Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Participants’ Behaviors in Technological Innovation of Mega Construction Projects under Risk Orientation
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Technological Innovation of MCPs
2.2. Evolutionary Game Theory
2.3. Cooperative Behavior
2.4. Technological Innovation Risk
2.5. Summary
3. Model Building
- Analyze literature to find out the participants in the technological innovation of MCPs and their relationship.
- Make model assumptions and establish the payment matrix, then get the replicated dynamic equations, and we can analyze the asymptotic stabilities and ESS through the Jacobi matrix.
- Assign parameters based on ESS, then carry out simulations by matlab2020a.
3.1. Moder Assumption
3.2. Evolutionary Game Payment Matrix
4. Model Analysis
4.1. Replicated Dynamic Equation
4.2. Asymptotic Stability
4.2.1. Asymptotic Stability Analysis for the Users
4.2.2. Asymptotic Stability Analysis for the CPEs
4.2.3. Asymptotic Stability Analysis for the URIs
4.3. Equilibrium Point
4.4. Evolutionary Stable Strategy
5. Simulation Analysis
5.1. Parameter Setting
5.2. Numerical Simulation
5.2.1. Government Support,
5.2.2. Reward and Penalty,
5.2.3. Perceived Loss of Technological Innovation Risk,
5.2.4. Risk-Taking Ratio,
5.2.5. Technological Innovation Investment,
5.2.6. Cost Compression Coefficient,
6. Discussion
7. Conclusions and Applications
- The Users can perceive the technology innovation risk loss of MCPs in advance, quantify the technology innovation risks caused by the simple cooperative behavior, and reasonably share the technological innovation risks of MCPs. The simple cooperation of the participants will cause the risk of the whole technological innovation of MCPs, and driven by common interests, the participants will also form a mutual monitoring mechanism. Moreover, if the technological innovation risk loss of each participant can be perceived in advance, it can improve the probability of participants choosing collaborative cooperation at the initial time.
- The Users can regulate the behavior of participants by establishing collaborative cooperation evaluation indexes. In MCPs, the Users can give reasonable rewards to cooperative participants and punish simple cooperative participants to improve the degree of cooperation, and an effective cooperation mechanism is established so that all participants can actively communicate with each other, realize rapid information transmission and share, avoid the phenomenon of information silos, and establish a collaborative network of technological innovation in MCPs.
- In the MCPs, a lot of technical difficulties will emerge. The government needs to encourage participants to carry out technological innovation, reward participants who cooperate collaboratively in technological innovation, and ensure that the technological innovation results of MCPs can be transformed and applied to the actual project. The technological innovation of MCPs is the embodiment of the national level of scientific and technological development, and in China, it is a carrier to achieve the 14th Five-Year Plan and the long-range objectives through the year 2035. Promoting the development of the construction industry requires the joint efforts of all participants.
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Participant | Strategies | |
---|---|---|
Collaborative Cooperation | Simple Cooperation | |
Users | 1. Active feedback demand and innovative information. 2. Provide sufficient financial and institutional support. | 1. The feedback on technological innovation demand is not enough. 2. The supervision is not enough. |
CPEs | 1. Work closely with other participants to share information and knowledge. 2. Promote the success of technological innovation while ensuring the best overall benefits of technological innovation. | 1. The feedback on the actual situation of innovative technology in the application is not timely. 2. Technological innovation activities that have no benefits for itself is out of sight [36]. |
URIs | 1. Make full use of research resources to complete the research tasks stipulated in the contract on time and with quality. | 1. The completion of the research tasks is perfunctory. 2. The information feedback is not timely. 3. Technological innovation needs cannot be met [37]. |
Symbol | Description | Symbol | Description |
---|---|---|---|
Benefit obtained by the Users | Cost invested by the Users | ||
Benefit obtained by the CPEs | Cost invested by the CPEs | ||
Benefit obtained by the URIs | Cost invested by the URIs | ||
Perceived loss of technological innovation risk | Proportions of total risk borne by the Users | ||
Proportions of total risk borne by the CPEs | Proportions of total risk borne by the URIs | ||
Discount coefficient of the risk perception loss for one participant choosing the collaborative cooperation strategy | Discount coefficient of the risk perception loss for two participants choosing the collaborative cooperation strategy | ||
Cost compression coefficient | Reward from the government | ||
Reward from the Users | Penalty from the Users |
The URIs | |||
---|---|---|---|
Collaborative Cooperation | |||
The Users collaborative cooperation x | The CPEs collaborative cooperation y | ||
The CPEs simple cooperation | |||
The Users simple cooperation | The CPEs collaborative cooperation | ||
The CPEs simple cooperation | |||
Eigenvalue Point | |||
---|---|---|---|
12 | 5 | 5 | 0.7 | 15 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
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Wang, Q.; Pan, L. Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Participants’ Behaviors in Technological Innovation of Mega Construction Projects under Risk Orientation. Buildings 2023, 13, 287. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings13020287
Wang Q, Pan L. Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Participants’ Behaviors in Technological Innovation of Mega Construction Projects under Risk Orientation. Buildings. 2023; 13(2):287. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings13020287
Chicago/Turabian StyleWang, Qinge, and Liying Pan. 2023. "Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Participants’ Behaviors in Technological Innovation of Mega Construction Projects under Risk Orientation" Buildings 13, no. 2: 287. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings13020287