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Article

“And They Shall Be Two in One Flesh”: A Scotistic Exploration of Marriage, Intersubjectivity, and Interpersonality

by
Liran Shia Gordon
The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Jerusalem 9214116, Israel
Religions 2024, 15(8), 983; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15080983
Submission received: 30 June 2024 / Revised: 30 July 2024 / Accepted: 7 August 2024 / Published: 13 August 2024
(This article belongs to the Section Religions and Humanities/Philosophies)

Abstract

:
Marriage is an institution known for both its virtues and challenges. This study examines marriage not merely as a sociological or theological construct but as a lens to explore the profound philosophical problems of intersubjectivity and interpersonality. By examining both the relational and sacramental dimensions of marriage, we gain insights into how two distinct individuals can form a deep, enduring bond that transcends individual isolation, thus offering a model for understanding both intersubjectivity and interpersonality. The unique perspective offered by Christian theology, which regards marriage as a sacrament, entails a fundamental and irreversible transformation in the individuals involved. This provides a unique venue to address intersubjectivity and interpersonality using unconventional sources and analysis. The objective is not to advocate for Catholic doctrine or any specific religious perspective but to deploy the sacramental understanding of matrimony and its conceptual framework to address these intertwined philosophical issues.

Marriage is an institution known for both its virtues and challenges. This study examines marriage not merely as a sociological or theological construct but as a lens to explore the profound philosophical problems of intersubjectivity and interpersonality. By examining both the relational and sacramental dimensions of marriage, we gain insights into how two distinct individuals can form a deep, enduring bond that transcends individual isolation, thus offering a model for understanding both intersubjectivity and interpersonality. The unique perspective offered by Catholic Christian theology, which regards marriage as a sacrament, entails a fundamental and irreversible transformation in the individuals involved, facilitating a joint ontological transformation between two persons and providing a unique venue to address intersubjectivity and interpersonality using unconventional sources and analysis. The objective is not to advocate for Catholic doctrine or any specific religious perspective but to deploy the sacramental understanding of matrimony and its conceptual framework to address these intertwined philosophical issues.
While the abstract problem of intersubjectivity deals with how individual minds can break out from solipsistic isolation to reach other minds, interpersonality emphasizes the practical existential aspects of these interactions, focusing on how individual consciousnesses understand and relate to each other and how these connections are expressed and sustained in everyday relationships. By examining how individuals engage with each other not as abstract egos but as persons shaped by their interactions and communications, the study explores the binding forces and implications of these intersubjective and interpersonal relationships. Through this dual lens, the investigation utilizes the sacramental understanding of marriage to offer insights, providing a comprehensive exploration of personal connections and mutual transformations.
The study begins by exploring the historical and theological foundations of marriage, delving into its role as a metaphor for divine love and union. It then emphasizes the sacramental nature of marriage, particularly its significance in the post-Fall world as a means of sanctification. Following this, a philosophical analysis examines the causes of marriage with a focus on mutual consent and the insights of Duns Scotus. The investigation concludes by addressing the ontological status of the marital bond and the interplay between will, passions, and consent, ultimately arguing that the sacramental understanding of marriage provides valuable insights into the problem of intersubjectivity.

1. Marriage: Natural and Sacred Institutions

This section offers a theological exposition of marriage, framed within the greater Catholic structure, to provide readers with a broader conceptual framework and establish a horizon for a deeper exploration of how marital union exemplifies and informs the dynamics of interpersonal relationships. This exposition is enriched by the eschatological purpose of marriage, which is the marriage of God and humankind, and through humankind, the marriage of God and the entire cosmos. While it does not present innovative thought or new contributions, relying instead on the extensive scholarship of others,1 it aims to enrich the reader’s understanding and set the stage for the philosophical analysis of intersubjectivity and interpersonality in the subsequent sections. For readers more interested in the philosophical aspects, they can skip ahead to the second section.

1.1. Theological and Historical Foundations of Marriage

Marriage, a central social and religious institution, has been defined in various ways throughout history, often drawing upon Roman legal concepts and theological interpretations. Definitions frequently stem from Justinian’s Institutes, which described marriage as the “union of a man and a woman holding together an indivisible way of life”, highlighting lifelong commitment and unique bond. Modestinus emphasized the legal and religious dimensions, referring to it as an “association for the whole of life, a sharing in divine and human law”. Peter Lombard expanded on these definitions, focusing on mutual consent, conjugal debt, inseparability, and the shared life of spouses. Lombard’s observation that mutual consent signifies a deep spiritual connection highlights the sacramental nature of marriage as a conduit for divine grace.
In the Christian tradition, as articulated by Augustine, marriage encompasses three primary goods: faith (fides), offspring (proles), and sacrament (sacramentum). These goods provide a theological and moral foundation for marriage, highlighting its purposes and values within the Catholic doctrine. Faith refers to mutual fidelity, encompassing sexual exclusivity, trust, and loyalty. Offspring emphasizes procreation and the upbringing of children within the Christian faith. Sacrament underscores the indissolubility and sacred nature of the marital union, highlighting its permanence as a divine covenant (Augustine 2001, De b. coniug. ch. 6, 24, 32)2. Additionally, parents have a moral responsibility to provide their children with a religious education, ensuring they are formed in faith and virtue.
A synthesis of these historical perspectives reveals the complex interplay between the legal, social, and spiritual dimensions of marriage, underscoring its sacramental nature in Christian theology. This complexity symbolizes the eternal union between Christ and the Church, conferring sanctifying grace upon the couple, their children, the Church, and the community. Duns Scotus explains that while sacrament is the intrinsic good of marriage, faith represents a proximate end, and offspring is the extrinsic and principal end, aiming towards the continuation and fulfillment of human and divine goals (Duns Scotus 2011, Ord. IV, d. 31, n. 18).
As an office of nature, marriage is governed by natural laws known through reason, customs, and human needs, recognizing men and women as sexual, social, and rational beings concerned with procreation, fidelity, and protection against exploitation. As a sacrament, marriage elevates these natural goods into a divine act, modeled on God’s creative and sacrificial acts, transforming the couple’s relationship much like baptism transforms the baptized. This sacrament brings special divine blessings upon the couple, their children, and the community, acting as a channel of divine grace. It sanctifies the Christian couple, allowing them to use their sexual bodies appropriately, and symbolizes the enduring nature of this sacred bond, ensuring the marriage remains indissoluble (Duns Scotus 2011, Ord. IV, d. 31, n. 14).

