A Study on Green Agricultural Production Decision-Making by Agricultural Cooperatives under Government Subsidies

Abstract

As a result of the ongoing development and advancement of green agriculture in China, consumers have benefited in numerous ways from green agricultural products. Consumers are increasingly attempting to purchase green agricultural products. However, there are still some problems in relation to green agricultural products, such as the inability of agricultural co-operatives to meet consumers’ demands due to the low return on investment of green agricultural products. To solve the above problems, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model involving the government, agricultural co-operatives, and consumers. In addition, simulation experiments were conducted to simulate and analyze the stakeholders’ strategic decisions in different situations. The results of this study show that government subsidies are effective in promoting the production of green agricultural products by agricultural cooperatives. The yield of green agricultural products, the degree of greenness of agricultural products, and the additional branding benefits of government subsidies for agricultural cooperatives can significantly influence the willingness of agricultural cooperatives to produce green agricultural products and the willingness of consumers to consume green agricultural products. Finally, some suggestions are given to solve the above problems. The findings of this study can provide a valuable reference for government subsidy strategy makers and valuable insights into the sustainable development of the green produce industry.

1. Introduction

As living standards have increased over time, an increasing number of consumers have realized that conventional agricultural products are detrimental to their health. As a result, they have started to seek out green agricultural products [1]. This trend becomes even more pronounced when new parents are tasked with regulating the diets of their infants [2]. Green agricultural products in China are comparable to organic agricultural products in that they are subject to more rigorous environmental quality standards than conventional agricultural products. The specifications must be adhered to by the pollution indices of each evaluation project. Additionally, the utilization of synthetic chemical substances during the production process is strictly forbidden. These prohibitions are in place to mitigate the detrimental environmental effects that may arise from the manufacturing process. To ensure the quality of agricultural products, the Chinese government has enacted regulatory standards, including the China Organic Standard certification. This certification verifies the absence of chemically synthesized products, genetically modified organisms, and environmental contamination. Green production methods that result in the production of environmentally friendly goods can increase agricultural output efficiency, decrease resource waste and contamination, and contribute positively to the maintenance of agricultural competitiveness and economic vitality [3]. Based on the China Agricultural Green Development Report 2022, the cumulative count of validly labeled units of organic agricultural products and green agricultural products in China is 60,254 and 27,246, respectively. These figures represent year-on-year growth rates of 10 percent and 8.3 percent. The report further highlights the substantial influence that the advancement of green agricultural products has already exerted on the ecological environment of China. Furthermore, while green agricultural products may not exhibit superior health qualities compared to conventional agricultural products, they play a crucial role in ensuring the safety of food for consumers [4].

Agricultural cooperatives, as the main production body of green agricultural products, often do not have a good economic income because they face problems such as insufficient motivation for green production, insufficient sustainability of green production, and difficulties in the implementation of branding strategies [5]. Farmers form agricultural cooperatives, which are small, cooperative, and mutually supportive organizations that increase the likelihood of reducing fertilizer and pesticide use on farms and increasing net returns per unit of fertilizer and pesticide [6] by working together. However, due to the high requirements of green agricultural products regarding the production environment and production materials, more time, energy, and capital are required for their production. Furthermore, information asymmetry and other issues among the members of agricultural cooperatives may arise, resulting in a dearth of incentives for green production [7]. Similarly, agricultural cooperatives face a lack of sustainability. On the one hand, agricultural cooperatives may find it difficult to maintain sustained green production due to factors such as smaller market demand; on the other hand, some agricultural cooperatives may engage in short-term behaviors, such as free riding, in the production process, pursuing immediate benefits at the expense of long-term sustainable development. In the context of green branding strategies for agricultural cooperatives, brand recognition refers to the way consumers identify a brand through visual or auditory cues and other elements of the brand identity. If an agricultural cooperative has a certain level of brand recognition, this means that potential customers who see the brand logo or hear the brand name can associate it with the branded product or service. Brand recognition is often the first step in establishing a brand’s position in the marketplace, and many agricultural cooperatives combine branded products with geographical indications to enable consumers to better remember the brand. Currently, there is a lack of consumer recognition and trust regarding green agricultural products [8]. Only a few consumers can recognize the benefits of green agricultural products with a high degree of greenness, which has a greater impact on the green brand recognition and word-of-mouth effect brought about by the repurchase rate of green agricultural products.

Even though the premium for green agricultural products is frequently two to three times that of conventional agricultural products and has a significant impact on consumers’ willingness to pay for such products [9], the supply of green agricultural products in China continues to fall short of consumer demand. Furthermore, it is imperative that the scarcity of green agricultural products be manifested not only in terms of quantity but also in terms of variety. This makes consumers face difficulties in choosing green agricultural products to meet their diversified needs.

Agricultural subsidies are a prevalent policy instrument employed by governments to provide assistance to the agricultural sector [10]. Agricultural subsidies can play a role in supporting the transition to healthier and more sustainable agricultural systems [11] and have emerged to promote green and sustainable agriculture globally [12]. Government subsidies generally take two forms, production subsidies for producers and consumption subsidies for consumers. Production subsidies are effective in increasing surplus throughout the agricultural supply chain and promoting green innovation among producers [13]. Consumer subsidies, on the other hand, can also increase consumer surplus but reduce producer surplus, ultimately leading some producers to choose to increase the price of agricultural products [14]. China has implemented numerous agricultural subsidy systems, encompassing resources and environmental protection subsidies, subsidies for agricultural infrastructure, subsidies for agricultural infrastructure, subsidies for agricultural production, subsidies for agricultural insurance, and subsidies for agricultural financial products [15]. Nevertheless, the existing subsidy mechanism for agricultural cooperatives in China exhibits several deficiencies. In the context of subsidies, production costs, and agricultural product quality, for instance, agricultural cooperatives consistently prioritize the acquisition of additional subsidies over the enhancement of operational productivity and agricultural product quality. To address the issues, rational government subsidy instruments are required.

Given the aforementioned context, this paper will address the following problem: Agricultural co-operatives face the problem of low yields in the production of green agricultural products. This has a serious impact on the willingness of agricultural cooperatives to produce green products, which ultimately leads to the production of green agricultural products that do not meet the needs of consumers who have the financial capacity to consume green products. Evolutionary game theory is a theory that combines the analysis of game theory with the analysis of the dynamic evolution process. It emphasizes a dynamic equilibrium. The theory originates from the theory of biological evolution, which has successfully explained some phenomena in the process of biological evolution. Nowadays, economists have made remarkable achievements in analyzing the factors influencing the formation of social habits, norms, institutions, or systems and explaining their formation process by using evolutionary game theory [16]. The EGT methodology allows modelling how strategies evolve over time in response to changing circumstances. Furthermore, unlike the completely rational hypothesis in traditional game theory, the stakeholders are finitely rational in adjusting their optimal options in a constantly repeated game rather than reaching optimality in a single game [17]. Ultimately, due to the complexity of stakeholder interactions in the process of green production by government-subsidized agricultural cooperatives, there is both cooperation and competition among them, such as the purchase by consumers of green agricultural products produced by agricultural cooperatives, which also involves adjustments in market demand and commodity prices. EGT methods can simulate how strategies evolve over time in response to changing circumstances.

As a result, this paper develops a tripartite model for determining government subsidies for agricultural products: consumers, agricultural cooperatives, and the government. The objective is to investigate thoroughly the interactive behavior and strategic choices of stakeholders in the green agricultural supply chain in different situations, and to explore how to promote the production of green agricultural products by agricultural cooperatives willing to produce green products through reasonable government subsidy strategies to obtain higher benefits, satisfy the demand for green agricultural products in the market, and help consumers buy green agricultural products at lower prices, so as to promote the sustainable development of the supply chain of green agricultural products and the protection of the ecosystem. Analogue experiments are utilized to conduct numerical simulations in order to validate the soundness of the deduced conclusions and to more intuitively illustrate the impact of the sensitivity of various factors. The experimental results are used to suggest some countermeasures for the green agricultural supply chain. Finally, the experimental results are used to suggest some countermeasures for green production in agricultural cooperatives under government subsidies.

In comparison to prior research, this article primarily contributes the following: first, we investigate the effect of incorporating brand recognition and the greenness of agricultural products into the green production model of government-subsidized agricultural cooperatives. The objective is to motivate agricultural cooperatives to enhance their profitability while concurrently considering the safety and quality of agricultural products. Furthermore, a significant portion of the scholarly literature concerning the ramifications of government incentives and disincentives posits that penalizing agricultural cooperatives for manufacturing conventional agricultural goods is warranted. However, in practice, traditional agricultural products remain the predominant sector output, and even the manufacturing of superior conventional goods continues to necessitate a certain degree of government support. Our study covers the case of subsidies to agricultural cooperatives that produce traditional agricultural products. In conclusion, government policymakers may gain valuable policy insights from our research. Appropriate subsidy ratios may increase the economic returns of agricultural cooperatives, encourage the production of green agricultural products by agricultural cooperatives, reduce the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, decrease consumer purchasing costs, and contribute to the maintenance of a healthy ecological environment, according to this study’s findings.

The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 is the problem description, model assumptions, and construction of the evolutionary game model. Section 4 replicates the dynamic equations as well as the equilibrium point analysis. Section 5 shows the simulation analysis of the effect of sensitivity of different parameters. Section 6 contains the conclusions and insights of this paper.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Green Production and Greenness of Agricultural Products

Green agriculture is an agricultural development model that promotes sustainable economic, ecological, and social development, and it is considered to solve growing social problems such as environmental pollution related to agriculture, animal welfare, and food quality and safety [18]. The implementation of environmentally sustainable and efficient production technologies and methods, known as “green production”, in the agricultural sector aims to mitigate adverse environmental effects and safeguard ecosystems. Crop rotation, fertilization, land fragmentation, and cultivation methods are all examples of green production techniques [19]. The green production process also includes the necessity of strict monitoring of green food during the processing of agricultural products, maintaining a high level of attention to pesticide residues, bacteria, heavy metals, and radioactive substances. On the basis of the high level of internal quality of agricultural products, it is important to ensure that the level of external packaging is clean and free of pollution [20]. Following green processing of agricultural products, agricultural residues are produced; transforming these residues into marketable products can reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which is advantageous to the environment [21].

