How to Promote Traditional Automobile Companies’ Intelligent-Connected Transformation under the New Dual-Credit Policy? A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis Combined with Funding Time Delay
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Policy Factors
2.2. Internet Technology
2.3. Evolutionary Game Theory
3. Questions and Assumptions
3.1. Problem Description
3.2. Assumptions
4. Models and Methods
4.1. Stability Analysis of Unilateral Game Players
4.1.1. Traditional Automobile Companies
4.1.2. Internet Companies
4.1.3. Financial Institutions
4.2. Stability Analysis of System Evolution
5. Simulation Analysis
5.1. Data Processing and Analysis
5.2. Influence of Changes in Collaborative Parameters between Traditional Automobile Companies and Internet Companies on System Evolution
5.2.1. Profit Sharing Coefficient
5.2.2. Cost-Sharing Coefficient
5.3. Influence of Changes in Financing Parameters of Financial Institutions on System Evolution
5.3.1. Financing Amount
5.3.2. Regulatory Cost of Financial Institutions
5.4. Influence of Changes in Policy Parameters of New Dual-Credit Policy on System Evolution
5.4.1. Credit Trading Price
5.4.2. NEV Credit Accounting Coefficients and for Standard Vehicle Model
5.4.3. NEV Credit Ratio Requirement
6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
6.1. Conclusions
6.2. Policy Recommendations
6.3. Limitations
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
1 | ICVs are classified as assisted driving stage (L1), partial driving stage (L2), conditional autonomous driving stage (L3), highly automated driving stage (L4) and fully automated driving stage (L5), and the mass production and popularization of L2 Level vehicles were achieved in 2019. |
2 | https://price.pcauto.com.cn/salescar/sg28312/ (accessed on 1 July 2023). |
3 | https://price.pcauto.com.cn/salescar/sg27941/ (accessed on 1 July 2023). |
4 | https://price.pcauto.com.cn/salescar/sg24393/ (accessed on 1 July 2023). |
5 | https://www.deepal.com.cn/sl03 (accessed on 1 July 2023). |
6 |
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Symbols | Definitions | Symbols | Definitions |
---|---|---|---|
Initial tripartite profits | Regulatory cost of financial institutions | ||
Credit trading price | NEV credit ratio requirement | ||
NEV credit accounting multiplication coefficient | CAFC credit coefficient of unit NEV | ||
NEV credit accounting additive coefficient | Credit reward coefficient of ICVs | ||
Driving range (CLTC) | Innovation profit between traditional automobile companies and internet companies | ||
Value-added profit of between traditional automobile companies and internet companies when financial institutions choose the financing strategy | Value-added profits of financial institutions financing when traditional automobile companies and internet companies choose innovation | ||
Profit-sharing coefficient of collaborative innovation | Cost-sharing coefficient of collaborative innovation | ||
Financing rate | Financing amount | ||
Cost of collaborative innovation when financial institutions choose the financing strategy | Cost of collaborative innovation when financial institutions choose the non-financing strategy | ||
Innovating cost of traditional automobile companies when financial institutions choose the financing strategy | Innovating cost of traditional automobile companies when financial institutions choose the non-financing strategy | ||
Innovating cost of internet companies when financial institutions choose the financing strategy | Innovating cost of internet companies when financial institutions choose the non-financing strategy | ||
Penalty for collaborative innovation | Success probability of collaborative innovation | ||
Production of high-end ICVs | Production of mid-end ICVs | ||
Production of TFVs | Probability of traditional automobile companies choosing collaborative innovation strategy | ||
Probability of internet companies choosing collaborative innovation strategy | Probability of financial institutions choosing financing strategy |
Traditional Automobile Companies | Internet Companies | Financial Institutions | |
---|---|---|---|
Financing (z) | Non-Financing (1 − z) | ||
Collaborative innovation (x) | Collaborative innovation (y) | ||
Non- Collaborative innovation (1 − y) | |||
Non- collaborative innovation (1 − x) | Collaborative innovation (y) | ||
Non- collaborative innovation (1 − y) |
Equilibrium Points | Characteristic Values | Result |
---|---|---|
ESS | ||
Instability point | ||
Instability point | ||
Saddle point | ||
Saddle point | ||
Saddle point | ||
Saddle point | ||
ESS |
Parameters | |||||||||
Initial value | 1 | 0.0034 | 0.25 | 1.2 | 0.1 × 10−4 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 1 | 0.047 |
Unit | ten thousand vehicles | - | billions | - | billions | billions | billions | billions | - |
Parameters | |||||||||
Initial value | 3 | 0.2 | 530 | 0.18 | 0.89 | 9.63 | 2.45 | 1.5 | 0.5 |
Unit | ten thousand vehicles | - | km | - | billions | billions | billions | billions | - |
Parameters | |||||||||
Initial value | 11 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.65 | |
Unit | ten thousand vehicles | - | - | - | billions | billions | billions | billions |
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Zhao, D.; Li, Y.; Wang, J.; Tang, J. How to Promote Traditional Automobile Companies’ Intelligent-Connected Transformation under the New Dual-Credit Policy? A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis Combined with Funding Time Delay. Systems 2024, 12, 319. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12090319
Zhao D, Li Y, Wang J, Tang J. How to Promote Traditional Automobile Companies’ Intelligent-Connected Transformation under the New Dual-Credit Policy? A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis Combined with Funding Time Delay. Systems. 2024; 12(9):319. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12090319
Chicago/Turabian StyleZhao, Dan, Yekai Li, Jian Wang, and Jinhuan Tang. 2024. "How to Promote Traditional Automobile Companies’ Intelligent-Connected Transformation under the New Dual-Credit Policy? A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis Combined with Funding Time Delay" Systems 12, no. 9: 319. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12090319