on one side while I turn to look at some of the major compositional approaches. Authors working in this way generally assume they have free rein over possible translations of the conveniently ambiguous εὖ πράξετε, but can quickly build elaborate social or rhetorical analyses around their choice, usually with matching theological commitments, that can lack rigorous integration. I revisit some of these approaches offering a more robust “stress test” using the findings of Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 above.

Starting with the epistolary context, I explore whether εὖ πράξετε might be part of a diplomatic stratagem or polite request to ensure the adoption of the terms of the decree. This leads naturally to a consideration of Danker’s hypothesis about power inequalities and social reciprocity, before returning to older theories of natural benefit and divine blessing, revisiting en route a possibly masked Septuagintal connection.

3. Contextual and Rhetorical Approaches

3.1. Decretal and Epistolary Context

Moles (2011, pp. 464–71) has emphasised the decretal context as important for the interpretation of the council’s activities in Acts 15. In common with decision-making processes across the ancient world, three distinct elements are present: the council’s judgment (Acts 15:19–21), the letter communicating and explaining its conclusions to the relevant parties (Acts 15:23–29)197 and finally, carefully chosen envoys (Acts 15:2–4; 22) who could not only acts as couriers, but also official exegetes of the letter198.

The model for such decision-making and conflict resolution processes appears in the decrees (δόγματα) routinely issued by the Hellenistic monarchs, city councils, the Roman emperor, provincial governors, magistrates and other officials199. Many of the resolutions are known epigraphically because of the common practice of placing such judgments for all to see in public places200. Fortunately, they are also known from literary sources, thanks to the widespread inclusion of decrees and official letters in Hellenistic and Roman historiography, including copiously in 1 and 2 Maccabees and Josephus201.

It is sometimes suggested that “decree“ is rather an overblown term for the decision recorded in the letter of Acts 15 by a fledgling new religious movement and that it should be classified in other ways, e.g., as a Graeco-Roman “association letter”202, a Jewish “diaspora letter”203 or Christian “apostolic letter”204. However, these designations arguably reflect social context more than they do form. In fact, the terminology of such resolutions (δόγμα, ψήφισμα, ἀπόφανσις, etc.) was used in a wide range of contexts205. Josephus uses δόγμα for decisions in Hellenistic and Roman governmental contexts (A.J. 12.416; 14.144 et sim.206) but also of local and popular resolutions (Vita 237; B.J. 4.390; A.J. 4:15207). Although δόγμα is absent from Acts 15, Luke uses it elsewhere for imperial decrees (Luke 2:1, Acts 17:7) and decisions made by the apostles and elders (Acts 16:4).

Notwithstanding, the characteristic structure and language of official decrees were widely imitated by cultural and religious groups that needed to resolve disputes of this kind within their various networks208, where resonances with their grander models no doubt added weight to what was being decided209. Idealised descriptions in Plato as to how religious matters might be resolved at the community level, including for culturally mixed groups, are particularly informative210. In Acts 15, we see the characteristic preambular “since” clause using ἐπεί/ἐπειδή (v. 24) and the impersonal expression of collective judgment using ἔδοξεν… ἡμῖν (v. 25, 28), both commonly appearing in Hellenistic πόλις/βουλή and Roman imperial and municipal documents211.

In governmental contexts, such judgments necessarily implied due authority212. But even where power may not have been formal, the fact that peripheral communities might appeal to their traditional “centres” for advice accords them a seniority that augments their honour. There is, however, a sense of “soft power” in these exchanges that had to be cultivated rather than assumed, and it is here that the letter comes into its own213.

It is in the letter where we often find the recipients addressed in collegial terms or even as friends214, requirements rephrased as requests215, and threats replaced by assurances of mutual benefit216. In short, it is where much of the “diplomatic positioning” was able to occur217. Literary adaptations, pseudepigraphal and straight fictional offerings can of course exaggerate these elements, but still essentially work from traits visible in “real” correspondence known from public archives or inscriptions218. In this sense, Acts 15, even if a Lukan composition, seems restrained and realistic219.

Osborne notes that a letter has, by its very nature, implicitly ceded the right to “compel” action, rather:

“… the recipient has to be made to think that action is the best thing to do, or is their duty, etc. But to make someone think this, they have to be persuaded that the case for action is strong … and that they are the only ones who know what needs doing and how to do it”.

