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Article

Returning to Zhen: An Investigation of Zhen Highlighted by Zhuangzi and Daoist Self-Transcendence

by
Shaojun Wang
College of Humanities, Hainan University, Haikou 570228, China
Religions 2025, 16(4), 534; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16040534
Submission received: 13 March 2025 / Revised: 11 April 2025 / Accepted: 16 April 2025 / Published: 21 April 2025

Abstract

:
Very few people know that there is not even one character of zhen 真 in the Thirteen Classics revered by Confucians. Among the three axiological categories, Confucianism attaches importance to shan 善 (goodness) and mei 美 (beauty), while Daoism highlights zhen. It was Daoism that first put forward zhen as a philosophical concept and discussed it extensively. However, the existing research about it is still insufficient and mingled with misunderstandings. In this article, I will explore its innermost connotations. I will mainly employ methods such as a literature analysis and comparative research in this inquiry. Zhen indicates the existential authenticity of each individual and the whole world. Daoists believe that one will deviate from zhen once he/she yields to su 俗. Su not only refers to sensual desires but includes Confucian moral regulations as well. Only when one has transcended these secular values will it be possible for him/her to become a true person (zhenren 真人). What Confucians are concerned with is shan, and they even want to repress zhen with shan. This is the fundamental reason that they are unwilling to mention zhen.

1. Introduction

Zhen, shan, and mei (真善美; truth, goodness, and beauty) are the three most universal axiological categories, but strangely enough, the Confucian Classics talk a lot about shan and mei, while the character zhen is nowhere to be found. This phenomenon has been noticed in history, for example, “there is no character zhen in the Six Classics 六經無真字” was once an idiom in the Song Dynasty.1 As a matter of fact, not only the Six Classics, but even the entire Thirteen Classics, do not contain a single character called zhen. However, today, very few people note this phenomenon. Even if they are so informed, people mostly feel that it is inconceivable. According to statistics, the total number of characters in the Thirteen Classics is over 640,000. People may wonder: how can it be possible that there is not a single instance of zhen among them? But surprisingly, this is indeed the case.
Gu Yanwu 顧炎武, a famous thinker in the early Qing Dynasty, pointed out, “Zhen first appears in the books of Lao-Zhuang” (Huang 1985, p. 1405). If we scan the transmitted version of Laozi, we can see that zhen appears three times. In Zhuangzi, we will frequently encounter zhen, more than 60 times in total.2 On the one hand, there is no character zhen in the Confucian Classics; on the other hand, zhen is used in large quantities and becomes a crucial philosophical concept in the Daoist literature. This phenomenon contains great theoretical significance and should be given full attention.
Conversely, Ch’ien Mu 錢穆 claimed, “Zhen has never appeared in the ancient Confucian Classics. It was Zhuangzi who began to create and use it” (Ch’ien 2002, p. 139). Ch’ien had a unique viewpoint. He believed that the inner chapters of Zhuangzi preceded Laozi, so he concluded that Zhuangzi used zhen for the first time.
The view that Laozi is later than Zhuangzi is untenable, both historically and logically. However, according to the Guodian Chu-tomb bamboo slips 郭店楚簡本 which were excavated in 1993, there may be no character zhen in Laozi either. In this article, I will endeavor to answer the following questions: If there is no character zhen in this earliest version of Laozi, does it imply that Laozi does not have a similar notion of zhen? Moreover, what on earth does zhen indicate? Is it propagating the idea of being immortal? Can Daoist zhen be analogous to existentialist authenticity? Why is there not a single instance of zhen in the Confucian Classics? I will mainly employ approaches such as a literature analysis and comparative research in this inquiry.

2. The Proposition of Zhen

As mentioned above, Laozi may not contain the character zhen because the propositions “質真若渝” (chp. 41) and “其德乃真” (chp. 54) in the transmitted version are written as “質 Religions 16 00534 i001 (貞)若渝” and “其德乃 Religions 16 00534 i002 (貞)” in the Chu bamboo slips (Jingmen Municipal Museum 1998, pp. 8, 118). The collators of these bamboo slips finally read Religions 16 00534 i001 and Religions 16 00534 i002 as 真, but this is doubtful. These two characters (真 and 貞) have the same pronunciation and similar glyphs but different meanings. Apparently, the glyphs of Religions 16 00534 i001 and Religions 16 00534 i002 are much closer to 貞. In addition, judging from a semantic perspective, we have to say that here 貞 is more appropriate than 真. Chapter 54 “Regulations for Posthumous Titles” of The Extra Book of Zhou 逸周書·謚法 says, “To be pure and stick to moral integrity is called 貞” (Y. Zhu 1940, p. 96). Therefore, 質貞若渝 means “firm and unyielding in morality, but seemingly flexible and changeable”. The characters 貞 and 渝 are opposed to each other. This is exactly Laozi’s paradoxical way of “expressing positive implications with negative words 正言若反”. “His/Her virtue will be firm and unyielding 其德乃貞”. This reading is also clear and coherent.
It should be noted that we still cannot claim that there is no character 真 in Laozi of the Chu bamboo slips. The main reason is that Chapter 21 of the transmitted version has “其精甚真” (here 真 is more appropriate than 貞), but to our regret, this chapter was not transcribed in the Chu bamboo slips. In spite of this, we can say that the earliest version of Laozi may not contain the character 真, and even if it does, 真 is still an adjective, not a noun.
In Zhuangzi, however, there are a series of expressions such as “endangering his zhen 危其真”, “perplexing their zhen 惑其真”, “forgetting its zhen 忘其真”, “returning to your zhen 反(返)其真”, “sticking to your zhen 守其真”, “valuing zhen 貴真”, “maintaining zhen 葆真”, “preserving zhen 全真”, and “gathering zhen 采真”. It is clear that zhen had turned into a noun and an important category. Therefore, it was Zhuangzi who first introduced zhen as a philosophical concept and discussed it at length.
Daoists and those who are deeply influenced by Daoism all call for zhen. For example, zhen appears 32 times in Wenzi 文子 and 20 times in Liezi 列子, which are also important Daoist classics. It is well known that Dao is the highest category of Daoism. However, at the same time, we should bear in mind that ”Dao follows ziran 道法自然” (Laozi, chp. 25). Ziran (lit. “self-so”) is the core value of Daoism, and in the theoretical framework of Daoism, zhen is often at the same level as ziran. For instance, one of ziran’s opposites is keyi 刻意, which indicates artificial, unnatural affectation that will inevitably turn into hypocrisy and inauthenticity (the opposite of zhen). Now the question is the following: what does zhen refer to and why was it stressed by Daoism?

