Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives—Theme 'Justice Based on Truth'

A special issue of Laws (ISSN 2075-471X).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (16 January 2023) | Viewed by 27663

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Emeritus Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Zurich, CH-8001 Zurich, Switzerland
Interests: history of law; philosophy of law

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

This Special Issue of Laws, “Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives—Theme 'Justice Based on Truth'”, provides a forum for the discussion of core issues in the philosophy of law and legal theory from both historical and contemporary perspectives. In this way, the editors hope to promote debate on fundamental questions concerning law from a scientific–theoretical perspective.  

For the first edition of “Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives—Theme 'Justice Based on Truth'”, we are interested in the basic business of the philosophy of science to arrive at “true” and “certain” knowledge in order to be able to determine the “just” parameter of law. Only such cognition and such knowledge, that is informed about itself, can and may speak critically of the things that constitute our world. Thus, the philosophy of science is the necessary basis to a qualified philosophy of law. Not political power as such, but the power of the intellect and power based on honesty, which must anchor within us,[1] help to develop a justice on truth, according to which people can act correctly. Then, law has its own effective power, which is able to shape and direct human life in society and state, for the right, the good and the true is not equal to what appears useful or success related.[2]

In my view, the really pressing questions in the philosophy and theory of law today are not so much questions of the concrete implementation and use of rights, with which the majority of expert speakers from jurisprudence and political philosophy are already concerned, but rather the central question of the basis on which law must be founded in order to be just. This classical perspective deserves increased attention, especially in view of today's worldwide confusion, in which soon no one seems to know any more what really “is”, what is “true”, or “important”. It is two different things: to have the technical possibility to spread lies and half-truths via social media instead of facts, or to claim to have a right to do so. Has there ever been a right to generate alternative facts of arbitrary, selfish, opinionated, or conspiracy-based and manipulative talking points? Such attempts must be clearly opposed. Truth in the sense of the philosophy of science relies on facts, not on opinions and doctrines. The true factual situation has to be defended, as fact-oriented investigative journalism in particular is doing today in the political debate—often at personal sacrifice. I have wondered where the philosophers of law have been offering just an intellectual sacrifice. In fact, we see more and more often that this is not only a problem in politics but also in the sciences, wherein research results are distorted in some way in order to gain academic recognition or economic success, or researchers support official politics, which is of no use to anyone or anything.

Only correct and complete ideas about things enable us to develop autonomous and critical thinking. Only then do we have that safe ground from which we can attend to and discuss the core question of any philosophy of law, namely the question of justice. This fundamental question is crucial, especially for lawyers, in order not to become stooges of a system but to bring in their own critical thinking and to solve a case or a problem according to the law in form of a statute but also according to the basic constitutional and international law ideas. In this way, “justice” is the term that signifies the balance between people as persons and their actions in social exchange. It means regulation with regard to the equality and equal value of people, their responsibility for each other, and their mutual solidarity to save freedom for all.

Philosophical “truth” is a methodological term. For this, we can take up with K’ung Fu-Tse, for example, namely, to be able to name things appropriately and correctly.[3] It is the old problem of the “adaequatio rei et intellectus” in the European tradition. However, a procedurally transparent acquisition of expertise ("knowledge") in a step-by-step process of argumentative differentiation (via sources, as is often the case in our fields of the humanities and cultural sciences) can also be thought of as a form of approach in the sense of “objectification”. In any case, the variants of this theory are reflected in theories of “correspondence”, “coherence”, “intersubjectivity”, or in the numerous so-called “deflationist theories of truth”, which have been discussed in the context of “justice” up to the present day[4]; that is why they should be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, we prove ourselves more thoroughly as seekers and questioners than as assertors, as this kind also constitutes us as thinkers.

The legitimation of autonomous thinking thus results from the righteousness of self-reflective and critical thinking itself; this thinking can, and indeed must, be recognised and guaranteed without condition. In reference to Spinoza, the concession to free critical thinking does not pose a risk to the stabilisation of a state.[5] Rather, the positive effect of critical thinking can be compared to hired hackers testing and identifying the weak points of an IT system. Thus, they are rewarded for their inventiveness because they thereby show where the system is vulnerable and can be subverted. In this way, they help to improve the suitability and stability of a system. The autonomy of critical thinking can therefore be accepted without hesitation because it fulfills the same hacking function.