(Osborne 2018, p. 187)

It is important to note that the phrasing of present interest, “you will do well”, is part of the accompanying letter, not the decree per se. Thus, after Luke’s internal account of the decision (Acts 15:19–21), the letter (Acts 15:23–29) switches attention to the petitioners. It opens with a warm greeting emphasising equality of status via the repeated ἀδελφοὶ, uniting the ἀπόστολοι καὶ… πρεσβύτεροι with their gentile “brothers”220 before offering a lengthy contextual preamble221. The council assures them of its unanimous support, although tempered by the concession that without divine agreement, this would perhaps not have been enough (ἔδοξεν γὰρ τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ καὶ ἡμῖν)222. Immediate action was thus now doubly appropriate, requiring envoys of the highest quality (vv. 23–27). Only after telling this story do the apostles and elders set out their judgement223 and commend it to the recipients, closing with a final “farewell”224. It is in the commendation that our words of interest occur, “if you keep yourselves from these things, you will do well”.

In this context, it has been claimed that the statement in Acts 15:29b “you shall do well” is a diplomatically conditioned “polite request” formula, that helps to soften the previous assertion that the prohibitions are, in fact, obligatory and emphasises the free and beneficial choice set before the recipients225. Foakes-Jackson et al. (1920–1933, p. 4:181) discuss “polite requests” in their comments on v. 29b, and the suggestion appears also in Marshall (2008, p. 270), “a courteous request to accept the proposal”, and also in Doering (2012, p. 469), who explicitly compares the more frequently attested formula using καλῶς ποιήσετε in 2 Macc 2:16 to the εὖ πράξετε of Acts 15:29b.

As noted above, collegial and non-confrontational language feature in the diplomatic realia of decretal letters but the claim that “politeness” explains the purpose and phrasing of v. 29b requires further evaluation.

3.2. εὖπράξετε and Politeness Theory

Following earlier pioneering work by linguists working in pragmatics226, there has now been a considerable interest in “politeness” on the part of classicists and some NT scholars working on both oral and written communication227. It has been good to be reminded however that even closing pleasantries like εὖ πράξετε might, in speech-act terms, carry “illocutionary force”228. Subtle stratagems, such as creating a sense of collegiality, or via a suitable ambiguity, seeking only to imply rather than state, are not any less real “acts”, and one of the key tasks of drawing back from straight assertion is allowing oneself or one’s reader to save “face” 229, a concept which will feature below.

In this section, I shall first explore the sense in which εὖ πράξετε may constitute a specific formula amounting to a polite request, and then consider ways in which it may be involved in broader stratagems of mediation.

Formulae built around future forms such as “you shall do well” (in the sense of acting in a helpful or commendable manner) can be used in Greek to frame polite requests equivalent to “please could you do X”. This usage is overwhelmingly found in letters, both in private correspondence and in correspondence to and from rulers, councils and officials, where such requests or polite instructions might naturally occur230. But what to make of the claim that Acts 15:29b constitutes a request of this kind? It would certainly fit with the epistolary setting, lend support to the accommodation reading of the decree, and would not be impossible to imagine as a polite “softener” in a letter ultimately seeking to remind its recipients about their “obligations”231.

Such requests are typically framed by an initial εὖ or καλῶς ποιήσεις or ποιήσετε, followed by a paratactic participle, an infinitive or an imperative232. Examples include SB 1.5216, καλῶς ποιήσετε προέμενοι τὸ σωμάτι[ο]ν μηθὲν πράξαντες (“please deliver the body free of charge”); P. Paris 43, καλῶς ποιήσεις ἀποστεῖλαί μοι ἱμίχουν (“Please send me half a chous [of oil]); and the petition in P. Cair. Zen. 59341, εἰ … σοι δοκεῖ, καλῶς ποιήσεις γράψας πρός τε τὴν πόλιν (“If… you approve, please write to the city…”)233. Similar formulae are visible in the letters of 1 and 2 Maccabees, Josephus and other Jewish texts, e.g., 1 Macc 12:18 (καλῶς ποιήσετε ἀντιφωνήσαντες ἡμῖν, “please reply to us”)234, as well as occasionally in the NT, e.g., 3 John 6 οὓς καλῶς ποιήσεις προπέμψας ἀξίως τοῦ θεοῦ (“please send them on in a manner worthy of God”), and possibly 2 Pet 2:19 καλῶς ποιεῖτε προσέχοντες (normally, “you will do well to/please be attentive to …”)235.

Although Acts 15:29b shows some similarities to these formulations, there is nevertheless a striking difference between the final position of εὖ πράξετε in a qualifying role and the regular pattern for καλῶς ποιέω requests. Thus, although εὖ πράσσω and καλῶς ποιέω can both mean “act or do well”236, this does not establish de facto idiomatic equivalence between the two patterns of phrasing. Indeed, a TLG search shows that εὖ πράσσω is almost never used to articulate a request, let alone do so in the same way as καλῶς ποιέω—in an initial position with a participle, infinitive or imperative following237. It is thus potentially misleading when Foakes-Jackson et al. (1920–1933, p. 4:181) refer to the well-known καλῶς ποιήσετε request formula while commenting on εὖ πράξετε in Acts 15:29b and direct the reader to the numerous examples in Moulton and Milligan (1930, p. 319)238.