The degree of greenness of agricultural products refers to the degree to which the production, processing, storage and transport of agricultural products have a low impact on the environment, there is a high rate of resource utilization, the quality of products is safe, and production is in line with the principle of sustainable development. This degree is fuzzy, and different agricultural products have different methods of evaluating greenness. For example, Adeyi et al. gave a method to evaluate the degree of greenness of pesticide use in agricultural products [22]. Farmers’ behavior to improve the greenness of agricultural products can improve the consumer’s purchasing efficiency and increase the consumer’s willingness to buy to a certain extent [23]. However, enhancing the greenness of agricultural products through the use of green innovation technology often requires more costs, which to a certain extent hinders the willingness of farmers to improve the greenness of agricultural products. Therefore, it is crucial to find a balance between the greenness of agricultural products and the use of green innovation technologies. Ataei’s study proved that green pesticides developed from green agriculture still have an effect on the greenness of agricultural products but can enhance consumer purchase intention [24]. Mao et al. investigated the effect of risk preference on the adoption of low-carbon agricultural technologies by farmers [25]. According to He et al., imbalance in the rate of adoption of green agricultural production technologies can lead to a decrease in the greenness of products, balance can lead to a decrease in product greenness, and applicable green agricultural technologies should be improved and promoted according to local production conditions [26].

2.2. Green Preferences

Green preference is a direct driver that influences stakeholders’ green behavior [27]. However, there is a general lack of green preferences for agri-food in China. Farmers’ green preferences are the substitution of traditional fuels with biogas, biofuels, and biomass and the adoption of biodegradable mulch and green planting techniques to promote production behaviors [28]. Mao et al.’s analysis shows that large-scale farmers have stronger green preferences and are more inclined to adopt green technologies compared to small-scale farmers [25]. In addition to scale, environmental regulations can also increase farmers’ green preferences and have different effects on the adoption of green technologies by farmers with different attributes [29]. Yu et al. measured farmers’ risk aversion using experimental economics. The experimental results proved that farmers’ green technology risk aversion preference has a significant negative effect on green production willingness [30].

On the other hand, consumers’ green preferences increase their willingness to purchase green agri-food products and motivate them to change their consumption behavior [31]. Consumers’ willingness to pay premiums is the greatest resistance to consumers’ green preferences. Consumers’ unwillingness to pay premiums is usually influenced by economic factors, but consumer-related variables, including gender, age, environment, and education, also affect consumers’ propensity to pay premiums [32]. In addition, a company’s brand image also affects consumers’ propensity to pay premiums for sustainable products [33]. In terms of brand image, consumers’ decisions on premium payment behavior are not influenced by CSR behavior [34].

However, farmers’ lack of green preference leads to underinvestment in green production and falsification of sales records to cheat government subsidies. Consumers find it difficult to purchase desirable green agricultural products, weakening their green preferences [35]. Therefore, to promote the cultivation of green agricultural products, it is crucial to correctly regulate farmers’ production behavior and to encourage farmers and consumers to enhance their green preferences.

2.3. Government Agricultural Subsidies

Agricultural subsidies possess both a technical and scale-based utility. Specifically, they can incentivize farmers to expand their production scale, which in turn enhances technical efficiency, and promotes the adoption of more environmentally sustainable and efficient agricultural production technologies [12]. Many researchers have focused on subsidy policies in the agricultural context, particularly the impact of agricultural subsidy policies on production. Zhang et al. argue that neither quantitative output subsidies nor environmental innovation subsidies alone can resolve the conflict between agricultural development and environmental protection. A hybrid subsidy scheme combining these two unilateral subsidies can reduce pollution emissions and increase agricultural production [36]. Peng et al. consider a three-tiered contractual agricultural supply chain, verifying that, as subsidies increase, so does the overall target production of farmers, and that subsidies have a positive impact on farmers who are highly risk averse [37]. Guo et al. argue that agricultural subsidies reduce fertilizer use by facilitating the adoption of agricultural technologies and the expansion of cultivated areas to reduce fertilizer use [12]. However, special subsidies for fertilizers have a positive effect on farmers’ spending [38].

However, agricultural subsidies may not exclusively yield advantages. Certain agricultural subsidy policies have effectively safeguarded the integrity and safety of agricultural products, yet they have inadvertently caused environmental degradation [36]; conversely, while certain subsidies have increased agricultural productivity, they have expedited the depletion of critical natural resources; and, while others have been environmentally advantageous, they have not been able to ensure food production due to alterations in agricultural production patterns [39].

Numerous nations have witnessed the implementation of public funding policies to support green agriculture by government agencies [40]. Agricultural subsidies to farmers are mainly implemented in developed countries, agricultural subsidies on production materials are usually implemented in developing countries, and output price support policies are usually implemented in both developed and developing countries [41]. Bai et al. elaborated that the Chinese agricultural subsidy model is divided into price subsidies and agricultural product type subsidies, verifying the effectiveness of the Chinese government’s sustainable agricultural subsidies [42]. A small number of high-income nations, including Norway and Japan, provide substantial levels of government subsidies. Agricultural output in China has increased by nearly 15% due to purchase price subsidies and additional subsidies, despite the fact that China’s subsidy rates are not as high but are nonetheless substantial [43].

2.4. Evolutionary Game Theory

Based on the limited rationality of stakeholders, evolutionary game theory can dynamically evolve to reflect the decision-making behavior of participants, as well as the influence of the external environment [44]. Fan et al. developed an evolutionary game model that incorporated industrial emitters and local governments in order to examine the dynamic impact mechanism of various fiscal expenditures by the former on the latter’s production transformation and pollutant reduction [45]. Ghasemi et al. proposed a two-layer model for the location, routing, and allocation of medical centers to distribution stations during a COVID-19 pandemic outbreak using an evolutionary game approach [46]. Hosseini-Motlagh et al. proposed a model based on evolutionary game theory, namely, “Profit-surplus allocation mechanism for supply chain coordination”, to investigate how the long-term behavior of supply chain members will affect the coordination decision and their share in the coordinated profit surplus [47]. Li et al. used an evolutionary game approach focusing on sorting out the evolutionary mechanism of cement companies adopting green product certification [48]. Wang et al. constructed a complex network evolution game model between enterprise operation teams of social e-commerce platforms to study the knowledge transfer of enterprise operation teams of social e-commerce platforms [49]. Xu et al. investigated a complex network evolutionary game model containing different types of car consumers and described the objective factors affecting consumers’ low-carbon purchase intentions [50].

The breadth of this study provides an important theoretical foundation for this research. However, there are still some gaps in the academic research. From the previous literature, it can be seen that the current research on promoting agricultural cooperatives to produce green agricultural products mainly focuses on new green technology for the greenness of agricultural products and the impact of consumer premium payment. There is also some research on the form and role of agricultural subsidies. However, few studies have paid attention to the fact that consumers’ premium purchase demand will motivate agricultural co-operatives to produce green agricultural products to achieve sustainable cultivation. Finding a balance between greener produce and lower prices creates uncertainty in the relationship between agricultural cooperatives and consumers. It is also worth further analyzing whether agricultural production subsidies in combination with green consumption subsidies can promote green preferences among farmers and consumers.

3. Methods

3.1. Model Descriptions

Currently, there are some problems that need to be solved in the process of promoting agricultural cooperatives to produce green agricultural products. First, agricultural cooperatives need to ensure a green production environment, adopt green and low-carbon production methods, and exercise strict control over product quality. They also need to obtain green product certification after production is completed, and these steps require high green production costs. Secondly, compared with traditional agricultural products, green agricultural products are mainly characterized by a relatively high price premium, and consumers usually need to pay two to three times the price of traditional agricultural products in order to buy green agricultural products. Moreover, there is a positive correlation between consumers’ willingness to buy and their willingness to be green. The market demand for green agricultural products is unstable due to the small number of consumers who have the ability to consume and the willingness to protect the environment. However, the supply of green agricultural products is still much smaller than the market demand, which leads to a higher risk for agricultural cooperatives when producing green agricultural products, and further reduces the green production willingness of agricultural cooperatives. Finally, a small scale of green production has a limited effect on improving the brand recognition of agricultural cooperatives, while a large scale of production tends to lead to an oversupply of products.

The subjects of the game model proposed in this paper are the government, agricultural cooperatives, and consumers. The government, agricultural cooperatives and consumer groups are all rationally bounded and cannot accurately know each other’s benefit functions and strategy choices. This makes it difficult to make optimal decisions and co-operate in the long term, so the process of adjusting and improving strategies to achieve evolutionary stability can take a while [51]. The green production behaviors of agricultural cooperatives include the management of the production environment, high-quality green production materials, and the rejection of the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, thereby reducing pollution of the ecosystem. Concurrently, the government has increased its support for agricultural cooperatives to protect the environment by actively promoting the production of green agricultural products by cooperatives that are willing to produce green products to some extent. This is reflected in policy support in the form of subsidies for environmentally friendly production and consumer purchases, as well as environmental inputs. To enhance the income of agricultural cooperatives, to ensure that the output of green agricultural products meets the market demand, consumers can buy low-priced green agricultural products. The construction of the game model can be intuitively analyzed to enhance the impact of the output of green agricultural products, the reasonableness of the distribution of income, and the impact of the enterprise’s brand recognition. The relationship between the stakeholders in green production by agricultural cooperatives under government subsidy is shown in Figure 1.

