Morality without God: Reality or Illusion?

A special issue of Religions (ISSN 2077-1444). This special issue belongs to the section "Religions and Humanities/Philosophies".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (1 September 2023) | Viewed by 10667

Special Issue Editor


E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Theology, Ansgar University College, 4635 Kristiansand, Norway
Interests: theological ethics; metaethics; philosophical theology; philosophy of religion

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

This Special Issue of Religions will focus on morality without God—a highly relevant topic in light of the recent interest in realist conceptions of morality—as well as ongoing debates in metaethics and the philosophy of religion. I am pleased to invite you to submit a proposal for this volume.

The aim of this Special Issue is to advance the discussion on the possibility of morality (not necessarily limited to a realist conception of morality) without God. Philosophers throughout the ages have discussed whether (and to what extent) morality can be, must be, does not have to be, or cannot be grounded in theism. Such discussions relate to a variety of debates in metaethics, moral psychology, normative moral theory, and applied ethics. While the literature on God and morality often engages with Christian traditions and conceptions of God, this Special Issue welcomes both contributions that engage with a Christian perspective and those that engage with other philosophical or religious conceptions of God.

Suggested themes include (but are not limited to):

Is God necessary for moral realism? Or is moral realism best explained by reference to God? Do various aspects of morality, such as moral obligations, human value, normativity, accountability, or moral knowledge, fit better with theism than atheism? Are there viable historical or contemporary formulations of a moral argument for the existence of God? Can the potential tension between morality and prudence be solved by appealing to God and a heavenly afterlife?

Is morality best construed without God? Is a moral theory without God more ontologically simple, more parsimonious, than one with God? Are there metaphysical problems facing theistic ethics, such as Euthyphro-related problems? Are there epistemological problems for theistic ethics? For instance, do evolution and cognitive science of religion undermine a religious moral epistemology?

How might a robust moral theory without God be construed? Are there viable naturalist or non-naturalist conceptions of moral realism that work well without God? Does atheism entail a non-realist or quasi-realist conception of morality?

I look forward to reading your proposals.

Sincerely,

Dr. Martin Jakobsen
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a double-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Religions is an international peer-reviewed open access monthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1800 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • God
  • atheism
  • morality
  • ethics
  • moral realism
  • moral argument
  • metaethics
  • moral epistemology
  • moral ontology
  • normativity

Published Papers (6 papers)

Order results
Result details
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:

Research

11 pages, 239 KiB  
Article
A Moral Fine-Tuning Argument
by Martin Jakobsen
Religions 2024, 15(1), 31; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15010031 - 24 Dec 2023
Viewed by 785
Abstract
This paper develops Mark D. Linville’s brief description of “a sort of moral fine-tuning argument”. I develop the argument in four ways: I unpack the argument and give it a clear formulation, I unpack the theistic explanation of why a somewhat reliable moral [...] Read more.
This paper develops Mark D. Linville’s brief description of “a sort of moral fine-tuning argument”. I develop the argument in four ways: I unpack the argument and give it a clear formulation, I unpack the theistic explanation of why a somewhat reliable moral capacity is expected, I point to the significance of not seeking to explain a perfect moral capacity, and I put the argument up against the recent work on non-theistic moral epistemology by Derek Parfit, David Enoch, and Erik Wielenberg. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Morality without God: Reality or Illusion?)
16 pages, 326 KiB  
Article
Egoism as a Problem for Robust Moral Realism
by Espen Ottosen
Religions 2023, 14(10), 1315; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14101315 - 19 Oct 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2377
Abstract
As a normative ethical theory, ethical egoism may seem compatible with the metaethical theory of moral realism. However, in this article, I will problematize such an assumption. The reason is that an important motivation for rejecting moral anti-realism by many moral realists—like Derek [...] Read more.
As a normative ethical theory, ethical egoism may seem compatible with the metaethical theory of moral realism. However, in this article, I will problematize such an assumption. The reason is that an important motivation for rejecting moral anti-realism by many moral realists—like Derek Parfit, Torbjörn Tännsjö, and Erik J. Wielenberg—is that such a view entails that not even cruel or horrendous acts are to be called wrong by any universal or objective standard. I suggest that this motivation also applies to the ethical theory of egoism, as it may imply that no one has any obligation to refrain from cruel or horrendous acts as long they are beneficial to the agent. On that basis, I will demonstrate that egoism is a problem for robust moral realists that also, to a large degree, is being overlooked. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Morality without God: Reality or Illusion?)
10 pages, 254 KiB  
Article
Debunking Divine Command Theory
by Hans Van Eyghen
Religions 2023, 14(10), 1252; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14101252 - 2 Oct 2023
Viewed by 1589
Abstract
The divine command theory holds that morality finds its origin in God or that God is somehow closely connected to morality. Many people across the world hold a related, though different belief that Religious belief is required for proper moral behavior. In this [...] Read more.
The divine command theory holds that morality finds its origin in God or that God is somehow closely connected to morality. Many people across the world hold a related, though different belief that Religious belief is required for proper moral behavior. In this paper, I look at a number of evolutionary and cognitive explanations (supernatural punishment theory, big gods theory, moral dyad, and costly signaling) that purport to explain why people hold beliefs concerning a close connection between God and morality. I assess whether any of these theories provide a reason for epistemic concern. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Morality without God: Reality or Illusion?)
9 pages, 221 KiB  
Article
A Dilemma for Theistic Non-Naturalism
by St.John Lambert
Religions 2023, 14(9), 1115; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14091115 - 29 Aug 2023
Viewed by 1184
Abstract
Non-naturalism is the view that there are sui generis, non-natural moral properties. This paper poses a dilemma for theists who accept this view. Either God explains why non-moral properties make sui generis, non-natural moral properties obtain, or God does not explain this. If [...] Read more.
Non-naturalism is the view that there are sui generis, non-natural moral properties. This paper poses a dilemma for theists who accept this view. Either God explains why non-moral properties make sui generis, non-natural moral properties obtain, or God does not explain this. If the former, then God is unacceptably involved in the explanation of his own moral goodness. If the latter, then God’s sovereignty, stature, and importance are undermined, and an unacceptable queerness is introduced into the world. This paper concludes that theists have good reasons to reject non-naturalism on account of the unacceptable consequences of accepting either horn. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Morality without God: Reality or Illusion?)
16 pages, 262 KiB  
Article
Mediated Morality as a Middle Position in Understanding the Relation between God and Morality
by Amund Tobias Måge Areklett and Atle Ottesen Søvik
Religions 2023, 14(8), 1074; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14081074 - 21 Aug 2023
Viewed by 1259
Abstract
How should we understand the relation between God and morality? This article aims to address this question by constructing a theistic metaethical theory informed by postphenomenological mediation theory. According to postphenomenological mediation theory, properties and values are not independent entities but are instead [...] Read more.
How should we understand the relation between God and morality? This article aims to address this question by constructing a theistic metaethical theory informed by postphenomenological mediation theory. According to postphenomenological mediation theory, properties and values are not independent entities but are instead mutually constituted through the relationships that they participate in. By emphasizing relationships and understanding goodness as harmony, the theory allows God and creation to jointly constitute goodness. This alternative theory is compared to the metaethical theories proposed by Robert M. Adams and Mark C. Murphy, which represent the two primary strands of theistic metaethics: theological voluntarism and natural law theory, respectively. The alternative theory exhibits certain advantages and resolves some of the issues found in Adams’ and Murphy’s theories. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Morality without God: Reality or Illusion?)
9 pages, 197 KiB  
Article
A New Explanation of Why the Euthyphro Dilemma Is a False Dilemma
by Atle Ottesen Søvik
Religions 2023, 14(8), 1038; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14081038 - 14 Aug 2023
Viewed by 1502
Abstract
The article gives a new explanation for why the Euthyphro dilemma is a false dilemma and argues that it is a middle position that both the theist and the atheist could accept. The argument is that both the will of God and the [...] Read more.
The article gives a new explanation for why the Euthyphro dilemma is a false dilemma and argues that it is a middle position that both the theist and the atheist could accept. The argument is that both the will of God and the preferences of individuals are necessary truthmakers for what the good is. Each of the components is insufficient on its own, but jointly they are sufficient. Individual preferences are necessary to provide the normativity of the good, while God is necessary for the objectivity of the good. It is the combination of individual preferences into a possible world that is valuated the most by the most that gives the normative goal for moral choices. It is the knowledge of God of what would most probably be valuated the most by the most that makes a concrete choice the morally right thing to do in a concrete situation. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Morality without God: Reality or Illusion?)
Back to TopTop