1.2. Symbolism and Eschatological Significance

Marriage is not merely a natural or sacred institution; it is integral to a broader structure that positions the couple and family within a community and cultural cosmos. According to Christian theology, marriage was part of the creation of Adam and Eve and an essential component of divine creation. Unique among sacraments, it existed before the Fall, reflecting the original harmony intended by God: “This is now bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh. Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother and cleave to his wife: and they shall be two in one flesh”. (Gen 2:23–24). The narrative of the Fall, whether understood as historical or mythical, represents humanity’s turn from God and the subsequent introduction of sin. Augustine characterizes this turn as a willful self-centeredness, describing it as a turning away from God to oneself (inclinatus ad se). Augustine explains that this inward turn signifies humanity’s choice to prioritize self over God, which fundamentally disrupted the original order and harmony of creation. This turning away introduced sin, manifesting as concupiscence, ignorance, and mortality, fundamentally altering human nature and relationships (Augustine 1972, De civ. Dei, XIV, 13; Jenson 2006, p. 22). Post-Fall, the institution of marriage underwent an expansion intended to help humanity cope with its fallen state and enable individuals to find their place in the divine plan. Marriage, thus, serves both as a continuation of the original divine intention for human partnership and as a remedy for the disorder introduced by the Fall, guiding individuals towards sanctification and restoration.
Theologically, marriage represents a microcosm of the union between Christ and the Church, highlighting the sanctified bond as a reflection of divine love and partnership. Christian spouses are called to emulate the sacrificial self-giving love that Christ demonstrates for the Church, transforming marriage into a divine sacrament. The indissolubility of marriage underscores this unbreakable bond, reflecting the sacredness of the marital covenant. The grace of this sacrament perfects natural love, fortifies the marital bond, and sanctifies the relationship, enabling spouses to fulfill their duties and remain united until death.
Mattew Levering explains that “the doctrine of marriage must center upon the purpose for which God created the whole cosmos namely the ‘mystical marriage’ of God and creation” (Levering 2020, p. 1). The notion that marriage was an integral part of the creation plan, independent of the Fall, parallels views on Christ’s incarnation, understood by some to perfect human nature as a part of God’s divine plan (Pancheri 1983; Pomplun 2014). This concept is reflected in the marital bond, where the union of two distinct individuals in a shared life of love, purpose, and mutual transformation serves as a profound metaphor for the incarnation’s unification of Christ’s divine and human natures. Viewing marriage through the lens of the incarnation illuminates the intersubjective dimensions of human experience. Just as Christ’s incarnation bridges the divine and human, marriage creates a shared interpersonal space, fostering a deep connection that transcends individual isolation. This union enables spouses to engage in a communal life marked by shared emotions, rationality, and purpose. The intertwined emotional and rational dimensions within marriage illustrate how love, sacrifice, and mutual understanding are foundational to both personal and relational fulfillment. This perspective deepens the understanding of marriage as a sacrament and highlights its role in addressing the philosophical problem of intersubjectivity.

1.3. Development of Sacramental Theology

Grounded in Christ’s redemptive work, the sacraments, defined by Augustine as sacrum signum, signify invisible spiritual realities that bridge the gap between the material and spiritual realms (Augustine 1972, De civ. Dei, X, 5). They provide spiritual healing, restoration, and communal unity through shared rituals. Sacraments hold a central place in Christian tradition, particularly in the context of human existence after the Fall. The theological narrative of Adam and Eve’s disobedience introduces the concept of corruption in human nature, manifesting as concupiscence, ignorance, and mortality. Augustine posits that before the Fall, there was perfect harmony between the human will and the body (Augustine 1978, De nupt. et conc. I, 7). This disruption necessitated divine intervention, leading God to provide sacraments as essential means to heal and restore humanity. Hugh of Saint-Victor describes the sacraments as medicinal remedies, using material elements to convey spiritual grace and restore fallen human nature (Saint-Victor 1954, De Sacramentis, I, 8, XII). Post-Fall marriage provides an adjusted model to support our corrupted state, serving as both a duty and a remedy. It embodies the transition from the original harmony of creation to the restorative mission of the sacraments in a fallen world, bridging the gap between the prelapsarian ideal and the postlapsarian reality.
The gradual development of the sacramental understanding of marriage in Catholic thought is deeply rooted in the theological discussions of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Early twelfth-century theologians, influenced by Augustine’s terminology, did not clearly differentiate between the “good of the sacrament” (bonum sacramenti) and the sacrament of marriage itself. The term “sacramentum” was broadly used, encompassing any sacred oath, including marriage vows, and the marriage itself was seen as a sign of the union between Christ and the Church (Reynolds 2016, p. 29).
Marriage, as emphasized in Ephesians 5:22–32, suggests that the relationship between a husband and wife mirrors the union between Christ and His Church, characterized by sacrifice and unwavering commitment. This analogy was initially rare before the 12th century, with early interpretations by Augustine focusing more on the spiritual union of Christ and the Church or the prophetic reference in Genesis 2:24. However, from the late 11th century onward, Ephesians 5:32 became increasingly significant in theology and canon law, identifying marriage as a “great sacrament” that exemplifies the union between Christ and the Church. By the late thirteenth century, the doctrine that marriage was a sacrament conferring grace “ex opere operato” began gaining broader acceptance among theologians, although it did not yet have the status of official Church teaching. The official recognition of marriage as one of the seven sacraments was significantly advanced by Pope Lucius III’s 1184 bull Ad abolendam and Pope Innocent III’s 1208 profession of faith for the Waldensians, both of which affirmed marriage as a sacrament. Theologians such as Alexander of Hales and Albert the Great further contributed to this development by discussing the sacramental history of marriage and emphasizing its foundational role in sacramental theology. They placed marriage under the Law of Nature and highlighted its covenantal union with Christ and the Church, offering a profound metaphor for understanding marriage. Elevated to a sacrament by Christ, marriage bestows a special grace that perfects natural love, sustaining commitment and fidelity. However, it was not until the Council of Trent in the sixteenth century that the sacramental status of marriage was formally defined as dogma, definitively declaring marriage as a sacrament that confers grace “ex opere operato” (Leeming 1956, p. 9; Reynolds 2016, pp. 461–65, 556, 595, 843).