If Foakes-Jackson, Lake et al. are overly zealous in seeing this equivalence, which would in any case rely on the less common “acting well” reading of εὖ πράσσω239, might a promise of well-being (the more attested sense) nonetheless not add a note of assurance or goodwill that functions rhetorically to encourage the desired response? The qualified answer must be yes, so long as this usage can be evidenced. One text makes use of a similar expression that routinely implies well-being, namely, καλῶς ἔχω240. Located in an initial position in its sentence, like καλῶς ποιέω, it cannot naturally be translated by “please” but does introduce some “advice” and therefore encourages its acceptance. It appears in a letter from Julius Caesar to the Parians241 about the Jews of Delos, whom they have prevented from observing their ancestral customs by making their own local decree (ψηφισμα) against them. Caesar counters this by mentioning his own imperial decree (διάταγμα) guaranteeing Jewish freedoms242, but closes with: “it will be good for you (καλῶς ἔχει), if you have made any decree against our friends… that you abrogate it”243. Whilst couched in polite terms, the remark retains its firmness and caries a hint of warning244.

This reminds us that none of the friendly and collegial language used in decretal or diplomatic letters, whether by polite requests or reassuring promises, ultimately removes the inequality involved. Thus, Phillip’s use of καλῶς ποιήσετε in his letter to the Amphipolitans amounts to a “polite if firm” reminder of their duties245, and in Josephus, Joshua’s envoys open with εὖ ποιήσετε but soon add warnings if their “polite request” is not heeded246. In this context, qualified promises of well-being, such as “If you do X, things will go well for you” may sound positive but are potentially more manipulative than straight requests.

In spite of the general soundness of looking for rhetorical implications of this kind, there are important contextual and linguistic differences in our passage. εὖ πράξετε does not have to be understood as a “softening device” if, unlike Julius Caesar, the apostles are not actually trying to change what their addressees are doing247. And as noted above, the translation “If you keep …” may be misleading if the relative clause in v. 29b ὧν διατηροῦντες presumes continuity rather than conditionality248. This translational problem besets a related passage in Josephus, where continuity of practice can also be contextually inferred249. Taken in this latter way, the addition of εὖ πράξετε would have a genuinely positive, non-threatening feel and reaffirm the Antiochenes’ current practice over and against their opponents’ demands250. Indeed, it would undermine the very suggestion that if they did not comply, they would not enter into the blessings of “salvation” at all (as v. 1).

Finally, it is sometimes suggested that, as part of a politeness-based stratagem, the apostles and elders (via Luke, at least) were actively exploiting the ambiguity of εὖ πράξετε for diplomatic reasons. Whilst wordplay has always formed a prominent part of the ANE and Greek linguistic cultures251, it has been somewhat neglected in NT exegesis, leading to calls to reconsider the possibility of deliberate use by Luke and Paul252. εὖ πράξετε in Acts 15:29b ought to be at least considered from this point of view. There is, however, an important difference between what Paul does, playing openly on two well-known meanings to help readers understand a connection or perhaps an irony253, and what is being imagined here, namely, an unstated ambiguity left for different readers to decide upon differently.

We saw how Plato used the ambiguity of εὖ πράσσω as a playful, didactic device in a not too dissimilar manner to Paul, both, of course, addressing their own disciples254. But in the domain of political relationships, Cicero was entirely aware that polite comments with hints of ambiguity about them could be very hazardous255, something confirmed both by ancient reflections on diplomacy256 and modern speech-act theory257. However, in view of the decretal letters considered above, it is not difficult to imagine someone chairing an arbitration process seeking to ensure that opposing groups could both save face by “hearing” a closing remark as they wished258.

Unfortunately, there are few if any examples of written dispute resolutions from religious networks of the kind represented by the Acts 15 council259, and in any case, we would have to ask how such an ambiguity would work. A simple version has already been implied. If the opponents heard the apostles underlining the “rightness” of Antiochene compliance, they might take some comfort that they were not being allowed to become a “law unto themselves”. In turn, if the Antiochenes heard themselves being praised for “acting nobly”, they could rest assured that they had not really submitted to anything, but were being thanked for a conciliatory gesture. But there are difficulties even with this. The first is that the letter would not be playing on the ambiguity made famous by Plato at all, but on two shades of the same “action” sense of εὖ πράξετε, which no orator is ever known to have exploited. The second problem is contextual. The dual face-saving picture relies on a concession actually being made, whereas in Luke’s narrative, the decree arguably offers nothing to the opponents.

