Research

331 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Bayesian Social Learning with Local Interactions

by Antonio Guarino and Antonella Ianni

Games 2010, 1(4), 438-458; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1040438 - 20 Oct 2010

Cited by 5 | Viewed by 6855

We study social learning in a large population of agents who only observe the actions taken by their neighbours. Agents have to choose one, out of two, reversible actions, each optimal in one, out of two, unknown states of the world. Each agent [...] Read more.

We study social learning in a large population of agents who only observe the actions taken by their neighbours. Agents have to choose one, out of two, reversible actions, each optimal in one, out of two, unknown states of the world. Each agent chooses rationally, on the basis of private information and of the observation of his neighbours’ actions. Agents can repeatedly update their choices at revision opportunities that they receive in a random sequential order. We show that if agents receive equally informative signals and observe both neighbours, then actions converge exponentially fast to a configuration where some agents are permanently wrong. In contrast, if agents are unequally informed (in that some agents receive a perfectly informative signal and others are uninformed) and observe one neighbour only, then everyone will eventually choose the correct action. Convergence, however, obtains very slowly, at rate √t. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)

157 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Insider-Outsider Model Reexamined

by Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard and Sudipta Sarangi

Games 2010, 1(4), 422-437; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1040422 - 20 Oct 2010

Cited by 6 | Viewed by 6515

Abstract

In this note we introduce different levels of decay in the Goyal, Galeotti and Kamphorst (GGK) insider-outsider model of network formation. First, we deal with situations where the amount of decay is sufficiently low to avoid superfluous connections in strict Nash networks and [...] Read more.

In this note we introduce different levels of decay in the Goyal, Galeotti and Kamphorst (GGK) insider-outsider model of network formation. First, we deal with situations where the amount of decay is sufficiently low to avoid superfluous connections in strict Nash networks and we examine the architectures of strict Nash networks. We show that centrality and small diameter are robust features of strict Nash networks. Then, we study the Nash and efficient networks when the decay vanishes. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)

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2001 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Modelling Social Dynamics (of Obesity) and Thresholds

by Franz Wirl and Gustav Feichtinger

Games 2010, 1(4), 395-414; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1040395 - 13 Oct 2010

Cited by 6 | Viewed by 6809

Abstract

This paper focuses on the dynamic aspects of individual behavior affected by its social embedding, either at large (society-wide norms or averages) or at a local neighborhood. The emphasis is on how initial conditions can affect the long run outcome and to derive, [...] Read more.

This paper focuses on the dynamic aspects of individual behavior affected by its social embedding, either at large (society-wide norms or averages) or at a local neighborhood. The emphasis is on how initial conditions can affect the long run outcome and to derive, discuss and apply the conditions for such thresholds. For this purpose, intertemporal social pressure (from peers, from norms, or from fashions) is modelled in two different ways: (i) individual benefit is influenced by the possession of a stock (in the application: weight) and the society wide average, and (ii) individual benefits depend on a norm that follows its own motion, of course driven by agents’ behavior. The topical issue of obesity serves as motivation and corresponding models and examples are presented and analyzed. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)

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170 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Coordination and Cooperation Problems in Network Good Production

by Antonie Knigge and Vincent Buskens

Games 2010, 1(4), 357-380; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1040357 - 28 Sep 2010

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 8577

Abstract

If actors want to reach a particular goal, they are often better off forming collaborative relations and investing together rather than investing separately. We study the coordination and cooperation problems that might hinder successful collaboration in a dynamic network setting. We develop an [...] Read more.

If actors want to reach a particular goal, they are often better off forming collaborative relations and investing together rather than investing separately. We study the coordination and cooperation problems that might hinder successful collaboration in a dynamic network setting. We develop an experiment in which coordination problems are mainly due to finding partners for collaboration, while cooperation problems arise at the investment levels of partners who have already agreed to collaborate. The results show that as costs of forming links increase, groups succeed less often in solving the coordination problem. Still, if subjects are able to solve the coordination problem, they invest in a suboptimal way in the network good. It is mostly found that if cooperation is successful in terms of investment, it is due to subjects being able to monitor how much their partners invest. Moreover, subjects deal better with the coordination and cooperation problems as they gain experience. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)

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954 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Coevolution of Cooperation, Response to Adverse Social Ties and Network Structure

by Sven Van Segbroeck, Francisco C. Santos, Jorge M. Pacheco and Tom Lenaerts

Games 2010, 1(3), 317-337; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030317 - 17 Sep 2010

Cited by 17 | Viewed by 10532

Abstract

Human social networks reshape continuously, as individuals forge new contacts while abandoning existing ones. Simultaneously, individuals adapt their behavior, leading to an intricate interplay been network evolution and behavior evolution. Here, we review a framework, called Active Linking, which allows an analytical treatment [...] Read more.