1.4. Love and Spiritual Parallels in Marriage

Aelred of Rievaulx describes love in marriage as the beginning, the middle, and the end of marrying, encapsulating the journey from its initial spark of affection to its deepening desire and ultimate fulfillment in mutual consent and physical union. This progression mirrors the spiritual journey of love for God, where affection leads to desire and ultimately to spiritual consummation. Just as love in marriage evolves and deepens, so too does the soul’s love for God, moving from an initial attraction to a profound union marked by ongoing transformation and sanctification. In both cases, the journey of love involves a committed relationship that grows and deepens over time, reflecting the ultimate fulfillment of divine love.
Aelred of Rievaulx and Innocent III use the physical union of marriage to draw spiritual parallels: the incarnational union of human nature with the Word in Christ, the covenantal union of Christ and the Church, and the daily spiritual union of the soul with God. These perspectives present marriage as both a spiritual and physical symbol of divine love, where the love between spouses reflects the greater love story between God and His creation. While these spiritual parallels primarily apply to the post-Fall state, reflecting the redemptive work of Christ, their prefigurations can be seen in the primordial institution of marriage. This signifies the ultimate union between God and humanity intended from creation and fully realized through the incarnation and the Church. Thus, the dimensions of marriage serve as both a symbol and a sacrament of divine love, reflecting God’s overarching narrative for creation. Theologians like Hugh of Saint-Victor highlight that marriage symbolizes the deeper spiritual union between God and the soul. Marriage involves a committed relationship marked by mutual love, faithfulness, and a spiritual dimension, serving as a metaphor for the soul’s relationship with God. This ongoing love, transformation, and sanctification create a joint life where the soul embraces divine will, similar to how spouses embrace each other’s will (Reynolds 2016, pp. 58–59, 74–75).