Ronald Dworkin's classic modern philosophy of law is suitable for such a discourse, as it deals with all these questions of “correct” knowledge, the “truth” of foundations and “justice” in a clear and detailed manner and, in addition to aspects of practice, as it also deals with important pioneers in the history of the philosophy of law. [6]  It may therefore provide the frame of reference for the present discourse in the sense of discussing the core question of “Justice on Truth”.

[1] Cf. Marcel Senn, Rechts- und Gesellschaftsphilosophie. Historische Fundamente der europäischen, nordamerikanischen, indischen sowie chinesischen Rechts-und Gesellschaftsphilosophie. Eine Einführung mit Quellenmaterialien. Mit einem Gastbeitrag zum «Sinomarxismus» von Prof. Dr. phil. und Dr. iur. Harro von Senger, Zürich/St. Gallen Dike/Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2.A., 2017, pp. 6-8. (translated: Philosophy of Law and Society. Historical foundations of European, North American, Indian and Chinese philosophy of law and society. An introduction with source materials. With a guest contribution on "Sinomarxism" by Prof. Dr phil. and Dr iur. Harro von Senger, Zurich/St. Gallen Dike/Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2nd edition, 2017). The first edition of 2012 has been translated into Chinese by Prof. Liu Yi and edited under the title 法哲学与社会哲学, 中国政法大学出版社by China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2016.

[2] Cf. Cicero, De officiis, Lib. III. 35.

[3] Cf. K’ung Fu-tse, Lun-yu, XIII.3.

[4] Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge (MA)/ London, 2011, notably Chap. 8, pp. 172-188.

[5] Cf. Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670), Motto.

[6] Cf. Dworkin (cf. Fn. 4).

Prof. Dr. Marcel Senn
Guest Editor

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Keywords

  • philosophy and history of law
  • legal theory
  • epistemology
  • truth
  • justice

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Published Papers (9 papers)

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Editorial

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7 pages, 730 KiB  
Editorial
Introduction to the Special Issue «Justice Based on Truth»
by Marcel Senn
Laws 2023, 12(3), 43; https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030043 - 28 Apr 2023
Viewed by 1601
Abstract
When I received a request from MDPI in 2021, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, to guest-edit a new online journal of philosophy of law and legal theory, including the history of their disciplines, it was immediately clear to me that this [...] Read more.
When I received a request from MDPI in 2021, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, to guest-edit a new online journal of philosophy of law and legal theory, including the history of their disciplines, it was immediately clear to me that this offer could be a great opportunity for all of us working in the field of philosophy of law or legal theory to develop an organ to exchange knowledge through this, as well as further crises [...] Full article