The question of loss (or otherwise) of “face” is, in fact, rapidly overtaken by that of who is actually in control of this process and what they may wish to get out of it. It incidentally switches attention away from the blows being traded between the parties in dispute to the relationship between them and the apostles and elders. Indeed, this is where the relevant power imbalance really lies in the context of Acts 15, and comes centre stage in the work of Danker (1983), whose call for a better understanding εὖ πράξετε frames this paper.

3.3. Reciprocity and Power Relations

The claim by Danker (1983, pp. 52–53) that there had been little progress in our understanding of εὖ πράξετε in Acts 15:29b was made in a paper cited frequently for its emphasis on reciprocity. The term was coined by anthropologists from the 1950s to describe material exchange260, but is now used to refer to any system of “requital of benefit”, including in kindness and honour261. Although always mutual, reciprocity does not necessarily imply equality and thus can often involve asymmetric obligations used to maintain power relations262. Nevertheless, and in spite of some questions surrounding the applicability to Jewish society263, the concept has become ubiquitous in treatments of family and civic obligations, patronage, etc., in the classical and Hellenistic worlds264 and thence NT studies265. In any case, Danker’s identification of reciprocity concepts in Acts 15 has been widely repeated, albeit with variations.

Whilst Okoronkwo (2001, p. 2) is not wrong to apply this idea to the relationship between the wider gentile and Jewish-Christian communities, where he incidentally sees gentiles as indebted to Jews266, Tannehill (1986, p. 2:192) follows Danker in focussing on what the Antiochenes’ compliance will do for their relationship with the apostles267.

Danker develops his reciprocity analysis of Acts 15:22–29 in dialogue with a letter from Eumenes II of Pergamon to the neighbouring Karians268. As noted above, letters were well suited to the task of insinuating or maintaining reciprocity269, particularly where authority per se could not simply be asserted270. In his letter, Eumenes seeks to garner support for the elevation of a local festival to Panhellenic status271. He cannot command the Karians’ support, only encourage it, so interweaves the language of equality with a pledge of reciprocity, albeit as the more powerful figure.

He opens with a polite request (καλῶς οὖν][πο]ιήσετε272) for the reception of his envoys and the adoption of the new festival273. But next, we see the subtleties. By adding “out of consideration for both the goddess and the King” (μὲν διὰ τὴν θεόν, έπειτα δὲ καὶ διʼ ἡ[μᾶς), he ranks himself with the deity as co-initiator and honouree. He then speaks of positive consequences, which, as in Acts 15:29b, are introduced by a participle phrase [τ]αῦτα γὰρ πράξαντες (“[by] doing these things… you will…”)274. The first benefit is a “share in the advancement of the goddess’ honours”, which, besides bringing its own rewards275, flatters the Karians by making them Eumenes’ “partners”276. But in the second, he promises them that in return he will do everything that is “advantageous” for them277.

Whilst this is illuminating, Acts 15 involves a dispute resolution rather than an a priori request, somewhat different power relations, and various options as to how the exchange of benefits might occur. Danker is aware that any reciprocity involved has to fit with a credible understanding of εὖ πράξετε278. He takes this to imply “good fortune” (p. 54), and thus opts for the prosperity/well-being reading, but makes this the concrete result of human reciprocity rather than some more abstract principle: if the recipients abide by the minimal provisions suggested…

“they can be assured of the abiding goodwill of the community in Jerusalem… [who] as benefactors, are bestowing their bounty on the Antiochenes by lifting [the additional] sanctions”.

(Danker 1983, p. 54)279

However, Danker’s presuppositions can still be questioned. Whilst it is good to consider both the “depth structure of the socio-cultural context” and the “specific semantic flavour generated by the inclusion of [εὖ πράξετε]”280, the connotations of εὖ πράξετε still depend rather strongly on a particular understanding of the social dynamics. Implying that the council have done the Antiochenes a favour by “lifting” a large number of legitimate but onerous requirements281 does not, in fact, correspond to Luke’s narrative, which describes an extraordinary demand for full Jewish conversion282 that is rejected as unauthorised and vexatious283, ostensibly by a universal ruling, not a special favour284.

Although the Antiochenes do not arguably “owe” the council for this ruling285, a broader reciprocity principle could still be relevant, in so far as receiving any help from a judge or council was not a foregone conclusion. The Antiochenes may certainly feel a sense of gratitude to the apostles and elders for at least attending to their case286, a sentiment seen in the letter of Archytas in Diog. Laert. 3. 22287 that ends with the plea “By so doing you will satisfy justice and… put us under an obligation” (ταῦτα γὰρ ποιῶν δίκαια πραξεῖς καὶ ἁμὶν χαριξῇ).