2. I Give So You May Give

The wedding ceremony transcends being a mere social event; it is a profound theological act where the will and consent of the couple play pivotal roles. The will signifies the deliberate decision to enter into the marital covenant, while consent, expressed through vows, is the formal declaration of this decision. Unlike sacraments such as Baptism, Confirmation, and Eucharist, which bring about individual change, marriage, according to the Catholic doctrine, brings about a joint alteration. The Catechism of the Catholic Church (§639, §1272) explains that while baptism seals the Christian with the indelible spiritual mark of belonging to Christ, marriage is sealed by the mutual consent given and received by the spouses, and this consent is sealed by God himself. Mutual consent, as a volitional act, is crucial in forming the sacramental bond of marriage, publicly acknowledging the couple’s intention to live together as husband and wife in a lifelong union. By affirming their will to marry, the couple enters into a sacramental covenant upheld by God’s grace, which strengthens their bond and supports their marital duties. This joint consent forms a sacramental union (coniunctio), an indivisible way of life that transcends a legal or social contract, becoming a sacred covenant uniting them (adunatio) in a common purpose.3
Mutual consent as the efficient cause of marriage is deeply rooted in the philosophical and theological traditions of the Middle Ages, reflecting an intricate interplay between human agency and divine sanction. This emphasis on mutual consent highlights the role of personal autonomy, underscoring the deliberate exercise of free will by both parties in choosing to enter into a binding marital relationship. This perspective values the individual’s capacity to make meaningful commitments and recognizes the ethical significance of freely given consent in forming the marital bond. In the context of marriage, mutual consent is identified as the efficient cause, meaning that the act of agreeing to marry fundamentally creates the marital bond, aligning with Aristotelian causality where the efficient cause is the agent or action that produces an effect. The efficient cause, being extrinsic, contrasts with the formal cause, which pertains to the inherent structure or essence of a thing—in this case, the sacrament of marriage. Therefore, while mutual consent initiates the union, the formal cause encompasses the enduring nature and structure of the marital bond.
Duns Scotus offers several distinctions that provide a robust philosophical and theological framework emphasizing the integral role of volitional and autonomous acts as co-causal acts that form the sacramental bond. Specifically, Scotus’s general treatment of co-causality and his distinction between the fieri (the act of becoming) and the esse (the state of being) in the context of marriage help clarify the philosophical and theological nuances surrounding the formation and enduring nature of the marital bond. Fieri refers to the process or event of becoming, which in the case of marriage is the act of mutual consent—the moment when the persons agree to marry. This moment is a dynamic and transitional phase marking the initial creation of the marital bond, triggering its formal existence. (Duns Scotus 1895, IV Parisiensis, d. 28) The fieri highlights its transient yet pivotal role in creating a lifelong marital bond.
Esse denotes the state of existence or being, referring in marriage to the ongoing, stable condition of being married. This continuous state persists beyond the initial act of consent and corresponds to the formal cause, the intrinsic nature that defines the marital relationship. It encompasses the enduring commitment and bond that develops from the initial act of consent. By distinguishing between the fieri and the esse, Scotus provides a framework to understand how a single act of mutual consent can create an enduring state—the marital bond. The fieri is the immediate cause that brings marriage into existence while the esse is the sustained state resulting from that initial act reflecting the permanence and stability of the marital relationship. This distinction aligns with the broader scholastic view that the efficient cause (mutual consent) is necessary to initiate marriage, but the formal cause (the enduring marital bond) defines its true essence.
Terms like matrimonium and coniugium were used interchangeably to denote both the act of marrying and the state of being married, highlighting a linguistic distinction: a wedding is a one-time event, while marriage is an ongoing state. Scotus’s framework underscores the complexity of the marital bond as both a single unity and a dual relation, with the fieri marking its beginning and the esse ensuring its continuity. In every relationship, including marriage, there is a phase where two individuals become acquainted with one another and then a moment of recognition where their relationship becomes self-standing. This recognition is similar to the fieri process, where the other person gains a position or recognition that changes our attitude towards them, their rights, and what is expected of them. This recognition results in a qualitative change in the relationship. For instance, a friend who becomes a former friend will not revert to being an acquaintance; similarly, a former partner who becomes an ex retains their former position but with expired rights and expectations. The esse expresses what happens and what is expected in the dynamics of those in their positions—married, partners, friends, or acquaintances. The formal distinction (a differentiation between the aspects of a single entity that are inseparable in reality but can be distinctly conceived by the mind (Vos 2006, §6.7)) between fieri and esse provides a lens to examine how relationships evolve from initial consent to a sustained bond. This ongoing relationship cannot downgrade to a pre-existing state but transforms qualitatively, ensuring the permanence of the marital bond and the expectations that come with it.4
Thus, while initiated by a singular decisive act of mutual consent, the marital union evolves into a lasting, stable bond characterized by ongoing mutual commitment and divine grace. This transformation underscores the qualitative change in relationships, cementing the permanence and expectations within the marital bond, reflecting a deeper understanding of relational dynamics and their enduring nature.
Scotus’s treatment of co-causality offers additional perspective to understand mutual consent in marriage. Scotus explores two types of co-causation: participative and autonomous. Participative co-causation is an instrumental co-causation, akin to the relationship between the hand and the pen in writing: “the inferior only exercises its causality by participating in the causality being exercised simultaneously by the superior.” (Frank 1992, p. 154). In this model, the superior cause directs the action, leaving the inferior cause responsible only in an instrumental sense. Autonomous co-causation is where both causes, regardless of their relative power, are independent and essential to the production of the effect. This type of co-causation is exemplified in the conception of a child, where both the father and the mother are independent co-causes (Duns Scotus 1954, Ord. I, d. 3, n. 496; Duns Scotus 2001, Ord. II, d. 37, q. 5, nn. 117–18). Each parent’s contribution is indispensable, and neither acts merely as an instrument of the other. In participative co-causation, the superior cause directs the action, leaving the inferior cause responsible only in an instrumental sense. This model does not fit the nature of mutual consent in marriage, where both parties are independent agents. Instead, the mutual consent required for the sacrament of marriage is an instance of autonomous co-causation. Both parties independently and freely consent to the union, and this joint action, or co-willing, is necessary to bring about the sacramental bond. This co-causal relationship, understood as co-willing, emphasizes the autonomous necessity of the marital bond, underscoring that it is a dynamic and collaborative act rather than a unilateral or instrumental process.
Understanding the emotional dimensions further enriches our comprehension of this co-causal relationship. Scotus’s insights into the passions of the soul offer a profound framework for grasping the dynamic emotional and causal aspects of an interpersonal and marital relationship. His exploration of the will, passions, and mutual giving reveals how joy, suffering, and mutual affirmation shape the marital bond. By examining how the will influences passions and how mutual consent transforms individual experiences into a shared existence, we can see how marriage becomes a personal and relational act of love and unity.
Scotus provides a nuanced explanation of how passions arise and the role of the will in this process, differentiating between passions that are a result of physiological changes and those that are purely spiritual and independent of the body (Drummond 2012; Perler 2018, pp. 73–96). According to Scotus, the will is fundamentally independent of the intellect and utterly free to position itself in regard to perceived objects, things, or subjects, thus generating passions such as joy or distress based on its volitional acts:
Even if something is of its own nature in agreement with the will, for example, the ultimate end, it is ultimately in agreement by an act of the will which accepts and finds it complacent. And such an agreement is made by willing the object, or a disagreement by refusing the object … an approximation follows this object, namely an apprehension of the object to be willed or nilled, and from this last thing, it seems that a passion of the will seem to follow from the presence of the object, joy or distress.
Scotus further explains that the will’s acceptance or rejection of an event or object is influenced by its prior dispositions, leading to a quasi-necessitated passion when the willed or nilled object appears (Duns Scotus 2006, Ord. III, d. 15, nn. 49–50). Thus, since the will’s act of willing or nilling pre-wills or nills the coming of the willed/nilled object, a passion of satisfaction or dissatisfaction necessarily arises when the willed or nilled object appears. The crux of Scotus’s account lies in the fact that though the will as a willing power determines what it wills or nills, the passion that accompanies the apprehension of the willed or nilled object cannot be produced by the will itself (Duns Scotus 2007, Ord. III, d. 34, q. 1, n. 48).
In human relationships, particularly marriage, each partner’s will engages with the other in a manner that produces integral passions. When one partner wills or affirms the presence, actions, or attributes of the other, it generates joy and satisfaction. Conversely, rejection or disapproval generates distress or dissatisfaction. These passions are grounded in the deep volitional acts of each individual, forming a robust structure of mutual affection. For instance, when a husband affirms his wife through acts of love and support, it generates joy and contributes to a sustained pattern of mutual affection and commitment. These actions shape the wife’s perception and will, inclining her towards similar affirmations, creating a reciprocal dynamic. This ongoing interaction influences their choices and behaviors, fostering a history of shared experiences and mutual growth. Joyful experiences reinforce the relationship’s positive aspects, while shared suffering deepens the bond by fostering empathy and understanding. However, when attentiveness and care wane, or when affirmations are not reciprocated, indifference or annoyance can arise. This lack of reciprocity can lead to emotional opacity and alienation, causing partners to become distant and disconnected. The bond weakens as mutual affection is replaced by feelings of rejection and dissatisfaction, highlighting the critical role of continuous, empathetic engagement in maintaining a healthy relationship.