3.2. Model Assumptions

To conduct a comprehensive analysis of the strategic decisions made by stakeholders regarding government subsidies for green production by agricultural cooperatives, this paper employs an evolutionary game to examine the three parties involved: the government, agricultural cooperatives, and consumers. These parties are considered to have limited rationality. The subsequent hypotheses are put forth in consideration of the impact of various decision variables on the strategic choices made by each stakeholder and the objective of determining the benefits associated with various strategic options.

Assumption 1.

The government strategy space $X=\left(x,1-x\right)=$ (subsidy, no subsidy) and $0<x<1$. Let the coefficient of government subsidy to agricultural cooperatives be $u$. Let the coefficient of government subsidy to agricultural cooperatives be u. When an agricultural cooperative produces traditional agricultural products that use chemical fertilizers or genetically modified technology, the government suffers an environmental loss of $R_d$. When agricultural cooperatives produce green agricultural products, government subsidies to agricultural cooperatives drive them to be more proactive in protecting the ecosystem, resulting in higher environmental benefits $R_a$. The government must assist agricultural cooperatives in bearing a portion of the high cost of environmental management $C_{eg}$, as it is difficult for them to do so independently. Additionally, consumer participation will generate a small excess return $U_e$ for both the government and the agricultural cooperatives.

Assumption 2.

Agricultural cooperative strategy space $Y=\left(y,1-y\right)=$ (produce green agricultural products, produce traditional agricultural products) and $0<y<1$. Let the income generated by the agricultural cooperative from the production of traditional agricultural products be $R_n$ and the underlying cost of production be $C_n$. The agricultural cooperative produces green agricultural products with a greenness of g to generate an income of $R_g$, a sustainable benefit of $B_g$, a base production cost of $C_g$, a green certification cost and an additional logistics cost of $C_a$, and a required environmental management cost of $C_{ec}$. When the agricultural cooperative’s production strategy matches consumer preferences, the agricultural cooperative receives branding recognition benefits of $B_a$, and the government’s subsidies and publicity can enable the agricultural cooperative to receive additional brandingbenefits $\Delta B_a$.

Assumption 3.

Consumer strategy space $Z=\left(z,1-z\right)=$ (preference for green agricultural products, preference for traditional agricultural products) and $0<z<1$. Consumers pay $C_h$ for traditional produce and receive safety and health benefits $R_h$. The cost to the consumer of purchasing green produce is $R_c$ and the safety and health benefits gained are $C_f$. Consumer preference also affects the production volume of agricultural cooperatives, which has a coefficient of $Q$ when consumer preference matches the agricultural cooperative’s strategy, and a coefficient of $Q_n$ when consumer preference does not match the agricultural cooperative’s strategy.

Assumption 4.

Consumers will purchase the entirety of the produce produced by the agricultural cooperatives in the model, notwithstanding the possibility that the cooperatives will be unable to sell a portion of their produce due to spoilage and decomposition.

Assumption 5.

Consumer preference has no discernible impact on the production of traditional agricultural products by agricultural cooperatives or the volume of consumer purchases, given that consumers are accustomed to purchasing green agricultural products.

In line with the above assumptions, a description of symbols is illustrated in

Table 1. Definition of parameters of the game.

Parameter	Description
$R_a$	Environmental benefits in the case of government subsidies
$R_e$	Environmental benefits in the absence of government subsidies
$R_d$	Environmental losses
$u$	Government subsidy coefficient
$C_{eg}$	Government’s environmental costs
$U_e$	Excess returns to government and agricultural cooperatives
$R_n$	Revenue from sales of traditional agricultural products
$R_g$	Revenue from sales of green agricultural products
$C_n$	Costs of producing traditional agricultural products
$C_g$	Costs of producing green agricultural products
$Q$	Coefficient of agricultural cooperative production when agricultural products meet consumer preferences
$Q_n$	Coefficient of agricultural cooperative production when agricultural products do not meet consumer preferences
$g$	Greenness of green agricultural products
$B_g$	Sustainable benefits from the production of green agricultural products
$B_a$	Brand recognition and green reputation
$\Delta B_a$	Additional brand recognition and green reputation
$C_a$	Green certification costs and additional logistics costs
$C_{ec}$	Costs of managing the environment
$C_h$	Cost of purchasing green produce
$C_f$	Cost of purchasing traditional agricultural products
$R_h$	Health and safety benefits
$\Delta R_h$	Additional health and safety benefits
$R_c$	Benefits from traditional agricultural products
${\Delta R}_c$	Additional benefits from traditional agricultural products

.

3.3. Model Construction

Based on the above assumptions, the tripartite evolutionary game model payoff matrix is constructed as shown in

Table 2. Payoff matrix for tripartite players.

Governments	Agricultural Cooperatives	Consumers with Green Consumption Intentions
		$\mathit{z}$	$1-\mathit{z}$
$x$	$y$	$R_{a}g-uQ{C}_{g}g-uQ{C}_{h}g-C_{eg}+U_e$ $Q{R}_g+uQ{C}_{g}g+B_{g}g-{QC}_g{g}^2+B_a+\Delta B_a-C_a-C_{ec}+U_e$ $Q{R}_h+Q{\Delta R}_h-Qg{C}_h+uQ{C}_{h}g$	$R_{a}g-u{Q_{n}C}_{g}g-u{Q_{n}C}_{h}g-C_{eg}$ ${Q_{n}R}_g+u{Q_{n}C}_{g}g+g{B}_g-{Q_{n}C}_g{g}^2-C_a-C_{ec}$ $Q_n{R}_h{+Q_n\Delta R}_h-Q_{n}g{C}_h+u{Q_{n}C}_{h}g$
	$1-y$	${-R}_d-u{C}_n$ $u{C}_n+R_{n^{-}}{C}_n$ $-C_f+R_c+\Delta R_c$	${-R}_d-u{C}_n$ $u{C}_n+R_{n^{-}}{C}_n+B_a$ $-C_f+R_c+\Delta R_c$
$1-x$	$y$	$R_{e}g$ ${QR}_g+B_{g}g-{QC}_g{g}^2+B_a-C_a-C_{ec}$ $Q{R}_h-{QgC}_h$	$R_{e}g$ ${Q_{n}R}_g+B_{g}g-Q_n{C}_g{g}^2-C_a-C_{ec}$ $Q_n{R}_h-Q_n{gC}_h$
	$1-y$	${-R}_d$ ${Q_{n}R}_{n^{-}}{Q_{n}C}_n$ $-{Q_{n}C}_f+Q_n{R}_c$	${-R}_d$ $R_{n^{-}}{C}_n+B_a$ $-C_f+R_c$

:

4. Results

4.1. Strategic Stability Analysis of Government

The government could adopt the best strategy based on their return.

The average benefit of the government choosing subsidy strategy:

$$\begin{array}{c}{E}_{11}=y{R}_d-R_d+yu{C}_n-y{C}_{eg}-u{C}_n+y{R}_{a}g+yz{U}_e-yug{Q}_n{C}_g-yug{Q}_n{C}_h\\ -yzugQ{C}_g-yzugQ{C}_h+yzug{Q}_n{C}_g+yzug{Q}_n{C}_h\end{array}$$

(1)

The average benefit of the government choosing the no-subsidy strategy:

$$E_{12}=y{R}_d-R_d+yg{R}_e$$

(2)

Average expected benefit to the government:

$$\overline{E_1}=x{E}_{11}+\left(1-x\right)E_{12}$$

(3)

Replication dynamic equation of government:

$$\begin{array}{c}{F}_1\left(x,y,z\right)=dx/dt=x\left(E_{11}-\overline{E_1}\right)=x(1-x)\left[yz\right(U_e+ug{Q}_n{C}_h-ugQ{C}_h+ug{Q}_n{C}_g-ugQ{C}_g)\\ +y(u{C}_n-C_{eg}+R_{a}g-R_{e}g-ug{Q}_n{C}_g-ug{Q}_n{C}_h)-u{C}_n]\end{array}$$

(4)

Derivation of the replicated dynamic equations:

$$\begin{array}{c}\frac{d{F}_1\left(x,y,z\right)}{dx}=\left(2x-1\right)[-yz(U_e+ug{Q}_n{C}_h-ugQ{C}_h+ug{Q}_n{C}_g-ugQ{C}_g)\\ -y(u{C}_n-C_{eg}+R_{a}g-R_{e}g-ug{Q}_n{C}_g-ug{Q}_n{C}_h)+u{C}_n]\end{array}$$

(5)

The parametric part of the derivative of the replication dynamic equation:

$$\begin{array}{c}G\left(z\right)=-yz(U_e+ug{Q}_n{C}_h-ugQ{C}_h+ug{Q}_n{C}_g-ugQ{C}_g)\\ -y(u{C}_n-C_{eg}+R_{a}g-R_{e}g-ug{Q}_n{C}_g-ug{Q}_n{C}_h)+u{C}_n\end{array}$$

(6)

According to the stability theorem of differential equations, the probability of the government choosing a subsidy strategy in a steady state must satisfy that $F_1\left(x,y,z\right)=0$ and $d{F}_1\left(x,y,z\right)/dx<0$. Since $\partial G\left(z\right)∕dz<0$, $G\left(z\right)$ is an increasing function. Therefore when $z=\frac{u{C}_n-y(u{C}_n-C_{eg}+R_{a}g-R_{e}g-ug{Q}_n{C}_g-ug{Q}_n{C}_h)}{y(U_e+ug{Q}_n{C}_h-ugQ{C}_h+ug{Q}_n{C}_g-ugQ{C}_g)}=z^{*}$ then $G\left(z\right)=0$, $d{F}_1\left(x,y,z\right)/dx\equiv 0$, and the government cannot determine a stabilization strategy. When $z>z^{*}$, $G\left(z\right)>0$, $d{F}_1\left(x,y,z\right)/d{\left.x\right|}_{x=0}<0$, and $x=0$ is the government’s evolutionary stabilization strategy (ESS); conversely when $z<z^{*}$, $x=1$ is the government’s evolutionary stabilization strategy. The phase diagram of the government strategy space is shown in Figure 2.