But if the Antiochenes feel grateful for the positive judgment, are they being asked to offer something back to the council? Does complying with the four prohibitions, as Danker assumes, constitute a favour? Giving ground in this way could certainly bring honour to the council and uphold its authority288, even if only as primus inter pares289. From their point of view, it allows them to secure a face-saving gesture for the losing side, and thus keep all the factions on board but also indebted, and by ensuring peace between them, help avert unwelcome attention from the authorities290.

Although this analysis remains very attractive, and certainly chimes with Luke’s developing picture of the role of the apostles and elders, it is still not certain that the Antiochenes are being asked to “do” something that might merit the council’s good will. The prohibitions, which they call “essentials“ (τὰ ἐπάναγκες), were not a point of negotiation291, and may simply have summarised the Antiochenes’ current practice292. If so, the council may simply be reassuring them that by continuing exactly as they are, they will be “fine”. This understanding does not in fact require a well-being reading for εὖ πράξετε at all, as Danker has to presuppose in his reciprocity picture293. It can simply assure them that their obligations are completely fulfilled, as envisaged in Vita 83 where Josephus speaks about οἱ τὰ δέοντα πράττοντες. This may lie behind Pervo’s translation “you will be in good standing”, which although not well supported294, fits well with the Antiochenes’ rejoicing (ἐχάρησαν) and avoids leaving them indebted to the council for having struck them a “relatively good deal”. Either way, it may be misleading to understand what is happening here in quid pro quo terms.

Whilst thus far none of the compositional arguments considered forces a choice on εὖ πράξετε, the role of “well-being” assurances in civic power-play, if a little disturbing, has been striking. A reciprocity-based analogy, however, locks us into a transactional view, with the council as guarantor and protector. Whilst social analysis is important, it can sometimes obscure simpler views of causality obvious to the earliest readers, namely, natural and biblical principles linking obedience and blessing, to which we now turn.

3.4. Natural Benefit and Divine Blessing

If mutual obligation cannot fully explain the rationale of the decree (even if it is involved in general terms), then others note that if, for the moment, we continue to allow εὖ πράξετε to refer to well-being, then a simpler de facto principle of exchange appears directly in the text295, outside of the discourse of power relations. Thus, Haenchen (1977, p. 437) notes a blessing appears as a result of obedience, “dann wäre mit dem Gehorsam ein Segen verheißen”296, a point apparently noticed also by Marguerat (2007, p. 2:107), “L’argument tient de la réciprocité: qui s’abstient s’en trouvera bien”297. Neither says exactly how or why this happens, nor what the well-being consists of. The mere suggestion, however, begs us to consider what might be envisaged298.

Although Marguerat uses the term “réciprocité”, I will not use this here to avoid confusion with Danker’s concept of mutual obligation and focus rather on two other ways that well-being might result from obedience. The first is via the notion of “natural benefit”, and the second, via “divine blessing”. In the “natural” view, good things simply come because of or through the actions undertaken, a principle that can be seen in the wisdom tradition, e.g., in the link between diligence and success, or between moderation and good health299. In the “divine” view, good things come because they are promised by the gods in return for obedience300. For some commands, of course, a modern reader could imagine both principles to be at work301.

As for the blessings themselves, there is no specific indication to as what might be involved. Johnson (1992, p. 277 n. 17) briefly considers health. This has often been imagined as a benefit of the food laws. However, older views that these were based on principles of hygiene, and therefore naturally health-giving, are now mostly discredited302, and making all four prohibitions kashrut-related is not convincing303. Philo does say at one point that Torah obedience as a whole leads to “complete freedom from disease” (εἰς ἅπαν ἄνοσον, Praem. 119), but rapidly backs off from making this a thoroughgoing claim304. Seeing a broader concern with pagan idolatry305, however, could make appetitive “excess” the chief culprit306, and this fits the fact that Jewish health claims are more often made on the basis of moderation rather than a kosher diet per se, including elsewhere by Philo himself307.

Rackham (1951, p. 252) sees this latter rationale at work in Acts 15, namely, that any set of rules will at least place the gentile Christians under a degree of self-discipline, which will bring its own benefits. Whilst pagan excess is clearly condemned in the NT308, at least some of its authors question the idea that rules of this kind offer much help in our struggle309. Indeed, when Paul makes a rare comment about food and health to Timothy, he appears to take a rather pragmatic approach310. All in all, however, a health emphasis in Acts 15 is not very intuitive. This is true at the lexical level, where we have seen that plenty of more specialised terms would be available were health to be a specific concern, but also in relation to the broader narrative context, where offering such an assurance would also seem unnatural. It is certainly not impossible, however, to stay with the classic usage of εὖ πράσσω for a broader sense of flourishing.