The discussion of marriage presented several different causes that fall under the Aristotelian causal structure. Efficient causality plays its role both in the formation of marriage through mutual consent as well as the ongoing choices and acts that sustain, nourish, and jeopardize interpersonal relationships. It has been discussed that the final causes of marriage, known as the three goods of marriage, include faith (fides), offspring (proles), and sacrament (sacramentum). These goods encompass fidelity, sexuality, family, and education, both spiritually and mundanely, and can also be extended to the spiritual allegories of incarnation, covenant, and the union of the soul with God. This causal structure explains how passions are not just transient feelings but constitute ongoing interpersonal causal influences within the marital relationship. The final causes might be the mutual fulfillment and flourishing of the partners, while the efficient causes are the daily acts of affirmation, support, and love. These actions shape each partner’s perception and will, inclining them towards similar affirmations and creating a reciprocal dynamic. This ongoing causal affection influences choices and behaviors, leading to a history of shared experiences and mutual growth. The passions generated by these volitional acts are not passive but actively shape the relational context.
The passions of the soul further enrich our understanding of fieri (the becoming of relationships) and esse (the steady state of being). Prior to forming a relationship, we experience an erotic desire, the longing for what we lack, driven by attraction and the pursuit of fulfillment. Agnes Callard offers a more sophisticated definition of eros as “wanting to be wanted”,5 which is a desire for the reciprocal wanting of the other person. This compliance with the other’s will cannot be forced, and in desiring it, the will contracts itself to the wanting of the other. If the other responds by not wanting, disappointment or heartbreak arises; if the other responds by wanting to be wanted, the passion acts as an efficient cause to establish the interpersonal connection. Once the relationship is formed, the dynamics of passions change. The formation stage is about mutual wanting, but within the relationship, in its esse, partners are measured by their commitment to the obligations of the relationship. The will’s role in generating and sustaining passions highlights how joy and suffering are integral to the marital bond. These passions “hold” the couple together by continuously reaffirming their mutual commitment and love. Joyful experiences reinforce positive aspects, while shared suffering deepens the bond by fostering empathy and understanding.
The mutual affirmation of one another through volitional acts, often reciprocally recognized and visible to both parties, creates a complex structure of passions that not only reflects the couple’s current state but also positions each partner in relation to the co-affirmed bond. This shared measure shapes their future interactions and choices, which in turn shapes the parties’ actions and passions, and allows the persistence of the bond even after the initial co-causality that brought it about is no longer in place. The distinction between fieri and esse in marriage illustrates how passions transform from an erotic desire, driven by the pursuit of what is lacking, to a more mature form of expectation and fulfillment based on the recognized nature of the relationship. The initial, more erotic passions fuel the formation of the bond, while the subsequent, steady-state passions sustain it, facilitating a reciprocity that aligns with the nature of the relationship. It is also possible for the fieri and esse passion systems to coexist, as when one develops a romantic desire towards a friend, placing the two systems in tension and highlighting the dynamic interplay between forming and sustaining relationships.
This dynamic interplay of passions can be further understood through Heidegger’s concept of the givenness of being. Heidegger argues that our understanding of being frames our experience and interpretation of the world; within the self, the Dasein is situated. His concept of “es gibt”, literally translating to “there is” or “it gives”, is crucial for understanding the ontological structure of being. Heidegger uses “es gibt” to describe how being is disclosed to us, highlighting that being is not just a static presence but an event of unveiling. This “givenness” emphasizes that existence is something bestowed upon us, originating from beyond our control.6 However, Heidegger also allows for the possibility of appropriation as freedom, where human beings can actively engage with and actualize this freedom through their actions, expressing their personality and autonomy (Heidegger 2002, pp. 94–95, 188–89). The mutual givenness of marriage aligns with this second kind of givenness. In marriage, the co-causality transforms the impersonal “givenness” into a personal and relational bond based on the consent of a trusting will. This mutual givenness sanctifies our sphere of existence, forming a foundation for building our lives, raising children, and creating a shared existence based on values and love. Although our existence will always be afflicted by the arbitrary nature of existence, we are able to form our own shared existence to some degree by committing to each other in a manner that expresses our personality and freedom, actualizing the relational aspect of givenness as described by Heidegger.
In marriage, the act of contracting binds the wills and futures of the parties involved, including their offspring and hopes. This commitment is both a personal pledge to each other and a dedication to the Church and its historical role as a manifestation of Christ in the world. Scotus explains the following:
The right that the other acquires over this one’s body when it is transferred to him is by an act of will freely transferring it—and this along with an extrinsic evident sign from which is obtained the idea of the aforesaid contract. And this contract is called ‘I give if you give’ or ‘I give so that you may give.’
This contract signifies a mutual giving where each partner’s future is joined with the other’s. In this “I give so that you may give” lies the ground to approach the intersubjective problem. Scotus phrases it as “you may give”, highlighting that one is not obliged but rather hoped to give back. This hope operates on two levels: first, a transactional hope that the other will respond to my giving; and second, a deeper existential hope that there is indeed someone there, a real person, who will receive my giving and give back to me as a person. This hope forms the foundation upon which the intersubjective relationship is built. It involves a recognition, based on my own act of giving, that another person is hoped to be out there. One can never know for certain, but this hope suffices to establish the interpersonal relationship from which love can be given and received.7
In defining the principles that ground personhood, Scotus writes the following: “Created personality is not something positive; for in addition to singularity we find no positive entity that renders the singular nature incommunicable. All that is added to singularity is the negation of dependence or incommunicability, the denial that it is given over to someone.” (Duns Scotus 1975, Quodl. 19.63). Personhood, according to Scotus, is an expression of an active act of the will—a striving to overcome limitation, simultaneously transcending dependencies and binding oneself to another (Den Bok et al. 2008, p. 66, Gordon 2022, ch. 9). The noncommunicable aspect of the self—the incommunicable “I”—is precisely what grounds the problem of intersubjectivity, as one will never have the ultimate substantive grasp of the other’s “I”. However, it is through what is communicable that our hope finds the other persona. These communicable aspects are vestiges that testify to who we are in a manner that is not complete but sufficient to sustain a relationship of trust, understanding, and hope that the other is indeed there. This aligns with the existential hope in “I give so that you may give”, where the hope that the other is truly there forms the basis of mutual recognition and relational bonds.
However, it is crucial to note that “wanting to be wanted” can also manifest non-reciprocally in a manner that does not align with the mutuality implied in “I give so you may give”. In such instances, one side desires the other to want them, not as part of a mutual desire, but in a possessive manner. This desire facilitates an asymmetric relationship where the “wanting” is used to exploit and possess the one who wants. Here, the exploiter is present in the mind of the other, not to give but to take, seeing the other not empathetically but as someone to be used. This dynamic highlights the potential for asymmetry and exploitation within the framework of desire.
Ill communication and manipulative communication are critical factors that can undermine or distort this mutual giving. Ill communication occurs when there is a failure to adequately convey or understand each other’s needs and intentions, leading to misunderstandings and mistrust. Manipulative communication, on the other hand, involves deliberate efforts to control or deceive the other, fostering an exploitative relationship. Both forms of communication erode the foundation of mutual recognition and hope, replacing trust and empathy with suspicion and control. Scotus’s definition of personhood, grounded in the tensions between dependencies and independencies, and communicability and incommunicability, allows relationships to be formed where both persons retain their distinctness while simultaneously, their personalities form a dynamic and living interpersonal relation. Genuine and empathetic communication fosters a relationship that supports mutual growth and understanding, enhancing the relational bond and the shared future of the partners.
The mutual givenness extends beyond mere physical possession to encompass holistic care for the other person’s well-being. The right over the body is not merely a permission for sexual intercourse but also a responsibility for the partner’s overall well-being, integrating physical and spiritual dimensions, as exemplified in the teaching of Hugh of St. Victor who held that each should look after each other’s body and spirit as if they were his or her own (Reynolds 2016, p. 382).
Thus, the co-causality in marriage, grounded in joint consent, follows the second kind of givenness described by Heidegger, resulting in a personal and mutual relational structure. While the couple may still be affected by the arbitrary nature of existence, they have the ability to form their own shared existence in the world. By engaging in this mutual giving, the couple creates a personal and relational bond that sanctifies their own sphere of existence. This shared existence, built on mutual values and love, provides a stable foundation for raising children and navigating the uncertainties of life together. The act of marriage is not merely a present state but a dynamic orientation towards shared future possibilities, where the couple’s being lies in their collective will and mutual dedication. The mutual givenness in marriage demonstrates how the sacramental bond transcends the impersonal nature of existence, transforming it into a deeply personal and relational act of love and unity.