3. The Connotations of Zhen and the Return to Zhen

3.1. Some Misunderstandings About Zhen

Although there has been some discussion of it, we can say that the existing research on zhen is still insufficient and mingled with misunderstandings.
We shall first examine definitions in ancient dictionaries. In the Eastern Han Dynasty, Xu Shen 許慎 defined it as follows: “Zhen refers to the immortal who transform themselves and ascend to heaven 僊人變形而登天也” (Duan 1981, p. 384). Duan Yucai 段玉裁 of the Qing Dynasty accepted this and offered further argumentation. Until now, some scholars are still influenced by this definition, such as Chen Yinque 陳寅恪 and Poul Andersen. For example, Andersen devoted an entire chapter to an analysis of the Daoist concept of zhen. He believed that zhen had “the two basic meanings of ‘true’ as a quality of propositions, and ‘real’ in the sense of being factual or alive” (Andersen 2019, p. 92). Meantime he emphasized, “in Daoist self-cultivation, the term zhen is crucial to the goal of becoming an immortal subject” (ibid., p. 113). Accordingly, the concept of zhenren 真人 was conceived as “a term which in Daoism designates the highest form of immortality available to a human being” (ibid., p. 3).
By contrast, many other scholars, such as Dai Tong 戴侗, Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, Wang Yun 王筠, Xu Hao 徐灝, Wu Chu 吳楚, Gao Songquan 高淞荃, Tang Lan 唐蘭, and Ma Xulun 馬敘倫, opposed this definition. To illustrate, Dai Tong of the Southern Song Dynasty pointed out the following:
There is no character zhen in the Classics and their commentaries. Only the books of Lie Yukou 列禦寇 and Zhuangzi have it. Their so-called zhen just means to be pure and not mixed, like “true or false” nowadays. They never regarded zhen as immortals that transformed themselves and ascended to heaven… Nevertheless, it was Zhuang and Lie who created the concept of zhenren and mentioned being immortal and ascending to heaven. However, this was only a fable. Later generations thus confused Daoism with a school that propagated the idea of being immortal. This is the reason why the idea of transforming and ascending to heaven came into being.
I also believe that Xu Shen’s definition is far from the original meaning of zhen. He confused Lao-Zhuang with the later religious Daoism, leading to a common but serious misinterpretation. Andersen’s book is also based on the premise of treating philosophical Daoism and religious Daoism as a whole, which is disputable. In reality, the attainment of immorality, which is the ultimate goal of later Daoist priests, was never what Lao-Zhuang pursued. As for life, Lao-Zhuang advocated for “always following the natural course of things without intentionally prolonging one’s life 常因自然而不益生” (Chapter 5 “The Sign of Abundant Virtue 德充符” of Zhuangzi, Guo 1961, p. 221).
Siao-Fang Sun gave an early discussion of zhen which is highly appreciated by Daoism. He said that for Zhuangzi, there were two kinds of truth: absolute truth (i.e., reality itself or Dao) and relative truth within our knowledge of empirical things (S.-F. Sun 1953, p. 146). This was interpreting zhen with Platonic thinking. Unsurprisingly, zhen was mistaken either for the ontological ίδέα of reality or for the traditional concept of truth in the sense of conformity.
In the last decade or two, there has been a growing academic discussion of Daoist zhen, mostly in existential terms, and some scholars have linked it to the existentialist theory of authenticity. According to Paul J. D’Ambrosio, existentialist authenticity “can be seen as a process of negating externally imposed identity that focuses on a static, internal self. Therefore, being authentic means casting off socially defined roles, and calls for a return to one’s true, or original, self” (D’Ambrosio 2015, pp. 355–56). However, D’Ambrosio opposed the “hasty” analog between Daoist zhen and existentialist authenticity. He claimed, “the zhen person clearly has little in common with existentialist authenticity. Key aspects such as uniqueness, authorship and ownership are completely lacking in the Zhuangzi” (ibid., p. 375); “the Zhuangzi does not advance the idea ‘to be yourself’” (ibid., p. 368). In his view, standing out or apart from others will be in tension with social expectations, while being empty enables a person to go along with all situations. “The Zhuangzi’s zhen person forgets, and is thereby empty of, any particular content” (ibid., p. 374). For this reason, zhen does not contain anything that is expected by society, nor a strong sense of self or ownness. On the contrary, it is Confucianism that emphasizes expressing one’s own uniqueness (ibid., pp. 372–73).
Unfortunately, there are some misunderstandings in D’Ambrosio’s interpretation. Firstly, this judgment is only based on the case of Ziyou 子游 asking about filial piety (X. Zhu 1983, p. 56). In this case, Confucius stressed showing respect for elders while undertaking the obligation of maintenance. D’Ambrosio believed this stood for a uniqueness in Confucianism, because the Confucian way of fulfilling filial duties differed from the conventional practice of demanding respect. Quite the opposite, this case cannot be regarded as evidence that Confucianism highlights uniqueness. In reality, Confucianism did not want this to be their uniqueness; instead, they urged that it be unanimously accepted by people and turned into a universal ethical norm. Secondly, Zhuangzi always encouraged people “to be yourself”. The widely known stories of blindly imitating to frown to appear beautiful 效顰 and imitating other people’s walking posture in Handan 邯鄲學步 are precisely telling us “to be who you are” (Guo 1961, pp. 515, 601). Thirdly, as for the relationship between self and others, Zhuangzi advocated for a delicate balance between being oneself and being with others. “Being oneself” does not mean that one should show his/her uniqueness at all times, while “being with others” does not necessarily mean one should entirely live up to social expectations, roles, and values. We should bear in mind “a sense of between-ness” when we research Lao-Zhuang’s philosophy. In this regard, perhaps Katrin Froese’s comment was more accurate when she said, “The challenge facing the genuine individual (zhenren) 真人 is to recognize the importance of particularity, in himself as well as in all others, but not to cling to it” (Froese 2007, p. 73).