4.2. Strategic Stability Analysis of Agricultural Cooperatives

Agricultural cooperatives could adopt the best strategy based on their return.

The average benefit of the agricultural cooperatives choosing to produce green agricultural products strategy:

$$\begin{array}{c}{E}_{21}=Q_n{R}_g-C_{ec}-C_a+g{B}_g+z{B}_a+zQ{R}_g-z{Q}_n{R}_g+xz{U}_e+xz\Delta B_a-C_g{Q}_n{g}^2\\ -{zC}_{g}Q{g}^2+{zC}_g{Q}_n{g}^2+{xugC}_g{Q}_n+{xzugC}_{g}Q-{xzugC}_g{Q}_n\end{array}$$

(7)

The average benefit of the agricultural cooperatives choosing to produce traditional agricultural products strategy:

$$E_{22}=Ba-Cn+Rn-z{B}_a+z{C}_n-z{R}_n-z{Q}_n{C}_n+z{Q}_n{R}_n+xu{C}_n-xz{C}_n+xz{R}_n+xz{Q}_n{C}_n-xz{Q}_n{R}_n$$

(8)

Average expected benefit to the agricultural cooperatives:

$$\overline{E_2}=y{E}_{21}+\left(1-y\right)E_{22}$$

(9)

Replication dynamic equation of agricultural cooperatives:

$$\begin{array}{c}{F}_2\left(x,y,z\right)=dy/dt=y\left(E_{21}-\overline{E_2}\right)=y\left(1-y\right)\left[xz\right(C_n-R_n+U_e+\Delta B_a-Q_n{C}_n+Q_n{R}_n+{ugC}_{g}Q-{ugC}_g{Q}_n)\\ +x({ugC}_g{Q}_n-u{C}_n)+z(2B_a-C_n+R_n+Q_n{C}_n+Q{R}_g-Q_n{R}_g-Q_n{R}_n-C_{g}Q{g}^2{+C}_g{Q}_n{g}^2)\\ +(Cn-C_{ec}-C_a-Ba-Rn+Q_n{R}_g+g{B}_g-C_g{Q}_n{g}^2)]\end{array}$$

(10)

Derivation of the replicated dynamic equations:

$$\begin{array}{c}\frac{d{F}_2\left(x,y,z\right)}{dy}=\left(2y-1\right)[-xz(C_n-R_n+U_e+\Delta B_a-Q_n{C}_n+Q_n{R}_n+{ugC}_{g}Q-{ugC}_g{Q}_n)\\ -x({ugC}_g{Q}_n-u{C}_n)-z(2B_a-C_n+R_n+Q_n{C}_n+Q{R}_g-Q_n{R}_g-Q_n{R}_n-C_{g}Q{g}^2{+C}_g{Q}_n{g}^2)\\ -(Cn-C_{ec}-C_a-Ba-Rn+Q_n{R}_g+g{B}_g-C_g{Q}_n{g}^2)]\end{array}$$

(11)

The parametric part of the derivative of the replication dynamic equation:

$$\begin{array}{c}H\left(x\right)=-xz(C_n-R_n+U_e+\Delta B_a-Q_n{C}_n+Q_n{R}_n+{ugC}_{g}Q-{ugC}_g{Q}_n)-x({ugC}_g{Q}_n-u{C}_n)\\ -z(2B_a-C_n+R_n+Q_n{C}_n+Q{R}_g-Q_n{R}_g-Q_n{R}_n-C_{g}Q{g}^2{+C}_g{Q}_n{g}^2)\\ -(Cn-C_{ec}-C_a-Ba-Rn+Q_n{R}_g+g{B}_g-C_g{Q}_n{g}^2)]\end{array}$$

(12)

According to the stability theorem of differential equations, the probability of an agricultural cooperative choosing to produce green agricultural products in a steady state must satisfy that $F_2\left(x,y,z\right)=0$ and $d{F}_2\left(x,y,z\right)/dy<0$. Since $\partial H\left(x\right)/dx<0$, $H\left(x\right)$ is an increasing function. Therefore, when

$$x=\frac{-z[2B_a{+(Q}_n-1)C_n+(1-Q_n{)R}_n+(Q{-Q_n)R}_g-C_g(Q-Q_n)g^2]-(Cn-C_{ec}-C_a-Ba-Rn+Q_n{R}_g+g{B}_g-C_g{Q}_n{g}^2)}{z\left(C_n-R_n+U_e+\Delta B_a-Q_n{C}_n+Q_n{R}_n+{ugC}_{g}Q-{ugC}_g{Q}_n\right)+({ugC}_g{Q}_n-u{C}_n)}=x^{*}$$

then $H\left(x\right)=0$, $d{F}_2\left(x,y,z\right)/dy\equiv 0$, and the agricultural cooperative cannot determine a stabilization strategy. When $x<x^{*}$, $H\left(x\right)>0$, $d{F}_2\left(x,y,z\right)/d{\left.y\right|}_{y=0}< 0$, and $y=0$ is the agricultural cooperative’s evolutionary stabilization strategy; conversely when $x>x^{*}$, $y=1$ is the agricultural cooperative’s evolutionary stabilization strategy. The phase diagram of the agricultural cooperative space is shown in Figure 3.

4.3. Strategic Stability Analysis of Consumers

Consumers will adopt the best strategy based on their return.

$$\begin{array}{c}{E}_{31}=Q_n{R}_c-x{C}_f+yE+x{R}_c+x\Delta R_c-C_f{Q}_n+x{C}_f{Q}_n+{yC}_f{Q}_n-x{Q}_n{R}_c+yQ{R}_h-y{Q}_n{R}_c+xy{C}_f\\ +xyM-xy{R}_c-xy\Delta R_c+xy{Q}_n\Delta R_h-ygQ{C}_h-xy{C}_f{Q}_n+xy{Q}_n{R}_c+xyugQ{C}_h\end{array}$$

(13)

The average benefit of the consumers choosing preference for green agricultural products strategy:

$$E_{32}=R_c-C_f+{yC}_f+yE-y{R}_c+x\Delta R_c+y{Q}_n{R}_h+xyM-xy\Delta R_c+xy{Q}_n\Delta R_h-yg{Q_{n}C}_h+{xyug{Q}_{n}C}_h$$

(14)

Average expected benefit to the consumers:

$$\overline{E_3}=z{E}_{31}+\left(1-z\right)E_{32}$$

(15)

Replication dynamic equation of consumers:

$$\begin{array}{c}{F}_3\left(x,y,z\right)=dz/dt=z\left(E_{31}-\overline{E_3}\right)=z\left(1-z\right)\left[xy\right(C_f-R_c-Q_n\Delta R_h+Q\Delta R_h-C_f{Q}_n+Q_n{R}_c+ugQ{C}_h\\ -{ug{Q}_{n}C}_h)+x(-C_f+R_c+C_f{Q}_n-Q_n{R}_c)+y(-C_f+R_c+C_f{Q}_n+Q{R}_h-Q_n{R}_c\\ -Q_n{R}_h-gQ{C}_h+g{Q_{n}C}_h)+{(C}_f-R_c+Q_n{R}_c-C_f{Q}_n)]\end{array}$$

(16)

Derivation of the replicated dynamic equations:

$$\begin{array}{c}\frac{d{F}_3\left(x,y,z\right)}{dz}=\left(2z-1\right)[-xy(C_f-R_c-Q_n\Delta R_h+Q\Delta R_h-C_f{Q}_n+Q_n{R}_c+ugQ{C}_h-{ug{Q}_{n}C}_h)\\ -x\left(-C_f+R_c+C_f{Q}_n-Q_n{R}_c\right)-y(-C_f+R_c+C_f{Q}_n+Q{R}_h-Q_n{R}_c\\ -Q_n{R}_h-gQ{C}_h+g{Q_{n}C}_h)-{(C}_f-R_c+Q_n{R}_c-C_f{Q}_n)]\end{array}$$

(17)

The parametric part of the derivative of the replication dynamic equation:

$$\begin{array}{c}J\left(x\right)=-xy(C_f-R_c-Q_n\Delta R_h+Q\Delta R_h-C_f{Q}_n+Q_n{R}_c+ugQ{C}_h-{ug{Q}_{n}C}_h)\\ -x(-C_f+R_c+C_f{Q}_n-Q_n{R}_c)-y(-C_f+R_c+C_f{Q}_n+Q{R}_h-Q_n{R}_c\\ -Q_n{R}_h-gQ{C}_h+g{Q_{n}C}_h)-{(C}_f-R_c+Q_n{R}_c-C_f{Q}_n)]\end{array}$$

(18)

According to the stability theorem of differential equations, the probability of consumers choosing to prefer green agricultural products in a steady state must satisfy that $F_3\left(x,y,z\right)=0$ and $d{F}_3\left(x,y,z\right)/dz< 0$. Since $\partial J\left(x\right)/dx<0$, $J\left(x\right)$ is an increasing function. Therefore, when

$$x=-\frac{y(-C_f+R_c+C_f{Q}_n+Q{R}_h-Q_n{R}_c)+{(C}_f-R_c+Q_n{R}_c-C_f{Q}_n)}{y(C_f-R_c-Q_n\Delta R_h+Q\Delta R_h-C_f{Q}_n+Q_n{R}_c+ugQ{C}_h-{ug{Q}_{n}C}_h)+(-C_f+R_c+C_f{Q}_n-Q_n{R}_c)}=x^{**}$$

then $J\left(x\right)=0$, $d{F}_3\left(x,y,z\right)/dz\equiv 0$, and the consumer cannot determine a stabilization strategy. When $x<x^{**}$, $J\left(y\right)>0$, $d{F}_3\left(x,y,z\right)/d{\left.z\right|}_{z=0}< 0$, and $z=0$ is the consumer’s evolutionary stabilization strategy; conversely when $x>x^{**}$, $z=0$ is the consumer’s evolutionary stabilization strategy. The phase diagram of the consumer space is shown in Figure 4.

