Lightweight Certificate-Less Anonymous Authentication Key Negotiation Scheme in the 5G Internet of Vehicles
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Related Work
3. Security Objectives and Models
3.1. Security Objectives
3.1.1. The Anonymity of Vehicles
3.1.2. Traceability and Revocability
3.1.3. Effective Message Authentication
3.1.4. Unlinkability
3.1.5. Forward Security and Backward Security
3.1.6. The Ability to Resist Various Attacks
3.2. Security Model
- In the Initialization stage, the challenger C sends the system parameters, excluding the system master key after initialization, to the adversary AI, and randomly selects an identity to await the start of the challenge.
- In the Query stage, the adversary conducts hash queries, partial private key extraction queries, public key extraction queries, secret value extraction queries, signature queries, and other random oracle queries.
- In the Forgery stage, adversary AI generates a forged signature based on the information obtained from the query.
- In the Initialization stage, the challenger C sends the initialized system parameters to the adversary AII, and randomly selects an identity to await the start of the challenge.
- In the Query stage, the adversary conducts hash queries, partial private key extraction queries, public key extraction queries, secret value extraction queries, signature queries, and other random oracle queries.
- In the Forgery stage, adversary AII generates a forged signature based on the information obtained from the query.
4. Lightweight Certificate-Less Anonymous Authentication Key Negotiation Scheme
4.1. Design of the Scheme
4.2. Description of the Scheme
Algorithm 1. System initialization. |
Both KGC and TA are the trusted third parties that generate the public parameters and the public–private key pairs of the system. The system initialization algorithm is as follows:
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Algorithm 2. Long-term pseudonym generation. |
The long-term pseudonym generation stage is divided into two parts; one part is for the TA to verify the real identity of the vehicle, and the other part is for the TA to generate a long-term pseudonym for the vehicle.
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Algorithm 3. Key generation. |
KGC perform the following operations to generate the public–private key pair of the vehicle.
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Algorithm 4. Short-term pseudonym generation. |
generates the one-time short-term pseudonym using the real identity of the vehicle and the long-term pseudonym according to the following steps. The short-term pseudonym of the vehicle consists of two parts as follows.
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Algorithm 5. Signature generation. |
constructs the signature of the vehicle according to the following steps and broadcasts the signed message to all other members in the system.
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Algorithm 6. Single verification. |
After the message recipient (taking as an example) receives the signed message broadcasted by , it verifies the signature. If the verification result is true, the identity of the message sender is authenticated as legal; otherwise, the message sender is an illegal user.
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Algorithm 7. Key negotiation. |
In this section, the two communicating parties need to negotiate a same-session key (taking the communication between and as an example). After the signature authentication, the key negotiation scheme is designed, as shown in Figure 2. As shown in Figure 2, and take the following steps to negotiate the same-session key:
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Algorithm 8. Aggregate signature. |
When there are n messages in the system that need to be signed, the n signatures for these n messages are aggregated by RSUi. The messages and signatures are , …, , and the aggregated certificate-less signature is , where . |
Algorithm 9. Batch verification. |
After the message recipient receives the aggregated certificate-less signature , it verifies the aggregated signature. If the verification is passed, the aggregated signature is considered legal; otherwise, it is not legal. The verification steps are as follows:
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5. Security Analysis and Proof
5.1. Security Analysis
5.1.1. Anonymity of Vehicles
5.1.2. Traceability and Revocability
5.1.3. Effective Message Authentication
5.1.4. Unlinkability
5.1.5. Forward Security and Backward Security
5.1.6. Ability to Resist Attacks
- Replay attack: In the authentication key agreement scheme designed in this section, a timestamp is introduced. During each authentication, the validity of the timestamp is first checked, and if it is valid, the subsequent steps will be carried out; otherwise, this message will be discarded. In this scheme, two timestamps need to be added. The first timestamp is added when generating the short-term pseudonym of the vehicle , to ensure the timeliness of the short-term pseudonym. The second timestamp is added when broadcasting the message , to ensure the timeliness of the broadcast message. The introduction of timestamps can effectively prevent the attacker from repeatedly sending the messages of the two communication parties in the channel and prevent the attacker from obtaining the secret information he expected. Therefore, the authentication key agreement protocol in this article can effectively resist replay attacks.
- Man-in-the-middle attack: This protocol adopts a certificate-less authentication method, relying on the difficult problem of ECDLP. The adversary cannot completely simulate a vehicle to generate message as a middleman, and the vehicle uses the public parameters published by the trusted party in the communication process, so there is no opportunity for a middleman to deceive the communication participants. Therefore, this scheme can resist man-in-the-middle attacks.
- Tampering attack: In this scheme, the message broadcasted by is signed, where is the digital signature, which can ensure the integrity of the message. At the same time, this scheme has a traceability mechanism for suspicious information and identities. When the attacker tampers with the message in the communication channel, the traceability of the user identity can help to discover whether the information has been tampered with by the attacker. Therefore, the authentication scheme proposed in this article can resist tampering attacks.