3.2. Zhen as Existential Authenticity

Zhen highlighted by Daoism is not truth in the traditional epistemological sense (semantic or cognitive truth). Zhen is neither the truth of logic nor the truth of empirical science but mainly existential authenticity, that is, the original existence of each individual and the world.
Zhen is an individual’s own primordial nature or true life. Zhuangzi mentions “xingming zhi qing 性命之情” many times, such as “do not lose one’s own xingming zhi qing”, “exist in accordance with one’s own xingming zhi qing” (Chapter 8 “Webbed Toes 駢拇”, Guo 1961, pp. 317, 327), and “be content with one’s own xingming zhi qing” (Chapter 11 “Let It Be 在宥”, Guo 1961, pp. 365–66). Here, qing 情 does not refer to emotions but rather the actual situation or truth.3 Chapter 19, “Fully Understanding Life 達生”, starts this way: “Those who comprehend the truth of life do not pursue those things that life cannot do anything about 達生之情者,不務生之所無以為” (Guo 1961, p. 630). Here, qing means the same. Such usage also appears in the other literature of the time:
So a gentleman will be ashamed if his reputation is more than the reality 故聲聞過情,君子恥之.
(Chapter 8 “Lilou II 離婁下” of Mencius, X. Zhu 1983, p. 293)
It is the real situation of things that they are not uniform 夫物之不齊,物之情也.
(Chapter 5 “Duke Wen of Teng State I 滕文公上” of Mencius, X. Zhu 1983, p. 261)
…totally know true from false and not get confused 盡知請(情)偽而不惑.
(“Jingfa” of Yellow Emperor’s Four Classics 黃帝四經·經法, Institute of Ancient Literature of National Cultural Heritage Administration 1980, p. 53)
Hence, the so-called “性命之情” in Zhuangzi approximates to one’s true nature and allotment. Chapter 9, “Horses’ Hooves 馬蹄”, even explicitly puts forward the concept zhenxing 真性, which shows that zhen actually refers to an individual’s innate nature.
Zhen is something primordial, as Kim-chong Chong has noted:
zhen is also used to describe the true nature of things in general and of human beings in particular. In this regard, it is closely associated with other terms such as tian 天 (heaven, nature, the natural), de 德 (virtue in the sense of certain original basic capacities), and xing 性 (nature of a thing). Together with these, zhen refers to the natural state of a thing and what it is natural to do, or, simply, what is natural.
Although Laozi may not have the character zhen, it includes strong appeals for the restoration of zhen, such as the propositions of remaining simple and undecorated見(現)素抱樸, returning to gen and ming 歸根復命, and returning to the state of an infant 復歸於嬰兒. Su 素 is undyed silk, and pu 樸 is uncarved wood. Chapter 15, “Acting Deliberately 刻意”, of Zhuangzi says, “Su means that a thing is not mixed with other things. Chun 純 means that a person does not waste his/her spirit. A person who can maintain chun and su is called a true person” (Guo 1961, p. 546). It can be seen that supu is exactly zhen, and the so-called “returning to gen and ming” simply refers to a return to the authenticity of life. In the original state, people are even unaware that they can deceive, so every one of their actions is always sincere. This is one of the reasons why Laozi praised the infant state of mind. Zhen, as advocated by Laozi, can be called “childish innocence 童真”. In Zhuangzi, zhen is often associated with heaven, so “heavenly innocence 天真” may be the most appropriate. Chapter 31, “The Old Fisherman 漁父”, says, “Zhen is endowed by heaven. It is natural and must not be changed” (Guo 1961, p. 1032).
It is evident that zhen and wei 偽 are sharply opposed to each other, and even the advocacy of zhen is possible only when falsity has become a common social climate. The character 偽 is constituted by 人 and 為, and its original meaning was just “human action”, but it later developed the meaning of being fake and hypocritical. Wei refers to everything that is attached to zhen and thus conceals or even destroys zhen. The opposition between zhen and wei is expressed in various ways, such as heaven (tian 天) and human (ren 人), I (wu 吾) and myself (wo 我):
The heavenly (the inborn nature) resides innermost; the human (the artificial elements) appears on the outside 天在内, 人在外.
(Chapter 17 “Autumn Floods 秋水”, Guo 1961, p. 588)
…to deviate from the human and become in line with heaven 畸於人而侔於天
(Chapter 6 “The Great Grandmaster 大宗師”, Guo 1961, p. 273)
Now I have eliminated myself 今者吾喪我.
(Chapter 2 “On Viewing Things Equally 齊物論“, Guo 1961, p. 45)
Chapter 5, “The Sign of Abundant Virtue”, says, “How insignificant and trivial it is to remain human 眇乎小哉, 所以屬於人也! How grand and great it is to attain alone the realm of heaven 謷乎大哉, 獨成其天!” (Guo 1961, p. 217). Chapter 12, “Heaven and Earth 天地”, says, “Those who forget themselves can be said to have attained the realm of heaven 忘己之人, 是之謂入於天” (Guo 1961, p. 428). Some people think that Zhuangzi wanted to escape from the human world, or that he aimed to alienate humans into non-humans (Cheng 1992, pp. 141–48). In fact, there are two main reasons for Zhuangzi’s longing for “heaven”: for one thing, he esteemed the profound virtue of heaven; for another, “heaven” represents authenticity and naturalness. “To deviate from the human and become in line with heaven” is not to escape from the human world, nor is it a spiritual suicide of the human. Rather, it is the elimination of wo and the emergence of wu (sangwo xianwu 喪我顯吾), which implies the retreat of the false self and the transcendence of the heart-mind.4
Here is another question to be answered. If each individual eliminates wo, will their remaining wu be the same? Xu Keqian 徐克謙 claimed that for Zhuangzi, ming is different for different individuals, while their xing 性 is the same (Xu 2005, p. 142). This view is incorrect. For Lao-Zhuang, Dao is the One and things are many. “Many” implies plurality, difference, uniqueness and individuality. Dao gives birth to the myriad things. Each individual’s de 德, which is obtained from Dao, is different from those of others5, so there are no two individuals who are completely identical. This is just as, in the natural state, cranes’ legs are long while ducks’ legs are short, or hawthorns, pears, oranges, and pomelos have different flavors. D’Ambrosio (2015) holds that Daoist cultivation would not only clear away all secular things but also eliminate one’s individuality and particularity. Hence, nothing is left; “I” become completely empty. Such a view is also untenable. The reason for this misconception is that he failed to realize the specific connotations of wo. For Lao-Zhuang, the wo to be eliminated refers to the false self that is blindfolded by one’s own avarice, prejudices, and opportunistic and utilitarian mind 機心. To eliminate wo is mainly to eliminate such dust in the mind, not to eliminate one’s individuality or peculiarity. But for one thing, Daoism emphasizes the differences among individuals; for another, it also stresses the importance of not being conceited and not showing off so as to prevent possible harm to others. In the words of Laozi, this is “softening one’s own light and dissolving into the commonplace 和其光, 同其塵” (Laozi, chp. 56). In the words of Zhuangzi, this is “taking pleasure in the fulfillment of others while holding on to being oneself 樂物之通而保己” (Chapter 25 “Zeyang 則陽”, Guo 1961, p. 878).

