The Church and the Law: Catholic Ecclesiology and Its Influence on Bioethical Legislation in Contemporary Europe

Abstract

This article examines the normative influence of the Catholic Church on contemporary legal systems in Europe, with particular emphasis on bioethical legislation concerning abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage. Referring to ecclesiology and the tradition of natural law, this study explores how Catholic moral doctrine shapes or challenges public law in countries with a strong Catholic heritage. A comparative legal method is applied to the legislation of three countries—Poland, France, and the Netherlands—representing distinct models of the relationship between religion and law. The analysis also addresses the tensions between the Church’s teachings and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, highlighting differences in the understanding of human rights, moral authority, and legal pluralism. The findings suggest that, although the Church maintains significant influence in certain jurisdictions, its normative authority is increasingly challenged by secular and pluralistic approaches, particularly in the context of protecting individual dignity and enacted law.

1. Introduction

In contemporary legal systems, the relationship between religious doctrine and state legislation continues to exert significant influence on the regulation of bioethical matters, such as abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage. In countries with a strong Catholic heritage, the Catholic Church remains a major normative actor, not only in the spiritual domain but also in the sphere of legislative influence (Kowalik et al. 2023). Ecclesiology—the theological study of the Church—serves as a key analytical tool in understanding how religious authority affects public law and binding ethical standards across different legal cultures.

Despite a rich body of scholarship addressing both Catholic theology and national bioethical regulation, existing research often omits a cross-disciplinary, comparative perspective, especially within the framework of morality policy studies and ecclesiology. This article builds upon that gap by integrating political science insights on morality policy (Engeli et al. 2012; Grzymała-Busse 2015; Knill and Preidel 2015) with legal–philosophical analysis. This article aims to address that gap by examining how Catholic moral teachings—rooted in the tradition of natural law—are reflected, challenged, or disregarded within the legal systems of modern Europe.

The central research question is as follows: How does Catholic ecclesiology influence bioethical legislation in contemporary European states with Catholic cultural roots? This inquiry investigates the extent to which moral and metaphysical positions derived from Church doctrine permeate binding legal norms in the three selected countries, Poland, France, and the Netherlands.

These countries were selected due to their typologically distinct approaches to religion–state relations, allowing for an insightful comparison of ecclesiastical influence within different legal and sociopolitical contexts. Poland represents a concordatory model with strong Church–state alignment; France reflects a laïcité-based model of institutional secularism; and the Netherlands embodies a liberal–secular model rooted in individual autonomy and pluralism.

The aims of this study are threefold: (1) to assess the normative influence of the Catholic Church on bioethical regulation, (2) to evaluate how this influence varies across divergent models of church–state relations, and (3) to juxtapose these national approaches with the evolving case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the values of the European Union. The value of this analysis lies in its interdisciplinary character—bridging philosophy of law, ecclesiology, and comparative law—to provide a deeper understanding of contemporary boundaries between religion and state in matters of law and ethics. This analysis also engages with the question of how theological norms are translated—or resisted—within legal discourse and what this means for the future of normative pluralism in Europe.

The structure of the article is as follows: The study begins with a discussion of the methodological framework, with particular emphasis on the philosophical–legal method and comparative legal analysis (Materials and Methods). The following section presents the theological foundations of the authority of the Catholic Church and its role as a norm-creating institution in the context of its influence on public law (The Catholic Church as a Norm-Creating Authority: Between Spiritual Doctrine and Legal Influence). The next chapter focuses on the role of natural law in Catholic legal doctrine and its impact on lawmaking in countries with a Catholic heritage (The Role of Natural Law in Catholic Legal Doctrine). This is followed by an analysis of critiques of natural law theory from the perspectives of postmodernism and the Critical Legal Studies movement, highlighting their influence on contemporary understandings of human rights (Rejections of Natural Law in Postmodern and Critical Legal Studies Thought). Subsequently, the article explores axiological conflicts between the Catholic understanding of natural law and the liberal conception of human rights, with special focus on the positions of the Church and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage (Conflicting Values: Natural Law and Human Rights in the Catholic Perspective). The next section offers a comparative legal analysis of bioethical regulations in Poland, France, and the Netherlands, representing different models of the relationship between religion and law (A Comparative Legal Analysis of Bioethical Norms in Poland, France, and the Netherlands). The article concludes with reflections on the relationship and tensions between the Catholic conception of natural law and the evolving axiological pluralism in European human rights jurisprudence (Results and Conclusions: Between Natural Law and the Pluralism of European Human Rights).

2. Materials and Methods

This study is based on the philosophical–legal method, complemented by comparative legal methodology and elements of dogmatic analysis. Its objective is to examine the influence of the Catholic Church on the legal systems of countries with a Catholic heritage, with particular emphasis on bioethical issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage.

In the scope of the philosophical and legal reflection, the analysis adopts a normative axiological research perspective that encompasses not only legislative practice but also its metaphysical and moral foundations. This approach finds justification in the “philosophical method” proposed by J. Gillroy, who emphasizes the need to dialectically link the normative and empirical dimensions of law and to transcend isolated positivism in comparative legal research (Gillroy 2009). The doctrinal foundations are analyzed in the light of the teachings of the Catholic Church, which draw from the tradition of natural law as developed by St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. The sources of analysis include, inter alia, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, the Code of Canon Law, and papal encyclicals. These teachings are juxtaposed with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which reflects a contrasting, liberal, and pluralistic approach to human rights interpretation, based on social consensus and the evolving nature of axiological standards.

The primary analytical method employed in this study is comparative legal analysis. It is applied in accordance with the following classical four-stage model: (1) selection of legal systems and formulation of the research question; (2) description of the legal frameworks in the selected countries; (3) identification of similarities and differences; and (4) critical assessment and formulation of de lege ferenda recommendations. This structure is thoroughly elaborated by M. Siems, who also highlights the necessity of taking into account historical and cultural contexts in comparative analysis (Siems 2018). The comparison covers three European Union countries, which are Poland, France, and the Netherlands. These states were selected due to their contrasting models of the relationship between religion and law, Poland representing a legal system closely tied to Catholic values, France embodying a laic and republican model, and the Netherlands reflecting a liberal and secular approach. The analysis of their respective bioethical legislation enables a nuanced assessment of the scope and direction of religious (or secular) influence on statutory law.