- Simulation attack: In the simulation attack, the attacker may imitate the structure of the pseudonym to disguise himself as a legitimate vehicle. However, under the assumption of ECDLP, the attacker cannot obtain the master key, which is protected by the trusted part, so he cannot forge a standardized pseudonym. Therefore, this scheme has the ability to resist simulation attacks.
- Eavesdropping attack: Though malicious eavesdropping attacks on the Internet of Vehicles system are continuous and the occurrence of the eavesdropping behavior cannot be prevented, the proposed authentication key agreement scheme uses a secure channel or encryption to protect the secret information, and the session key negotiated will play an encryption role when the communication entities conduct dialogue interaction. Therefore, this scheme can prevent malicious attackers from obtaining confidential information and user privacy through eavesdropping.
5.2. Security Proof
- Initialization stage: The challenger C initializes the system parameters and sends them to the adversary, and the challenger C randomly selects an identity as its challenge identity in this game, and the system parameters are .
- Query stage: The adversary will perform the following random oracle queries.
- query: When the adversary queries this oracle, the challenger records the interaction between the adversary and the challenger C in the list . When the challenger C finds the corresponding record in the list , it returns to the adversary ; otherwise, it randomly selects and gives it to the adversary , and adds to the list .
- query: When the adversary queries this oracle, the challenger records the interaction between the adversary and the challenger C in the list . When the challenger C finds the corresponding record in the list , it returns to the adversary ; otherwise, it randomly selects and gives it to the adversary , and adds to the list .
- query: When the adversary queries this oracle, the challenger records the interaction between the adversary and the challenger C in the list . When the challenger C finds the corresponding record in the list , it returns to the adversary ; otherwise, it randomly selects and gives it to the adversary , and adds to the list .
- query: When the adversary queries this oracle, the challenger records the interaction between the adversary and the challenger C in the list . When the challenger C finds the corresponding record in the list , it returns to the adversary ; otherwise, it randomly selects and gives it to the adversary , and adds to the list .
- Partial private key extraction query: When the adversary queries this oracle, the challenger records the interaction between the adversary and the challenger C in the list . When the challenger C finds the corresponding record in the list , it returns to the adversary ; otherwise, if , it randomly selects and gives it to the adversary , and adds to the list , and if , the game ends.
- Public key extraction query: When the adversary queries this oracle, the challenger records the interaction between the adversary and the challenger C in the list . When the challenger C finds the corresponding record in the list , it returns to the adversary ; otherwise, if , it randomly selects and gives it to the adversary , and adds and to and , respectively.
- Secret value extraction query: When the adversary queries this oracle, if , the challenger C quits and ends the game; otherwise, if there is a record , the challenger C returns to the adversary , and otherwise, the challenger C adds the record to the list and returns to the adversary .
- Signature query: When the adversary queries this oracle, the challenger C obtains , , , from the lists , , , , respectively. If , the challenger C outputs the signature corresponding to the message and returns it to the adversary ; otherwise, it calculates , , , , and returns the correct signature of the message to the adversary .
- Forgery stage: After the adversary completes the above queries, it outputs a forged signature. If , the challenger C ends the game; otherwise, if the adversary wants to win the game, it needs to find out the corresponding signature information from the information obtained from the queries, and it needs to make the equation hold.
6. Discussion of Performance
6.1. Security Comparison
6.2. Computational Overhead Comparison
6.3. Communication Overhead Comparison
7. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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Scheme | Anonymity | Traceability and Revocability | Identity Privacy | Message Authenticability | Unlinkability | Resistance to Man-in-the-Middle Attack | Resistance to Replay Attack | Resistance to Simulation Attack | Key Escrow Resilience | Batch Verification |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Scheme in [15] | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | × | √ | √ |
Scheme in [16] | × | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | × | × | √ | √ |
Scheme in [17] | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | × | √ | √ | √ |
Scheme in [18] | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | × | √ |
This paper | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ |
Scheme | Sign/ms | Verify/ms | Total/ms |
---|---|---|---|
Scheme in [15] | Tea | 4Tem + 2Tea | 5Tem + 2Tea |
Scheme in [16] | 4Tem + 2Tea | 3Tem + Tea + 3Tbp | 7Tem + 3Tea + 3Tbp |
Scheme in [17] | 3Tem + 2Tea | 3Tem + 2Tea | 6Tem + 4Tea |
Scheme in [18] | 3Tem + Tea | 3Tem + 2Tea | 7Tem + 4Tea |
This paper’s scheme | Tea | 4Tem + 3Tea | 5Tem + 3Tea |
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Wei, G.; Qin, Y.; Kou, G.; Sun, Z. Lightweight Certificate-Less Anonymous Authentication Key Negotiation Scheme in the 5G Internet of Vehicles. Electronics 2024, 13, 3288. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13163288
Wei G, Qin Y, Kou G, Sun Z. Lightweight Certificate-Less Anonymous Authentication Key Negotiation Scheme in the 5G Internet of Vehicles. Electronics. 2024; 13(16):3288. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13163288
Chicago/Turabian StyleWei, Guoheng, Yanlin Qin, Guangyue Kou, and Zhihong Sun. 2024. "Lightweight Certificate-Less Anonymous Authentication Key Negotiation Scheme in the 5G Internet of Vehicles" Electronics 13, no. 16: 3288. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13163288