This is implicit in Witherington (1998, p. 469), who roots the well-being not in the prohibitions per se, nor even in the discipline involved, but in the resulting community harmony. Besides aligning with the text’s conflict narratio311, this suggests a socially manifest rather than purely individual notion of well-being, not unlike the biblical concept of שׁלום (šālōm)312. This would fit the context well and would appear as the natural consequence of the Antiochenes’ generous accommodation, aligning with one of the classic interpretations of the narrative313, as well as a known Lukan theme314.

Indeed, that a social agenda might be served by a “decree” of this kind may have some basis in Jewish tradition and is reminiscent of early rabbinical rulings made “for the sake of peace” (מפני דרכי שׁלום)315. These diverged from strict legal norms in order to ensure good relationships both between Jews of differing persuasions, but crucially also between Jews and gentiles316, promoting civility, good business and everyone’s well-being317, and which may well have informed early church life318.

However, even if the Acts 15 decree could be understood in this way, problems remain. First, we see none of the characteristic terminology associated with the “for the sake of peace” rulings319. Secondly, however, such judgments were always conceived as concessions made by the stronger party, not accommodations required of the weaker. Neither the request to the Antiochenes nor the wholesale rejection of the demands of their stronger opponents fit this scenario at all320, and as a radical, almost one-sided ruling, could easily have risked not bringing “peace” in any case321.

This directs us back to reconsider the divine blessing model. Whilst one can imagine community harmony as a form of indirect divine blessing, the significance of a “direct” reading is the fact that it also permits a Torah-based understanding of the Antiochenes’ obedience, which, as noted, is increasingly being considered in a post-New Perspective scholarship. And if obedience can also bring well-being in this simple sense, it does at least help to soften the tension between earlier German scholars like Zahn, and later approaches from Haenchen onwards.

Although he does not say it explicitly, Haenchen’s “wäre mit dem Gehorsam ein Segen verheißen” suggests that he may have been thinking that readers of Acts 15:29b would be reminded of the Deuteronomic pattern “you shall do X… so that it may go well with you” (Deut 4:40; 5:16, 29, 33; 6:18, etc.). This is tempting, but problematic. The LXX does not use εὖ πράξετε for this characteristic formula, so perhaps the connection should be dismissed. However, the phrasing it does use, ἵνα εὖ σοι γένηται322 (variants ἵνα εὖ σοι ἔσται or ᾖ323), represents such an awkwardly Semitic translation of the Hebrew324, that it is avoided elsewhere in the LXX325 or substituted by other terms. This is so even when the Deuteronomic ideal itself is being expressed326, a pattern seen in later Jewish and Christian writers unless specifically quoting the Pentateuch327. It is thus possible that Luke offers an alternative of his own, suited to a Hellenistic decretal letter, but without entirely losing the Pentateuchal resonance. Although not hugely strengthening this suggestion, something similar might be happening with another hapax legomenon used a few words earlier for the obligations themselves, namely, τὰ ἐπάναγκες. This too is never used in the LXX, but appears occasionally in Philo and Josephus where Jewish legal principles are being explained to gentiles328.

Besides the language problem, in the NT at least, there may also a further “political” reason to avoid a direct reproduction of the LXX phrasing, ἵνα εὖ σοι γένηται. This is the awkward fact that in many of the verses distinctively flagged by these words, the land is promised as well as blessing (Exod 20:12; Deut 5:16, 33b; 11:99; 30:18; 32:47), a concept that cannot easily be extended to gentiles. But although the NT can be seen doing some careful editing around the land motif329, it generally re-works the promise positively, if figuratively330, and at least some scholars believe that an eschatologically refigured “land” precisely lies behind the formulation of the decree331. Nevertheless, once can see how a paraphrase of the Deuteronomic promise might feel safer than a direct quote.

It is nevertheless important to remind ourselves that framing a Deuteronomic link between obedience and blessing but avoiding the εὖ σοι γένηται wording is not an NT innovation, but goes back to the post-Pentateuchal parts of the LXX (noted above)332. It continues in Jewish authors thereafter, such as Josephus’ report in A.J. 4.199 that God promised that if the Israelites kept his laws, they “would have secure happiness” (εὐδαιμονίαν βεβαίαν ἕξετε). Such accessible koine alternatives would still seem to leave Luke’s rather classically framed εὖ πράξετε looking a little exposed, were there not one last but very striking example, considered earlier, in 4 Macc 3:20. Here, we read, Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ βαθεῖαν εἰρήνην διὰ τὴν εὐνομίαν οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν εἶχον καὶ ἔπραττον καλῶς, “At a time when our ancestors were enjoying profound peace because of their observance of the law and were prospering…”, where, in so far is it echoes the Deuteronomic logic, the author replaces a notional εὖ αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο with ἔπραττον καλῶς, a very close match to the wording used by Luke. Whilst this scarcely constitutes overwhelming evidence, it perhaps provides proof of principle.