Although this article does not directly adopt the theoretical paradigm of “morality policy” studies, it draws on selected insights from this field to conceptually frame bioethical regulation as a value-laden policy domain. As emphasized in the literature (Engeli et al. 2012; Knill and Preidel 2015), such policies are highly sensitive to cultural, religious, and institutional variables. These findings support the typological rather than representative selection of case studies and help contextualize differences in legal responses to normative conflicts. To broaden the interpretative lens, this study also includes critical theoretical perspectives—particularly postmodernism and the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement—which challenge the objectivity and universality of moral norms, viewing law instead as a relational and political construct. This dual analytical perspective helps contextualize the divergence between natural law ethics and evolving liberal interpretations of human rights. Although the study primarily relies on English- and Polish-language literature and official translations when analyzing the legal systems of France and the Netherlands, efforts have been made to include selected native-language sources where accessible. This linguistic constraint is mitigated through the use of high-quality secondary literature, as well as triangulation with international documents—such as case law of the European Court of Human Rights, EU legal instruments, and comparative analyses—ensuring consistency and credibility in the legal interpretations presented. The choice of countries is purposive and follows the following typological logic: Poland is categorized as a concordatory system with high Church–state entanglement; France as a laic state emphasizing republican neutrality; and the Netherlands as a liberal–secular system. These types correspond with varying levels of institutional openness to religious moral claims, which allows for systematic contrast and controlled comparative inference. The overarching aim of the adopted methodology is not only to contrast the normative position of the Catholic Church with the current legislative practices of EU Member States, but also to analyze the axiological sources of these discrepancies and their impact on the coherence of the human rights protection system in Europe.

Limitations of this approach include potential variability in the enforcement of legal norms, diversity in local church–state relations, and the interpretive subjectivity inherent in theological and philosophical analysis.

3. The Catholic Church as a Norm-Creating Authority: Between Spiritual Doctrine and Legal Influence

In introducing the reader to the main thesis of this article, it is important to emphasize that law—according to sociological and axiological approaches—does not function in a vacuum, but rather, it constitutes a social fact that reflects the dominant moral and cultural values of a given society. In countries with a Catholic majority, these values are shaped, among other things, by the Catholic Church, which—although formally separated from the state—plays a significant formative role for its faithful. These faithful, as citizens, participate in democratic political and legislative processes, which means that the Church’s influence on law may be indirect, yet substantial.

Although this article does not directly adopt the paradigm of “morality policy” studies, it is worth noting that the political science literature frequently identifies the Catholic Church as an actor influencing legislation in moral matters, particularly in Western Europe (see Engeli et al. 2012; Knill and Preidel 2015; Grzymała-Busse 2015). From a legal perspective, the Catholic Church appears more as a source of social internalization of values than as a direct participant in political processes; nevertheless, these values may indirectly shape the content of binding legal norms. The legal perspective proposed here does not compete with the political science approach but complements it by indicating that legal systems in Catholic countries may incorporate moral and ethical norms derived from Church doctrine, not necessarily as a result of formal lobbying, but through the formation of citizens’ consciences.

In this context, the Catholic Church acts as a global normative institution which, through catechesis, pastoral care, and social teaching, shapes the collective moral beliefs of the faithful. These faithful, as voters and participants in public life, may support legislative solutions consistent with Church teaching, thus rendering the Church a real, albeit informal, participant in the legislative sphere. This influence is particularly visible in areas such as bioethics, public morality, or the definition of family life.

A clear example is the Church’s teaching on conscience and the role of Catholic ethics in everyday life (John Paul II 1995, no. 72), as well as the Church’s stance on issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage. The Catechism of the Catholic Church unequivocally condemns abortion as a grave sin and as the taking of human life from the moment of conception (Catechism of the Catholic Church 1992, nos. 2270–2275), rejects euthanasia as a morally unacceptable shortening of life (Catechism of the Catholic Church 1992, no. 2277), and defines marriage exclusively as a covenant between a man and a woman, rejecting the legalization of same-sex unions (Catechism of the Catholic Church 1992, nos. 2357–2359). Although theological in content, these positions may influence the shape of law—especially in states where a significant portion of society identifies with Church teaching.

The Catholic Church derives its prohibitions against abortion, contraception, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage from its own doctrinal foundations, grounding them in theological principles and Catholic moral teaching. The Catholic Church firmly opposes abortion and euthanasia as a violation of the dignity of human life, emphasizing the immutability of its teaching on the value of human life (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1987, no. 5). On the one hand, the Catholic Church responds to the challenges of an increasingly globalized and secularized society by striving to keep pace with its transformations (Second Vatican Council, Gaudium Et Spes 1965, no. 21); on the other hand, it faces criticism, particularly in the context of allegations of reinforcing gender inequality, discriminating against LGBTQ+ individuals, and resisting women’s rights, especially concerning birth control and abortion. The Catholic Church tries to establish a dialogue with each person but with a moral stance that, according to Pope Francis, can be difficult in the context of modern interpretations of equality (Francis 2016, Amoris Laetitia, no. 56).

Ecclesiology plays a key role in understanding this influence, as it not only examines the nature of the Church and its spiritual character, but it also reflects upon its socio-political role in the world (Przybylski 1959). In this context, the Church, through its teachings and spiritual authority, shapes not only the religious life of its faithful but also exerts influence on the legal systems in which they operate. Ecclesiology provides insight into how such influence is transmitted at not only a spiritual level but also in the context of politics and legislation in Catholic countries. Within this discipline, the Church is viewed not only as a community of believers but also as an institution with a tangible impact on the development of morality and law in society. Therefore, the Church plays a significant role in shaping legal systems in Catholic countries (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace 2004, no. 143). The Church not only promotes its values at the spiritual level, but it also affects civil law, influencing legislative decisions on ethical and moral matters such as abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage (John Paul II 1981, no. 29). This influence is not merely the result of lobbying activities but rather stems from deeply rooted theological foundations that shape its positions on issues of life, morality, conscience, and ethics. Ecclesiology helps explain how the Church functions not only as a spiritual institution but also as an active normative actor, exerting real influence over legal structures in Catholic states by shaping the moral and political domains. As such, the Church as an institution impacts the legal systems of Catholic countries, shaping both the spiritual and political spheres.

4. The Role of Natural Law in Catholic Legal Doctrine

In legal philosophy, the following two fundamental approaches to law are traditionally distinguished, encompassing a variety of sub-theories: legal positivism, which developed in the 19th century, and natural law theory, whose origins may be traced back to antiquity (Oniszczuk 2012, p. 38; Billier and Maryioli 2000). Some scholars also identify intermediate positions, such as the school of “soft positivism” represented by Herbert Hart (Pietrzykowski 2001). The essential differences between these two principal traditions lie in their understanding of the source of law, its connection with morality, and the role of statutory law. The Catholic Church and its affiliated legal philosophers, due to their reference to values derived directly from God, are aligned with the natural law tradition. Among the most influential representatives of this current within the Church are St. Augustine (Augustine 2012, XIX.17) and St. Thomas Aquinas (Aquinas 2018, I–II, q. 90, a. 1). These theological concepts—such as natural law, the idea that man is created in the image and likeness of God, and the commandment “Thou shalt not kill”—are rooted in Scripture: Romans 2:14–15, Genesis 1:26–27, and Exodus 20:13.