3. The Union

In marriage, the spouses do not lose their individual identities but are united in a way that creates a new, singular entity, reflected in the concept of “two becoming one flesh”. This inseparable reality underscores the indissolubility of marriage, ensuring the marital bond remains unbroken and continuous, reflecting its sacred and sacramental significance. Rooted in the belief that the sacramental bond, once formed, cannot be dissolved, this indissolubility ensures the stability required for raising children and fulfilling marital duties, embodying the divine union it signifies.
To grasp the theological and philosophical significance of marriage, it is essential to understand its ontological status. This exploration began in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, aiming to reconcile marriage’s unique characteristics within Christian theology and Aristotelian philosophy. Theologians debated whether marriage was a substance or an accident, and if an accident, whether it was a relation or a quality. The prevailing view was that marriage was a relation, though some argued for it being a quality. This categorization impacted how the marital bond and its existence in each spouse were understood. For example, Stephen Langton argued that marriage is not just a relation but a single quality inhering in two subjects at once, much like the number “three” in three pebbles is present in all without being in any one individually. This view emphasizes that marriage creates a new, distinct reality beyond the individual identities of the spouses.
One central question in understanding marriage was how many marriages exist between two spouses. Common sense suggests a single marriage, but philosophical scrutiny proposed the possibility of two distinct marriages, one from each spouse’s perspective. This led to three main solutions: assimilation (seeing two marriages as one due to their similarity in essence and purpose), convergence (considering two marriages one because of a shared goal), and polyadic accident (a single marriage existing in both spouses simultaneously, a shared entity that does not exist independently within either spouse alone).
Praepositinus offered an alternative view that blended elements of the assimilation and polyadic accident theories while emphasizing the sacramental and relational nature of marriage. He proposed that a marriage is a single entity existing in both spouses at once but not individually in either. This view suggests that the marital bond, much like the work of a painter, is a quality that exists as a result of the partners’ mutual commitment. Just as a wall is white from the work of the painter but the painter’s work is not in the wall, the marital bond exists within the spouses as a secondary virtual entity carried by their primary individual existences. This analogy emphasizes that the bond is a unified quality derived from the joint action of the spouses, reflecting their combined identity as husband and wife (Reynolds 2016, pp. 495–503).
Scotus provided a sophisticated ontological perspective on marriage, emphasizing the interplay of unity and distinction within this profound union. At the heart of his analysis lies the concept of “formal distinction”, a philosophical tool that articulates the complex identity and unity inherent in the marital bond, distinguishing it from the “real” and “modal” distinctions commonly discussed in metaphysics. Real distinctions refer to completely separate entities with no overlapping substance, such as two different people or objects that exist independently. Modal distinctions, however, relate to the different states or conditions that a single entity can assume, like the various forms a substance might take. Formal distinctions, crucial to understanding marriage, denote entities that are united yet retain distinct attributes or roles essential to their identity (Vos 2006, §6.7). This type of distinction captures the essence of marriage as a union where two individuals merge their lives without forfeiting their unique personal qualities, embodying a singular entity that maintains internal diversity.
In the marital context, Scotus argues that marriage comprises two complementary real relations that are materially identical but formally distinct. This means that while the marital relationship involves two individuals, each with their own existence and identity, these individuals form a single unified entity through their marital bond. The material identity refers to the shared life and mutual commitments of the spouses, which are the same for both. However, the formal distinction lies in the unique roles and perspectives each spouse brings to the marriage, such as their different wills and intentions. As a middle ground between real distinction and modal distinction, the formal distinction offers a means for a union where individual identities are preserved, thereby enhancing the depth and richness of the marital bond without diminishing its unity.
Scotus emphasized that the marital union is not merely a contract or agreement but a profound ontological reality. The two spouses, while remaining distinct persons, create a new reality characterized by mutual self-giving and love. This union is an indivisible bond ordained by God, reflecting the unity of Christ and the Church. Thus, the marital relationship is both a personal commitment and a divine institution, embodying both human and divine elements.
Having explored the various ways in which the partners relate to each other and the nature of their union, it becomes essential to determine what kind of unity this marital bond represents. Scotus’s theological insights, particularly his discussion of the unity of the divine essence and the distinction of the divine persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), provide a valuable framework for understanding this (Duns Scotus 1950, Ord. I, d. 2, q. 4). His main challenge is to reconcile how the divine essence can be truly one (simple and indivisible) while accommodating the real distinctions among the persons within the Godhead. To do this, he delves into the various types of unity to demonstrate that the highest form of unity—simplicity—allows for these distinctions without compromising the unity of the essence. This nuanced understanding is crucial for maintaining the orthodox Christian doctrine of the Trinity, which posits one God in three persons.
Scotus identifies five types of unity, which Paasch translates into types of “fusions”: Unity of Aggregation (aggregationis), the simplest form, where parts are merely collected together without any intrinsic connection, like a pile of stones. Unity of Order (unitas ordinis), which adds structure or arrangement to the parts, such as the arrangement of books on a shelf. Accidental Unity (unitas per accidens), where the parts are unified by an external factor but each part retains its individual identity, exemplified by Socrates and his accidental attribute of being tan. Per se unity (unitas per se), where a thing is composed of essential principles that are intrinsically united by act and potency, like the union of body and soul in a human being. Unity of simplicity (unitas simplicitatis), the highest form of unity, where the parts are identical to each other in essence, not just united externally but truly identical, as seen in the divine attributes of God (Paasch 2021, p. 1275).
But what kind of bond is the sacramental bond, and how does this bond “exist” and “act” in the world? Scotus’s discussion (Duns Scotus 1950, Ord. I, d. 2, q. 4, n. 403; Paasch 2012, p. 45) of different types of unities helps us to see to what degree they apply to marriage: Unity of Aggregation is a simple collection of parts without any specific structure or order, akin to viewing marriage as a mere social arrangement without deeper metaphysical significance. Unity of Order involves parts that are ordered or arranged in a particular way, similar to marriages where roles and duties are clearly delineated but lack the depth of mutual self-giving and love emphasized by Scotus. Accidental Unity occurs where one part is an accident of the other, such as the color of an object, implying that marriage is contingent and external to the individuals, failing to capture the intrinsic bond created by mutual consent and divine grace. Per se unity involves entities joined through act and potency to form an intrinsic unity. Applied to marriage, this unity signifies that marriage is not merely a combination of two individuals but a profound ontological union where the partners are intrinsically connected, sharing a common life and purpose through their mutual consent. Unity of simplicity, the highest form of unity, is where the parts are truly identical to each other in essence, not just united externally but truly identical. In this form of unity, there is no distinction between the parts at all; they are one and the same in essence and existence, such as the divine attributes in God, where attributes like wisdom and goodness are not separate but completely unified without any division.
From a mereological perspective, while the unity of simplicity is a compelling metaphor for the sacramental bond of marriage, Scotus’s notion of per se or substantial unity might be more accurate. Substantial unity captures the intrinsic and indissoluble nature of marriage, where the spouses form a single, unified entity without losing their individual identities. This reflects the deep ontological bond formed by mutual consent and divine grace, emphasizing the inseparability and permanence of the marital union. This aligns with the theological notion of covenant and the profound ontological reality of marriage as both a sacrament and a divine institution. The per se unity model is particularly relevant as it illustrates how two distinct entities (spouses) are integrated into a cohesive unit without losing their individual essence—mirroring the formal distinction where each entity contributes its unique essence to the union. In this sense, marriage is not just a social or legal contract but an ontological transformation where two persons become one unified entity, intrinsically ordered towards each other in their mutual giving and commitment.