Human social networks reshape continuously, as individuals forge new contacts while abandoning existing ones. Simultaneously, individuals adapt their behavior, leading to an intricate interplay been network evolution and behavior evolution. Here, we review a framework, called Active Linking, which allows an analytical treatment of such a co-evolutionary dynamics. Using this framework we showed that an increase in the number of ways of responding to adverse interactions leads an overall increase of cooperation, which is here extended to all two-player social dilemmas. In addition, we discuss the role of the selection pressure in these results. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)

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361 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Local Interaction on Random Graphs

by Siegfried Berninghaus and Hans Haller

Games 2010, 1(3), 262-285; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030262 - 10 Aug 2010

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 7304

Abstract

We analyze dynamic local interaction in population games where the local interaction structure (modeled as a graph) can change over time: A stochastic process generates a random sequence of graphs. This contrasts with models where the initial interaction structure (represented by a deterministic [...] Read more.

We analyze dynamic local interaction in population games where the local interaction structure (modeled as a graph) can change over time: A stochastic process generates a random sequence of graphs. This contrasts with models where the initial interaction structure (represented by a deterministic graph or the realization of a random graph) cannot change over time. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)

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3428 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Coordination Games on Dynamical Networks

by Marco Tomassini and Enea Pestelacci

Games 2010, 1(3), 242-261; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030242 - 29 Jul 2010

Cited by 13 | Viewed by 10911

Abstract

We propose a model in which agents of a population interacting according to a network of contacts play games of coordination with each other and can also dynamically break and redirect links to neighbors if they are unsatisfied. As a result, there is [...] Read more.

We propose a model in which agents of a population interacting according to a network of contacts play games of coordination with each other and can also dynamically break and redirect links to neighbors if they are unsatisfied. As a result, there is co-evolution of strategies in the population and of the graph that represents the network of contacts. We apply the model to the class of pure and general coordination games. For pure coordination games, the networks co-evolve towards the polarization of different strategies. In the case of general coordination games our results show that the possibility of refusing neighbors and choosing different partners increases the success rate of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)

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219 KiB

Open AccessArticle

A Characterization of Farsightedly Stable Networks

by Gilles Grandjean, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Games 2010, 1(3), 226-241; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030226 - 22 Jul 2010

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 7189

Abstract

We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. We first provide an algorithm that characterizes the unique pairwise and groupwise farsightedly stable set of networks under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule. We then show that this set coincides [...] Read more.

We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. We first provide an algorithm that characterizes the unique pairwise and groupwise farsightedly stable set of networks under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule. We then show that this set coincides with the unique groupwise myopically stable set of networks but not with the unique pairwise myopically stable set of networks. We conclude that, if groupwise deviations are allowed then whether players are farsighted or myopic does not matter; if players are farsighted then whether players are allowed to deviate in pairs only or in groups does not matter. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)

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547 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The ‘Hawk-Dove’ Game and the Speed of the Evolutionary Process in Small Heterogeneous Populations

by Bernhard Voelkl

Games 2010, 1(2), 103-116; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1020103 - 06 May 2010

Cited by 16 | Viewed by 11306

Abstract

I study the speed of the evolutionary process on small heterogeneous graphs using the Hawk-Dove game. The graphs are based on empirical observation data of grooming interactions in 81 primate groups. Analytic results for the star graph have revealed that irregular graphs can [...] Read more.

I study the speed of the evolutionary process on small heterogeneous graphs using the Hawk-Dove game. The graphs are based on empirical observation data of grooming interactions in 81 primate groups. Analytic results for the star graph have revealed that irregular graphs can slow down the evolutionary process by increasing the mean time to absorption. Here I show that the same effects can be found for graphs representing natural animal populations which are much less heterogeneous than star graphs. Degree variance has proven to be a good predictor for the mean time to absorption also for these graphs. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)

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