3.3. The Outcome of Self-Transcendence: The “Zhenren (True Person)”

People not only live but also guide their own lifestyles. We need to plan what kind of self to be. “I” can go up or down, left or right. Take Confucianism and Daoism for instance. What Confucianism wants to achieve is a virtuous self. Nevertheless, there are many different accounts of the self that the Daoist wants to be. According to Chen Guu-ying 陳鼓應, Daoism transcends the secular self in daily life and achieves a cosmic self by re-evaluating all values, “The great self 大我 which the supreme person intends to be is not the physical self, nor the familial self, nor the social self, but a cosmic self” (Chen 1992, p. 127). Lao Sze-kwang 勞思光 said that Laozi disapproved of the moral self, cognitive self, and physical self but affirmed an esthetic self (Lao 2005, pp. 185–88). In my opinion, if we use one word to summarize the difference between the personality ideals of Daoism and Confucianism, it is the difference between zhen and shan (authenticity and goodness). As Cheng Fuwang 成復旺 put it, Daoism and Confucianism create a natural personality and ethical personality, respectively, and “the main difference between them is: the former values ‘authenticity’ while the latter values ‘goodness’; the former aspires for ‘heaven’ and the latter stagnates in the ‘human’” (Cheng 1989, p. 83). This assertion is insightful.
Daoists intend to be zhenren and lead a life of simplicity and authenticity. Chapter 3, “Nine Perseverances 九守”, of Wenzi says, “A so-called true person is one whose nature is in accordance with Dao” (L. Wang 2000, p. 167). This is a precise definition. A true person is not a deity of religious Daoism, nor is he/she just a symbol of an ideal personality but rather a person in ordinary life. In the last chapter, “The World 天下”, Guan Yin 關尹 and Lao Dan 老聃 are regarded as “ancient true persons with broad-mindedness”. Chapter 21, “Tian Zifang 田子方”, praises Dongguo Shunzi 東郭順子 as “a true person with a human appearance but heavenly open-mindedness 天虛. He conforms to others while preserving his true nature, and has a pure but tolerant mind” (Guo 1961, p. 702).6
Zhuangzi wanted to guide people’s way of living by heaven, so as to be true persons. As Wang Bo 王博 eloquently pointed out:
People who have been immersed in the earthly world for too long have been shaped to become more and more like “humans” and therefore more and more isolated from heaven… Heaven has become so distant and unfamiliar that a life of following heaven will be regarded as eccentric. A person who follows heaven is precisely a true person.
The beginning of Chapter 6, “The Great Grandmaster”, makes the most concentrated description of the “true person” and concludes the following: “This is called not leading the heart-mind astray from Dao, not ‘assisting’ the natural by human doing. And this is what is meant by a true person” (Guo 1961, p. 229). Chapter 24, “Xu Wugui 徐無鬼”, also says that “The true persons in ancient times treated people with heaven and did not mix heaven with the human 不以人入天” (Guo 1961, p. 866). Chapter 17, “Autumn Floods 秋水”, also advocates for “no destroying things’ inborn nature by artificial actions 無以人滅天” (Guo 1961, pp. 590–91), that is, not letting wei overwhelm zhen. Chapter 21, “Undeceiving”, of Xunzi 荀子·解蔽 criticizes Zhuangzi for “being deceived by heaven and not knowing the human 蔽於天而不知人” (X. Wang 1988, p. 393). This is a superficial view. As a matter of fact, it was Xunzi who was deceived by the human and did not know heaven.