In light of the present article’s objective, it is necessary to outline the concept of natural law, which has profoundly influenced the doctrinal development of the Catholic Church. The idea of natural law appears as early as the fifth century in the writings of St. Augustine, whose views dominated Christian thought until the thirteenth century, when the theory of St. Thomas Aquinas emerged.

This study focuses on the most relevant elements of the natural law philosophy developed within the Catholic tradition, while omitting peripheral aspects unrelated to the research problem or to contemporary Catholic teaching. St. Thomas Aquinas, a disciple of St. Albert the Great and a representative of Latin Aristotelianism, sought to reconcile Aristotle’s philosophy with Scripture (Oniszczuk 2012, p. 115). According to Aquinas (Aquinas 2018, I–II, q. 90, a. 1), the following four types of law can be distinguished: human, divine, eternal, and natural law. Human law must conform to natural law, which, for Aquinas, consists of universal and immutable moral principles discernible by reason.

Civil and public law, as forms of human legislation, must therefore comply with moral principles. The concept of natural law is referenced explicitly in John Paul II’s Apostolic Constitution (John Paul II 1992), which affirms that natural law—inscribed in human nature and accessible through reason—is universal and binding upon all. Hence, man-made law must meet the following criteria: it must be enacted by proper authority, conform to divine law, be just, and serve the common good. Civil and public law, as subsets of human law, are equally subject to these requirements.

Additionally, the doctrine of the Catholic Church places significant emphasis on human dignity. According to its teachings, every individual possesses inalienable dignity by virtue of having been created in the image and likeness of God. This dignity is the primary source of all human rights, which are considered inherent, that is, they belong to the individual by nature, regardless of their recognition by the state or society.

Human rights are also recognized and particularly protected within the Catholic Church. Since 1983, when the new Code of Canon Law entered into force, such protection has gained a formal foundation within canon law (Sztychmiler 2003, p. 190). According to Canon 221 § 1, all the faithful have the right to vindicate and defend the rights they possess in the Church before the competent ecclesiastical forum (Code of Canon Law 1983). However, it should be emphasized—as will be elaborated on in later sections of this paper—that the Catholic Church interprets certain human rights differently than, for example, the European Court of Human Rights. Notwithstanding the above, it can be stated that the Catholic Church—or more accurately, Christianity—also had an influence on the development of human rights concepts in the 20th century, particularly when taking into account the fact that the concept of human rights in the 20th century was developed primarily by Christian states, including both Catholic and Protestant ones.

When considering the assumptions of natural law, one cannot omit reference to the so-called “new natural law” theory, initiated in the 1960s by Germain Grisez. It should first be noted that the propositions advanced by proponents of this philosophy are adapted to contemporary reality and are intended to reconcile natural law with current challenges. Therefore, full incorporation of all the tenets of the new natural law would alter the Catholic Church’s approach to the issues discussed in this article. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the concept of new natural law faces considerable criticism, including claims that it should not be considered a doctrine of natural law at all (Miętek 2008, pp. 280–81) or that it constitutes a so-called “baptized version of Kantianism” (Wolfe 2006, p. 171). Due to the extensive criticism of this doctrine, and the lukewarm reception it has received from leading figures of the Catholic Church, further analysis of its principles within this article should, at least for now and until it gains broader acceptance, be limited.

Finally, when analyzing the influence of natural law on the doctrine of the Catholic Church, it is impossible to ignore critical voices, as even numerous members of the Church oppose its official doctrine. One example is the case of Charles Curran, who was dismissed from the Catholic University of America in Washington in 1986 for promoting views contrary to the teachings of the Catholic Church (Nowosad 2022, p. 247). However, due to the limited impact of dissenting voices on the official doctrine of the Catholic Church, further discussion of such objections in this article should remain limited.

5. Rejections of Natural Law in Postmodern and Critical Legal Studies Thought

Postmodernism and Critical Legal Studies (CLS) are two intellectual currents that have significantly challenged the traditional understanding of law, including the concept of natural law. Although they differ in many respects, both currents are united in their fundamental critique of the objectivity, universality, and neutrality of law, which are principles that have always underpinned natural law theory. Since both schools of thought gained prominence during the rise of contemporary human rights concepts, they played a pivotal role in shaping practical approaches to this area. Given the importance of human rights in the context of this study, a discussion of both is necessary.

Postmodernism emerged as a response to the social crisis arising in Western societies alongside the advent of so-called “modernity” (Oniszczuk 2012, p. 824). It is associated with the breakdown of a rationalist worldview and the decline of the Cartesian ratio, the rise of middle-class dominance and relativism, and the erosion of formerly respected moral values. Closely linked to postmodernism is a critique of science, particularly the belief that reason and scientific inquiry can provide an objective, certain, and universal foundation for knowledge (Oniszczuk 2012, p. 833). According to the literature, postmodernists argue that traditional conceptions of science and its relationship to society are unfounded, asserting that science not only fails to solve real societal problems but may in fact exacerbate them (Peno 2017, p. 64). Among the key representatives of postmodernism whose views align with the aforementioned assertions, one must identify, inter alia, Jean-François Lyotard, who claimed that grand narratives lost their credibility following the Holocaust, Stalinism, and the rise of technology (Lyotard 1979); Jacques Derrida, who questioned the possibility of objective and universal access to truth or morality (Derrida 1967); and Michel Foucault, whose concept of power–knowledge demonstrated how what is treated as objective scientific knowledge is in fact produced through specific power relations and serves to reinforce them (Foucault 1980).

From the perspective of natural law theory, the critique centers on its assumption of the existence of universal, immutable, and rationally knowable moral principles that form the foundation of positive law. These principles are considered independent of human legislators or culture and derive from divine order, human nature, or reason. In contrast, postmodernism expresses deep skepticism toward grand narratives and universal truths. It emphasizes the fragmentary, subjective, and localized nature of knowledge. Regarding law, postmodernism rejects the idea of law as objective and neutral, viewing it instead as a social construct embedded in specific cultural, historical, and political contexts. Thus, its critique of natural law arises from a rejection of universal concepts of truth and morality, the Enlightenment belief in reason as a source of objective knowledge, and the emphasis on language as a tool for constructing reality.

Critical Legal Studies, an academic movement originating in the United States, draws from Marxism, postmodernism, and critical theory. The literature emphasizes that CLS scholars view law as neither objective, neutral, nor determinate. Instead, law is seen as reinforcing existing power structures and hierarchies while concealing internal contradictions. By rigidly classifying legal subjects, it suppresses individuality, and through the reification of concepts and ideas, it imposes a specific mode of thought. Consequently, law is considered deeply unjust (Cabaj 2013, p. 24).