4.4. Analysis of Equilibrium Points

Following the method proposed by Friedman, the evolutionary stability strategy for a system of differential equations can be obtained from the local stability analysis of the Jacobian matrix of the system. The Jacobian matrix of the system is:

$$\mathrm{J}=\left[\begin{array}{ccc}{\mathrm{J}}_{11}& {\mathrm{J}}_{12}& {\mathrm{J}}_{13}\\ {\mathrm{J}}_{21}& {\mathrm{J}}_{22}& {\mathrm{J}}_{23}\\ {\mathrm{J}}_{31}& {\mathrm{J}}_{32}& {\mathrm{J}}_{33}\end{array}\right]=\left[\begin{array}{ccc}\frac{d{F}_1\left(x,y,z\right)}{dx}& \frac{d{F}_1\left(x,y,z\right)}{dy}& \frac{d{F}_1\left(x,y,z\right)}{dz}\\ \frac{d{F}_2\left(x,y,z\right)}{dx}& \frac{d{F}_2\left(x,y,z\right)}{dy}& \frac{d{F}_2\left(x,y,z\right)}{dz}\\ \frac{d{F}_3\left(x,y,z\right)}{dx}& \frac{d{F}_3\left(x,y,z\right)}{dy}& \frac{d{F}_3\left(x,y,z\right)}{dz}\end{array}\right]$$

(19)

$$\begin{array}{c}\frac{d{F}_1\left(x,y,z\right)}{dx}=\left(2x-1\right)[-yz(U_e+ug{Q}_n{C}_h-ugQ{C}_h+ug{Q}_n{C}_g-ugQ{C}_g)\\ -y(u{C}_n-C_{eg}+R_{a}g-R_{e}g-ug{Q}_n{C}_g-ug{Q}_n{C}_h)+u{C}_n]\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}\frac{d{F}_1\left(x,y,z\right)}{dy}=x\left(1-x\right)[z(U_e+ug{Q}_n{C}_h-ugQ{C}_h+ug{Q}_n{C}_g-ugQ{C}_g)\\ (u{C}_n-C_{eg}+R_{a}g-R_{e}g-ug{Q}_n{C}_g-ug{Q}_n{C}_h)]\end{array}$$

$$\frac{d{F}_1\left(x,y,z\right)}{dz}=x\left(1-x\right)y(U_e+ug{Q}_n{C}_h-ugQ{C}_h+ug{Q}_n{C}_g-ugQ{C}_g)$$

$$\frac{d{F}_2\left(x,y,z\right)}{dx}=y\left(1-y\right)[z(C_n-R_n+U_e+\Delta B_a-Q_n{C}_n+Q_n{R}_n+{ugC}_{g}Q-{ugC}_g{Q}_n)+({ugC}_g{Q}_n-u{C}_n)]$$

$$\begin{array}{c}\frac{d{F}_2\left(x,y,z\right)}{dy}=\left(2y-1\right)[-xz(C_n-R_n+U_e+\Delta B_a-Q_n{C}_n+Q_n{R}_n+{ugC}_{g}Q-{ugC}_g{Q}_n)-x({ugC}_g{Q}_n-u{C}_n)\\ -z(2B_a-C_n+R_n+Q_n{C}_n+Q{R}_g-Q_n{R}_g-Q_n{R}_n-C_{g}Q{g}^2{+C}_g{Q}_n{g}^2)\\ -(Cn-C_{ec}-C_a-Ba-Rn+Q_n{R}_g+g{B}_g-C_g{Q}_n{g}^2)]\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}\frac{d{F}_2\left(x,y,z\right)}{dz}=y\left(1-y\right)\left[x\left(C_n-R_n+U_e+\Delta B_a-Q_n{C}_n+Q_n{R}_n+{ugC}_{g}Q-{ugC}_g{Q}_n\right)\right]\\ +z(2B_a-C_n+R_n+Q_n{C}_n+Q{R}_g-Q_n{R}_g-Q_n{R}_n-C_{g}Q{g}^2{+C}_g{Q}_n{g}^2)\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}\frac{d{F}_3\left(x,y,z\right)}{dx}=z\left(1-z\right)[y(C_f-R_c-Q_n\Delta R_h+Q\Delta R_h-C_f{Q}_n+Q_n{R}_c+ugQ{C}_h-{ug{Q}_{n}C}_h)\\ +(-C_f+R_c+C_f{Q}_n-Q_n{R}_c)]\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}\frac{d{F}_3\left(x,y,z\right)}{dy}=z\left(1-z\right)[x(C_f-R_c-\Delta R_h+Q\Delta R_h-C_f{Q}_n+Q_n{R}_c+ugQ{C}_h-{ug{Q}_{n}C}_h)\\ +(-C_f+R_c+C_f{Q}_n+Q{R}_h-Q_n{R}_c-Q_n{R}_h-gQ{C}_h+g{Q_{n}C}_h)]\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}\frac{d{F}_3\left(x,y,z\right)}{dz}=\left(2z-1\right)[-xy(C_f-R_c-Q_n\Delta R_h+Q\Delta R_h-C_f{Q}_n+Q_n{R}_c+ugQ{C}_h-{ug{Q}_{n}C}_h)\\ -x(-C_f+R_c+C_f{Q}_n-Q_n{R}_c)-y(-C_f+R_c+C_f{Q}_n+Q{R}_h-Q_n{R}_c\\ -Q_n{R}_h-gQ{C}_h+g{Q_{n}C}_h)-{(C}_f-R_c+Q_n{R}_c-C_f{Q}_n)]\end{array}$$

Let $F_1\left(x,y,z\right)=F_2\left(x,y,z\right)=F_3\left(x,y,z\right)=0$, we can obtain $E_1\left(0,0,0\right)$, $E_2\left(1,0,0\right)$, $E_3\left(0,1,0\right)$, $E_4\left(0,0,1\right)$, $E_5\left(1,1,0\right)$, $E_6\left(1,0,1\right)$, $E_7\left(0,1,1\right)$, $E_8\left(1,1,1\right)$ as local equilibria. The equilibrium points where all eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are non-positive is the evolutionary stable point of the system, while the equilibrium point where all eigenvalues have a definite sign and are positive is the unstable point. The eigenvalues corresponding to each equilibrium point are shown in

Table 3. Eigenvalues corresponding to each equilibrium.

Equilibrium Points		Eigenvalue
$E_1\left(0,0,0\right)$	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_1$	$-u{C}_n$
	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_2$	${Q_{n}R}_g+g{B}_g-{g^2{Q}_{n}C}_g-C_a-C_{ec}-R_n+C_n-B_a$
	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_3$	$C_f-R_c-C_f{Q}_n+Q_n{R}_c$
$E_2\left(1,0,0\right)$	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_1$	$u{C}_n$
	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_2$	${Q_{n}R}_g+g{B}_g-{{g^{2}Q}_{n}C}_g+ug{Q}_n{C}_g-C_a-C_{ec}-R_n+C_n-B_a-u{C}_n$
	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_3$	$0$
	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_1$	$R_{a}g-R_{e}g-u{{gQ}_{n}C}_g-ug{Q_{n}C}_h-C_{eg}$
$E_3\left(0,1,0\right)$	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_2$	${{-Q}_{n}R}_g-g{B}_g+g^2{Q_{n}C}_g+C_a+C_{ec}+R_n-C_n+B_a$
	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_3$	$Q{R}_h-gQ{C}_h-Q_n{R}_h+{gQ}_n{C}_h$
	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_1$	$-u{C}_n$
$E_4\left(0,0,1\right)$	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_2$	${QR}_g-{Q_{n}R}_n+{Q_{n}C}_n+g{B}_g-{{g^{2}Q}_{n}C}_g-C_a-C_{ec}+B_a$
	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_3$	$R_c-C_f+C_f{Q}_n-Q_n{R}_c$
	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_1$	$C_{eg} {-R}_{a}g+R_{e}g+u{{gQ}_{n}C}_g+ug{Q_{n}C}_h$
$E_5\left(1,1,0\right)$	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_2$	$B_a+C_a+C_{ec}+R_n-C_n-{Q_{n}R}_g-g{B}_g+u{C}_n+g^2{Q_{n}C}_g-ug{Q}_n{C}_g$
	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_3$	$Q{R}_h-Q_n\Delta R_h-Q_n{R}_h+Q\Delta R_h-gQ{C}_h+{gQ}_n{C}_h+ugQ{C}_h-u{gQ}_n{C}_h$
	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_1$	$u{C}_n$
$E_6\left(1,0,1\right)$	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_2$	$B_a-C_a-C_{ec}-R_n+C_n+{Q_{n}R}_g+g{B}_g-u{C}_n-g^2{QC}_g+ugQ{C}_g$
	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_3$	$0$
	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_1$	$U_e+R_{a}g-R_{e}g-ug{QC}_g-ug{QC}_h-C_{eg}$
$E_7\left(0,1,1\right)$	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_2$	$g^2{QC}_g-g{B}_g-B_a+C_a+C_{ec}-{QR}_g+Q_n{R}_n-Q_n{C}_n$
	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_3$	$-Q{R}_h+gQ{C}_h+Q_n{R}_h-g{Q}_n{C}_h$
	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_1$	$-U_e-R_{a}g+R_{e}g+ug{QC}_g+u{gQC}_h+C_{eg}$
$E_8\left(1,1,1\right)$	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_2$	$-U_e-\Delta B_a{-B}_a+C_a+C_{ec}+R_n-C_n-{QR}_g-g{B}_g+u{C}_n+{g^{2}QC}_g-ugQ{C}_g$
	${\mathsf{\lambda }}_3$	$-Q{R}_h+Q_n\Delta R_h+Q_n{R}_h-Q\Delta R_h+gQ{C}_h-{gQ}_n{C}_h-ugQ{C}_h+u{gQ}_n{C}_h$

.