3.4. Bringing Out the Concealed Zhen by Removing Wei or Su

Living in the earthly world, individuals are easily drawn away from zhen by wei. As I said earlier, wei refers to everything that covers zhen. Only by brushing off the dust of wei can the concealed zhen reappear. In other words, only when the wo (false self) is transcended will it be possible that the wu emerges. The wu is the authentic self, that is, the true person.7 Poul Andersen’s following statement is very helpful. He noted, “The true self of Daoism…is not something that is created; rather, it is the result of an inner transformation, comparable to what Kierkegaard, in one of his definitions of truth, refers to as ‘the transformation of the subject in itself.’” (Andersen 2019, p. 67).
Additionally, Lao-Zhuang often said that following the secular would deviate from zhen 徇俗乖真, and they made the deepest exploration of the true self. “The secular” not only refers to worldly values but also includes Confucian-style morality. These are the two main factors that suppress an individual’s life. The expression “to desert that and select this 去彼取此” appears several times in Laozi. In Chapter 12, it addresses sensual desires, while in Chapter 38, it addresses benevolence, righteousness, and propriety 仁義禮. This expression is quite meaningful. Why it is not “to desert this and select that”? Actually “this” has the implication of possessing something inherently. Only those who forget “this” will eagerly seek “that”, so it also tells people to return to the authenticity of life.
Let us first briefly discuss the former dimension. Laozi proposed to reduce selfishness and desires, and to be content and stop chasing, that is, not to be overwhelmed by various kinds of desires that are neither natural nor indispensable. Those who are unwilling to be content cannot be true. Chapter 8, “Webbed Toes”, of Zhuangzi sighs, “Unkind persons desert their true nature and allotment, and are greedy for status and riches” (Guo 1961, p. 319). “(They) are all allured by profit and forcibly violate their own true nature 強反其情性” (Chapter 29 “Robber Zhi 盜跖”, Guo 1961, p. 997) and “forgetting their zhen when facing profit” (Chapter 20 “A Mountain Tree 山木”, Guo 1961, p. 695) also speak of the opposition between zhen and greed.
Nearly all the pre-Qin schools were very alert to the expansion of desires, but Daoism has its own characteristics. First, it emphasizes that the expansion of greed is a deviation from zhen, while Confucianism dislikes it because it is against the moral law. Second, Daoism always focuses on the relationship between self and others. It holds that in the process of pursuing greed, the individual will not only deviate from his/her own true life but also squeeze the living space of others. Chapter 14, “The Movement of Heaven 天運”, says “(The Three Emperors’) wits are more harmful than scorpions’ tails. The little beasts (metaphorically refer to the underprivileged) do not have the opportunity to keep their true nature and allotment” (Guo 1961, p. 527). In other words, wits motivated by desires often drag the world into chaos: the possessors of such wits go crazy, and the external world is disturbed.8
Confucian-style morality is also among the things that ought to be abandoned. To Daoism, intellectualized and institutionalized benevolence, righteousness, and propriety are not only inessential but also harmful. Chapter 8, “Webbed Toes”, says, “What I deem as zang 臧 does not refer to the so-called benevolence and righteousness; rather, it just means to exist in accordance with one’s own true nature and allotment” (Guo 1961, p. 327). Zang means goodness. Here, the true nature and allotment, not goodness in the view of ordinary people (benevolence, righteousness, etc.), are taken as good. In Chapter 29, “Robber Zhi”, Confucius is criticized via the mouth of Zhi, “The dao advocated by you… is a deceitful and hypocritical thing. It cannot be used to preserve zhen” (Guo 1961, p. 1000). Chapter 31, “The Old Fisherman”, explicitly states the following:
Rituals are what ordinary people are keen on. Zhen is what individuals receive from heaven, and it is natural and must not be changed. Therefore, sages follow heaven and value zhen. They are not confined to the mundane. On the contrary, fools are absorbed in artificial actions and unwilling to follow heaven. They do not know the preciousness of zhen. They are so mediocre that they are transformed by the secular, so they are always unsatisfied. It is a pity that you have been immersed in human hypocrisy for so long, and thus hear about Dao so late.
Here, benevolence, righteousness, and propriety are despised as wei, the opposite of zhen. Daoists oppose using them to make all people uniform because in their view, this is to ruin everyone’s xing and de and make everyone lose his/her true life. Daoism rejects stereotyped and coercive moral indoctrination with the aim of preserving a world of diversity and authenticity. Chapter 8, “Ziran” of Wenzi, also says, “Indoctrination 教道 is contrary to de and harmful to things” (L. Wang 2000, p. 348).
When an individual transcends these worldly values, he/she will become a true person. True persons do not care for worldly interests, nor do they care about social conventions or roles. So, from the worldly perspective, true persons are often seen as crazy. Take Zhuangzi himself for instance. He “lived in an impoverished and narrow alley. His life was so distressed that he had to weave sandals for a living, with his neck shriveled up and his face looking seriously malnourished” (Chapter 32 “Lie Yukou”, Guo 1961, p. 1049). Nevertheless, Zhuangzi refused a high salary and high official position promised by the king of Chu State and would rather be like a turtle trailing its tail in the mud. Additionally, Zhuangzi did not cry as stipulated by ritual when his wife died; instead, he sang while drumming on a basin. Zhuangzi was exactly an exemplar of true persons and the “crazy”. In Chapter 6, “The Great Grandmaster”, Meng Zifan 孟子反 and Zi Qinzhang 子琴張 compose music and play a stringed instrument at their friend’s funeral, holding a contemptuous attitude towards performative and insincere worldly rituals. Zigong 子貢 was astonished to see this and asked his teacher Confucius:
What sort of people are they? They do not observe moral cultivation, nor do they care about their conduct. They sing together beside their friend’s corpse, without the slightest change of facial expression. I can hardly describe them. What sort of people are they?
These two “rebellious” fellows were precisely true persons. However, as a Confucian disciple immersed in worldly rituals, Zigong certainly did not know this. True persons appear to be crazy and unrestrained, but in fact they are merely leading a life according to their true nature. Individuals will be qualified to be “crazy” only when they are true to themselves. On the contrary, if they seek to be valued by society, they may often have to go against their true nature and subject themselves to socially defined roles and consequently be ineligible to be “crazy”.