Research

Jump to: Editorial

12 pages, 232 KiB  
Article
Truth, Ethics and Legal Thought—Some Lessons from Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs and Its Critique
by Matthias Mahlmann
Laws 2023, 12(3), 42; https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030042 - 28 Apr 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 3152
Abstract
This paper reconstructs some of the core elements of Dworkin’s epistemology of ethics. To understand why, for Dworkin, questions of legal philosophy lead to moral epistemology, the main points of Dworkin’s last restatement of his theoretical account of law are outlined. Against this [...] Read more.
This paper reconstructs some of the core elements of Dworkin’s epistemology of ethics. To understand why, for Dworkin, questions of legal philosophy lead to moral epistemology, the main points of Dworkin’s last restatement of his theoretical account of law are outlined. Against this background, the paper critically assesses the merits of Dworkin’s criticism of current prominent forms of skepticism and what it teaches us about the epistemology of legal thought. Full article
9 pages, 207 KiB  
Article
Ronald Dworkin: Seeking Truth and Justice through Responsibility
by Samra Ibric
Laws 2023, 12(3), 41; https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030041 - 28 Apr 2023
Viewed by 5012
Abstract
According to Dworkin, “truth” is an interpretative concept. Why? Moral judgements are often the subject of disagreement because they are often the result of divergent conceptual understandings. If, on the other hand, we want to interpret concepts correctly, we have to deal with [...] Read more.
According to Dworkin, “truth” is an interpretative concept. Why? Moral judgements are often the subject of disagreement because they are often the result of divergent conceptual understandings. If, on the other hand, we want to interpret concepts correctly, we have to deal with the analysis of the underlying values we attach to these concepts. Dworkin understands the true as a matter of interpretation, which—and this is often misunderstood—is capable of producing a correct conception of the truth. The truth is thereby directly related to justice. Dworkin even ties his theory of interpretation to an objective truth that can only produce conclusive reasons for a specific advocacy of a particular position in an argument after responsible and intensive debate—in the sense of his two-stage theory. In fact, it turns out that Dworkin’s search for and conception of an objective truth describes a (historical) process. We interpret what our ancestors have already interpreted and continue to understand (in a modified way). This reflexive responsibility is ours to bear; according to Dworkin, it is our responsibility to always stand up for truth through good arguments. Full article
27 pages, 397 KiB  
Article
Thomas Aquinas, Ronald Dworkin, and the Fourth Revolution: The Foundations of Law in the Age of Surveillance Capitalism
by Kyle Lauriston Smith
Laws 2023, 12(3), 40; https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030040 - 28 Apr 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2171
Abstract
Since the publication of Shoshana Zuboff’s The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, the strategies of Surveillance Capitalists and appropriate responses to them have become common points of discussion across several fields. However, there is relatively little literature addressing challenges that Surveillance Capitalism raises [...] Read more.
Since the publication of Shoshana Zuboff’s The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, the strategies of Surveillance Capitalists and appropriate responses to them have become common points of discussion across several fields. However, there is relatively little literature addressing challenges that Surveillance Capitalism raises for the foundations of law. This article outlines Surveillance Capitalism and then compares the views of Thomas Aquinas and Ronald Dworkin in four areas: truth and reality, reality and law, interpretation and social custom, and virtue and law; finally, it closes by asking whether the law alone can provide a sufficient response to Surveillance Capitalism. The overarching argument of the article is that, while Aquinas’s view of the foundations of law accounts for and responds to the challenges of Surveillance Capitalism more effectively than Dworkin’s, law alone cannot provide a sufficient response to this emerging phenomenon. Full article
11 pages, 320 KiB  
Article
Truth and Justice in Spinoza’s Theological–Political Treatise and the Ethics
by André Kistler
Laws 2023, 12(3), 39; https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030039 - 28 Apr 2023
Viewed by 2296
Abstract
Spinoza’s philosophy argues for the freedom of individuals as singular beings in the state. This freedom is not perfect yet immanent. Freedom—according to the Ethics—is a consequence of true knowledge and virtue, which must be able to develop and can only be [...] Read more.
Spinoza’s philosophy argues for the freedom of individuals as singular beings in the state. This freedom is not perfect yet immanent. Freedom—according to the Ethics—is a consequence of true knowledge and virtue, which must be able to develop and can only be realised gradually. The state and the laws establish the framework that makes this freedom possible. Freedom and true knowledge are basic concepts of the metaphysical system. Justice, however, appears as a legal and political concept in Spinoza’s thought, which the philosopher did not discuss in depth. Nevertheless, the concept of justice has a specific significance in the philosophical context in which it occurs in the TTP—especially in the wisdom of King Solomon—and in the Ethics. Justice, on the one hand, strengthens harmony, security, and freedom. On the other hand, the freedom to philosophise forms a condition for justice to develop according to reason. The knowledge that justice has a importance in Spinoza’s thought is consistent with the complexity of his philosophy and makes its understanding more complete. Full article