Were a running allusion to Deuteronomy to be detected behind the formulation of the decree and its accompanying letter333, even speculatively, then it is not hard to see how a motif of “obligations and blessings” could be refigured for a NT context. In relation to the prohibitions, for instance, it is intriguing that although we mostly remember the promised blessings in connection with the fifth commandment, Deuteronomy extends it to all sorts of other instructions, including importantly for our considerations of the decree, avoiding idolatry (Deut 4:25–26334) and the spilling or eating blood (Deut 19:13; 12:23–25)335. Indeed, the promise’s repeated appearance in calls for obedience to all of God’s commandments (Deut 4:40; 5:29 et sim.336) means it can the more easily accompany those representative sets of prohibitions signalling gentile obligation in toto adopted by NT writers337. In this way, both the obedience and the blessing can come across together338, and the promise of well-being signal an assurance of “covenantal belonging” for the gentiles and that all the blessings promised in Christ are fully available to them339.

Although we have noted the nearest thing to Luke’s εὖ πράξετε for a Deuteronomic well-being promise appears in 4 Macc 3:20, the initial wording of Josephus’ A.J. 4.199 provides another extraordinary parallel to Luke’s opening words in v. 29. Thus, we read in full ταῦτα ποιοῦντες τῷ θεῷ φίλα πράξετε καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν βεβαίαν ἕξετε, “if you do these things, you will be doing things that are pleasing to God and will have secure happiness”. The uncanny resemblance of the adverbial phrase (also using a present participle), ταῦτα ποιοῦντες, to Luke’s ἐξ ὧν διατηροῦντες ἑαυτούς, is immediately striking. This passage incidentally lends support to the idea noted earlier, that the obedience envisaged is not to be understood as “new”340, but something to be continued. When Josephus starts with “When you have possessed… the land of Canaan…” he is paraphrasing the opening lines of Deut 6:10–25, which warns the Israelites not to forget the Lord after they arrive in the promised land, urging them to continue to obey “as at this day” (ὥσπερ καὶ σήμερον, v. 24). The point that Josephus is seeking to capture in his ταῦτα ποιοῦντες would not be that they should now submit to new instructions and gain a blessing hitherto unexperienced, but should continue as they are, and thus not, through complacency, forfeit present blessings341. Were this narrative subtext to be informing the apostolic letter, it could lend further support to a reading of Acts 15 in which the council affirms the traditional contours of gentile faithfulness and inclusion and rejects the identity-changing demand of v. 1.

4. Conclusions

This paper stated that it would be unlikely to be able to “solve” the problem of the decree, and given the important ongoing disputes about its rationale, it might seem unwarranted to have spent so much time on a seemingly innocuous remark in the apostolic letter. However, the attested senses of εὖ πράξετε, of prospering, or acting well (the latter ranging from “commendably” to “correctly”), were different enough to warrant investigation. That no choice has ever met with universal agreement, and indeed, presented different challenges to different exegetical presuppositions, suggested a variational, reflective methodology, not so much dedicated to making a definitive judgment as to opening up questions about common readings of the decree narrative.

Scholars were traditionally divided over the relative weight to give lexical evidence vis-à-vis contextual fit, but this was made more difficult still by questions surrounding Luke’s literary and linguistic reach, on the one hand, and the rather different constraints foregrounded by different social, rhetorical or theological approaches. These tensions were often without clear means of arbitration, as illustrated by Zahn’s signal, but short-lived attempt to champion wider philological evidence over theological concerns. This suggested the need for a more systematic approach.

This paper therefore sought (a) to stratify evidence of idiomatic usage with some attention to chronology, genre and proximity; (b) to use linguistic data to “stress test” a selection of recent contextual approaches; and (c) to suspend judgment as long as possible to allow extended critical dialogue on a case-by-case basis, and thus map the problem “to the edges”.

At the broader lexical level, in classical and Hellenistic sources, εὖ πράσσω and its later καλῶς variant were found to indicate “success” or “well-being” very frequently, but “acting well”, considerably less so, although with scattered examples in drama, history and philosophy. A niche, Platonic wordplay on the two senses was avoided by most. Amongst more proximate texts, such as the LXX and other Jewish literature, however, the expression essentially disappeared, although Philo and Josephus were aware of both senses. It was concluded that Luke, as they, would most likely have been independently informed by classical and Hellenistic usage. This would ostensibly favour a well-being reading, although the very small frequencies involved make certainty difficult.