3.5. Authentic Co-Existence of the Myriad Things

Daoism advocates for self-control and not being controlled by others. This is applicable not only for oneself but also for all people, so we should remember that Daoists do not want to control others. Zhuangzi said, “Thus to enslave others is weary, while to be enslaved by others is worrying. 故有人者累,見有於人者憂” (Chapter 20 “A Mountain Tree”, Guo 1961, p. 674). Neither enslaving others nor being enslaved can make an individual at ease. The above-mentioned sangwo is just the Daoist art of self-control. Its result is xianwu, that is, self-transcendence. Once an individual has accomplished self-transcendence, he/she will have no desire to control others.
From another point of view, since the myriad things are all relational beings, the Daoist art of self-control is logically to grant others more living space. As I said before:
Daoist cultivation of wuji sangwo is not only a matter of personal cultivation, but also a matter of positioning oneself properly in a group. … On the one hand, wuji or sangwo is trying not to be enslaved by one’s own avarice; on the other hand, it is trying to set limits for oneself, so as not to squeeze others.
Zhen is firstly directed toward the relationship between a person and his/her own heart-mind, but since a true person will not make himself/herself an obstacle to others, people will live in harmony with each other and achieve authentic co-existence 本真的共在.
As we know, philosophical ideas are universal to a certain degree. Furthermore, though environmental protection has never been an issue for Daoism, and the fables about plants and beasts in Zhuangzi (such as raising birds as birds would be raised 以鳥養養鳥, disciplining horses by violating their inherent nature 殘樸) are mostly metaphors of the human world, their literal meaning is about how to cope with the relationship between humans and nature. As I mentioned above, zhen means the existential authenticity of each individual and the whole world. If everyone is willing to reconstruct the relationship between humans and nature with the Daoist art of self-control, he/she may reduce intervention and allow nature to thrive freely. Then, everything will be able to exist and develop in accordance with its own true nature.