The local equilibrium points $E_2\left(1,0,0\right)$, $E_4\left(0,0,1\right)$, $E_6\left(1,0,1\right)$ have positive eigenvalues, and they are all unstable points. The other equilibrium points: $E_1\left(0,0,0\right)$, $E_3\left(0,1,0\right)$, $E_5\left(1,1,0\right)$, $E_7\left(0,1,1\right)$, $E_8\left(1,1,1\right)$ are all possible stable points that require conditions to be met, and the stability of these possible stable points is analyzed below:

Scenario 1.

When ${Q_{n}R}_g+g{B}_g-{g^2{Q}_{n}C}_g-C_a-C_{ec}-B_a<R_n-C_n$, the government will not subsidize the production of the agricultural cooperative, and the cost of the agricultural cooperative to produce green products is too high and the production of traditional agricultural products will surely produce a stable income. At this time, the eigenvalues of $E_1$ are all negative, and the system gradually evolves towards the equilibrium point $E_1\left(0,0,0\right)$, where the government chooses not to subsidize the agricultural cooperatives, the agricultural cooperatives choose to produce traditional agricultural products, and the consumer chooses to prefer traditional agricultural products.

Scenario 2.

When $\left\{\begin{array}{c}{R}_{a}g-R_{e}g-C_{eg}<ug{Q}_n{C}_g+ug{Q}_n{C}_h\\ R_n-C_n<Q_n{R}_g+g{B}_g-g^2{Q}_n{C}_g-C_a-C_{ec}-B_a\\ Q{R}_h-Q_n{R}_h<gQ{C}_h-{gQ}_n{C}_h\end{array}\right.$, the environmental benefits of government subsidies to agricultural cooperatives and consumers for production and consumption do not cover the cost of the subsidies to the government. Even when yields are low and agricultural cooperatives do not receive subsidies, the production of green agricultural products continues to generate more revenue than the production of traditional agricultural products. The safety and health benefits of consumer preference for green agricultural products are less than the high costs that consumers need to point out for purchasing green agricultural products, subject to the yield of green agricultural products. At this point, the eigenvalues of$E_3$are all negative, and the system gradually evolves towards the equilibrium point$E_3\left(0,1,0\right)$, where the government chooses not to subsidize the agricultural cooperative, the agricultural cooperative chooses to produce green agricultural products, and the consumer chooses to prefer traditional agricultural products.

Scenario 3.

When $\left\{\begin{array}{c}ug{Q}_n{C}_g+ug{Q}_n{C}_h<R_{a}g-R_{e}g-C_{eg}\\ R_n-C_n<-B_a-C_a-C_{ec}+Q_n{R}_g+g{B}_g-u{C}_n-g^2{Q}_n{C}_g+ug{Q}_n{C}_g\\ Q{R}_h+Q\Delta R_h+ugQ{C}_h-gQ{C}_h<Q_n{R}_h+Q_n\Delta R_h+u{gQ}_n{C}_h-{gQ}_n{C}_h\end{array}\right.$, the environmental benefits of government subsidies to agricultural cooperatives and consumers for green production and consumption can offset the cost of government subsidies. Agricultural cooperatives that receive government subsidies for the production of green agricultural products receive greater returns than the stable returns received from the production of traditional agricultural products. Consumers can only buy green agricultural products, which are expensive and have a lower health value, and they can help save money by buying fewer of them. At this point, the eigenvalues of$E_5$are all negative, and the system gradually evolves towards the equilibrium point$E_5\left(1,1,0\right)$, where the governments choose to subsidize agricultural cooperatives, agricultural cooperatives choose to produce green agricultural products, and consumers choose to prefer traditional agricultural products.

Scenario 4.

When $\left\{\begin{array}{c}{U}_e+R_{a}g-R_{e}g-C_{eg}<ugQ{C}_g+ug{QC}_h\\ Q_n{R}_n-Q_n{C}_n<{g{B}_g+{QR}_g+B_a-g}^2{QC}_g-C_a-C_{ec}\\ gQ{C}_h-g{Q}_n{C}_h<{Q{R}_h-Q}_n{R}_h\end{array}\right.$, the environmental benefits and excess returns from government subsidies to agricultural cooperatives and consumers for green production and consumption do not cover the cost of government subsidies. Agricultural cooperatives are less profitable in producing traditional agricultural products at low yields than they are in producing green agricultural products at high yields. The high cost that consumers need to pay to buy green agricultural products when they are affected by the yield of green agricultural products is less than the safety and health benefits of preferring green agricultural products. At this point, the eigenvalues of$E_7$are all negative, and the system gradually evolves towards the equilibrium point$E_7\left(0,1,1\right)$, where the government chooses not to subsidize the agricultural cooperatives, the agricultural cooperatives choose to produce green agricultural products, and the consumers choose to prefer green agricultural products.

Scenario 5.

When $\left\{\begin{array}{c}ug{QC}_g+u{gQC}_h<U_e+R_{a}g-R_{e}g-C_{eg}\\ R_n-C_n<U_e+\Delta B_a{+B}_a-C_a-C_{ec}+{QR}_g+g{B}_g-u{C}_n-{g^{2}QC}_g+ugQ{C}_g\\ -Q{R}_h-Q\Delta R_h+gQ{C}_h-ugQ{C}_h<{gQ}_n{C}_h-Q_n{R}_h-u{gQ}_n{C}_h-Q_n\Delta R_h\end{array}\right.$, government subsidies to agricultural cooperatives and consumers for green production and consumption provide environmental benefits and excess returns that offset the cost of government subsidies. Agricultural cooperatives receive more benefits from producing green agricultural products than from producing traditional agricultural products when they receive government subsidies. Consumers can only buy green agricultural products, when the price of green agricultural products is acceptable to consumers and the health value and safety of green agricultural products are higher, consumers buy more green agricultural products to help health and safety and contribute to the ecological environment. At this point, the eigenvalues of$E_8$are all negative, and the system gradually evolves towards the equilibrium point$E_8\left(1,1,1\right)$, where the government chooses to subsidize the agricultural cooperative, the agricultural cooperative chooses to produce green agricultural products, and the consumer chooses to prefer green agricultural products.

5. Numerical Simulation Analysis

To qualitatively investigate the specific impact of parameter changes on the experimental results, we used MATLAB R2021a software to numerically simulate a three-way evolutionary game model of green production in agricultural cooperatives receiving government subsidies. The values of consumer preferences for the parameters in the model were taken from the study of Kamboj K [51], and the values of the other parameters were taken from the studies of Du [52] and Zou [53] and set in the context of the equilibrium points above.

5.1. Effect of the Initial State of the System on the Evolutionary Game Outcome

To facilitate the substitution of parameter values into the 3D replica dynamic system, the tripartite subjects’ initial willingness function is established as follows: $\left(x,y,z\right)=0:0.2:1$. The experimental results of the numerical simulation are shown in Figure 5a–f. The different colored lines in the figure represent the strategy choices of the subjects participating in the experiment in different initial states. Figure 5a–e corresponds to cases 1–5 of the equilibrium point analysis. The correlation between the rate at which the system reaches an asymptotically stable state and the willingness of the participating tripartite subjects to select their initial strategies is positive. However, this correlation does not have an impact on the ultimate outcome of the system’s stabilization, as illustrated in Figure 5a–e.

In the scenario depicted in Figure 5e, the government provides subsidies to agricultural cooperatives and consumers, agricultural cooperatives manufacture green agricultural products, and consumers exhibit a preference for such products; nevertheless, the parameters are exceedingly stringent, the expectation that all agricultural cooperatives produce green agricultural products is an overly idealistic situation, and agricultural cooperatives tend to prefer traditional agricultural products that will bring a stable income. Based on the above conditions, it is inferred that government subsidies can positively promote the production of green agricultural products by agricultural cooperatives and have a significant impact on the profitability of agricultural cooperatives.

Figure 5a shows the least desirable state, with no government subsidies, traditional production by agricultural cooperatives, and consumer preference for traditional agricultural products. Here, agricultural cooperatives and consumer returns are still relatively substantial, albeit undesirable for the purposes of this paper, but even agricultural cooperatives with a willingness to produce green products should not need to be discouraged or penalized for producing traditional agricultural products.

Figure 5f is more relevant to most realities, where the production of traditional agricultural products is a viable option for agricultural cooperatives to obtain a stable income. Moreover, when the government provides subsidies, agricultural cooperatives can still obtain high returns from producing green agricultural products with a certain degree of risk, and agricultural cooperatives will waver between different strategies. Currently, initial willingness has a certain influence on the choice of strategy of agricultural cooperatives. The values of the parameters required for Figure 5a–f are shown in

Table 4. Setting of parameter values in different scenarios.

