Adapting to Multipolarity: Insights from Iterated Game Theory Simulations—A Preliminary Study on Hypothetical Optimal Global Cooperation
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Background: On the Evolution of Cooperation and Its Structural Features in International Relationships
3. Methodology
- Large Countries: This group comprises the highest-ranking countries by GDP, such as the United States and China. These nations typically exert significant global influence and possess substantial economic power.
- Medium Countries: Countries in this category, such as Japan and Germany, have mid-range GDPs, indicating moderate economic power. These countries play crucial roles in regional markets and often maintain substantial trade relationships with both larger and smaller economies.
- Small Countries: The small-country group includes nations with the lowest GDPs in the study, such as Norway and Argentina. These countries have smaller economies and may be more susceptible to external economic pressures, yet they often exhibit high levels of export dependency.
- The size (M) represents the economic power of a country. It reflects a country’s GDP or economic output. Larger economies may have more resources to invest in cooperation and can derive greater benefits from stable international relations (Keohane 1984).
- The Export orientation (e) is calculated as the ratio of a country’s exports to its GDP, representing the share of the export industry.
- The Barriers (i) refer to protectionist policies. They are measured by the weighted average tariff rates on imports, indicating the level of protection against foreign imports.
- Always Defect: This strategy always chooses to defect regardless of the opponent’s previous actions.
- Always Cooperate: This strategy always chooses to cooperate regardless of the opponent’s previous actions.
- Tit-for-Tat: This strategy cooperates on the first move and then mimics the opponent’s last move in subsequent rounds (Axelrod 1984). This has been shown to be effective in promoting cooperation during repeated interactions.
- Generous Tit-for-Tat: This strategy is similar to Tit-for-Tat, but includes a 25% chance of forgiving a defection by cooperating (Nowak and Sigmund 1993). This allows for the possibility of repairing damaged relationships and avoids retaliation cycles.
3.1. Single Simulation
- Initialization: Random strategies and attributes are assigned to each country based on their size categories (see Appendix A). The initial allocation of strategies and attributes among countries in the model reflects the diverse and unpredictable nature of international relations. By starting with random strategies and economic attributes, we avoid introducing any bias and allow the model to explore how different approaches evolve naturally over time. Importantly, the randomness was balanced through 100 iterations within each simulation and 100 single simulations. This extensive repetition ensures that the outcomes reflect underlying patterns and trends rather than just the initial randomness, providing robust insights into the dynamics of international cooperation.
- Iterations: Each country pairs with every other country, resulting in 105 interactions per round. In each interaction, countries choose their moves based on their strategies and the history of previous interactions. The payoffs are calculated by taking into account each country’s size, export gains, and barrier costs.
- Adjustment of strategies: A country is selected based on cumulative gains to potentially influence the strategy of another country. This captures the diffusion of information and the ability of countries to monitor what is happening in the international economic and political scene and adjust their policies accordingly. Note that an additional random strategy change occurs with a 10% probability. This represents random events and/or non-rational behaviors that may influence policy decisions in an unexpected way.
- Measurements: The measurements were performed as follows:
- Level of cooperation: Percentage of cooperative moves in each round.
- Distribution of strategies: Frequency of each strategy across iterations.
- Cumulative gains: Recorded for each country.
