Games, Volume 9, Issue 1

We conduct a laboratory experiment where groups of 4 subjects constrained to obtain at most one good each, sequentially bid for three goods in first and second price auctions. Subjects learn at the beginning of each auction their valuation for the go...

Many companies try to access personal information to discriminate among consumers. We analyse how privacy regulations affect the acquisition and disclosure of information in a simple game of persuasion. Theory predicts that no data will be acquired w...

This study examines the effects of initial endowment size on individual behavior in a binary choice game with no dominant strategy. Subjects make decisions in two, theoretically identical sequences, differing in initial endowment levels only. Each de...

Imitation of the successful choices of others is a simple and superficially attractive learning rule. It has been shown to be an important driving force for the strategic behavior of (young) adults. In this study we examine whether imitation is preva...

This paper studies the optimal contract offered by a risk-neutral principal to a risk-averse agent when the agent’s hidden ability and action both improve the probability of the project being successful. We show that if the agent is sufficiently prud...

Focusing on sellers’ pricing decisions and the ensuing seller-buyer interactions, we report an experiment on dynamic pricing with scarcity in the form of capacity constraints. Rational expectations equilibrium solutions are constructed and then teste...

In this paper, we present an application of the dynamic tracking games framework to a monetary union. We use a small stylized nonlinear three-country macroeconomic model of a monetary union to analyze the interactions between fiscal (governments) and...

In this paper, we consider a novel game theory model for the competitive influence maximization problem. We model this problem as a simultaneous non-cooperative game with complete information and rational players, where there are at least two players...

In this work, a multi-person mean-field-type game is formulated and solved that is described by a linear jump-diffusion system of mean-field type and a quadratic cost functional involving the second moments, the square of the expected value of the st...

One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk aversion. In this paper, we show that this relationship may be absent or reversed when the technology is endogenous and projects with...

We had participants play two sets of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (RPD) games, one with a large continuation probability and the other with a small continuation probability, as well as Dictator Games (DGs) before and after the RPDs. We find that, rega...

In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their strategy choices and the consequent outcomes of the games. Limited evidence exists regarding incentive magnitude effects in experimental...

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Mastermind is a two players zero sum game of imperfect information. Starting with Erdős and Rényi (1963), its combinatorics have been studied to date by several authors, e.g., Knuth (1977), Chvátal (1983), Goodrich (2009). The first player, called “c...

One problem in cooperative game theory is to model situations when two players refuse to cooperate (or the problem of quarreling members in coalitions). One example of such exclusions is the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. Other situat...