The CLS critique of natural law can be summarized in three main arguments. First, CLS views natural law as an ideological façade designed to mask the arbitrariness and political nature of positive law. Referring to “nature” or “reason” is seen as a strategy for legitimizing particular values and interests as “objective” and “beyond question.” Duncan Kennedy, one of the representatives of the CLS movement, even asserted that law is permeated by politics (Klare 2001, pp. 1074–75). Second, CLS rejects the notion of natural law as a coherent and universal moral code, arguing instead that law is inherently contradictory and must be understood as a collection of conflicting norms and concepts, interpreted variably depending on the interpreter’s interests and position (see Unger 1983). Third, CLS holds that the moral principles underpinning natural law reflect the interests of dominant social groups and thus cannot be objective.

Both postmodernism and CLS criticize natural law theory. This critique stems from their differing reasoning approaches and evolving value priorities. Representatives of both schools treat law as a discourse of power rather than a reflection of “eternal truths” or divine law. Because these theories developed alongside the evolution of human rights discourse, they played an influential role in shaping human rights interpretations. As they oppose the natural law tradition, many doctrinal positions and judicial rulings of the second half of the twentieth century reflect perspectives aligned with these movements. Nonetheless, despite substantial criticism from both, natural law theory persisted and continued to develop—including within the Catholic Church doctrine.

6. Conflicting Values: Natural Law and Human Rights in the Catholic Perspective

This article addresses the issue of the influence of the Catholic Church on the legal regulations of both civil and public law aspects of human life by the state. It is therefore necessary to analyze the most controversial issues that clearly illustrate this influence. These three areas are abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage. In order to demonstrate the Catholic Church’s impact, both the Church’s position and that of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on human rights will be presented.

Human rights form one of the foundations of the modern international legal order. The first instrument directly addressing the formulation of human rights was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 217/III A on 10 December 1948 in Paris (United Nations General Assembly 1948). This declaration consists of 30 articles and, although non-binding as a UN resolution, it constitutes a fundamental contribution to human rights discourse. It served as the basis for adopting the following two major international treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, both ratified by over 170 countries. Together, the declaration and these treaties are referred to as the International Bill of Human Rights (Kędzia 2018, p. 18).

Beyond global treaties, there are also regional human rights instruments. The most important treaty in Europe is the European Convention on Human Rights (1953), which was ratified by over 40 states. Article 19 of this Convention establishes the European Court of Human Rights. Based on the ECtHR’s case law, conclusions can be drawn about how the three controversial issues are assessed in light of human rights.

The first issue is abortion. According to ECtHR jurisprudence, abortion is not an absolute human right. Given the Court’s recognition of the protection of unborn life, states retain a certain margin of appreciation in regulating access to abortion. States should also consider the diverse moral and religious values present in European societies. The ECtHR acknowledges that no one can be forced to undergo an abortion, as confirmed in G.M. and Others v. Moldova (European Court of Human Rights 2022). The Court also does not recognize a “right to euthanasia” or a “right to assisted suicide” as standalone human rights derived from the Convention. Its jurisprudence asserts that the right to life does not entail a “right to die,” as stated in Dániel Karsai v. Hungary (European Court of Human Rights 2024). Nonetheless, the Court allows for the possibility that states may legalize euthanasia provided that adequate safeguards are established.

Initially, the ECtHR also did not recognize same-sex marriage as an absolute human right (i.e., the right to marry). However, over the years, its case law has evolved. Currently, the ECtHR consistently rules that the complete lack of legal recognition and protection for same-sex couples violates the right to respect for private and family life and the prohibition of discrimination. This means that states have a duty to introduce legal provisions that allow same-sex couples to formalize their unions and enjoy associated rights and obligations, even if not in the form of marriage. In Przybyszewska and Others v. Poland, the Court stated: “The Court considers that the respondent State has overstepped its margin of appreciation and has failed to comply with its positive obligation to ensure that the applicants had a specific legal framework providing for the recognition and protection of their same-sex unions” (European Court of Human Rights 2023).

The Catholic Church’s stance on euthanasia and abortion is presented in the encyclical Evangelium Vitae issued by Pope John Paul II (John Paul II 1995). In it, the Pope wrote: “False prophets and false teachers have had the greatest success. Aside from intentions, which can be varied and perhaps can seem convincing at times, especially if presented in the name of solidarity, we are in fact faced by an objective ‘conspiracy against life’, involving even international Institutions, engaged in encouraging and carrying out actual campaigns to make contraception, sterilization and abortion widely available. Nor can it be denied that the mass media are often implicated in this conspiracy, by lending credit to that culture which presents recourse to contraception, sterilization, abortion and even euthanasia as a mark of progress and a victory of freedom, while depicting as enemies of freedom and progress those positions which are unreservedly pro-life.” In a similar tone, the Pastoral Constitution of 1965 also addresses abortion and euthanasia: “Furthermore, whatever is opposed to life itself, such as any type of murder, genocide, abortion, euthanasia or wilful self-destruction, whatever violates the integrity of the hu-man person, such as mutilation, torments inflicted on body or mind, attempts to coerce the will itself; whatever insults human dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary imprisonment, deportation, slavery, prostitution, the selling of women and children; as well as disgraceful working conditions, where men are treated as mere tools for profit, ra-ther than as free and responsible persons; all these things and others of their like are infa-mies indeed” (Gaudium Et Spes 1965).

According to Catholic teaching, expressed in Evangelium Vitae (John Paul II 1995, no. 72), human life should be unconditionally protected. Therefore, the Church firmly opposes both abortion and euthanasia.

Euthanasia and abortion are also considered impermissible in the Catechism of the Catholic Church. Paragraphs 2270–2275 affirm that “human life must be respected and protected absolutely from the moment of conception” and that “since the first century the Church has affirmed the moral evil of every procured abortion” (Catechism of the Catholic Church 1992, nos. 2270–2271). In paragraphs 2276–2279, the Catechism of the Catholic Church condemns euthanasia, stating that: “Whatever its motives and means, direct euthanasia consists in putting an end to the lives of handicapped, sick, or dying persons. It is morally unacceptable” (Catechism of the Catholic Church 1992, no. 2277).

In this context, the influence of the doctrine of natural law is also evident. According to the position of the Catholic Church, it is believed that man was created in the image and likeness of God. Therefore, only God has the authority to decide when life should end, and human law—as already indicated—must conform both to divine law and to natural law.

In the context of same-sex marriage, the Church’s position derives directly from the Scriptures. According to the Book of Genesis (1:27–28; 2:24), God created man and woman and commanded them to be fruitful and multiply. From this passage, the Church concludes that same-sex marriages are impermissible, as they cannot lead to procreation. This view has been held since the early days of the Church, including in Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Romans (Rom 1:26–27).