At the contextual level, both senses could be understood within an “accommodation” picture of the decree, where the letter sought, by one means or another, to secure Antiochene cooperation. “Acting well” was involved in the claim that εὖ πράξετε framed a polite request intended to soften the sense of obligation, but this lacked linguistic support. Another politeness concept, “diplomatic ambiguity”, where the dual options of “acting correctly” and “acting nobly” allowed each side to save face, was attractive, although playing on this subtlety was unattested elsewhere, and in any case left the relatively one-sided judgment entirely visible. More positively, the “well-being” reading could simply remind the Antiochenes of the social benefits that might stem from a gesture made “for the sake of peace”, although Jewish formalisation of this ideas postdated the NT. Much tougher questions arose if the apostles were understood to be guaranteeing something collegially, but where their pledge came with “expectations”. This reciprocity reading, whilst anthropologically grounded, worked less well if the apostles were not asking for a favour from the Antiochenes, nor indebting them for their judgment.

Meanwhile, the stronger take on “acting well”, namely, acting properly, which had remained the mainstay of later German scholarship and tended to undermine the accommodation picture, latterly lent support to newer “gentile Torah” approaches to the decree. Whilst certainly attractive within a post-New Perspective context, unfortunately, the commendatory feel of εὖ πράσσω could not easily be taken linguistically as an assurance only of “compliance”, or “good standing”, even if this could be inferred on other grounds.

It was Haenchen, however, who by a passing remark connecting obedience and well-being, suggested a Deuteronomic line of thought that could move naturally from the “essentials” of the decree to an assurance of blessing, and implicitly of belonging. Although this involved an unpromising difference in terminology, the frequent reworking of the awkward phrasing of the LXX—suggestively so in Josephus and 4 Maccabees—offered illustrative support for Luke’s εὖ πράξετε. Although tenuous, this would not only suggest the inclusion of gentile Christians but militate against imagining the imposition of new observances and confirm, instead, existing post-conversion norms, as implied by Zahn.

The entire discussion has, of course, been severely limited by the lack of “proximate” parallels to Luke’s wording. Signalling the Graeco-Roman framing of the conciliar process by a relatively well-known expression from that very public domain is certainly credible. However, exploring ways in which Luke’s phrasing—poorly attested but not absent from his more proximate sources—might signal something closer to home is also warranted, particularly where a well-recognised intertext might be in mind. It remains intriguing that using εὖ πράξετε may thus have fulfilled both purposes, whilst providing just the degree of figuration required for a clearly controversial settlement.

On balance, therefore, I have ended up marginally supporting “well-being” as the sense that would most naturally come into readers’ minds, albeit allowing that secondary meanings might be noticed. This tentative reconstruction thus agrees with Zahn, but by drawing on more extensive evidence, is able to soften his absolutism. However, his instinct to locate εὖ πράξετε primarily within an external idiomatic stock does not seem to be mistaken. Paradoxically, as noted above, Zahn’s “public” reading may also align with a less obvious intertextual nudge from Deuteronomy, and thus, pace Haenchen, still allow a Torah-based understanding.

As for the other possibilities, the praise of noble action, whilst almost certainly known to Luke, has rather specialised connotations, whether ideally virtuous or simply expedient, that do not quite fit the discourse Luke presents. And the sparser assertion of “right action”, visible in some contemporary versions, finds poorer linguistic support and adds nothing to the decree’s prior determination that what is being spoken about is already obligatory.

Were a reader to take the expression in one of these other ways, it would hardly do great violence to their understanding. However, I cannot see a deliberate use of ambiguity here, and whatever diplomatic latitude the assurance might offer, it scarcely conceals the very firm decision in favour of the Antiochene petition.

Although well-being played a role within several important contextual analyses, e.g., those using rhetorical and reciprocity theory, that does not mean I have accepted any of their conclusions on that account. In fact, Luke’s focus on specifically religious or performative expectations does not immediately suggest praiseworthiness or well-being. However, the thought that this unlikely idiom might offer Luke a contemporary yet recognisable rendering of an unusable Septuagintalism, implicitly locating believing gentiles within a biblical discourse of obedience and blessing, has a curious attraction.

Would I change the common English translation? If an amplified paraphrase were permitted, and a glance at several important overtones also allowed, I would be sorely tempted by “if you just carry on as you are, holding fast to the essentials, … you will be absolutely fine and fully blessed”. Otherwise, we may have to go back to “you will do well” with an improbably long footnote.