3.2. Monte Carlo Simulation
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Single Simulation Results
4.2. Monte Carlo Simulation Results
4.3. Statistical Validation
4.4. Specific Insights from Our Findings
4.5. Limitations, Contribution, and Future Research Guidelines
5. Concluding Remarks
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Category | Countries | GDP (Current USD bn.) | Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) | Tariff Rate, Applied, Weighted Mean, All Products (%) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Large | China, USA, | 17,820–23,315 | 10.9–19.9 | 1.5–2.3 |
Medium | Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korean Rep., Russian Federation, United Kingdom | 1650–5035 | 18.1–47.3 | 0.7–7.8 |
Small | Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Macao SAR, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe | 14–503 | 2.2–99.3 | 0.00–12.7 |
1 | For example, the “Thucydides Trap” refers to the conflicts that can arise when a rising power (China) threatens to surpass a ruling power (the United States of America—USA). |
2 | Traditional game theory focuses on interactions between perfectly rational individuals. Conversely, evolutionary game theory concentrates on (i) large populations that interact randomly, and (ii) the assumption that players employ adaptive rules instead of engaging in perfectly rational behavior (Wallace and Young 2015). It is concerned with finding the dominant strategy as well as with the fact that frequency-dependent fitness introduces a strategic aspect to evolution. |
3 | Niccolo Machiavelli in The Prince (Machiavelli [1566] 2008, pp. 43–44) not only states this, but also explains the reason behind the significance of being able to foresee future troubles: Leaders should “[…] regard not only present troubles but also future ones, for which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. This happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy”. |
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Size (M) (Current USD bn.) | Export Orientation (e) (% of GDP) | Barriers (i) (%) | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Small | Medium | Large | Small | Medium | Large | Small | Medium | Large |
From 14 to 503 | From 1650 to 5035 | From 17,820 to 23,315 | From 2.2 to 99.3 | From 18.1 to 47.3 | From 10.9 to 19.9 | From 0 to 12.7 | From 7 to 7.8 | From 1.5 to 2.3 |
Country | Category | Strategy | Size (M) | Export Orientation (e) | Barriers (i) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Small | Generous Tit-for-Tat | 91.574 | 0.675 | 0.037 |
2 | Large | Tit-for-Tat | 18,394.005 | 0.112 | 0.025 |
3 | Medium | Always Defect | 2,562.558 | 0.413 | 0.052 |
4 | Medium | Always Defect | 3,438.514 | 0.331 | 0.024 |
5 | Small | Always Cooperate | 357.210 | 0.987 | 0.036 |
6 | Small | Tit-for-Tat | 34.012 | 0.771 | 0.007 |
7 | Small | Tit-for-Tat | 86.936 | 0.724 | 0.018 |
8 | Medium | Always Cooperate | 3,734.833 | 0.408 | 0.050 |
9 | Small | Always Cooperate | 92.504 | 0.743 | 0.049 |
10 | Small | Tit-for-Tat | 77.867 | 0.601 | 0.049 |
11 | Small | Tit-for-Tat | 347.261 | 0.980 | 0.049 |
12 | Small | Tit-for-Tat | 448.817 | 0.500 | 0.025 |
13 | Medium | Always Defect | 4,391.060 | 0.435 | 0.026 |
14 | Small | Always Defect | 457.881 | 0.499 | 0.027 |
15 | Small | Always Cooperate | 129.965 | 0.442 | 0.028 |
Country B | |||
---|---|---|---|
Cooperate | Defect | ||
Country A | Cooperate | ||
Defect | 0 | ||
0 |
Country | Category | Final Strategy | Cumulative Payoffs |
---|---|---|---|
1 | Small | Generous Tit-for-Tat | 3,287,319 |
2 | Large | Tit-for-Tat | 27,818,081 |
3 | Medium | Always Cooperate | 5,314,262 |
4 | Medium | Tit-for-Tat | 36,690,050 |
5 | Small | Always Cooperate | 5,133,721 |
6 | Small | Always Defect | 3,765,800 |
7 | Small | Tit-for-Tat | 3,782,402 |
8 | Medium | Always Cooperate | 7,461,958 |
9 | Small | Always Cooperate | 3,950,124 |
10 | Small | Always Cooperate | 4,483,764 |
11 | Small | Always Cooperate | 5,500,975 |
12 | Small | Always Cooperate | 3,223,603 |
13 | Medium | Tit-for-Tat | 8,087,985 |
14 | Small | Always Defect | 2,903,647 |
15 | Small | Always Cooperate | 4,524,781 |
Number of Large Countries | Mean Cooperation Level | Standard Error |
---|---|---|
1 | 0.6191 | 0.0189 |
2 | 0.6657 | 0.0171 |
3 | 0.6392 | 0.0198 |
4 | 0.6584 | 0.0179 |
5 | 0.7116 | 0.0159 |
6 | 0.6950 | 0.0171 |
7 | 0.7470 | 0.148 |
8 | 0.7582 | 0.0152 |
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Petrakis, P.E.; Kanzola, A.-M.; Lomis, I. Adapting to Multipolarity: Insights from Iterated Game Theory Simulations—A Preliminary Study on Hypothetical Optimal Global Cooperation. J. Risk Financial Manag. 2024, 17, 370. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm17080370
Petrakis PE, Kanzola A-M, Lomis I. Adapting to Multipolarity: Insights from Iterated Game Theory Simulations—A Preliminary Study on Hypothetical Optimal Global Cooperation. Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 2024; 17(8):370. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm17080370
Chicago/Turabian StylePetrakis, Panagiotis E., Anna-Maria Kanzola, and Ioannis Lomis. 2024. "Adapting to Multipolarity: Insights from Iterated Game Theory Simulations—A Preliminary Study on Hypothetical Optimal Global Cooperation" Journal of Risk and Financial Management 17, no. 8: 370. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm17080370