The Catechism of the Catholic Church addresses same-sex marriages (homosexual couples) in paragraphs 2357–2359 and indirectly in paragraphs 1601 and 1603. It declares that “tradition has always declared that homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered” (Catechism of the Catholic Church 1992, no. 2357). Furthermore, the same paragraph states that same-sex unions “are contrary to the natural law” (Catechism of the Catholic Church 1992, no. 2357). Since human law cannot be in contradiction with natural law—among others, according to the teachings of Thomas Aquinas—same-sex marriages cannot be considered legally permissible.

The Catholic Church’s position on these selected controversial issues—euthanasia, abortion, and same-sex marriage—is unequivocally negative. It stems from the Church’s longstanding tradition, the views of its foremost thinkers, and the Scriptures. It should also be emphasized, as previously noted, that among members of the Church, there are, of course, numerous individuals who do not agree with its official doctrine and who propose their own point of view or who support the Church’s position while presenting their own reasoning in its defense. Nevertheless, since—despite internal pressure—the Church’s official stance on euthanasia, abortion, and same-sex marriage, as well as the rationale underlying this position, has not changed to date, further analysis of this internal debate within the Catholic Church in this regard shall be omitted. It may be noted, however, that the issue of doctrinal disagreement within the Catholic Church concerning abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage is a topic that could itself warrant a separate article.

The ECtHR, on the other hand, adopts a different perspective. It notes that abortion and euthanasia are not human rights per se and that states have discretion in regulating them. However, it does not assert that abortion and euthanasia must be banned; rather, it acknowledges that states may choose to prohibit them. In contrast, the ECtHR’s stance on same-sex unions has evolved to impose a positive obligation on states to provide legal recognition and protection, even if not in the form of marriage.

When considering the case law of the ECtHR, it is also worth noting that, in some countries, a debate is currently underway regarding the possible denunciation of the Convention. One such country is the United Kingdom. The first indications of an intention to denounce the Convention appeared there as early as after the 2005 terrorist attacks (Magliveras and Naldi 2013, p. 96). In some states, attempts are also being considered to avoid the consequences of implementing ECtHR judgments without formally withdrawing from the Convention, that is, without denouncing it in accordance with applicable law (see in detail Tyagi 2008, pp. 123–33). Poland serves as an example, where the Constitutional Tribunal has examined the compatibility of the Convention with the national constitution (Wiącek 2025, pp. 186–87).

Despite these developments, it must be emphasized that the influence of ECtHR jurisprudence on the judicial practice of domestic courts remains significant.

7. A Comparative Legal Analysis of Bioethical Norms in Poland, France, and The Netherlands

The selection of countries for this analysis is based on a purposive and typological comparison of cases. It is not intended to be representative, but rather, it is intended to highlight three clearly distinct institutional and axiological models within which the doctrine of the Catholic Church operates. Each of the countries analyzed represents a different Weberian type of configuration in the relationship between Church and state, allowing for a systematic examination of the influence of Catholic teaching on legislation in diverse legal and cultural contexts.

The Netherlands exemplifies a model of pluralistic secularization, grounded in procedural secularism, worldview pluralism, and a pragmatic approach to bioethical issues shaped by social consensus and the liberal neutrality of the state (Kennedy and Zwemer 2010, pp. 237–39). Key legal acts codifying this approach include the Termination of Pregnancy Act (1984), the Euthanasia Act (2001), and the Civil Marriage (Amendment) Act (2001), which legalized same-sex marriage (Netherlands 1984, Termination of Pregnancy Act 1984; Netherlands 2001, Euthanasia Act 2001; Netherlands 2000, Civil Marriage Act 2000).

France, although historically closely tied to Catholicism, currently embodies a strict laïcité model, based on the constitutional principle of secularism and the 1905 law on the separation of Church and state. This model is characterized not only by institutional separation but also by the emancipation of public reason from religious normative justifications (Sandberg and Doe 2007, pp. 8–10). This secular model is reflected in legal milestones such as the Veil Act of 1975 (legalizing abortion), the Loi n° 2013-404 of 2013 (introducing same-sex marriage), and the Claeys–Leonetti Law of 2016 (permitting terminal sedation) (France 1975, Loi Veil 1975; France 2013, Loi n° 2013-404, 2013; France 2016, Loi n° 2016-87, 2016).

Poland serves as an example of the concordat model, in which the Catholic Church retains a dominant cultural position and exerts significant influence on public debate. Despite formal separation, Church–state relations are cooperative in nature and are governed by the 1993 Concordat (Poland 1993b). The Church’s position is also rooted in its historical role as the guardian of national identity and as an opponent of totalitarian regimes (Northmore-Ball and Evans 2016, pp. 45–46). In contrast to the liberal regimes in France and the Netherlands, Polish legislation remains restrictive, notably through the Family Planning Act of 1993 (restricting abortion), the Criminal Code of 1997 (criminalizing euthanasia), and the Family and Guardianship Code (defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman) (Poland 1993a, Act of 7 January 1993; Poland 1997a, Criminal Code 1997; Poland 1964, Family and Guardianship Code 1964).

This case selection is exploratory in nature and serves as a starting point for further in-depth comparative analyses involving other European countries. Future research will aim to include, inter alia, Spain, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the continuum of Church–state relations in the context of bioethics and law.

At the level of the European Union, bioethical issues are not harmonized, as pursuant to the principle of subsidiarity, they fall within the exclusive competence of the Member States. The EU promotes values such as individual autonomy, dignity, equality, and non-discrimination, as reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. While the Charter does not directly regulate abortion or euthanasia, it guarantees the right to bodily integrity, freedom of conscience, and a prohibition of discrimination, provisions which may serve as benchmarks when assessing domestic regulations. Both the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights increasingly rely on these values when reviewing the actions of Member States.

The divergence in the interpretation of bioethical values between national legal systems and EU recommendations is particularly evident in the Polish legal order, especially regarding reproductive rights and the rights of LGBT+ persons. While, formally, the Union does not interfere in domestic legal frameworks, case law from the CJEU and ECtHR, combined with political and financial mechanisms, may exert pressure on states to liberalize regulations that conflict with European human rights standards. As a Member State of the European Union, Poland must ensure compliance with fundamental human rights, the interpretation of which continues to evolve in line with the transformation of European values.