Scenario	${\mathit{R}}_{\mathit{a}}$	${\mathit{R}}_{\mathit{e}}$	$\mathit{g}$	$\mathit{u}$	${\mathit{Q}}_{\mathit{n}}$	$\mathit{Q}$	${\mathit{C}}_{\mathit{g}}$	${\mathit{C}}_{\mathit{n}}$	${\mathit{C}}_{\mathit{e}\mathit{g}}$	${\mathit{R}}_{\mathit{h}}$	$\mathbf{\Delta }{\mathit{R}}_{\mathit{h}}$
$a$	15	5	1.2	0.5	0.8	1.3	8	3	3	12	2
$b$	10	5	1.2	0.3	0.8	1.3	8	3	3	12	2
$c$	15	5	1.2	0.3	0.8	1.3	8	3	3	11	2
$d$	15	5	1.2	0.3	0.8	1.3	8	3	3	20	2
$e$	15	5	1.2	0.3	0.8	1.3	8	3	3	12	2
$f$	15	5	1.2	0.3	0.8	1.3	8	3	3	12	2
Scenario	${\mathit{R}}_{\mathit{n}}$	${\mathit{C}}_{\mathit{f}}$	${\mathit{R}}_{\mathit{c}}$	${\mathit{C}}_{\mathit{h}}$	${\mathit{R}}_{\mathit{g}}$	${\mathit{B}}_{\mathit{g}}$	${\mathit{B}}_{\mathit{a}}$	$\mathbf{\Delta }{\mathit{B}}_{\mathit{a}}$	${\mathit{C}}_{\mathit{a}}$	${\mathit{C}}_{\mathit{e}\mathit{c}}$	${\mathit{U}}_{\mathit{e}}$
$a$	7	8	10	12	12	6	1	2	5	3	1
$b$	5	8	10	12	17	6	1	2	5	3	1
$c$	5	8	10	15	14	8	1	2	5	3	1
$d$	5	8	10	15	14	8	1	2	5	3	1
$e$	5	8	10	12	17	6	1	2	5	3	1
$f$	5	8	10	12	12	6	1	2	5	3	1

.

5.2. Sensitivity Analysis

The objective of this paper is to increase the income of agricultural cooperatives by means of government subsidies to promote the production of green agricultural products by agricultural cooperatives with a certain green production orientation to meet market demand. At the same time, it reduces consumer purchasing costs, protects the ecosystem, and promotes the sustainable development of the green agricultural products industry. To achieve the above objectives, the system must eventually stabilize at the asymptotic point $E_8\left(1,1,1\right)$. To enhance the authenticity of the parameters, we modified the parameters in conjunction with Figure 5f. We arbitrarily set the initial willingness of the three parties to a constant 0.5 and conducted comparative experiments to determine the sensitivity of the various influences on the evolution towards the stabilization strategy.

5.2.1. Impact of Green Produce Yield Coefficient

The yield coefficients of green agricultural products are categorized into low, medium, and high levels, i.e., $Q=\{1,1.3,1.6\}$. To avoid the interference of the remaining influences on the experimental results, the values of the remaining parameters were taken as constant values. The evolution of stakeholder strategy selection for green production in agricultural cooperatives under government subsidy is shown in Figure 6 below.

According to Figure 6, as the production of green agricultural products by agricultural cooperatives increases to a threshold value, the rate at which the government chooses to subsidize slows down, and the rate at which agricultural cooperatives choose to produce green agricultural products increases in relation to consumer preference for green agricultural products. This implies that increasing the production of green agricultural products will increase the cost of government subsidies but the excess environmental benefits to the government will hardly compensate for the financial burden on government subsidies. In addition, an appropriate increase in the production of green agricultural products can improve the green production income of agricultural cooperatives, increase their motivation to produce green products, and improve the health and safety benefits for consumers.

As $Q$ increases from the threshold, the rate at which the government chooses not to subsidize, the rate at which agricultural cooperatives produce traditional agricultural products, and the rate at which consumers prefer traditional agricultural products increase significantly. This is due to the strong correlation between the output of green agricultural products, the quantity of government subsidies, and the cost of producing such products by agricultural cooperatives. Once the output surpasses a certain threshold, agricultural cooperatives’ willingness to produce green products will rapidly decrease. Increasing the amount of government subsidies will not effectively promote their green agricultural product production. In addition, green produce is always the choice of a small number of consumers with financial means. It is difficult for agricultural cooperatives to sell all of their green produce when it exceeds the total demand of a small number of markets, which can have a significant impact on the profitability of agricultural cooperatives.

Therefore, an increase in the output of green agricultural products cannot linearly increase the income of the three parties. Agricultural cooperatives should set a reasonable output of green agricultural products based on their total cost of producing green agricultural products and the demand of the market. At the same time, to ensure that both parties can reap the benefits, agricultural cooperatives should also take into account the economic capacity of the government when determining yields.

5.2.2. Impact of Government Subsidy Coefficients

The government subsidy coefficients are categorized into low, medium, and high levels, i.e., $u=\{0.1,0.3,0.5\}$. To avoid the interference of the remaining influences on the experimental results, the values of the remaining parameters were taken as constant values. The evolution of stakeholder strategy selection for green production in agricultural cooperatives under government subsidy is shown in Figure 7 below.

According to Figure 7, when $u$ is lower, the government has a higher incentive to subsidize agricultural cooperatives, but the amount of subsidy is lower. Consumers are less motivated to buy green agricultural products when the price of green agricultural products is higher. This leads to lower returns for agricultural cooperatives until agricultural cooperatives choose the strategy of producing traditional agricultural products. At this point, the government’s strategy shifted to not subsidizing agricultural cooperatives producing traditional agricultural products, as they could not reap the environmental benefits of subsidizing them.

When $u$ gradually rises to reach the threshold, the government can just afford to pay the subsidy and obtain some environmental benefits, the agricultural cooperatives can obtain satisfactory subsidies, and consumers can buy green agricultural products at lower prices.

As $u$ gradually rises from the threshold, the government’s environmental benefits are far from compensating for the subsidies paid and take the lead in choosing the no-subsidy strategy. While the other two parties have lower benefits without government subsidies. The system finally evolves towards ESS1.

In the case of government subsidies to agricultural cooperatives producing green agricultural products, u is mainly influenced by the complexity of the organizational structure of the agricultural cooperatives and the technological innovation inputs of the agricultural cooperatives. The scaling up of agricultural cooperative organizations and the green transformation to green technological innovation is a gradual process. Therefore, the government should determine the amount of subsidy by considering a variety of factors to ensure the fairness and effectiveness of the subsidy policy. This overlaps somewhat with Heyl K’s findings [54].

5.2.3. Impact of Greenness of Green Produce

The greenness of green produce is categorized into low, medium, and high levels, i.e., $g=\{0.8,1.2,1.6\}$. To avoid the interference of the remaining influences on the experimental results, the values of the remaining parameters were taken as constant values. The evolution of stakeholder strategy selection for green production in agricultural cooperatives under government subsidy is shown in Figure 8 below.

According to Figure 8, when the green agricultural products produced by agricultural cooperatives are lower in greenness, the amount of government subsidy decreases in relation to the production costs of agricultural cooperatives. At the same time, agricultural cooperatives and the government receive lower sustainable benefits and environmental benefits. However, high brand recognition benefits and lower production costs still motivate agricultural cooperatives to produce green agricultural products. For the government, lower subsidies do not compensate for lower environmental benefits. Lower levels of greenness result in lower price subsidies for consumers and higher prices for green agricultural products, which are difficult for consumers to afford.

As $g$ rises to the threshold, the government can reap satisfactory environmental benefits, the high production costs of agricultural cooperatives can be compensated by government subsidies, and consumers are able to purchase green agricultural products at low prices.

As $g$ gradually increases from the threshold, the production costs of agricultural cooperatives skyrocket and the rate at which agricultural cooperatives choose to produce traditional agricultural products rapidly increases. At this point, government subsidies cannot compensate for the high production costs, which motivates government to choose a non-subsidy strategy, and consumers to choose a strategy of preferring traditional agricultural products.

Increasing the greenness of agricultural products satisfies consumers’ quest for safety, nutrition, and responsibility, thus becoming a preferred choice. When determining the greenness of the green agricultural products produced by agricultural cooperatives, it is important to focus on the way in which green production is carried out, whether the cost of green certification is expensive, the safety of the agricultural products, and consumer feedback. Therefore, it is crucial for agricultural cooperatives to find a balance between the greenness of their produce and consumer preferences. There are some differences between the above results and the findings of Teng Y [55]. This is mainly due to the increasing marginal cost of increasing the greenness of green produce. In other words, as the degree of greenness increases, producers may face higher and higher economic thresholds. These thresholds may include high-cost changes in production methods versus the adoption of innovative new technologies, etc., all of which can lead to exponential increases in overall costs.

5.2.4. Impact of Additional Brand Recognition Benefits

Additional brand recognition benefits are categorized into low, medium, and high levels, i.e., ${\Delta B}_a=\{1,2,3\}$. To avoid the interference of the remaining influences on the experimental results, the values of the remaining parameters were taken as constant values. The evolution of stakeholder strategy selection for green production in agricultural cooperatives under government subsidy is shown in Figure 9 below.

According to Figure 9, when ${\Delta B}_a$ is low, agricultural cooperatives prefer to produce traditional agricultural products for lower and stable returns than to take the risk of producing green agricultural products. This motivates the government to choose the non-subsidized strategy, and the consumers to choose the strategy of preferring traditional agricultural products.

When ${\Delta B}_a$ gradually increases, agricultural cooperatives choose to produce green agricultural products at a faster rate. Agricultural cooperatives are able to communicate their brands more clearly to consumers in the process of selling green agricultural products. Consumers have more opportunities to access and gradually try green agricultural products to gain more health and safety benefits.

Implementing a branding strategy is critical to enhancing the market competitiveness of green agricultural products, as brands communicate the quality, credibility, and environmental commitment of a product, build consumer trust, and create product differentiation. Through an effective branding strategy, green agricultural products can better communicate their unique value to target consumers, enhance market recognition, and increase consumer loyalty, thereby standing out in a competitive market.

