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Games, Volume 1, Issue 2 (June 2010), Pages 66-167

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Research

Open AccessArticle The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games
Games 2010, 1(2), 66-88; doi:10.3390/g1020066
Received: 23 January 2010 / Revised: 2 April 2010 / Accepted: 8 April 2010 / Published: 15 April 2010
Cited by 2 | PDF Full-text (311 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjöström [8]. In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically
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We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjöström [8]. In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically different from the one predicted by the α-core. We fully implement the recursive core for general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equilibrium. We do not put any restrictions, such as stationarity, on strategies. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
Open AccessArticle Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments
Games 2010, 1(2), 89-102; doi:10.3390/g1020089
Received: 16 March 2010 / Revised: 16 April 2010 / Accepted: 16 April 2010 / Published: 22 April 2010
Cited by 6 | PDF Full-text (6531 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text | Supplementary Files
Abstract
In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded
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In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded or imposed. We predict that the latter crowds out - or at least weakens - efficiency seeking. Our treatments rely on a 2x3 factorial design, differing in whether the responder or the third (dummy) player is the residual claimant and whether the proposer’s agreement payoff is larger, equal, or smaller than the other exogenously given agreement payoff. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Other-Regarding Preferences)
Open AccessArticle The ‘Hawk-Dove’ Game and the Speed of the Evolutionary Process in Small Heterogeneous Populations
Games 2010, 1(2), 103-116; doi:10.3390/g1020103
Received: 2 April 2010 / Revised: 30 April 2010 / Accepted: 4 May 2010 / Published: 6 May 2010
Cited by 9 | PDF Full-text (547 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text | Supplementary Files
Abstract
I study the speed of the evolutionary process on small heterogeneous graphs using the Hawk-Dove game. The graphs are based on empirical observation data of grooming interactions in 81 primate groups. Analytic results for the star graph have revealed that irregular graphs can
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I study the speed of the evolutionary process on small heterogeneous graphs using the Hawk-Dove game. The graphs are based on empirical observation data of grooming interactions in 81 primate groups. Analytic results for the star graph have revealed that irregular graphs can slow down the evolutionary process by increasing the mean time to absorption. Here I show that the same effects can be found for graphs representing natural animal populations which are much less heterogeneous than star graphs. Degree variance has proven to be a good predictor for the mean time to absorption also for these graphs. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)
Figures

Open AccessArticle A Choice Prediction Competition for Market Entry Games: An Introduction
Games 2010, 1(2), 117-136; doi:10.3390/g1020117
Received: 30 April 2010 / Accepted: 12 May 2010 / Published: 14 May 2010
Cited by 30 | PDF Full-text (148 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text | Correction | Supplementary Files
Abstract
A choice prediction competition is organized that focuses on decisions from experience in market entry games (http://sites.google.com/site/gpredcomp/ and http://www.mdpi.com/si/games/predict-behavior/). The competition is based on two experiments: An estimation experiment, and a competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool,
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A choice prediction competition is organized that focuses on decisions from experience in market entry games (http://sites.google.com/site/gpredcomp/ and http://www.mdpi.com/si/games/predict-behavior/). The competition is based on two experiments: An estimation experiment, and a competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool, and examine games randomly selected from the same distribution. The current introductory paper presents the results of the estimation experiment, and clarifies the descriptive value of several baseline models. The experimental results reveal the robustness of eight behavioral tendencies that were documented in previous studies of market entry games and individual decisions from experience. The best baseline model (I-SAW) assumes reliance on small samples of experiences, and strong inertia when the recent results are not surprising. The competition experiment will be run in May 2010 (after the completion of this introduction), but they will not be revealed until September. To participate in the competition, researchers are asked to E-mail the organizers models (implemented in computer programs) that read the incentive structure as input, and derive the predicted behavior as an output. The submitted models will be ranked based on their prediction error. The winners of the competition will be invited to publish a paper that describes their model. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Predicting Behavior in Games)
Open AccessArticle Can Justice and Fairness Enlarge International Environmental Agreements?
Games 2010, 1(2), 137-158; doi:10.3390/g1020137
Received: 11 May 2010 / Revised: 1 June 2010 / Accepted: 14 June 2010 / Published: 24 June 2010
Cited by 3 | PDF Full-text (486 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
The literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) predicts a rather low number of signatories to an IEA. This is in sharp contrast to empirical evidence. As experimental economics provides some evidence for more complex human behavior, extending the theory of IEAs to a
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The literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) predicts a rather low number of signatories to an IEA. This is in sharp contrast to empirical evidence. As experimental economics provides some evidence for more complex human behavior, extending the theory of IEAs to a broader class of preferences is clearly promising. The present paper shows that where countries’ preferences incorporate justice and fairness there will be a strong incentive for them to choose similar abatement policies within and outside an IEA. Consequently, free-riding at the expense of the signatory states diminishes and participation in an IEA becomes a more successful strategy, so that the size of stable IEAs increases. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
Open AccessArticle Balanced Weights and Three-Sided Coalition Formation
Games 2010, 1(2), 159-167; doi:10.3390/g1020159
Received: 5 May 2010 / Revised: 10 June 2010 / Accepted: 15 June 2010 / Published: 25 June 2010
PDF Full-text (215 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average
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We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)

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