The position of the Catholic Church on abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage is doctrinally coherent and is unambiguously articulated in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which serves as the Church’s official teaching document. The Church adopts a critical stance toward abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex unions, designating them as sinful acts. Deane observes that, according to Catholic teaching, abortion constitutes a rejection of the commitment to live within God’s created order and represents the complete antithesis of sacramentality, as it destroys the presence of God (Deane 2023, pp. 102–5). The incompatibility of abortion with Church doctrine is also clearly expressed in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which states that both direct participation in and formal cooperation with abortion entail the canonical penalty of excommunication (Catechism of the Catholic Church 1992, nos. 2270–2273). According to Catholic doctrine, abortion is categorically prohibited, based on the conviction that human life begins at the moment of conception. Marriage, in the Church’s doctrinal understanding, is a sacrament between a man and a woman and serves as the foundational unit of societies structured around the family. As such, it is intended to promote demographic growth, which is an objective that same-sex unions do not fulfill (Knill and Preidel 2015, pp. 374–90). With respect to euthanasia, the Catechism does not provide an absolute condemnation, particularly in cases involving the withdrawal of extraordinary or disproportionate medical treatment, provided there is no intention to cause death. On the contrary, the Church affirms that suffering—even in the context of terminal illness—has spiritual value (Catechism of the Catholic Church 1992, nos. 2277–2279). Finally, the Catechism defines marriage explicitly as a union between a man and a woman and views same-sex relationships as contrary to natural law. While it calls for individuals with same-sex attraction to be treated with respect and compassion, it firmly states that such unions cannot be approved or tolerated (Catechism of the Catholic Church 1992, nos. 2357–2359). This understanding of marriage is not merely sacramental but also involves a moral and pedagogical dimension, as evidenced by the Church’s emphasis on formation and preparation for marriage as a lifelong moral commitment (Dudziak 2024).

Differences between the state and the Church are also evident in the field of bioethics. Catholic bioethics differ radically from secular bioethics in its understanding of human autonomy, which is of fundamental importance for bioethical legislation. Autonomy refers to individual freedom—the right to choose what is best for oneself—and plays a significant role in secular bioethics. The Catholic view of the acting human person also focuses on free will, emphasizing the belief that God created us free so that we may choose. Thus, the human being is a steward of the body, not its absolute owner, and should be morally accountable to God for their choices; this is also the foundation of human dignity (Catechism of the Catholic Church 1992, no. 356).

Poland, as a country with a predominantly Catholic population, is characterized by a strong interconnection between Catholic ethics and the legislative process. According to the 2021 National Census, approximately 27 million Poles declare affiliation with the Catholic Church, representing 71.3% of the population (Statistics Poland 2025). In the realm of bioethics, this influence is most visible in the restrictive regulations concerning the termination of pregnancy. The topic has sparked extensive debate on both moral and legal grounds, transcending political or social sentiment; the legal permissibility of abortion has been a point of contention for decades.

Following the political transformation of 1989, the Catholic religion re-entered public life, including the education system and constitutional and legislative debates. The Catholic Church, which has consistently opposed abortion, regards it as a violation of the Fifth Commandment: ”Thou shalt not kill”. Contraception, in vitro fertilization, and prenatal testing have also been contested as practices inconsistent with Church teaching (Borowik and Koralewska 2018, pp. 206–10).

The Act on the Conditions for the Permissibility of Termination of Pregnancy, enacted on 27 April 1956 (Poland 1956, Act of 27 April 1956), allowed abortion under the following three grounds: medical indications concerning the woman or the fetus, difficult living conditions of the woman, and suspected criminal origin of the pregnancy confirmed by a prosecutor’s certificate. Until 1959, physicians were obliged to verify women’s declarations regarding their living conditions. Subsequently, abortion became permissible upon the request of the pregnant woman. It was not until after the regime change in 1989 and the commencement of parliamentary democratization that attempts were made to tighten the law, which was a process driven, in part, by pressures from the Catholic Church (Szelewa 2017, p. 12).

With the entry into force of the Family Planning, Human Fetus Protection, and Conditions for Permissibility of Termination of Pregnancy Act of 7 January 1993 (Poland 1993a, Act of 7 January 1993), the previously liberal approach was restricted. The so-called “abortion compromise,” based on three permissible grounds, initially included an economic hardship ground introduced by an amendment in 1996 (Poland 1996, Act of 30 August 1996), which was found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal a year later (Poland 1997b, Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of 28 May 1997, K 26/96). Following the landmark 2020 ruling (Poland 2020, Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of 22 October 2020, K 1/20), Polish abortion law became one of the most restrictive in Europe. Under the current framework, abortion is permitted only in cases where the pregnancy results from a criminal act, such as rape, incest, or sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of 15, or when the woman’s life or health is at risk.

An argument that advanced in support of the Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling was Article 38 of the Polish Constitution, which guarantees the legal protection of life for every human being. The provision was interpreted broadly, extending its personal scope to include every human being. A dissenting opinion was submitted by two judges—Leon Kieres and Piotr Pszczółkowski—who argued that the majority of the bench had drawn an overly far-reaching conclusion by granting themselves the right to interpret the provision in such an extensive manner (Soniewicka 2021, pp. 8–9).

According to data gathered by supporters of abortion law liberalization, in 2024, 896 legal abortions were performed in Poland, on grounds relating to criminal acts or threats to the life of the pregnant woman. In 2023, this number stood at 425. These procedures were accessible in only 7 out of 16 provinces, which contributed to the growing phenomenon of “abortion tourism” to more liberal jurisdictions, such as the Czech Republic or Germany. The dominant form was medical abortion, most often supported by non-governmental organizations, with only around 2% conducted within the public healthcare system (Aborcja Bez Granic 2023).

Another area directly tied to the right to life, freedom of choice, and bodily autonomy is euthanasia. The concept dates back to antiquity, where it was understood as a “good death”, painless and free from suffering (Pacian et al. 2014, pp. 19–21). Today, the following two main types are distinguished: passive euthanasia, understood as the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment, and active euthanasia, which involves deliberately hastening death (Grabowska and Chodorowska 2018, p. 178).

Under Polish law, euthanasia is classified as a privileged form of homicide and is criminalized under the Criminal Code of 6 June 1997 (Poland 1997a, Act of 6 June 1997). This regulation is a continuation of earlier laws and decrees aimed at protecting human life. Unlike abortion, euthanasia has never been permitted in any form, regardless of the historical period. According to data from the Polish National Police, no such crimes were initiated or recorded in either 2023 or 2024 (Polish Police 2025).

Moreover, active euthanasia is explicitly prohibited by the Polish Code of Medical Ethics, which, in exceptional end-of-life cases, allows for passive forms (Poland 2004). This is supplemented by the Act on Patient Rights and the Patient Ombudsman of 2008 (Poland 2008, Act of 2008), which grants patients, among others, the right to die in peace and dignity and the right to pain management.