Therefore, brand recognition is a significant incentive for agricultural cooperatives. With a large number of consumers of green agricultural products, the strategy of leveraging government promotion to enhance the additional brand recognition available to agricultural cooperatives should be seen as a primary consideration. Geographical indications can be used as a basis for improving brand recognition through the creation of a highly recognizable corporate brand image that focuses on interaction and communication between companies and consumers, as well as between consumers and consumers. This has some similarities with the findings of Zhang G [56]. Geographical indications can improve the sense of belonging in the heart of consumers, thus increasing their cognitive interest in green agricultural products.

6. Discussion and Recommendations

6.1. Discussion

In this study, we take the government, agricultural cooperatives, and consumers as the stakeholders in green production by agricultural cooperatives under government subsidies and construct an evolutionary game model of the green production of agricultural cooperatives under government subsidies. We focus on the impacts of the green agricultural output, government subsidy coefficient, greenness of agricultural products, and additional brand recognition on the model, and simulate the behavioral choices of the government, agricultural cooperatives, and consumers as stakeholders under different scenarios. The aim is to increase the willingness of agricultural cooperatives to produce green products to meet market demand, increase the brand recognition of agricultural cooperatives, and enable consumers to purchase green agricultural products at lower prices. This also has some relevance to the protection of the ecological environment. Based on the analysis, the following conclusions can be drawn:

• Agricultural cooperatives are greatly motivated to produce green agricultural products when they receive subsidies that alleviate the economic pressure of high production costs. When agricultural cooperatives make up for the shortage of green agricultural products and consumers can purchase qualified green agricultural products, consumers’ willingness to buy will also increase. At this point, the initial willingness of the three parties’ strategic choices in the model does not change the final evolutionary outcome, but the higher the initial willingness, the faster the system evolves to a stable state. In reality, however, there is no need for the government to penalize agricultural cooperatives that produce traditional agricultural products, but only those that produce traditional agricultural products and cause excessive damage to the environment, such as pollution of water sources, excessive logging, serious deterioration of soil quality, and so on. Agricultural cooperatives tend to produce traditional agricultural products with a relatively stable income, so it is difficult to satisfy the above evolutionary conditions for all agricultural cooperatives to produce green agricultural products by means of government subsidies. $E_8\left(1,1,1\right)$ in the equilibrium point can only be analysed as a desirable evolutionary state to obtain the means to enhance the willingness of agricultural cooperatives to produce green products.
• The economic pressure of increasing the production of green agricultural products significantly affects the green production decisions of agricultural cooperatives. When yields of green produce are low, agricultural cooperatives are more inclined to choose stable returns between producing traditional produce with more stable yields for stable returns and green produce with unstable yields and markets for risky returns. When the output of green agricultural products can basically meet consumer demand, their green production costs can often not be borne by agricultural cooperatives alone, and government subsidies can as well alleviate the economic pressure on agricultural cooperatives. When the production of green agricultural goods is sufficient to satisfy consumer demand, agricultural cooperatives are often not able to bear the entire cost of their green production. In such cases, government subsidies can significantly alleviate the financial pressure on agricultural cooperatives. When green produce is produced in excess of consumer demand, it can cause serious waste based on the high production costs of green produce. Therefore, it is necessary for agricultural cooperatives to cooperate with the government in order to rationally formulate production plans by investigating the local market demand for green agricultural products and deciding on the amount of government subsidies in accordance with the market demand and the production capacity of agricultural cooperatives in conjunction with the government. In addition to increasing the production of agricultural products, agricultural cooperatives should also enrich the variety of green agricultural products to give consumers more choices.
• Government subsidies are effective in influencing the final decisions of agricultural cooperatives and consumers. In general, the higher the amount of government subsidy, the higher the willingness of agricultural cooperatives to produce green agricultural products, and the higher the willingness of consumers to buy green agricultural products. However, higher subsidies would greatly increase the financial burden on the government, which would only be willing to increase the amount of subsidies if the environmental benefits of producing green agricultural products are abundantly clear. Therefore, the government should strictly monitor the optimization of the sustainable production environment by agricultural cooperatives in the process of green production, strictly control the quality and safety of green agricultural products, ensure the food safety of consumers, safeguard consumers’ rights and interests, and decide on the amount of government subsidies accordingly.
• Increasing the greenness of green produce has a greater impact on the cost of green production than increasing the yield of green produce and is a major impediment to the production of high-quality green produce by agricultural cooperatives. When agricultural cooperatives decide to produce fewer green agricultural products, they face relatively little economic pressure to do so on their own without relying on government support. However, this reduction in green produce has implications for consumer food security. If the price premium is not high, consumers still have the ability and willingness to buy green agricultural products. Undoubtedly, governments prefer agricultural cooperatives to produce green agricultural products with a high degree of greenness. However, the implementation of substantial production subsidies to compensate for the exorbitant production costs of green agricultural products produced by agricultural cooperatives can significantly escalate the financial burden on governments. Even if the government is willing to cut purchase subsidies to provide high production subsidies, the willingness of the few consumers who can afford to buy green agricultural products will be further reduced, which will have a greater impact on market demand. Therefore, the government should set up a consumer feedback mechanism through complaint channels to investigate the satisfaction of consumers who buy green agricultural products with regard to their greenness. It should also establish a complete set of production indicators for agricultural cooperatives to ensure that they do not engage in free-riding behavior.
• The additional brand recognition generated by government subsidies has a significant effect on the green production incentives of agricultural cooperatives. In other words, when the number of consumers with a higher preference for green agricultural products increases during the green production process of agricultural cooperatives under government subsidies, the incentive for agricultural cooperatives to carry out green production in order to obtain higher brand recognition will also increase accordingly. The more brand recognition an agricultural cooperative can achieve, the more significant the incentive effect on its willingness to cater for consumer preferences. Therefore, enhancing the brand recognition available to agricultural cooperatives should be prioritized if the number of consumers of green agricultural products is high. Enhancing brand recognition can be achieved by setting up a highly recognizable corporate brand image and focusing on interaction and communication between the company and consumers as well as among consumers.

6.2. Recommendations

To enhance the willingness of agricultural cooperatives to produce green products to meet market demand, to reduce consumer purchase prices, and to increase agricultural cooperatives’ brand recognition, and for the government to gain environmental benefits, based on the results of the above study, the following recommendations are made from the perspective of the stakeholders in green production by agricultural cooperatives under government subsidy:

• When governments subsidize agricultural cooperatives, they need to ensure that the subsidy policy effectively incentivizes agricultural cooperatives to produce green agricultural products in order to ensure that the production of green agricultural products meets consumer demand. This needs to be achieved by setting clear production quality standards and production volume targets, as well as providing adequate and reasonable financial support and resources. The fairness of government subsidy policies is crucial. Governments need to ensure that all agricultural cooperatives that produce green agricultural products of acceptable quality have equal access to subsidies to avoid situations where agricultural cooperatives compete unfairly or reduce the greenness of the agricultural products they produce. Governments also need to consider the long-term impact of subsidy policies to avoid over-reliance on subsidies by agricultural cooperatives. The government should pay attention to opportunities for brand promotion for agricultural cooperatives and actively cooperate with agricultural cooperatives that produce green agricultural products to gain a green reputation by organizing exhibitions and promotional activities for green agricultural products, helping agricultural cooperatives to plan and maintain their corporate brand image, and promoting green agricultural products to consumers. In addition, governments need to flexibly adjust and optimize their subsidy policies on the basis of the green production costs of agricultural cooperatives, in accordance with the scale of agricultural production and changes in local market demand. Transparency of the government’s purchase price subsidy to consumers is crucial. The government needs to disclose detailed information on the subsidy policy, including the criteria for the subsidy, the application process, the approval process, etc., in order to increase consumers’ trust. The government should require retailers to clearly demonstrate to consumers the amount of government subsidy on prices at the point of purchase. Considering the sustainability of subsidies, the government needs to carefully weigh the relationship between budgetary expenditure and people’s welfare. This is because over-reliance on fiscal subsidies may lead to fiscal deficit problems. Therefore, the government may need to regulate the green agricultural products’ consumption market through diversified means such as issuing consumption vouchers.
• Agricultural cooperatives and other agricultural enterprises should be fully aware of the standards and requirements for the certification of green agricultural products and establish a green agricultural product certification system or enter into cooperation with other green certification organizations. In the production of green agricultural products, environmentally friendly agricultural production methods should be adhered to, ensuring that there are no pesticide residues and no genetically modified ingredients. At the same time, a balance should be found between sales revenues and the greenness of the agricultural products produced, a reasonable production program should be developed, and false publicity should be rejected. Agricultural cooperatives need to establish effective supply chain management systems to ensure the traceability and transparency of their products, including the recording of production data, the keeping of records of farming activities, and the establishment of close partnerships with processors and e-commerce platforms. Agricultural cooperatives can also establish partnerships with catering and other related enterprises to jointly promote the sustainable development of green agricultural supply chains. Through these effective means of publicity, agricultural cooperatives can increase brand recognition and attract more consumers to choose green agricultural products.

6.3. Research Shortcomings and Future Prospects

In reality, the issues that need to be faced in order for governments to subsidize green production in agricultural cooperatives are quite complex. This paper does not provide an in-depth discussion of the uncertainties in the green production process of agricultural cooperatives. For example, incomplete marketing of agricultural products produced by agricultural cooperatives may lead to a decline in the greenness or even spoilage of the produce, with a corresponding risk of loss. In addition, the greenness of agricultural products is related to government environmental revenues to some extent and to consumer health benefits to a lesser extent. This proportionality is difficult to determine. In addition, there are speculative costs for agricultural cooperatives and processors in the green certification of agricultural products. In future research, it is possible to consider the impact of more complex government subsidy strategies on the production strategies of agricultural cooperatives and to try to construct a three-party stochastic evolutionary game that includes a stochastic perturbation term. Interviews with government subsidy strategy makers were effective in validating the applicability of the results.