4. The Reason Why the Thirteen Classics Do Not Contain the Character Zhen

On the question of why the Confucian Classics do not contain a single character zhen, there have been several explanations in history. For example, Sun Xu 孫緒 of the Ming Dynasty explained, “words often have their opposites... In ancient times, people were not deceitful or hypocritical, so there is no zhen in the Six Classics” (X. Sun 1986, pp. 629–30). I would suggest that this is an over-idealization of ancient people.
Another approach is to find a counterpart to zhen in the Confucian Classics. For instance, Sima Guang 司馬光 of the Northern Song Dynasty found cheng 誠. He said, “Absolutely there is no character zhen in the Six Classics. The cheng they speak of is exactly zhen” (Ma 1986, p. 375). There is some truth in this statement. In the pre-Qin period, there were two characters which had similar meanings to zhen, namely cheng and xin 信. These two characters were used frequently in the Warring States Period and had become nominalized. As we know, the nominalized cheng and xin function as moral concepts in Confucianism. Confucianism attaches great importance to them. The Doctrine of the Mean 中庸 even says, “Cheng is the dao of heaven” (X. Zhu 1983, p. 31). It is not that Daoism does not pay attention to cheng or xin, but they are more concerned with zhen. Zhen has the meaning of cheng, but its connotations overflow beyond those of cheng.
Duan Yucai, however, found the character shen 慎. In his opinion, 慎 has the component 真, and in ancient times, it was used to express the meaning of cheng, so it can be regarded as a borrowed character for zhen (Duan 1981, p. 384). This view was echoed by Xu Hao and Wu Chu. Wu even said, “Duan’s view is fairly accurate. Nevertheless, we should know that zhen and shen were just one character in ancient times, not two. The meaning of 慎 stems from the fact that it is constituted by 心 and 真. What difference does it have compared with the original meaning of zhen?” (Ding 1988, p. 17234). We have already argued that there is a semantic difference between zhen and cheng. Moreover, if shen is associated with zhen via cheng, then there is more distance between shen and zhen.
Fang Yizhi 方以智 of the Ming Dynasty claimed that 貞 was exactly 真 (Fang 1990, p. 1). This view was supported by Zhao Zengwang 趙曾望 from the perspective of glyphs but denied by Wang Yun and Wu Shanshu 吳善述. Wu argued that although the Classics did not contain真, there were many characters containing 真 as a component, indicating that 真already existed at that time and was different from 貞 (Ding 1988, p. 17234). As I have argued before, these two characters have the same pronunciation and similar forms, but they have different meanings. Therefore, this view is not acceptable.
The above practices attempt to argue that Confucians also attach importance to 真 because they highlight 誠, 慎, or 貞, but none of them are fully successful. Then, why do Confucians not speak of zhen? It is because they indeed lack or even intentionally reject the notion of zhen. Confucian pan-moralism regards good or evil as its primary criterion for judging things. In addition, because Confucianism emphasizes rituals and embellishment 禮文, being beautiful or not also becomes an important criterion for them (of course, to Confucianism, beauty is only an appendage of goodness and does not have independent value). As a good case in point, Confucius praised Shao music as perfect yet thought that Wu music was “already as beautiful as it can be, but not as good as it can be 盡美矣,未盡善也” (Chapter 3 “Eight Rows of Dancers 八佾” of The Analects, X. Zhu 1983, p. 68).
Daoism, on the other hand, is against highlighting beauty and goodness. Chapter 2 of Laozi begins by saying, “天下皆知美之為美,斯惡已;皆知善之為善,斯不善已”. It is widely believed that this is talking about the interdependent relationship between the beautiful and ugly, good and evil. In fact, what Laozi wanted to say is the following: If everyone in the world knows and clings to so-called beauty and goodness, this will be bad and not good 斯惡已,斯不善已. Why? One of the reasons is that setting beauty and goodness as absolute standards will inevitably lead to discrimination and envy, which in turn will lead to the coercive behavior of imposing oneself on others and the artificial behavior of emulating others at the price of abandoning oneself.9 Among the three values of truth, goodness, and beauty, Daoism highlights truth, holding that beauty without truth and goodness without truth are meaningless and even harmful.
The focus of Confucianism is virtue, even using goodness to suppress truth. This is the fundamental reason for preventing truth from entering its vision. Confucianism, of course, also requires sincerity in morality but believes that true nature will turn into “being unrestrained 狂狷”, and therefore needs to be “disciplined with propriety 約之以禮”. As Cheng Fuwang pointed out, Confucianism “unambiguously demands that one give up truth and obey propriety when seeking truth and obeying propriety contradict each other”; “In contrast, zhen is being true to oneself (true to one’s own emotions or perceptions), not to external demands; while cheng is being sincere to the external, loyal to some external demands” (Cheng 1989, p. 84). True persons are destined to be unappreciated in a hypocritical and distorted society because they have broken through worldly values.
Returning to zhen is both the Daoist ideal of personality and an ideal state of existence. It is the alienation of human nature and human civilization that triggers Lao-Zhuang to call for zhen. Unfortunately, it is widely believed that Lao-Zhuang wanted to destroy civilization completely and step back to a primitive society. This is not the case. If we examine this issue in association with zhen, we can see that they were actually trying to construct a natural and non-repressive civilization on the basis of zhen. They were thinking the following: What kind of civilization meets the needs of human life? What kind of foundation should civilization be built on? The Daoist School was in fact the guardian of civilization. With their deep concern for human civilization, they wanted to find a solid foothold for it so as to prevent it from falling into self-negation and decaying from the roots.

Funding

This research was funded by the National Social Science Fund of China [Grant Number: 16FZX004].