Therefore, it should be emphasized that Polish law does not always criminalize such conduct, particularly where persistent therapy is refused. Nevertheless, many physicians invoke conscientious objection, often motivated by their religious beliefs and worldview. According to Christian doctrine and in accordance with the encyclical of John Paul II, life is the greatest gift from God, and euthanasia is regarded as inherently evil, alongside abortion and suicide (John Paul II 1993). Thus, euthanasia cannot be framed as a “good” death. Moreover, suffering, in the understanding of Church teaching, is not only inevitable but also temporary; it is emphasized that even God, as the supreme being, partakes in suffering. Euthanasia, which is also portrayed as an escape from suffering and the destruction of life as the highest value, distances the individual from salvation (Best et al. 2022, pp. 4768–70). Physicians are entitled not to withdraw treatment; for many, such actions contradict their convictions, as they view euthanasia as either an escape from suffering or an acceleration of the inevitable and are, therefore, in direct opposition to divine will (Skura-Madziała 2009, pp. 32–33).

In Poland, the status of LGBT+ individuals and the lack of access to same-sex marriage remain contentious issues. Both the Constitution and the Family and Guardianship Code adopt a heteronormative model of marriage. Membership in the European Union or the Council of Europe does not oblige Poland to legalize such unions; however, international human rights standards—including the European Convention on Human Rights—promote equality before the law and prohibit discrimination. These standards often serve as the basis for ECtHR rulings challenging domestic legal practices. The activities of the Roman Catholic Church, which strongly opposes the demands of LGBT+ communities, significantly influence public attitudes and the positions of political decision-makers. In Poland, the reconciliation of Church values with European trends, particularly in terms of the moral and legal permissibility of same-sex marriage, poses a considerable challenge (Zawadzka 2022, pp. 44–45). In the face of such legislative shifts, scholars have examined how the Catholic Church navigates tensions between traditional doctrine and evolving societal norms. For instance, in the Italian context, Adelaide Madera highlights the Church’s struggle to maintain doctrinal consistency amid growing legal pluralism and the civil redefinition of marriage (Madera 2022).

The Kingdom of the Netherlands, by contrast, is a country where Christians constitute a clear minority, contributing to a high level of secularization; as of 2023, Catholics made up approximately 23% of the population (CBS 2021). This demographic structure results in a lack of legislative implementation of Catholic values. The Dutch are commonly regarded as an open and progressive society, often pioneering legislation in ethically sensitive areas. Now, abortion in the Netherlands is legal up to the 24th week of pregnancy, subject to the following specific procedural conditions: the pregnancy must place the woman in a “difficult situation,” must not exceed 24 weeks, and the physician must be satisfied that the decision was made voluntarily. Moreover, the procedure must be performed by a licensed physician after a mandatory five-day reflection period, which may be waived if the pregnancy is under six weeks (Netherlands 1984, Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1984, Arts. 3–6). Despite its liberal abortion law, the Netherlands reports one of the lowest abortion rates among countries where the procedure is legal; according to the 2023 statistics of the Health and Youth Care Inspectorate, 39,332 abortions were recorded (DutchNews.nl 2024). This state of affairs is also influenced by technological progress and the centering of standards around the needs of women; factors such as sexual education, access to contraception, and a system of reliable, voluntary abortion are also significant (Silvestre 2022, p. 3). Recent academic criticism of the law primarily concerns the need for women to prove their distress and comply with the waiting period, often labeled as “patriarchal” and outdated (Borkowska 2024, pp. 56–57).

Additionally, since 2002, euthanasia has been permissible in the Netherlands, provided that certain criteria are met, such as incurability, persistent patient suffering, and the patient’s informed consent. Since 2000, euthanasia has also been permitted for minors, with parental consent required for individuals under the age of 16 (Stankiewicz 2010, p. 215). The complexity of this procedure in children led to pressure for the adoption of guidelines under which the deliberate ending of life is permitted in exceptional cases. According to the Groningen Protocol, the following three categories of children are distinguished: those with no chance of survival despite intensive medical care; those who may survive through ongoing intensive therapy but have extremely poor prognoses; and those who will survive without intensive care but are expected to suffer greatly and have a very low quality of life. Although the guidelines were initially accepted by the Danes, the Netherlands played a significant role in revising the protocol in 2016 and in introducing five criteria for carrying out this procedure in children (Wach 2020, pp. 60–62). Despite the ongoing secularization of Dutch society, in 1999—a year before the legalization of euthanasia for minors under the age of 16—the Dutch Bishops’ Conference issued a statement opposing such extensive legalization of the procedure. However, due to the Church’s limited influence, the opposition failed to produce the desired effect (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1980). The scholarly literature identifies the Netherlands as a global pioneer in euthanasia legislation. As with abortion, which was not always accessible, euthanasia had been criminalized under the Dutch Penal Code until 2001. The campaign for legal reform eventually led to the adoption of one of the most liberal euthanasia frameworks worldwide (Lipowski and Wiliński 2021, pp. 97–98). In 2023, a total of 9068 euthanasia cases were reported, including 138 based on psychiatric conditions (Regional Euthanasia Review Committees 2023, p. 12). The current increase in cases of euthanasia in the Netherlands may be attributed to the aging of the population and growing social acceptance of the practice. Nevertheless, further research is needed on the motivations of both patients and physicians (Nivel 2019).

The Netherlands was also the first country in the European Union—and the world—to legalize same-sex marriage, enacting relevant legislation in 2001. Despite initial public resistance, opposition gradually diminished, and over time, same-sex marriage became fully accepted. It is acknowledged that legislation influenced social norms, having a positive effect on Dutch society (Lubbers et al. 2006, pp. 104–6). Furthermore, the Netherlands actively promotes EU initiatives aimed at combatting discrimination based on sexual orientation. Same-sex marriages enjoy the same legal status as heterosexual unions, including the right to adopt children, as is also the case in France (Zawadzka 2022, pp. 50–51). After 21 years of the liberal legal framework, in 2023, there were 799 marriages between men and 827 between women (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2025).

France, although historically associated with Catholicism, is one of the most secularized countries within the European Union. According to a report published in 2023 by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, covering the years 2019–2020, 29% of respondents identified as Roman Catholic, while 51% declared no religious affiliation (INSEE 2023). The principle of laïcité—secularism—was formally established by the 1905 Act on the Separation of Churches and State, and its constitutional foundations are found in Article 1 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, which states that France is an indivisible, secular, democratic, and social Republic (France 1958, Constitution, Art. 1). In practice, this principle excludes any formal influence of the Church—including the Catholic Church—on the legislative process. Although Catholicism remains a declared religion for a portion of the population, it no longer holds normative authority, having been replaced by positive law grounded in republican values and human rights. For instance, the positions adopted by the French Conference of Bishops opposing both the legalization of same-sex marriage and the constitutionalization of abortion rights were not reflected in political decisions (France 2023, Conference of Bishops).