Another well-known example of per se unity is the hypostatic union of Christ’s divine and human natures. In the hypostatic union, Christ’s divine and human natures are united in one person without losing their distinct identities, illustrating not only how these natures are joined but also emphasizing the unity of the person of Christ. This theological discussion offers an interesting horizon to examine the union of marriage and interpersonal relationships. In a similar sense, the creation of Adam and Eve can be seen as an incarnation of two becoming one flesh: “and they shall be two in one flesh”. This they shall be two in one flesh is, in fact, an incarnation of two in one flesh, much like the hypostatic union. The problem of divine impassibility—how Christ, God incarnate in human flesh, could genuinely suffer—provides profound insight into understanding how two distinct beings can form a shared existence that simultaneously joins and changes them while preserving their distinctiveness. As I have discussed elsewhere the conundrum of Christ’s incarnation and presented a metaphysical solution to the question of his suffering, I will utilize it to present here the metaphysical grounds to address the hypostatic union that is involved in interpersonal relationships and the central role of the logic of the passions in such a union (Gordon 2022, ch. 7).
Richard Cross presents a schematization of the relationship between the divine and human natures to “allow for the Word to change, to suffer, and to be temporal”. This, he explains, is achieved through what he calls extrinsic relations, labeled relational mutability or “R-Mutability”. Conversely, he assigns the terms “I-mutability” and “I-immutability” to denote what is intrinsically mutable and immutable. According to the relational understanding of the incarnation, while Christ is R-mutable, He is I-immutable. Cross explains that the relational view of incarnation easily handles the becoming of the incarnation: “Becoming man is merely a sort of change” and does not result from a change within the divine nature but rather with the world. In this respect, being impassible is equivalent to I-immutable. However, Cross notes that it is more difficult to explain whether the actual incarnate being is impassible (Cross 2002, pp. 214–17). The two relations that Cross presents—intrinsic and extrinsic—seem to leave us in a stalemate. On the one hand, the extrinsic relation leaves the divine nature utterly independent of human nature and immutable, suggesting that the divine Christ did not truly suffer on the cross. On the other hand, the intrinsic relation cannot account for how the impassible divine nature can genuinely suffer. I propose that a third relation can be added to mitigate the two intrinsic and extrinsic relations presented by Cross, overcoming the stalemate.
Consider this from the perspective of Cross’s internal–external relations. As far as internal relations go, the fact that a triangle has three angles is an internal relation derived from its definition as a polygon with three sides. However, as Kant has shown us, the fact that a triangle has 180° is not a result of an intrinsic relation. It can be said that insofar as the triangle is taken from its internal definition, it is indifferent to whether the geometry is Euclidean or non-Euclidean; in other words, the triangle is I-immutable to any specific geometry. However, in different geometrical worlds, the triangle may assume different “truths” according to the manner in which it expands, one for a Euclidean world and others for non-Euclidean worlds. This solution preserves, on the one hand, a change that is “merely a sort of change” that does not involve a change in the sense of warming up or cooling down, as the assumption does not involve that from which it is changed. On the other hand, it avoids the fate of Cross’s relational consideration of the incarnation, which leaves it empty of any real content.
Instead of thinking of the incarnation as a mixture or composite of the divine and human natures, I suggest using the triangle example as a model. In this model, the actualization of the triangle in a specific geometry incarnates the geometrical synthetic a priori truths in the analytic truths of the triangle. In this way, the analytic truths of the triangle, which are immutable, assume new attributes in a synthetic a priori manner when applied to them in this specific world-incarnation. These real attributes, insofar as they characterize the triangle’s existence in a specific geometry, are external to the triangle’s essence and remain indifferent to it. Consequently, these external attributes do not alter the nature of a thing but rather perfect it, expressing its existence in the world.
With respect to the divine incarnation, such a model will protect the divine nature from alteration, which would compromise divine immutability, and avoid merely bringing the divine nature into an extrinsic relation to human nature, which would empty the incarnation of content. Instead, it represents a specific transcendental incarnation or determination of the divine nature in a specific world, with contingent characteristics that are the products of divine will. In this model, the assumption of synthetic attributes can be understood as a “suffering” of attributes, grounding the passions transcendentally in the hypostatic union. This suffering of attributes reflects the divine nature actualizing itself in human nature, expressing the intentionality and freedom of the will as described by Scotus. Thus, the incarnation not only preserves divine immutability but also reveals the depth of God’s engagement with creation. The passions are an integral part of the divine commitment to the union, enabling genuine caring, involvement, and love with other persons.
In the context of marriage, each partner retains their intrinsic identity and essence, akin to the immutable aspect of the divine nature. This is their “I”, which remains consistent before, during, and after the marriage, as well as after the death or separation from the partner. However, this intrinsic identity coexists with a relational identity that emerges within the union, similar to how the human nature of Christ is relationally mutable while the divine nature remains intrinsically immutable. When considering the interpersonal union, particularly in marriage, we can draw an analogy with the geometric example of a triangle. Following the example of the triangle, the husband and wife, while maintaining their intrinsic selves, experience a form of relational change within the marriage that actuates reciprocal partnership attributes and their “angles”. This relational change is not a transformation of their essential selves but rather an external adaptation to the union, synthesizing their personalities and forming their space of interaction and communication. Just as the triangle’s angles adapt to the geometry of the space, the individuals in a relationship adapt to the relational dynamics that govern the nature of their interaction. Integral to this union are the passions, whereby two distinct persons willingly embrace the other. In such an embrace, each person positions themselves to assume the other’s needs, desires, and hopes, for better or worse. Through shared experiences of joy and suffering, the relational bond deepens, fostering empathy and understanding, enabling a profound and transformative connection.
While the triangle uses a spatial image, interpersonal relationships need to be perceived temporally. The relationship is based on mutual reciprocity that is revealed over time, in the future, in the manner we allow each other to be revealed or concealed to us. This “geometry” of the relationship determines how our personalities radiate to the other and is future-oriented around the ends or purposes that join our union. Thus, the temporal dimension of marriage emphasizes the unfolding and evolving nature of the relationship, where each partner’s identity is continuously revealed and shaped through their ongoing interactions and shared goals. The idea that the interpersonal relationship, particularly that of marriage, is made through a joining of futures offers a different ontological view, one that perceives marriage not as a static entity but as an intentional act where two individuals willingly contract the possibilities of their futures.8 This bond, formed through passions and care, is guided by the “not-yet” of what is desired to come. This conceptualization is developed in a previous study where I present the idea that Christ in the Eucharist is present in His absence as the becoming of the not-yet, which promises to come and directs the faithful (Gordon 2021).
Applying these insights to marriage, the union of a couple involves a dynamic interplay of relational mutability and intrinsic immutability. Each partner retains their intrinsic identity (I-immutability) while engaging in a relationally mutable (R-mutable) union oriented toward a shared future. This future-oriented relationality, built on mutual consent and shared goals, enables couples to form a shared existence based on mutual values and love. Despite being affected by the arbitrary nature of existence, they shape their shared reality through collective will and commitment. Analogous to Christ’s incarnation, the marital union represents individual and relational truths. Each partner’s immutable essence (I-immutability) coexists with the relationally mutable (R-mutable) aspects of the marriage, fostering a dynamic and evolving relationship while maintaining core identities. Thus, their union becomes a new reality, an incarnation of their collective will and mutual consent.