9 pages, 241 KiB  
Article
Justice and Truth: A Leibnizian Perspective on Modern Jurisprudence
by Matthias Armgardt
Laws 2023, 12(3), 38; https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030038 - 28 Apr 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1949
Abstract
The purpose of this essay is to outline the significance of Leibniz’s philosophy of law for the present. The essay traces the main features of Leibniz’s theory and points out what further developments of his approach are pending today. Finally, it shows how [...] Read more.
The purpose of this essay is to outline the significance of Leibniz’s philosophy of law for the present. The essay traces the main features of Leibniz’s theory and points out what further developments of his approach are pending today. Finally, it shows how similar Leibniz’s basic convictions are to those of Ronald Dworkin. Full article
47 pages, 493 KiB  
Article
Fuller, Dworkin, Scientism, and Liberty: The Dichotomy between Continental and Common Law Traditions and Their Consequences
by Nadia Elizabeth Nedzel
Laws 2023, 12(3), 37; https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030037 - 28 Apr 2023
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2846
Abstract
Dworkin’s and other analytic/positivist philosophers’ theoretical approach to law leads inexorably to politicization, totalitarianism, less justice, less trust in government, and less truth. A more practical approach is Fuller’s, which is based on experience of human behavior and an analysis of what has [...] Read more.
Dworkin’s and other analytic/positivist philosophers’ theoretical approach to law leads inexorably to politicization, totalitarianism, less justice, less trust in government, and less truth. A more practical approach is Fuller’s, which is based on experience of human behavior and an analysis of what has worked in the past. That is also the approach traditionally used in the common law system. This article uses a comparative study of the two Western traditions, their history, and their most prominent legal philosophers to explicate how and why Dworkin’s and Fuller’s approaches are consistent and inconsistent with those traditions, followed by a comparative analysis of the results obtained by prominent international NGOs. Dworkin’s approach, which grows out of analytic philosophy, is unworkable because like all scientistic theories, it treats human beings mechanistically, de-emphasizing personal responsibility, ignoring the need for individual incentive, and it assumes an all-encompassing, all-powerful government of experts to make legal decisions for a collectivity. Under Fuller’s common law approach, the proper role of law is to manage conflict, as it cannot be prevented and cannot always be resolved, thus building the public’s trust in government as unbiased and apolitical as possible. This concept of the rule of law places law above government, minimizes politicization, incentivizes personal responsibility, individual incentive, and entrepreneurship, and is the only true common good among men. Full article
13 pages, 1575 KiB  
Article
Stratagems as a Means of Achieving Justice and Spreading Truth
by Harro von Senger
Laws 2023, 12(3), 36; https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030036 - 28 Apr 2023
Viewed by 1966
Abstract
This contribution is based on the Chinese concept called Moulüe. A unique feature of Moulüe, without parallel in Western praxis-oriented schools of thinking, is its Yin-Yang dimension. The two hemispheres of the Yin-Yang symbol, a white one and a black one, are inseparably [...] Read more.
This contribution is based on the Chinese concept called Moulüe. A unique feature of Moulüe, without parallel in Western praxis-oriented schools of thinking, is its Yin-Yang dimension. The two hemispheres of the Yin-Yang symbol, a white one and a black one, are inseparably interconnected. According to the Moulüe concept, the white hemisphere is the place of transparent, conventional, legal ways to solve problems, whereas the black hemisphere harbors hidden agendas, and unconventional, cunning methods to solve problems, with the 36 stratagems as a central component. A person with Moulüe competence who is confronted with a problem can switch from options for action in one hemisphere to options for action in the other according to the circumstances. This contribution shows how the realization of justice, and the spreading of truth, can be achieved based on Moulüe skill which enables the application of the 36 stratagems. Full article
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23 pages, 405 KiB  
Article
Transitional Justice Process and the Justice Theory of Roland Dworkin
by Helen Gyr
Laws 2023, 12(3), 35; https://doi.org/10.3390/laws12030035 - 26 Apr 2023
Viewed by 3744
Abstract
The determination of truth in the aftermath of war aiming at establishing justice and peace is a key element of a transitional justice (TJ) process. The theory of justice of Roland Dworkin deals with an approach in which the interpretation of values such [...] Read more.
The determination of truth in the aftermath of war aiming at establishing justice and peace is a key element of a transitional justice (TJ) process. The theory of justice of Roland Dworkin deals with an approach in which the interpretation of values such as equality, liberty or truth are paramount. Dworkin’s theory of justice is applied to constitutional states and lays out how democratic values are negotiated. The goal of a TJ process is to lead a state towards democracy after a war or internal armed conflict. TJ processes as well as Dworkin’s theory of justice are to be understood as dynamic, which implies that they are subject to constant change and thus to be considered in their respective social, cultural, political, and economic contexts. This paper explores the relationship between truth and justice in the framework of a TJ trial and Roland Dworkin’s theory of justice. The TJ process in Colombia serves as a case study because that was where I conducted field research in TJ in 2019. Full article
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