Abortion was legalized in France in 1975 through the so-called Veil Act (Loi Veil). In 2022, the statutory time limit for the voluntary termination of pregnancy was extended to 14 weeks of gestation. In 2024, France became the first country in the world to enshrine the right to abortion in its Constitution, declaring it a fundamental right of women. The constitutional provision states that the law guarantees a woman’s freedom to access the voluntary termination of pregnancy (France [1958] 2024), Constitution 1958, as amended in 2024). This constitutionalization exemplifies the dominance of secular and individualistic reasoning over the doctrine of natural law within the French legal framework. According to the analysis, the number of abortions in France remained stable at approximately 220,000 per year but increased the following year (Chaput and Baril 2024, pp. 2–3). According to data published by INED, 242,000 abortions were performed in France in 2023, with higher rates reported in regions such as Paris and the Côte d’Azur, primarily due to disparities in access to specialized medical personnel (France 2024, INED).

Civil partnerships were legalized in 1999 under the Civil Solidarity Pact (Pacte civil de solidarité—PACS), while same-sex marriage was legalized in 2013 (France 2013, Loi n° 2013-404, 2013). This legal development occurred despite strong opposition from conservative and Catholic groups (Zawadzka 2022, pp. 48–49). The Catholic Church explicitly criticized the legislation, but its objections did not influence parliamentary outcomes. In 2023, a decade after legalization, 7000 individuals entered into same-sex marriages, out of a total of 242,000 marriages recorded in that year (INSEE 2024). According to an economic study conducted by the CNRS analyzing the impact of same-sex marriage legalization on social attitudes, it was concluded that legal changes can lead to greater social acceptance, especially when the new law aligns with the social norms of a given community (CNRS 2023).

France has not legalized active euthanasia. However, since 2005, the Leonetti Act has permitted passive euthanasia, which is the right to refuse life-prolonging treatment. This right was further extended in the 2016 Claeys–Leonetti Act, which introduced the legal possibility of terminal sedation (France 2016, Loi n° 2016-87). In 2024, a legislative proposal was introduced to allow assisted suicide in cases of incurable suffering, marking a further development of French bioethical law (Le Monde 2025). Nonetheless, active euthanasia remains classified under French criminal law as homicide, which is punishable under the Penal Code. Passive euthanasia, by contrast, is not subject to criminal sanctions. This distinction arises from the interpretation of homicide as a material offence; thus, omissions, which are characteristic of passive euthanasia, are not subject to penalization (Pacian et al. 2014, pp. 22–23). French law remains restrictive with regard to euthanasia, focusing instead on palliative care and patients’ rights. The author suggests that future changes may arise from the public exposure of dramatic medical cases that lead to unequal treatment by the justice system (Byk 2006, pp. 669–71). There are no legally recorded cases of active euthanasia in France, and national statistics on euthanasia-related crimes are not publicly available, unlike in Poland.

The European Union formally respects the sovereignty of its Member States in matters of bioethics; there are no unified policies concerning abortion, euthanasia, or the definition of marriage. Nevertheless, through legal instruments and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, values such as individual autonomy, human dignity, equality, and non-discrimination are actively promoted. Of particular importance is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2016), which, although it does not directly regulate abortion or euthanasia, establishes general principles concerning the protection of private life, freedom of conscience, the right to bodily integrity, and the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. In practice, these principles may influence the assessment of national laws if they are found to be in breach of EU standards for the protection of individual rights (Podlecki 2016, pp. 83–84).

Importantly, the EU approach is based on the principle of subsidiarity, while simultaneously creating “soft standards” that serve as points of reference for national societies and courts. Poland, the Netherlands, and France represent divergent models in the field of bioethics, ranging from a strongly conservative and religious approach, through pragmatic liberalism, to the secular protection of individual rights. These differences stem from each country’s historical context, legal culture, and the relationship between church and state. Although the European Union does not directly intervene in national bioethical legislation, the growing significance of values such as autonomy, equality, and dignity may in the future lead either to further harmonization or to legal and ideological clashes between Member States. The future of bioethical law in Europe is therefore likely to unfold at the intersection of national law, EU case law, and evolving social expectations with regard to human rights protection.

8. Results

The conducted analysis confirms that the Catholic Church, as an institution possessing both spiritual and social authority, plays a significant role in shaping the axiology of legal systems in countries with a Catholic heritage. Its influence does not solely stem from its presence in the public sphere but rather from a deeply rooted moral doctrine, which refers to natural law as the foundation of the legal order.

In areas of bioethical regulation such as abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage, the Church’s position remains consistent and unchanged. It is rooted in the concept of the inviolable dignity of the human person and the belief in the existence of objective moral norms, accessible through human reason and derived from the order of creation. This approach is reflected not only in doctrinal teaching but also in the social practice of forming consciences and influencing legislative decisions.

By contrast, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights reflects a procedural and pluralistic model of legal interpretation, in which the dignity of the individual and the protection of minority rights often prevail over communitarian or religious conceptions of the common good. The Court does not adopt a uniform axiological standard, but instead, it respects the autonomy of states in defining the permissible limits of bioethical regulation, while simultaneously emphasizing the prohibition of discrimination and the protection of human dignity. This tendency is particularly visible in recent jurisprudence regarding the formal recognition of same-sex unions.

The comparison of three legal systems—Poland, the Netherlands, and France—demonstrates the tangible manifestations of either the presence or absence of Catholic values in the formation of law. Poland, as a country where the Church holds a strong position, maintains restrictive regulations regarding abortion and euthanasia and does not recognize same-sex marriage. Conversely, the Netherlands and France, both secular states, have implemented wide-ranging liberalization in these areas, prioritizing individual autonomy over communitarian values.

The typological comparison confirms that the degree of institutional entanglement between Church and state significantly influences legal outcomes in bioethics. Poland represents a model of high symbolic and political alignment, resulting in laws that closely reflect Catholic moral doctrine. In contrast, France—despite its Catholic past—upholds laïcité and constitutional secularism, which limit the Church’s impact on legislation. The Netherlands exemplifies a pragmatically liberal model in which religion is largely privatized, and bioethics are regulated primarily through consensus-based public reasoning.

It is also worth noting that, in Poland, legislative changes—particularly in abortion law—have at times directly coincided with public statements and political advocacy from Church authorities, suggesting at least an indirect influence. However, the strength of this influence should not be overestimated, as broader historical, political, and constitutional factors (e.g., post-communist transformation, constitutional jurisprudence) also play a decisive role.

While the differences across systems remain significant, the future trajectory of Church–state relations in the bioethical domain is dynamic and open-ended. In the face of ongoing social transformations and the growing importance of international judiciary bodies, further interpretative divergences concerning bioethical norms may be expected, alongside the potential for the coexistence of differing axiological models. The search for common ground—particularly in the area of protecting human dignity—will be key, as it may serve as a bridge between the concept of natural law and the liberal understanding of human rights.

Ultimately, this study reveals not only institutional contrasts but also competing normative visions of personhood, autonomy, and moral responsibility. The reconciliation—or continued tension—between these visions will shape the legal landscape of bioethics in Europe for years to come.