4. Concluding Reflections

This study has used marriage as a test case to understand the complexities of interpersonal relationships, exploring the philosophical dimensions of intersubjectivity and interpersonality. By examining marriage, we have seen that relationships do not possess being in the same way as typical objects but rather exist as dynamic processes grounded in future-oriented mutual engagement and commitment. The “goods” of marriage—fidelity, offspring, and sacrament—illustrate this future orientation, providing a foundation for stable, meaningful connections. These specific goods can be generalized to represent broader ethical considerations, joint investments in shared goals, and the covenant of forming a joint historical community. Fidelity highlights the importance of trust and ethical commitment in relationships, ensuring stability and mutual respect. Offspring symbolizes shared projects and collective future-building, emphasizing the significance of joint endeavors and responsibilities. The sacrament underscores the enduring and transformative nature of deep relational bonds, grounded in a shared sense of purpose and mutual dedication.
Interpersonal relationships, exemplified through marriage, are living, evolving entities grounded in the mutual consent and future-oriented actions of the partners. This perspective challenges the conventional notions of being and emphasizes the transformative nature of relational bonds. The essence of such relationships lies in their potential for future growth and development, shaped by mutual dedication and shared futures, encompassing both intersubjective and interpersonal dimensions.
These aspects of marriage provide a robust framework for understanding and nurturing interpersonal relationships, offering a model for ethical engagement, shared goals, and enduring commitment in the various contexts of human interaction. Future research could further explore the practical applications of these insights in contemporary marital counseling and relationship dynamics, contributing to a deeper understanding of how to cultivate meaningful and transformative connections in today’s world.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude to the reviewers for their valuable comments. I also thank my friends and colleagues for their insightful discussions, advice, and help. Special thanks go to Raphael Starnitzky, who guided me through the labyrinth of Christian dogmatics; to Eli Rothenberg, a dear friend and faithful reader, whose comments are always invaluable; to Andrea A. Robiglio and Warren Zev Harvey for their advice along the way; and lastly to Rachel Friedman, who enriched me in ways that were both intellectually stimulating and personally meaningful.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

Notes

1
2
Scotus connects the act of procreation within marriage to a broader eschatological vision. The reference to the “heavenly city Jerusalem” suggests that human procreation participates in the divine plan for salvation history and the fulfillment of the eschaton. The idea is that through marriage and the raising of children, humanity contributes to the divine purpose of populating the heavenly city. See Ord. IV, d. 26, nn. 12–13.
3
Authoritative example can be found in Peter Lombard’s Sentences (IV, d. 27. Q. 3). For further reading, see (Reynolds 2016, ch. 5).
4
Schwartz analysis Aristotle and Aquinas, “that friendship is neither a feeling nor an act, but rather a state or habit”, seems to match the current analysis and support the extension to different sorts of interpersonal relationships. See (Schwartz 2007, p. 8).
5
In Minds Almost Meeting (https://mindsalmostmeeting.com/episodes/wanting-to-be-wanted accessed on 1 December 2022), Callard explains that “our original paradox which we still haven’t solved is that each person’s erotic desire is fundamentally a desire about wanting to be wanted. And if everyone just wants to be wanted, then nobody wants anybody else. Everyone just wants the wanting to come to them. So wanting to be wanted is egocentric or selfish.” This wanting seems to be an ill-wanting, blinded to the other person’s will and desire. However, in an article for Haaretz (28 December 2022), she explains that “‘my wanting of you’ becomes erotic only when it is directed to your will. Desiring you erotically means: I want you to want me. … Envy is a sign of love’s insatiability. We want precisely what we cannot have… wanting the desire of the one I know cannot be mine.”
6
The usage of es gibt is extensive throughout his writings; see, among other places (Heidegger 1926, pp. 6–7).
7
Scotus is famous for his distinction between affectio commodi (affection for advantage), representing the primary self-interested desire of the will, and affectio iustitiae (affection for justice), which is the “first moderator of the affection for advantage” (Ord. II, d. 6, q. 2, nn. 49–51 Thomas Williams has argued that God is not directed by the affection for justice as his obligation toward his creatures since he owes them nothing. In my reply to him, I argued that the mere fact, according to the theological presupposition, that God has created us endowed with freedom, presupposes that he has willingly taken upon himself the consideration of our choices and, as such, is not indifferent to us. The two interpretations of “I give so you may give” resemble the dual structure of the affections. The “so you may give” of the second level, which recognizes freedom, fundamentally regulates our relationship and attitude toward the other. See (Williams 2005; Gordon 2017); For further reading see (King 2010, pp. 368–70).
8
Schwartz’s assertion that friendship is grounded in the unity of wills aligns with my analysis. Additionally, his preference for conformity of wills, rather than unity of wills, can be interpreted as future-oriented conformity. This futuristic conformity resonates with my discussion on the applicability of truth to angels, where I argued that the conformity that establishes angels’ truth refers to the adequation of an angel’s thoughts about a future outcome with the unfolding of that future. See (Schwartz 2007, pp. 28–29; Gordon 2016, p. 12).

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Gordon, L.S. “And They Shall Be Two in One Flesh”: A Scotistic Exploration of Marriage, Intersubjectivity, and Interpersonality. Religions 2024, 15, 983. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15080983

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Gordon LS. “And They Shall Be Two in One Flesh”: A Scotistic Exploration of Marriage, Intersubjectivity, and Interpersonality. Religions. 2024; 15(8):983. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15080983

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Gordon, Liran Shia. 2024. "“And They Shall Be Two in One Flesh”: A Scotistic Exploration of Marriage, Intersubjectivity, and Interpersonality" Religions 15, no. 8: 983. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15080983

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