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Shan Gao, Benjamin Coles and the expert referees for their precious comments and suggestions.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

Notes

1
See vol. 2 of Ma Yongqing’s 馬永卿Sayings of Yuancheng 元城語錄, vol. 10 of Zhang Ci’s 張鎡 The Imperial Norms of Ruling and Learning 皇朝仕學規範, vol. 2 of Hong Shi’s 洪適 Sequel of Ancient Stone Inscriptions 隸續, Yu Wenbao’s 俞文豹 The Outer Set of Records of Blowing Swords 吹劍錄外集.
2
Except where specifically stated, all quotations from Laozi in this article are based on Lou (1980). Besides, Zhuangzi is regarded as a collection of writings of the school represented by Zhuang Zhou.
People generally regard the seven inner chapters as Zhuangzi’s works, but the question who is the author of the other twenty-six chapters remains a controversial issue. Maybe the most detailed discussion of this issue comes from A.C. Graham and Liu Xiaogan 劉笑敢. Their textual studies of Zhuangzi have something in common: They both strived to achieve some objectivity by means of linguistic analysis; they both tried to divide the outer chapters and miscellaneous chapters into several different ideological tendencies, and then excluded those which are not like Zhuangzi’s thoughts from the credible materials. Take Liu Xiaogan for instance. He thought that the outer chapters and miscellaneous chapters were later than the inner chapters. In addition, according to the degree of conformity between the thoughts and those of the inner chapters, he argued that the outer chapters and miscellaneous chapters were written by three factions: the school of passing on Zhuangzi’s thoughts, the Huang-Lao School and the school of denying monarchism. Among them, twelve chapters of the first school could be used as credible materials for the study of Zhuangzi’s thoughts, while the remaining fourteen chapters were not suitable (Liu 1988, pp. 3–98). In my opinion, it is inappropriate to judge the authenticity of works by their chronological order or ideological tendencies. Liu believed that we needed to break the assumption that a person could only have one thought and never changed (ibid., p. 26). This is quite true, but it seems that he himself had not carried it out to cope with the relations of the thirty-three chapters of Zhuangzi. As we know, Zhuangzi was an active thinker and lived for a long time, so it is unlikely for him to rest on exactly the same style of thought and writing throughout his life. Except Chapter 30 “Talking about Swords 說劍” which is undoubtedly a forgery, the overall spirit of the outer chapters and miscellaneous chapters is compatible with that of the inner chapters. They are related by family resemblances and some of them can even interpret each other. Liu finally admitted that there was indeed consistency among the three factions of Zhuangzi’s disciples, and Zhuangzi should not be conceived as a miscellany of piecing together different Daoist schools (ibid., pp. 92–93). Actually, it is doubtful how many of the suspected forgeries are forgeries. To some extent the ancient work of identifying forgeries is as Li Ling 李零 said: “Since the Song Dynasty, whether people suspect or not, they all hold it as the inner principle to defend orthodoxy and criticize heterodoxy... To suspect the other thinkers is to worship the Confucian classics; to suspect ‘forged’ classics is to protect one’s own clique. People suspect books widely, just with the aim of discarding them, not identifying their age” (L. Li 2007, p. 15). Consequently, this kind of differentiation lacks objectivity and cannot be reliable.
3
Chris Fraser and Frank Saunders Jr. read qing as “conditions”. For example, Saunders Jr. said, “The concept of xing ming zhi qing… can be understood as ‘the conditions (qing) of one’s natural, spontaneous tendencies (xing) and allotments (ming)’” (Saunders 2020, p. 3).
4
Under the influence of Daoism, Heidegger also said, “Mit den Sterblichen wendet es sich aber, wenn sie in ihr eigenes Wesen finden” (Heidegger 1977, p. 272).
5
What an individual obtains from Dao is also called de. Chapter 36 “The Art of Heart-Mind I” of Guanzi 管子·心術上, another important pre-Qin Daoist classic, says, “De refers to the obtained 德者得也” (X. Li 2004, p. 770). It is noteworthy that de is sometimes equivalent to xing in the Daoist theoretical framework. Chapter 8 “Webbed Toes” says, “ruin its xing…violate its de” (Guo 1961, p. 321). Chapter 11 “Let It Be” says, “do not corrupt their xing… do not change their de” (Guo 1961, p. 364). It can be seen that there exists an inter-textual relationship between xing and de, that is, they can interpret each other.
6
The character xu 虛 was originally placed in the next sentence (“人貌而天,虛緣而葆真,清而容物”). Such punctuation is incorrect. Judging from the context, it should be placed into the previous sentence (“人貌而天虛,緣而葆真,清而容物”). By doing so, “人貌” and “天虛”, “緣而葆真” and “清而容物” can form a proper correspondence.
7
Heidegger traced truth (Wahrheit) back to the ancient Greek word αλήθεια (aletheia). He broke αλήθεια down into the prefix “α-“ with a negative meaning of removing something and the root “λήθος” which means the concealed, and finally interpreted αλήθεια as revealing the concealed (Unverborgenheit). Regardless of whether this practice is reasonable or not, it is certain that Heidegger’s view of truth and notion of exploring the concealed origin by removing its coverings have been inspired by Daoism.
8
For more detailed analysis of Daoist attitude towards desires, see (S. Wang 2019).
9
“If people all over the world know the so-called beauty, this in itself is bad; If people all over the world know the so-called goodness, this in itself is not good.” This assertion is very meaningful. For detailed analysis, see (S. Wang 2020).

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Wang, S. Returning to Zhen: An Investigation of Zhen Highlighted by Zhuangzi and Daoist Self-Transcendence. Religions 2025, 16, 534. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16040534

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Wang S. Returning to Zhen: An Investigation of Zhen Highlighted by Zhuangzi and Daoist Self-Transcendence. Religions. 2025; 16(4):534. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16040534

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Wang, Shaojun. 2025. "Returning to Zhen: An Investigation of Zhen Highlighted by Zhuangzi and Daoist Self-Transcendence" Religions 16, no. 4: 534. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16040534

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Wang, S. (2025). Returning to Zhen: An Investigation of Zhen Highlighted by Zhuangzi and Daoist Self-Transcendence. Religions, 16(4), 534. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16040534

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